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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the question of how West European political parties use Euroscepticism in 
European elections during the time period of 1989-2004. In doing so it puts forward five core 
arguments surrounding the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of the 
phenomenon; the need to deploy a multi-dimensional framework to position parties towards the 
component processes of European integration; that Europe does play a more important role in 
European elections than previously thought; that political party ideology is the strongest 
predictor of behaviour towards European integration in European elections; and finally that the 
quantitative study of party manifestos produces valid and reliable data for positioning political 
parties. Euroscepticism is defined as:  
The sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards one or more aspects 
of European integration: economic, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy 
forms of integration. 
 
The research takes on an empirical strategy that demonstrates the importance of Europe in 
European elections by analysing issue saliency, compares the predicted positions between 
national and European elections to demonstrate that party behaviour is similar between national 
and European elections on the specific issue of Europe, before embarking on multivariate OLS 
regression analyses to investigate the predictive power of the several sets of independent 
variables. These include party families, national location, year of election, forms of integration, 
and existing alternative theories – including left-right position, new politics position, member of 
government or opposition, and the median voter position. It returns to reconsider ideology in 
terms of observed positions examining the patterns of behaviour by each party family, and 
whether there are further patterns of behaviour within the families in each accession group and 
between geographical core and peripheral member states.  
 III 
The study finds that the European issue is the most important in European election manifestos 
and that parties do take similar positions of behaviour towards Europe in both national and 
European elections, despite the greater number of Eurosceptic parties identified in EP elections. 
Furthermore, it finds that ideology remains an important and strong predictive factor, but its 
explanatory power diminishes in the analyses towards the newer dimensions of integration 
(social, cultural, and foreign policy integration). However, the existing alternative theories also 
have little explanatory power, but positions towards the other forms of integration do have more 
impact, indicating that importantly there remains a protest element within the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism. Overall, when returning to the issue of party ideology, it is possible to identify a 
significantly greater number of Eurosceptic parties using the new definition, that Euroscepticism 
is now found in all political party families, and that there remains a strong ideological component 
in the content of positions towards integration across all party families. However, ideology is a 
stronger influence for the left-wing parties, with those on the right being more fragmented and 
heterogeneous. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION – ASSESSING THE USE 
OF EUROSCEPTICISM  
European integration has brought about a fundamental reorganisation in the relationship 
between nation states in Europe (however one defines „Europe‟1). As of 2010 it has seen the 
tying together of French and German coal and steel production; the development of a Common 
Market for goods, services, capital and persons; the development of a single European market; 
and the expansion of membership to West European neighbours, southern European countries 
undergoing a painful transition to democracy, and also the Central and Eastern states which until 
1989 had been under the political umbrella of Soviet state socialism. The process has also seen 
the adoption of a European currency; the development of common policies towards security and 
defence, as well as the field of justice and home affairs.  
This smattering of the history of European integration does not do these changes justice, but 
serves to highlight some of the most important events. With such an important set of 
transformations, a resistance to these developments taking place was predictable. National party 
systems of the European states, the media and public have all seen the growth in the 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism. Broadly speaking this has included discourses of outright 
rejection, calls for the exit of the member state from the European Community/European Union 
(EC/EU), scepticism towards the processes of integration – traditionally seen as economic and 
political - and criticism of the institutions and policies of the EU. 
RESEARCH QUESTION 
As mentioned above, Euroscepticism has grown in three specific national arenas – party systems, 
the news and print media, and the publics of European states. Whilst recognising the importance 
of all three arenas, in focusing on the phenomenon of Euroscepticism this thesis solely addresses 
                                                 
1
 An excellent starting point when considering the question „what is Europe?‟ is Paasi (2001).  
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the arena of national political party discourse, but uniquely within the context of European 
Parliamentary (EP) election campaigns. The study examines the following research question:  
How do parties in Western Europe utilise Eurosceptic discourse in European election 
campaigns over the period of 1989-2004? 
 
Therefore the key aim of the research thesis is to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic 
arguments by West European political parties in European elections and to examine causation of 
the party positions observed. This thesis has a much broader set of related research aims: 
 To explore the number of and variety of Eurosceptic discourses used by political parties; 
 To identify specific Eurosceptic parties within in each party family;  
 To compare the salience of Euroscepticism in national and European elections; and 
finally; 
 To compare Eurosceptic party behaviour in national and European elections. 
While addressing the key aim, the thesis seeks to promote five fundamental aspects within its 
core argument. Firstly, the European integration project is a dynamic process, which is 
continually evolving with expanding competencies and policy areas. So in order to understand 
political party responses over time, we need a dynamic conceptualisation of Euroscepticism that 
is sufficiently broad to take account of the major developments by identifying multiple 
dimensions of EU decision-making, but vitally it needs to allow for the capturing of sufficient 
detail by disaggregating these to understand the specific positions taken by political parties in 
those areas of EU involvement2. 
                                                 
2 This conceptualisation is concerned with the general ideas behind integration, as there is a danger when creating a broad 
conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, to include almost every disagreement with the EU-level by a party actor. It identifies 
particular areas where integration has expanded, and allows for the identification of party positions over time by using multiple 
data points, but recognises that the saliency of the issue will increase or decrease with EU developments during the period. 
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Secondly, in order to implement a more dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation, a multi-
dimensional framework should be employed. This allows for a more intricate understanding over 
time as parties can be identified as to the aspects they are more supportive or more sceptical 
towards. 
Thirdly, in focusing on European elections, not only is the thesis attempting to fill the literature 
gap on Euroscepticism in European elections, but the research also aims to turn against the tide 
of prevailing academic orthodoxy. It argues that despite the second-order label, which is applied 
to non-national elections, i.e. regional, local and European, they remain an important element 
within party competition. Specifically with European elections, whilst nationally derived issues 
enter the election campaigns, they invariably are about Europe, and that in manifestos political 
parties focus far more on European rather than national issues. 
The fourth fundamental element of the core argument surrounds the role of ideology in how 
parties respond to the dynamic multi-dimensional nature of European integration. Ideology 
conceptualised through party families constricts the freedom of political parties to adapt their 
positions. While ideology does not constitute a solid barrier to change, it creates an air of 
expectation amongst its party members, parliamentary party and its core voters. Put another way 
it becomes an opportunity cost in terms of the potential alienation of its current supporters if the 
party attempts to attract new voters and members through shifting their policies. This is 
operationalised in terms of party families. This is because they allow the capturing of and 
evolution of behaviour by related political parties, especially on issues, which do not necessarily 
easily relate to the left-right dimension – such as post-materialist values.  
The fifth and final principal element of the argument surrounds the use of manifesto research, 
and specifically a quantitative research strategy. The thesis posits the argument that manifestos 
are relevant sources for deriving policy positions from the political party election campaign 
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discourse, as fundamentally they are one of the only comprehensive policy statements that 
political parties make (Budge, 1994: 455). For the analyst they offer valid positions for the time 
series, as it is not possible to contaminate historical positions with later party behaviour, unlike 
with an expert survey. Manifesto research allows the positioning of any party, even those that 
have received little expert attention – though they need sufficient party manifesto material in 
order to allow accurate analyses. The use of quantitative analyses also allows for a practical large-
n study. It provides valid large-scale longitudinal language-blind data on party positions, the 
thorough testing of operationalised theoretical explanations in multiple settings and the 
possibility of retesting to allow for reliability assessments or alternative theoretical explanations. 
In constructing the research question to focus on West European Euroscepticism in European 
elections during the period of 1989-2004, several important decisions need to be clarified 
surrounding the focus on national parties; the focus on Western Europe; the focus on European 
elections - specifically election campaigns rather than behaviour post-election; and finally the 
choice of time period.  
Parties remain a key component in how European integration was constructed and how it has 
developed, and will continue to develop. Governing parties provide ministers, personnel and 
conceptions of how business should be performed at the supranational level. Ultimately the 
major steps in the integration process have been and continue to be taken at Intergovernmental 
Conferences (IGCs), but parties still remain the major actors in the process. Opposition parties 
are still relevant, given that they provide critical appraisals of decisions taken (and help ratify any 
treaties and legislation) and increase the political costs of decision-making. 
The decision to restrict the study to Western Europe was taken on both theoretical and practical 
reasons. In Central and Eastern Europe, during the time period, those countries were dealing 
with massive economic and social upheavals, and the European Union was often seen 
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uncritically, or at the very least less critically, and as a way in which to “return to Europe” 
(Grabbe & Hughes, 1998). Significantly, for those states there were precious few alternatives, and 
this would have tempered party discourses. Furthermore, additional variations need to be taken 
account of such as wealth disparities, their newer more unstable party systems, and the lack of 
impact of the historical cleavage structures seen in Western Europe. Practically speaking, the 
parties from the Central and Eastern member states have only taken part in one European 
election during the 1984-2004 period, meaning that important data points from 1989-1999 do not 
exist. Importantly one also had to consider what could be achieved in the time frame. Giving 
appropriate analytical time and space to the twenty-seven member states (and further numbers of 
potential candidate and non-member states such as Croatia, Turkey, Norway and Switzerland, 
would have been a massive undertaking, one which would have been beyond the scope of one 
researcher and one PhD.   
That this study has framed the research question to focus on European elections is also 
important. Research on Euroscepticism in European elections has been lacking, especially given 
the assumption that European elections were fought on national election priorities3 as will be 
discussed below. Analysing European elections will provide important findings on how parties 
relate to multi-dimensional developments at the supranational level and how they use this in 
party competition.  
Related to this is the decision to focus on studying election campaign behaviour rather than party 
policy post-election. The researcher has a choice of whether to focus on elections campaigns, to 
focus on behaviour during the parliamentary period, or a combination of both (see Volkens, 
2007:117). Importantly, the decision to restrict the research question to the study of elections can 
be justified on several grounds. Elections allow the party to examine their core ideology and core 
                                                 
3 3 See Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 1990; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996; Marsh, 1998 Schmitt, 2004; Koepke & Ringe, 2006;  
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policies and present an appropriate course of action to the electorate in terms of a manifesto and 
planned election campaign. This really can provide an important insight into how each party sees 
European integration and how it should develop. One can of course argue that election 
campaigns are strategic, but the election campaign is still a clear statement of intent. During the 
parliamentary period, governing and opposition parties will not be free to pursue their policies 
freely. Governing parties will have coalition stability, institutional structures, member state 
partners requirements, societal and pressure group interests, and intra-party wishes to take into 
account when pursuing European integration policy. Opposition parties will have their coalition 
potential to take account of, other opposition party policy, their position in the party system – as 
a potential governing party or as a permanently excluded pariah party, societal and pressure group 
interests. What can be achieved during the parliamentary period between elections is down to a 
combination of the factors mentioned above, and may not be a clear indication of the party‟s 
programmatic aspirations.      
Finally, the time period also needs clarification. At first glance one can ask the question of why 
has the entire period not been included in the study – for example 1979-2004 or even 1957-2004. 
Taggart (1998: 363) argued that Maastricht was the turning point in Eurosceptic party behaviour. 
So why not have the time period from 1992 onwards, or perhaps taking into account its 
precursor, the Single European Act of 1986 (enacted 1987) which laid down the foundations for 
the Single Market of 1992? The European integration process was born out of the post-war 
situation of a Europe recovering from an extraordinarily destructive war, and a continent split 
down the middle by a two-superpower cold war. With the removal of this geopolitical situation in 
1989, transformations across Europe took place, as well as a reorientation of Communist and far 
left parties. Furthermore, by 1989 the EC/EU had twelve member states and later expanded to 
fifteen by 1995. From these arguments it makes sense to limit the time frame to 1989-2004 given 
the drastic geopolitical change and also given that the number of cases available was far greater. 
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RELEVANCE OF THE PHENOMENON OF EUROSCEPTICISM IN CONTEMPORARY 
EUROPEAN POLITICS 
At first glance, one may argue that Europe has not had a major impact on party competition in 
national politics. Europe has remained a second-order issue (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; 
Schmitt, 1990; 2004; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk et al, 1996; Marsh, 1998). Mair (2000) argued that 
in terms of the format and mechanics of party competition that Europe had generated new 
parties – particularly those who were anti-Europe. However, they have been mostly confined to 
the European Parliament and have had little impact on national politics. In addition, while the 
anti-European bloc accounted for approximately 17% of parties, they gained a low percentage of 
votes in national elections. Those that were stronger used Euroscepticism as a tool among many 
in the toolkit (Mair, 2000: 31-33). As Harmsen and Spiering (2004:24) noted there continues to 
be little evidence of existing parties redefining themselves and hence much of the evidence 
continues to confirm the limited impact of Europe. However, the study was limited to direct 
effects on the format and mechanics of party competition only, and while parties may not be 
redefining themselves in terms a new cleavage, many parties have now incorporated the issue and 
have developed critical positions across all party families and almost all member, candidate, and 
European non-member states. 
In particular the phenomenon brings the triple issues of the democratic deficit4 of the European 
Union, the community deficit and the political legitimacy of the European integration process 
into sharp focus. Assessing the European Union‟s democratic deficit on the level of perceptions, 
the European Commission – the institution with the major right of legislative initiation – has the 
perception of being a technocracy. Only one institution receives directly elected representatives 
from the European constituencies, often on an electoral ticket that is distant in its construction 
                                                 
4
 Europe‟s “democratic deficit” is an extremely contentious issue. Moravcsik (2002) and Menon (2008) for example have argued that to introduce 
party competition into the area of the running of the single market would have been a mistake. Whether or not this is the reality of the situation is 
not at stake, but on the level of perceptions – at least in some quarters – Europe‟s major institution, the European Commission, features 
unelected officials at its head. 
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from European issues. The remaining institutions receive appointed officials and ministers from 
the constituent member states. The deliberations taking place at the EU level appear to lack 
transparency with decisions being taken behind closed doors (Moravcsik, 2002: 604-605). 
Euroscepticism also highlights the issue of a community deficit, the notion of a lack of shared 
values and bonds, which is underscored when a significant minority reject the process of 
European integration. Indeed, Etzoni argues that Community building is necessary before the 
democratic deficit can be curtailed – democracy would require sacrifices by some EU citizens for 
the common good, both in economic terms, in legal harmonisation requisites, and perhaps even 
in terms of lives, in the case of hard power foreign policy actions (military and peace keeping 
operations) (Etzoni, 2007: 23-24 & 31-34). Euroscepticism has the potential to cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of the European integration project. Legitimacy is traditionally seen as the right to 
govern, but related to this is the issue of consent. A right, which is not seen as valid by the many, 
does not possess the character of a right (Coicaud, 2002: 10-11). However, as Beetham and Lord 
(1998: 15) noted: 
Positions of authority are confirmed by the express consent or affirmation on the part of 
appropriate subordinates, and by recognition from other legitimate authorities. 
 
The recognition from other legitimate authorities element has been the key mode of legitimation 
in the past, but key referenda results have shown this has not been enough and they constitute a 
delegitimation – a removal of consent by the public (Beetham, 1991: 19). 
In Western Europe, what was once considered a peripheral phenomenon has seen use amongst 
parties of major importance in the individual party systems. From the empirical findings in this 
thesis it has been possible to identify that Eurosceptic discourses have appeared in the campaign 
manifestos of even the more „centrist‟ party families. To present a few examples, in the Socialist 
and Social Democratic party family, relevant discourses emerged from major parties such as the 
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Luxembourg POSL/LSAP (Luxembourg Socialist Workers Party) – the second largest party and 
junior member of the governing coalition; the French PS (Socialist Party) – the largest left-wing 
party in the party system; and the Portuguese PS (Socialist Party) party – a major governing party.  
Amongst the Conservative party family, Eurosceptic discourse was identifiable amongst two 
major governing parties and one former governing party – the Italian FI (Forward Italy), French 
UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) and British Conservative Party. Even with the German 
case, often considered the Musterknabe or „model boy‟ (Lees, 2002: 244), there have even been 
instances of Eurosceptic discourses used by the CDU (Christian Democratic Union), something 
which was more expected of the Christian Social Union (CSU) sister party, and also the SPD 
(German Social Democratic Party). While these may have been exceptions to their general pro-
EU behaviour, Euroscepticism is still present in „centrist‟ parties. In the case of the CDU, 
Eurosceptic discourse was used after the Commission declared a state subsidy illegal (Lees, 2002: 
258). With the SPD case, they flirted with Euroscepticism in the Baden-Württemberg state 
elections of 1996 (Reinhardt, 1997)5.  
Euroscepticism also became an important issue for the former accession states during their 
negotiations for EU membership during the 1990s and early 2000s. Across all applicant states, 
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002:15) noted that the potential size of the Eurosceptic electoral 
constituency could be as high as 25.9% although most parties constructed their identities around 
other issues. However, they also underlined Eurobarometer results from the then thirteen 
candidate states which amounted to an average of 10% of the populations who regarded EU 
membership as a bad thing (Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: 6). A cursory glance at the latest 
Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2009) figures reveal that by the later stages of 2009, five 
                                                 
5 This case of Euroscepticism was entirely situational. The 1996 campaign was focused on the personality of Dieter Spöri and this 
allowed a greater opportunity to promote his critique of EMU. While not formally endorsed by the main leadership of the SPD, it 
was influenced by positions taken by three major politicians within the party: Scharping, Schröder and Lafontaine. Given the 
reaction of other political parties, regional and national media, the later intervention of the SPD leadership after the contents of a 
proposed billboard campaign became public, as well as voter reactions, it remains unlikely that challenges to the prevailing 
consensus on Europe will emerge within election campaigns again in Germany. 
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years after joining, 50.31% of the public thought membership was a good thing compared with 
an EU27 average of 53%. Conversely, 13.54% of the population viewed EU membership as a 
bad thing. The EU27 average was 15%. The results among those who saw membership as a bad 
thing were particularly high for Cyprus, Latvia and Hungary (approximately 22%). This 
highlighted a significant undercurrent of negative views in those member states. While the values 
show that those holding more critical views are most certainly not a majority, they still suggest 
that a significant portion of the electorate amongst the Central and East European EU member 
states holds these Eurosceptic beliefs.  
The European non-member states, some of which have opted to have an economic association 
rather than full membership, for example Norway and Switzerland, are a significant example of 
the importance of issue of Euroscepticism in contemporary European politics. The EU issue in 
these two states has been extremely divisive on both a societal and, in the case of Norway, on the 
level of the party system. Norway has seen several failed applications to the EC/EU including 
two referenda defeats (Svåsand, 2002: 329). Furthermore amongst political parties there has been 
a desire to compartmentalise the EU issue in Norwegian politics. The Christian People‟s Party, 
for example, made it clear that EU matters were off limits to its pro-EU Conservative coalition 
partners (Aylott, 2002: 455). With the Swiss case, Marquis (2004: 3) noted that the Swiss have 
been considerably opposed to full integration into the EU. Three referenda between 1992-2001 
only resulted in support for a bilateral economic agreement rather than membership in the EEA 
or as a full member of the EU. In particular there has been a division in support between the 
French-speaking pro-EU minority and the anti-EU German-speaking population (Theiler, 2004: 
646)6. 
The impact of public criticism and unease can potentially undermine any democratic credentials 
that the project can claim when a sizeable section of the Union‟s population is sceptical. Of 
                                                 
6 Also see Church (2003) for an in-depth examination of the Swiss case. 
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particular public interest has been the continuing fraud at the EU-level. The fight against the 
practice has been hampered by fragmentation at transnational, national and legal levels; the 
agency combating fraud has not been provided with the required responsibilities; and new 
member states have been less than effective in tackling the issue. Despite the majority of the 
fraud taking place at the member state level (Quirke, 2010: 61), the perception is that fraud is 
endemic at the European level. Press reports often focus on fraud, some with the clear intention 
of inflicting damage to the integration process. Sieber (1998: 1-2) noted that elements of the 
press claimed that up to 20% of the EC budget was subject to fraud. More recently, Pop (2009) 
reported that the EU‟s Court of Auditors refused to sign off the accounts for the 15th year in a 
row. In addition, as was evidenced by the rejection of the European Constitution by the French 
and Dutch public, the Union was left in somewhat of a quandary as to how to bring about 
changes to the institutional structure to allow twenty-five, and later twenty-seven member states 
to work together more effectively. Public scepticism exercised through referenda can significantly 
impact on the progress of the European integration project (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008a: 1). 
WHAT IS EUROSCEPTICISM & WHAT IS IDEOLOGY 
Thus far, the thesis has provided an outline of the research question, and the five fundamental 
aspects of the core argument: the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of 
Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional framework to analyse 
Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the not-so second-order nature of European 
elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses to 
European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research 
strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns. It has also clarified aspects of the 
research question and underlined the relevance of Euroscepticism for member states, the (then) 
accession states, European non-member states, and for the European national publics.  
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The first and fourth aspects of the core argument will rely on clear definitions of Euroscepticism, 
and party ideology. This next section will provide working definitions for both concepts, though 
the definition of Euroscepticism will be further built upon in chapter three. 
EUROSCEPTICISM 
Initially, there was a lag in the scholarly treatment of Euroscepticism, due to the early dominance 
of the International Relations (IR) tradition in examining the processes of European integration 
(see Marks & Steenbergen, 2002: 883). However, from 1998 onwards two particular approaches 
emerged out of the comparative literature. These two approaches are perhaps best distinguished 
by the type of research they promoted – the broader definitions used a more qualitative approach 
and the dimensional analyses used quantitative analyses.  
Euroscepticism was initially defined in a broad fashion that brought together discourses of 
outright rejection, exit from EU, scepticism towards the processes of integration, and criticism of 
the practice of the EU. The most dominant definitions were those by Paul Taggart and his later 
collaborative work with Aleks Szczerbiak. Euroscepticism was defined as: 
…the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration (Taggart, 1998: 365-366).  
 
Specifically with the Taggart (1998) definition, Euroscepticism was both an anti-system 
phenomenon, and also one that encompassed more specific and qualified grievances. This was 
later split into “hard” and “soft” aspects, which were based around whether the actor advocated 
outright rejection and withdrawal in the case of hard Euroscepticism, or more qualified 
scepticism in the case of soft Euroscepticism without the withdrawal option (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2001). The emphasis of Euroscepticism as a phenomenon that encompasses an anti-
system feature is important and has been repeatedly included elsewhere. It allowed the 
identification of the more critical parties from those parties who have used milder negative 
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discourses. However it suffered from a key weakness in the lack of an analytical distinction 
between those critiquing the European Union, the process of European integration and whether 
membership was of benefit to that member state. In addition, the use of hard and soft 
distinctions was not particularly successful due to the broad nature of the soft Euroscepticism 
definition – which had the potential to include most European political parties (see Szczerbiak & 
Taggart, 2003: 7).   
In the same vein, Flood (2002: 73 in Ray, 2004: 4) defined Euroscepticism as a phenomenon 
concerned with doubts and distrusts. The really important and key development offered by 
Flood‟s conceptualisation was to include those in favour of integration, and so Euroscepticism 
was not treated as analytically separate, but as the negative end of a range of positions from 
outright rejection to strongly pro-European. It was not dimensional, but based on a large 
typology (Flood, 2002 in Szczerbiak & Taggart, 2003: 10). 
The critique of Flood was quite specific. His six categories were not mutually exclusive and 
required a substantial amount of information before each party could be classified: whether a 
party opposed membership or participation in an institution or policy area; preferred a return of 
competencies as a whole or in a specific policy area; whether a party accepted the status quo but 
resisted further integration as a whole or in a specific area; supported integration as a whole or in 
a specific area as long as it was gradual; took positions of constructive engagement and reform; 
or wished to push integration forward as a whole or in a specific policy area (see Szczerbiak & 
Taggart, 2003: 10). Parties could also potentially move between categories over time creating 
further difficulties in classifying them. With dimensional analyses, if a party does not take a 
position this can be recorded as such. If this is systemic across party families or party systems, 
then the entire dimension can be removed. 
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The improvement in the understanding of Euroscepticism with this definition has been 
significant and these party types capture important aspects of competition towards European 
integration/European Union, but with the exception of maximalists all other parties could be 
labelled Eurosceptic. Furthermore it is questionable whether parties truly elaborate on their 
positions enough to provide the nuanced data necessary to apply such a theoretically detailed 
framework. 
Responding to two specific weaknesses in the existing Taggart and Szczerbiak  (2001) definition 
– namely whether the focus of Euroscepticism was on matters of integration, EU membership or 
both; and also the inclusive nature of the „soft‟ Eurosceptic category, Kopecký and Mudde (2002) 
treated Euroscepticism as a dual dimensional phenomenon, with diffuse support indicating a 
position towards the general ideas of European integration and specific support indicating a 
position towards how European integration was being practiced – i.e. the European Union and 
its development. This produced a typology of four positions: “Euroenthuasiast” (support for the 
theory and practice of integration); “Eurosceptics” (support for the general ideas, but pessimistic 
about the practice); “Eurorejects” (rejection of the theory and the practice); and finally 
“Europragmatists” (rejection of the theory, but support for the practice – perhaps for utilitarian 
considerations) (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002: 300-303).   
Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) development was to analytically separate political Euroscepticism 
from the instrumental form. The former was concerned with the transfers of policy 
competencies in thirteen policy areas from currency and defence to fighting unemployment and 
cultural policy. The latter dimension focused on whether people were sceptical about the benefits 
of the EU for their own country (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005: 225-228). 
What was observable was a shift from assessing all criticisms of European integration, the EU 
and membership, to consider Euroscepticism as a dual dimension – the first with diffuse and 
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specific support and the second with political and instrumental support. The two most useful 
aspects to utilise from this subset of the literature are the importance of treating support for the 
general ideas behind European integration as analytically separate from more instrumental 
Euroscepticism and specific support within party discourse and to include pro-European values 
in assessing party positions.  
A second approach was taken by academics adopting a mostly quantitative research strategy. 
Euroscepticism here was not treated as analytically distinct from pro-European attitudes and 
these could be positioned on dimensions of behaviour.  
The initial conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, or rather party positions towards integration 
using this method was Ray‟s (1999) single pro versus anti dimension and this was followed in a 
similar fashion by Tsebelis and Garrett (2000, in Marks and Steenbergen, 2002: 886) with a 
dimension which reflected the desire for high or low regulation. These approaches had the 
distinct advantage of being easy to operationalise and in the case of the latter conceptualisation 
narrow enough to allow the researcher to appraise the level of support for economic integration, 
but these were rather static understandings of the integration process, and did not allow for the 
identification of more nuanced attitudes towards the integration process.   
Several focused on conceptualising European integration in terms of dual or multiple 
dimensions. Hix and Lord (1997) produced a more advanced explanation of positions being 
derived from two irreconcilable dimensions – the left-right dimension and an integration-
independence dimension. In a similar fashion, Marks and Wilson (2000) identified that the twin 
process of economic and political integration could be subsumed into the left-right dimension. 
These frameworks began to see European integration more dynamically, though they still 
simplified political integration too much. However one has to remain sceptical of the relevance 
of the left-right dimension given that it was a simplification in the first place, and with the 
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unfreezing of the original cleavage structures there has been the emergence of post-materialist 
values that did not fit so easily within the traditional left-right dimension (see Inglehart, 1977). 
Yet, one has to acknowledge that some have seen the changing paradigm as the enrichment 
rather than a marginalisation of the left-right dimension (Ignazi, 2003: 6).  
A later improvement dealt with the emergence of further European developments and the 
growth of post-materialist values with a conceptualisation which saw positions as derived from 
multiple dimensions being subsumed into the traditional patterns of party competition – pro 
versus anti, environmental, cohesion, asylum, fiscal, foreign policy and European Parliament (EP) 
powers, and an related but unfused dimension which represented new politics and traditional 
authoritarian values (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). The inclusion of multiple dimensions 
was a tremendous advancement in the field as this allowed for a far more dynamic assessment of 
party positions, but where this conceptualisation faltered was the focus on policies rather than 
processes – it was hard to analytically separate whether a party supported the transfer of 
sovereignty in that field or were sceptical of a particular aspect of content. Furthermore, one has 
to question whether these are the only dimensions that would be appropriate to study. For 
example, the growths in social and cultural policies at the EU level, as well as the harmonising 
effect of Economic and Monetary Union have been significant enough for parties to adopt 
positions towards the developments.   
Taking these developments on board, the thesis will proceed by extending and adapting the 
theoretical developments of Hooghe et al (2002) and Marks et al (2006), as well as Lubbers and 
Scheepers (2005) to develop a multi-dimensional framework by analysing integration not by 
policies, but dimensions representing forms of integration (see chapter three). This will allow the 
exploration of whether a party was critical or rejectionist towards transfers of sovereignty within 
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those processes7 rather than necessarily the content of the policy areas identified. The alternative 
dimensions identified are as follows: economic liberalisation; economic harmonisation; 
supranational integration; legal integration; social integration; cultural integration; and foreign 
policy integration. With this, Euroscepticism needs a more appropriate definition: 
The sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards one or more aspects of 
European integration: economic, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy forms of 
integration. 
As will be explored later in chapter three, the definition was constructed in such a fashion to 
emphasise that a party could only be considered truly Eurosceptic if it presented a sustained 
critique of one or more aspects of European integration. Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 300) were 
particularly critical of Taggart and Szczerbiak‟s (2001) definition of soft Euroscepticism given 
that it was constructed in a too broad manner, which meant that almost all policy disagreements 
could be considered Eurosceptic. What this thesis employs is a usage scale, which classifies 
Eurosceptic parties on the basis of major or extreme use of a particular Eurosceptic discourse 
(>=5% for major use and >= 10% for extreme use) in a manifesto. What this allows for is the 
exclusion of normal policy objections without classifying all parties as Eurosceptic. 
IDEOLOGY 
Prevalent in the literature has been the conviction that “ideology is the most elusive concept in 
the whole of the social sciences” (McLellan, 1995:1), and in order to fully explore the intricacies 
of this contested concept would require far more space than can unfortunately be given. 
However, as Eccleshall, (1984: 7) identified, there are two key characteristics of ideology: an 
image of society and a political programme and these are particularly relevant to this thesis. The 
image enables the actor to interpret the social world from a particular viewpoint and also 
                                                 
7 The use of the term process is important as it denotes that European integration has been, and continues to be a project in 
development. It is essentially fluid and this to be taken account of in any conceptualisation of the phenomenon. 
 18 
provides normative aspects to how society should be organised. The political programme sets out 
how this should be achieved. An important point to note is that rival social images are 
constructed from a shared pool of concepts. Each ideology is adapted to the evolving social 
circumstances and ideas are in a constant state of amendment, with some even being abandoned 
and with new ones being used for a particular perspective of society (Eccleshall, 1984:30). 
Eccleshall (1984: 23) argued that:  
People are sustained and inspired by beliefs and ideals. They need, while in pursuit of 
varied social purposes, both to feel at home in the world and to act with good conscience 
to make sense of everyday reality, as well as to clothe their interests and aspirations in the 
finery of moral principle. The powerful have to reassure themselves, as well as convince 
others, of the rightness of their might: that power is a trust held for the common good 
rather than self-advantage. The powerless, on the other hand, need to believe either that 
they are not exploited or if they nurture a grievance and desire political change that right 
is on their side. Ideology is the realm in which people clarify and justify their actions as 
they pursue divergent interests. 
 
Several key concepts are identifiable: beliefs; principles; social; moral; political change; and 
interests. These do appear to be intrinsically linked to ideology. The list was very similar to the 
traits identified by Donald and Hall (1986: 3):  
Ideas have social roots and perform a social function. They provide ideas „true‟ and „false‟ 
– within which men and women „think‟ about society and their place in it.  
 
The concept of ideology was born out of the process of enlightenment. Destutt de Tracy devised 
the concept around the aim of formulating a rational study of ideas – ideology (i.e. the science of 
ideas). His motive was to establish a method for scientifically identifying correct ideas. This 
would enable the use of reason to govern affairs for societal progression. This was seen as a 
threat by Napoleon who labelled them as „ideologues‟ producing a contrasting meaning of false, 
and possibly subversive ideas (MacKenzie, 2003: 3-4).  
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The concept of ideology was developed further by Marx and Engels who argued that it 
demonstrated the rationality of the existing distribution of wealth and power relations, and later 
by Althusser who saw it as a way to mould and socialise citizens required by society (Mackenzie, 
2003:3-6). Gramsci contended that ideology should include everyday conceptions to include the 
fragmentary, episodic, internally contradictory and incomplete chains of thought used to 
understand the social and political world (Donald & Hall, 1986: x). 
Later, Laclau (1977 in Donald & Hall, 1986: xviii – xix) argued that concepts such as „democracy‟ 
and „the people‟ were used within fascist discourse in a way that provided some ideological unity 
for different classes. As such rather than having a single unequivocal class connotation these 
ideological terms were „multi-discursive‟. 
However, this thesis draws most heavily from Seliger (1976: 14) who presented two conceptions 
of ideology, that of a restrictive concept and a more inclusive concept. The restrictive type 
reserves the use of ideology for extremist belief systems and parties; ideological factors are held 
to be present in some and absent from other belief systems; or at least, they are assumed to be 
more important in some than in others. The more inclusive use covers sets of ideas that men 
posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, aims to preserve, amend, 
uproot or rebuild a given order. Both conceptions hold in common that ideology signifies a set of 
ideas that have not primarily been conceived for cognitive purposes. Furthermore he argues that 
four propositions are crucial to any definition of ideology. Firstly all ideologies are linked to 
politics - it requires it as its mode of implementation. Secondly, ideology cannot be divorced 
from factual knowledge, rational justification, as well as moral and other prescriptions. Thirdly, all 
ideologies see overlap in terms of the descriptions, analysis, prescriptions, for example. Fourthly, 
the way ideology functions or is intended to function has a bearing on its nature (Seliger 1976: 
15-16). 
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Seliger (1976: 102) constructed an ideological composite which he conceived as a: 
…relatively coherent and never entirely non-factual and non-empirical configuration of 
thought and speech used for concerted social action, the notion that politics and ideology 
are inextricably tied to each other does not entail the conclusion that ideologically pure 
politics exists. From the outset ideologies are asymmetric structures and some of their 
principles and assessments are advanced by more than one ideology.  
To summarise the components, a party would first notice and describe a phenomena. It would 
then analyse, and decide according to moral norms and in view of technical possibilities what to 
do or not to do about them. There is always a component of ideology that rejects. However, he 
does admit that in reality the process is much more complex. It is these two conceptions of 
ideology that will be carried forward to assess the impact of party ideology on party positions 
towards European integration. 
APPROACH 
The fundamental aim of the research question is to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic 
discourse by West European political parties in European elections and to examine the causal 
influences behind the positions taken. The thesis will establish the importance of European 
elections to the understanding of party conflict over European integration both theoretically and 
empirically. In order to carry out the fundamental aim, the theoretical underpinnings of the multi-
dimensional definition and framework will be examined and a priori predictions of party positions 
will be presented in chapter three. Using a quantitative research strategy, party positions will be 
investigated empirically using multiple OLS regression on data provided through the 
Comparative and Euromanifestos Project datasets8 (Klingemann et al, 2006; Euromanifestos 
Project, 2007). OLS regression was selected as the most appropriate technique to examine 
causation given its use of a continuous dependent variable. Logistic, Ordinal logistic and 
Multinomial regression techniques rely on categorical dependent variables. Logistic regression 
uses a dichotomous dependent variable; Ordinal logistic regression allows for more than two 
                                                 
8 The Euromanifestos dataset can be downloaded from here: http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/projekte/manifestos/ 
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categories of response that are ordered; and finally multinomial regression allows for multiple 
response categories. While these would allow for the analysis of the independent variables 
identified, support for each aspect of integration was conceptualised as a continuum stretching 
from strong support to outright rejection, which is more suited to being operationalised as a 
continuous variable. 
The research strategy provides the opportunity to conduct feasible language-blind analyses of 
party positions in a large-n study. Furthermore, it provides other scholars the opportunity subject 
the results to further empirical tests by using the publicly available datasets. The section below 
will provide further justification for the use of manifesto-based research.  
As stated earlier the third element of the core argument of the thesis is that despite the second-
order label, which is applied to non-national elections, i.e. regional, local and European, they 
remain an important element within party competition (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; 
Schmitt, 1990; 2004; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk et al, 1996; Marsh, 1998). Specifically with 
European elections, whilst nationally derived issues enter the election campaigns, in manifestos 
political parties focus far more on European rather than national issues. In chapter four this will 
be examined empirically by calculating the mean average salience for each party family towards 
the twelve major election issues9. What this provides is a general indication of the level of 
importance of each issue in the four European elections. The data for this will be taken from 
both the Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al, 2006) and the Euromanifestos 
dataset (Euromanifestos Project, 2007) and derived from the number of quasi sentences devoted 
to the relevant manifesto codes, which will be summed and divided by the total. This will then be 
averaged for each party within the party family. This will allow a direct comparison between 
national and European elections.  
                                                 
9 These are Economic Policy; Social Welfare; Foreign Policy; European Policy; Internationalism; Agricultural Policy; Performance of 
Government; Military; Democracy Issues; Crime Issues; Cultural issues; and Environmental Issues. 
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The saliency measures only tell part of the picture – the relative importance of the issue in an 
election manifesto. Next, the number of, as well as the specific  party family of each Eurosceptic 
parties will be identified from the national and European election data. Furthermore, in order to 
ascertain whether parties behave in a similar fashion it will require a comparison of the predicted 
values between national and European elections. For this it will be necessary to employ a single 
dimension of pro versus anti-EU to facilitate this. The independent variables for this assessment 
are essentially as similar as possible to those used in the later multi-dimensional analyses. The 
expectation is not that the coefficients will be same, but it will be possible to see if parties use the 
discourse more or less aggressively between national and European elections. 
With the new development in conceptualising European integration and the new data from the 
understudied European arena, the thesis aims to contribute to the debate on Eurosceptic 
causation. To provide a background to the literature which will be detailed in chapter two, 
scholars have argued that Euroscepticism is derived from ideology, strategy, and/or institutional 
factors. To be specific these can be broken down into a further set of themes. Of those who have 
argued that Euroscepticism is derived from ideology, a number have posited that party families 
and/or the left-right dimension are the most appropriate unit of analysis (Aspinwall, 2002; 
Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Crum, 2007; Hellström, 2008); another group have argued that the left-
right dimension and a further dimension – either orthogonal or related, but not fused are more 
appropriate prisms with which to view party positions (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hix, 1999; Hooghe, 
Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & Edwards, 2006). A further group have argued 
that Euroscepticism is derived from cleavage structures or indeed constitutes a new cleavage 
(Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002; Kriesi, 2007). Strategic factors have been 
put forward as causal factor in structuring the use of Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998; Taggart & 
Szczerbiak, 2001; 2002; Sitter, 2002; 2003; 2004). Finally, the impact of institutional structures has 
also been put forward as a restriction on the use of Euroscepticism (Lees, 2002; Lees 2008b). 
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Given the extent of the disagreement, there is a need to reassess these theoretical and empirical 
contributions to the understanding of causation. For this the thesis will apply the saliency theory 
of political competition in understanding how parties compete. This essentially argues that parties 
do not compete directly, but attempt to promote the policy areas, which they specialise in or own 
(Budge & Farlie, 1983: 23-24). This will be explored further in chapter four.  
The dependent variables for this study are the position of each party on the individual 
dimensions identified above: economic integration (both liberalisation and harmonisation); 
supranational integration; legal integration; social integration; cultural integration; and foreign 
policy integration. As stated earlier, the fourth core aspect of the argument presented in the thesis 
is the importance of party ideology operationalised in terms of party families. This is because 
while cleavage structures are highly correlated with party families and share much of the variance, 
it is important to move away from considering them - due to the question as to whether they are 
still frozen (see Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Inglehart, 1977, 1981, 1990; Pedersen, 1979) given that 
new forms of conflict have emerged from the 1970s and beyond.  
Ideology constricts the freedom of political parties to adapt their positions. While ideology does 
not constitute a solid barrier to change, it creates an air of expectation amongst its party 
members, parliamentary party and its core voters. Put another way it becomes an opportunity 
cost in terms of the potential alienation of its current supporters if the party attempts to attract 
new voters and members through shifting policy. It does bring up the question of why ideology 
is operationalised in terms of party families and not the left-right dimension. Both of them are 
contested in terms of where a party lies. However, one has to question the continued relevance 
of the left-right dimension (see Kitchelt & Hellemans, 1990 for an overview). This is something 
that has been continually debated since the 1960s especially since the emergence of post-
materialist values identified by Inglehart (1977). Another issue surrounding the reliance of the 
left-right dimension is that the scale differs from country to country. Castles and Mair‟s (1984) 
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work on an empirical foundation for the left-right scale went someway to resolving this issue, but 
as the party family is somewhat broader in its nature it can account for differences in the cross-
national setting.    
Party families therefore are the key independent variable. They, however, will tested alongside 
other independent variables such as: national location; positions towards other dimensions of 
integration; year of election; left-right position; position on the new politics dimension; public 
opinion towards membership; and finally whether the party was an office holder through the use 
of multiple OLS regression (see chapter three for the theoretical justification). This allows the 
determination of the empirical weight of the party family independent variable compared to the 
other theoretical and empirical arguments put forward.  
Finally, the approach will return to consider party ideology in a much more in-depth fashion by 
examining observed individual party positions and examining potential patterns of observable 
behaviour in the European-wide party family, or whether there are specific patterns identifiable 
within two sub-categories of the accession grouping and also if the party was from a member 
state in the geographical core or periphery of the EU. This allows the assessment of whether 
there are further contextual factors at play and takes account of specific differences within the 
party family itself.    
RESEARCHING PARTY POSITIONS: RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
In recent years there has been an extensive debate surrounding the methodological approach to 
explore party positions towards policy and ideological dimensions. One can distinguish between 
survey data (elite, expert or mass surveys) and document-driven data (first or secondary source 
information) (Keman, 2007: 77). The quantitative approaches can be subdivided into five specific 
techniques: expert surveys, mass surveys, roll-call analysis, flows of public funding analyses, and 
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manifesto-based content analysis. The Manifesto-based content analysis can be further split into 
Computer Aided Content Analysis techniques and manual hand coding techniques.  
Expert surveys enable the gathering of data on the policy positions of key political actors by 
surveying people who are expert on the countries in question (Laver & Hunt, 1992: 33) and 
produce usable policy locations for parties at a particular point in time (Budge 2000: 111). They 
have a number of distinct advantages. They are reasonably cheap and simple to conduct (Ray, 
1999: 285); they draw on broad knowledge, offer direct quantification (with inter-expert reliability 
tests), provide flexibility in information gathering, and are also valid (given the diverse sources of 
information used by experts) (Marks et al, 2007: 26).  
Despite considerable popularity and extensive use, the technique has been the subject of 
significant criticism. The major weaknesses of expert surveys concern the validity with respect to 
the definition of party, time scale, and cause and effect (Volkens, 2007: 117).  Firstly, what is the 
expert judging? One may evaluate the position of the electorate; another, the position of the 
party leadership; or the views of party activists (Marks & Steenbergen, 2006: 348-349; Budge, 
2000: 111). Secondly, the temporal issue is of key concern. Retrospective party positioning is very 
difficult and subject to the significant possibility of errors given the potential for judgments to be 
influenced by subsequent party behaviour (Marks et al, 2007: 26). While some of the concerns 
could be alleviated by skilled expert survey design (Marks & Steenbergen, 2006: 349), it is 
questionable whether one can tie experts down to a specific time period (Budge, 2000: 110). 
Thirdly, as experts will use a variety of sources to judge party positions, it makes it very difficult, 
if not impossible to separate cause and effect. Party positions may be judged on programmatic 
promises or resulting actions, or a combination of both (see Volkens, 2007: 117).   The fourth 
issue concerns information taken from experts being quite vulnerable to selection bias, and this is 
exacerbated by low response rates. One can argue that this will be less of a problem with 
particular parties, which have been the subject of extensive research, but those less popular with 
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the research community, as well as smaller newer parties may suffer from selection bias as experts 
have little information to draw upon (Keman, 2007: 77). This fourth point can also be an issue 
for the problem, which Marks et al (2007: 26; Budge, 2000: 109) illuminate in that expert 
judgements will take account of both rhetoric and actions. Actions may be restricted by 
institutional rules and the path dependent nature of previous decisions will restrict party 
behaviour. Hence judging parties on observed behaviour may produce different positions 
compared to positioning on the basis of party preferences. 
The second approach is the use of mass survey data that has specifically asked respondents where 
parties lie on certain positions. Unfortunately very few cross-national surveys ask about party 
positions on issues. One Eurobarometer survey, Eurobarometer 30 did ask respondents in each 
EU member state to evaluate the positions of the political parties of their nation. This survey is 
therefore an excellent source of data on the public perception of party positions but only for 
1988 (Ray, 1999: 285)10. In addition, information drawn from individuals can suffer from 
selection bias (Keman, 2007: 77), it cannot address positions from previous years for the same 
reason as expert surveys, and can only focus on perceived behaviour rather than party 
preferences. 
The third method of estimating policy positions is to look at what they actually do in public 
office. The flow of public expenditure into particular policy areas can be used as an indicator of 
government policy. It unfortunately is only limited to single party governments, and only those 
parties who take office (Laver & Hunt, 1992: 32-33). The other issue is that it completely ignores 
policy preferences of governmental parties, focusing on behaviour, and in addition does not take 
into account the path dependent nature of policy decisions made by previous governments. 
                                                 
10 For more up-to-date election surveys see: See http://www.ees-homepage.net/seiten/ees.html access to the questionnaires 
distributed for the European Election Survey. However, they do not have questions appropriate for extracting specific party 
position data. 
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The fourth form of data analysis is the scaling of roll-call voting11 data (Hix et al, 2006: 494). This 
involves the coding of roll-call votes, which are published in public in the European Parliament‟s 
official minutes (Yes, No and Abstain). In the case of Hix et al (2006: 499) they grouped 
Members of the European Parliament (MEP) by their political grouping and positioned them on 
two dimensions – left-right and pro vs. anti-EU. Specifically, this deals with observed behaviour 
and not party preferences. It is also limited by the trichotomous nature of the three responses – 
Yes and No and Abstain, and suffers from similar weakness to that of expenditure flow analysis 
namely the path dependent nature of previous decisions and institutional rigidity. However, it 
does not suffer from the temporal issue that is prevalent in time series estimates from expert 
surveys. It provides observed publically available positions for each Member of Parliament (MP) 
or MEP.   
The fifth process of producing empirical data for the positioning of political parties is through 
the analysis of manifestos. There are two relevant techniques - the traditional content analytic 
approach of the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/EMP) 
that utilised a standardised coding scheme, and Computer-Assisted Content Analysis (CACA) of 
election programmes (Volkens, 2007: 108). 
The MRG/CMP approach consisted of a quantitative textual analysis of election programmes 
from a large number of OECD countries (plus Israel) for the entire period since 1945 
(Franzmann & Kaiser, 2006: 164). It involved the developing of its own coding scheme and 
utilising expert coders, fluent in the language of the manifesto, reading each sentence and 
allocating each sentence a category in the coding scheme. The theory behind the project was the 
promotion of the salience model of party competition where parties compete on the basis of 
salience of particular issues in the policy package they put to voters (Laver & Garry, 2000: 620). 
                                                 
11 See Hix, Noury and Roland (2006); Mattila & Lane (2001); Heckman & Snyder (1997); Poole (1985); Clinton, Jackman & Rivers 
(2004) for examples of roll-call data analyses. 
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The categories relied on parties competing indirectly by emphasizing another issue rather than a 
direct negative comment. However, there were compromise codings where pro and con 
categories were also used (Klingemann et al, 2006: xviii).  
With the Euromanifestos project, Hermann Schmitt developed the idea to apply the MRG/CMP 
on elections to the European Parliament. The aim of the project was to collect and code all 
European Parliament election programmes of all parties ever represented in that body. 
Furthermore it needed to be comparable with the MRG/CMP, but also tailored in such a way to 
allow the possibility of coding specific European policies (Wüst & Volkens, 2003: 1). It was 
modified in three ways – firstly 54 out of the 56 codes were kept with the remaining divided into 
sub-codes. Further sub-codes were inserted where suitable. Secondly, the codes were mirrored 
based on the level which they were addressing – national, sub-national and local level; 
supranational; or focus on neither Europe nor national level and below. Finally 13 codes were 
exclusively developed for the EC/EU political system (Wüst & Volkens, 2003: 6). 
In general, in terms of strengths manifesto research allows access to objective data, produces 
time series data, allows the separation of preferences from behaviour, and provides direct 
evidence of issue salience for political parties (Marks et al, 2007: 26-27). However, manifesto data 
only shows the declared salience of an issue, has the added complication of election timing 
varying from country to country and the data also gives no indication of the level of internal 
party dissent. Furthermore, election manifestos vary in length, and while the number of sentences 
towards each issue is presented as a percentage score of the total, some manifestos can be very 
short which does have an impact on whether it is possible to capture the variation between 
parties (Marks et al, 2007: 26-27). Volkens (2007: 115-116) noted several important criticisms of 
conventional content analysis and the MRG/CMP data. Firstly classification schemes are very 
time consuming. Secondly, the MRG/CMP is confined to those relevant parties in parliament.  
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Thirdly, with some exceptions the MRG/CMP data is based on the coding of one expert – which 
does increase the potential for error. Fourthly, associated costs will rise if the datasets are updated 
due to the increasing number of relevant parties and the general increase in the length of the 
manifestos. Recently, while there were shortcomings in the underlying coding scheme 
surrounding the ability to update it (or lack of), it has significant strength of enabling 
comparisons across time and space (Pennings and Keman, 2002: 66; Benoit and Laver, 2007: 
130). Fortunately, the Euromanifestos coding scheme is far younger and more relevant. Another 
critical issue with the MRG/CMP is the lack of an agreed method of assigning the uncertainty of 
the estimates. Yet not only is every number estimated in the MRG/CMP dataset generated by a 
single human coder, but also the manifesto texts themselves represent stochastically generated 
verbal deposits of party positions whose random character is not represented in MRG/CMP 
scores (Benoit and Laver, 2007: 130). 
The relevant approach within CACA is Wordscore, which was introduced in 2003. The 
Wordscore approach (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 2003) can be summarised as a method of 
estimating policy positions when comparing two sets of political texts – the first probabilistic 
technique for coding political text using neither predefined coding dictionaries nor subjective 
judgement calls by coders. Words were treated as “data”, based on the assumption that the 
relative frequencies of the use of specific words by political actors would provide manifestations 
of underlying political positions (Klemmensen et al, 2007: 748). The method utilises a 
comparison between “reference” and “virgin” texts. The “reference” texts are sources where a 
priori policy dimensions are already known. These are then compared to “virgin” texts that are a 
set of texts whose policy positions are not known. A key strength of the approach is the 
improvement in reliability of the process due to the removal of the human factor from the 
coding process. It is technically easier, more flexible and cheaper to implement. The word scoring 
also provides a measure of uncertainty associated with each position score and perhaps most 
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interestingly non-English language texts – it is essentially language blind (Laver, Benoit & Garry, 
2003: 325-328). It is able to provide valid estimates for left-right and economic policy positions, 
but, up to now, cannot deliver valid estimates for other policy dimensions (Volkens, 2007: 109).  
There were a number of other pitfalls to CACA and Wordscore in particular, such as a 
undermining of the validity of the scores obtained due to a lack of words. The technique is also is 
also dependent on the reference and virgin texts have to sharing properties, which decrease the 
ability of reference texts to be shared amongst a wide range of political texts available. Each one 
has to be tailored to the virgin text under study (Klemmensen, 2007: 748). It also suffers from 
several other criticisms. Firstly, pairwise comparisons seem an inadequate empirical base for 
generating large sets of scores. Secondly, how should reference and virgin texts be used? Should 
the reference texts look forwards or backwards in time, and how long are these appropriate for? 
As they state “the potential for cumulative error here seems very large” (Budge and Pennings, 
2007: 123). Furthermore CACA shares all the problems of comprehensiveness, which are 
attributed to the MRG/CMP because both approaches rely on the same documents - not every 
party publishes an election program, secondly, not all policy areas are mentioned in all of the 
programmes, and many programmes are short (Volkens, 2007: 109) In addition, the Wordscore 
approach relies on the relative frequencies of words, ignoring completing their positive or 
negative connotations in establishing estimates of party locations (Budge and Pennings, 2007:  
123-126).  
However, one should note that manifesto-based research relies in its entirety on official 
documentation released by the party, and hence will inevitably not be able to identify aspects of 
party faction based Euroscepticism, as well as more tactical aspects of the use of Euroscepticism 
which are not sustained over the medium to long-term. This is a weakness, which is unavoidable 
within this research. However, as an alternative or complimentary methodological strategy the 
manifesto-based research approaches can be combined with more qualitative strategies such as 
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the analysis of newspaper material either using the adapted content analysis schemes or more 
simplified but related content codes, interviews of party officials or indeed qualitative (or even 
quantitative) expert survey analysis.  
To go into more detail, there are several directions a qualitative approach to the research 
questions can take. Firstly, one could utilise a qualitative content analysis approach of available 
manifesto material, as well as other sources – such as newspaper articles and further political 
speeches, which has the potential benefit of allowing the identification of specific grievances 
within the categories used by the comparative and European manifesto projects, for example. In 
this sense it is much more revealing as to how the content of specific scepticism compares over 
time and between parties. Fundamentally, however, it suffers from significant weaknesses 
surrounding the accessibility of manifesto material (though this is not necessarily the case for 
newspaper articles) from the earlier years of the time frame; the language barrier presents a 
significant problem for comparative analyses as it requires multiple language competencies in 
order to conduct large-n analyses; and finally, the time-scale (provided that the language barrier 
could be overcome through the use of translations – itself potentially problematic) is incredibly 
time-consuming for one researcher. 
Secondly, qualitative interviews of party officials have the potential to yield extremely important 
content-rich data. This approach provides the promise of revealing data on party factionalism, as 
well as the importance of and how Euroscepticism was used in the election campaigns. However, 
it does have a number of shortcomings. There is the potential for data on the earliest elections to 
be less accurate given the amount of time that has elapsed, as well as the potential contamination 
from later events. Furthermore, the accessibility of some senior party officials may be limited 
given their seniority and busy roles, some of those involved in the earlier elections of the period 
may well now be deceased given that the 1989 elections were over twenty-one years ago. Finally, 
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the cost factor may also be prohibitive with a large-n study. These issues potentially could lead to 
a significant number of missing cases or a much more restrictive study. 
The final appropriate approach is that of the informal qualitative expert survey approach. 
Specifically, this takes much of the same approach as that of the formalised quantitative survey, 
but without the aim of positioning each party on a specific numerical scale. In particular, it is 
relatively cost-effective, easy to administer, and potentially covers a large number of parties. 
However, it still suffers from the same weaknesses as the more formalised variety – namely 
validity with respect to the definition of the party, time-scale, and cause and effect (see Budge, 
2000; Volkens, 2007: 117). It is the informal nature with which this thesis is specifically opposed. 
The criteria for judging parties are considerably more opaque, and offer little possibility of error 
calculations and testing. 
RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
Though alluded to above, it is helpful to review and discuss the issues in more detail. In terms of 
reliability the approaches being quantitative in nature allow for the testing and retesting of 
estimates created during the process of analysis. However, as Volkens (2007: 118) notes as CACA 
relies on word counts, the measurement problem of getting the same results whenever the 
process is repeated is no problem. Expert surveys and the MRG/CMP can have problems with 
this too. With expert surveys, it depends on the number of experts available, but with sufficient 
numbers reliability can checked and outliers deleted. The MRG/CMP has also been subjected to 
many reliability tests with encouraging results.  
In terms of validity, Ray (2007: 12) identified four types of validity – content, criterion, 
convergent, and construct. The first was concerned with whether the concept was clear and 
measures fully represented what the concept was focussing on. The second refers to the 
comparison of the measure with another generally accepted measure of the same concept. The 
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third involves a comparison of alternative measures of the same concept. The final refers to an 
assessment as to whether a measure relates to other observed variables in a way, which is 
consistent with pre-existing theoretical predictions. These should correlate with each other. He 
found between the alternative approaches some discrepancy between the directional conception 
of the political space for content validity; for convergent validity, strong commonality between 
the expert survey measure, mass perceptions, electorate self-placement and manifesto data, when 
relative EU references were used, the exception was the roll-call method; and finally the 
construct validity produced similar results between expert, mass survey and roll call scores, but 
markedly different results with manifesto data. Marks et al (2007: 24) concluded that despite both 
having flaws, expert surveys and manifesto data arrived at reasonably valid measures of party 
positioning on European integration, although they believed that expert survey data with the 
current datasets were the most accurate.  
Finally, Volkens (2007: 117) identified several concerns over validity for expert surveys, 
MRG/CMP and CACA analyses. She argued that the major concern for expert surveys over 
validity were with the definition of party, time scale and cause and effect. However, with the 
MRG/CMP, country and time specific issues which are fitted into abstract policy positions is 
actually highly contextual, and the method consists of a qualitative judgement as to which 
category is most appropriate, though all questionable results can be checked by looking at the 
text base. Lastly, with CACA different methods rely on differing levels of human intervention 
and the approaches, which rely more heavily, come closer to conventional content analysis 
strengths and weaknesses. Overall one can argue that with the access to objective data, the 
avoidance of later events contaminating the data, the provision of reasonably valid results, and 
the access to pre-existing data – rather than need to commission a new expert survey all 
demonstrate the importance of analysing CMP/Euromanifesto data in this thesis. 
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STRUCTURE 
The thesis will be structured as follows: 
Chapter two explores the existing literature related to the research topic of party-based 
Euroscepticism. Academic research on this area of study is now extensive. There are four areas 
that are directly linked to the inquiry. These are the Eurosceptic party mapping and causation; the 
impact of Europe on the party system; area studies based work using single country cases studies; 
and finally public Euroscepticism. However, other areas of literature are also relevant. In 
particular, this includes the Europeanisation of political parties; National and European 
Election/Manifesto research; and finally first and second-order elections. Critically the main 
focus of this chapter will be on examining the four areas identified, which are directly linked to 
the research question.  
Having identified the limitations of the existing literature on Euroscepticism, chapter three will 
first  to construct the multi-dimensional definition and framework. In particular it will focus on 
examining the individual processes of integration: economic integration – including liberalisation 
and harmonisation; supranational integration; legal integration; social integration; cultural 
integration; and foreign policy integration. It will then proceed to examine the theoretical basis 
behind the party family responses towards European integration. Hypotheses will be drawn up 
for the individual party families using a modified version of von Beyme (1985) framework. The 
Liberal party family will be addressed first as it serves as the control group in the multiple-
regression analyses12. Next, the remaining party families will be analysed according to the 
ordering in the party family framework: Conservative; Socialist and Social Democratic; Christian 
Democrat; Communist; Agrarian; Ethno-regionalist; and finally the Green parties. The final part 
of the chapter will question the second-order nature of European elections. 
                                                 
12 See chapter three for an explanation as to why the Liberal party family was chosen as a control group. 
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Chapter four will focus on providing an empirical justification for the relevance of European 
elections. It starts with providing detail on how saliency, as well as the dependent and 
independent variables will be operationalised. The primary aim is to explore the saliency of 
Europe in both national and European elections, to identify Eurosceptic political parties, and to 
explore whether different behaviour is observable between national and European elections. For 
this third task OLS regression analyses will be employed utilising similar modelling between the 
two datasets, and also to that employed in Chapter five, and the same dependent variable with 
both the Comparative and Euromanifestos dataset. The explanatory models use the following 
variables: Party Families; Country; Year of Election; General Ideological Variables (Foreign 
Special Relations: positive versus negative, Military: positive versus negative, Internationalism: 
positive versus negative, Decentralisation versus Centralisation, Free enterprise versus Market 
Regulation, Welfare: positive versus negative, National Way of Life: positive versus negative, 
Multiculturalism: positive versus negative; and Constitutionalism: positive versus negative); and 
finally Alternative Theories (Left-Right position, Gal-Tan13 position in 1999, 2002, and 2006, and 
Median Voter position). 
Chapter five presents the empirical results from the quantitative testing of the multi-dimensional 
framework. Multiple OLS Regression is utilised to test explanatory models utilising the following 
variables: Party Families; Country; Year of Election; Forms of Integration (party position towards 
social, supranational, legal, cultural, economic and foreign policy integration); and finally 
Alternative Theories (Left-Right Position, GAL-TAN position in 1999, 2002, and 2006, and 
Median Voter position). This allows the first testing of the multi-dimensional hypotheses for 
party families and with that the first tentative conclusions. 
                                                 
13  This is the new politics dimension which positions a party based on whether its values and discourse are in line with 
green/alternative/libertarian values or traditional/authoritarian values. 
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Chapter six constitutes the final empirical chapter. It puts the general observations made through 
predictive positioning to one side and delves deeper into the patterns of behaviour. Firstly, the 
Eurosceptic parties are identified according to the negative discourses used towards the 
dimensions in each of the four elections (1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004). Secondly, by grouping 
parties according to their party families, behavioural trends can be identified. Thirdly alternative 
party groupings will be examined as subdivisions of the party families according to which 
accession group they belong to and whether the party is a member of a party system at the 
geographical core or periphery of the EU. Finally, the theoretical impact of these findings will be 
discussed. 
Chapter seven concludes the thesis by returning to the original research question and evaluates it 
in light of the empirical evidence provided. The research finds parties compete on multiple 
dimensions of European integration, and that ideology does indeed contribute strongly to the 
way in which parties structure the content of their Eurosceptic responses. Furthermore it 
considers the application of the framework to further cases, and the opportunities for further 
research. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter argued that in light of the massive transformation in the relationship between nation 
states in Europe and the growing supranationality of the European integration process, it is 
unsurprising to see a growth in critical and concerned voices. Euroscepticism has seen growth 
amongst political parties, the news and print media, and the public across Europe. 
The research question and key aim of the thesis were presented which highlighted that the thesis 
has set out to identify the level and usage of Eurosceptic discourse by West European political 
parties in European elections, and to examine causation of the positions observed.  While 
addressing this, the thesis will put forward the core argument which contains five fundamental 
 37 
elements: the need to develop a more dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; 
the importance of developing a multidimensional framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based 
on the definition; that European elections are not necessarily fought solely on national issues; the 
role and importance of ideology; and lastly the importance of utilising a quantitative manifesto 
research strategy to analyse party positions.  
It was also demonstrated that on the levels of perception, Euroscepticism has brought the issues 
of democratic deficit, the Community deficit, and fundamentally the political legitimacy of the 
project into question, and the articulation of Euroscepticism has been seen at both the party and 
voter level in member states, the then accession states of Central and Eastern Europe, and the 
European non-member states. 
Working definitions of Euroscepticism in a multi-dimensional setting and party ideology were 
developed and the approach was outlined. This will entail a quantitative empirical strategy to 
assess the salience of European issues in national and European elections. Furthermore it will use 
the single dimension of pro versus anti-EU to assess the behaviour of parties in both elections. 
Subsequently, the research will apply the multi-dimensional framework, treating each dimension 
as a separate dependent variable and examining the empirical weight behind party families and 
the other causation theories presented using multiple OLS regression on data derived from the 
European manifestos. Finally the approach will shift to consider observed values of individual 
parties and will apply the more nuanced definition to identify Eurosceptic parties, and to assess 
the behaviour within party families, and furthermore within accession groups and whether the 
party is from geographical core or peripheral member state. This is to capture any differences 
within the party family itself. 
The final section of the introduction assessed the different approaches to researching party 
positions – noting five key techniques: expert surveys, mass survey data, expenditure flows, roll 
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call voting analysis and manifesto research. Manifesto research was opted for due to the access to 
more objective data, the avoidance of later events contaminating the data, and the provision of 
reasonably valid results. In addition, the section also addressed the strengths and weaknesses of 
qualitative-based approaches to deriving party positions towards the aspects of integration 
identified. 
Looking forward to the literature review, as previously mentioned the fourth aspect of the core 
argument is the importance of ideology in explaining why political parties adopt Eurosceptic 
discourse in European election campaigns, hence the detailed discussion of ideology in this 
chapter. The question of causation is one of the most active areas within the Euroscepticism 
literature and through investigating the strengths and weaknesses of the existing work in that area 
– as well as the research in the areas of Eurosceptic party mapping; the party system perspective; 
single-country case studies; and public Euroscepticism – it will make clear that the issue is still 
open to question as to whether the phenomenon is derived from party ideology, party strategy or 
a combination of both. This is especially the case in light of the multi-dimensional developments 
that this thesis is presenting. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review builds on the previous chapter by contouring the existing literature base of 
the Euroscepticism research and explicitly identifies the relevant gaps in the research in more 
detail. In particular, the review of the existing research reveals two specific gaps in the literature 
surrounding the understanding of how parties behave Eurosceptically in elections, and 
particularly in European elections.  
However, there are further aspects that are uncovered. Firstly, as alluded to in the introduction, 
there are key areas of improvements surrounding the conceptualisation of Euroscepticism which 
need to be made – especially with regard to its specific focus (on the ideas of integration or its 
practice), and its multidimensionality. The field has already moved forward with improvements, 
but there are still areas in which this thesis can innovate – especially surrounding the specific 
individual dimensions on which parties compete. The discussion of causation will reveal that 
there are still remaining questions, and with a new set of data, further evidence of party 
behaviour can be illuminated. Finally, the remaining strands of literature (which the thesis does 
not directly contribute to) firstly within the single country case study literature reveal the 
importance of several causal factors – some of which will be included in the comparative study 
(for example national location of the party); secondly, highlight the relevance of European issues 
to party competition; and finally provide an understanding of whether a party is reacting to cues 
from the electorate and vice versa. This final point also highlights the importance of including an 
assessment of the median voter position in the analysis.  
The way in which the overall direction and content of the thesis is linked in with the existing 
academic literature is presented in figure 1 below: 
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Figure 1: Strands of Literature 
 
As stated earlier, initially there was a lag in the scholarly treatment of Euroscepticism, due to the 
early dominance of the IR tradition in examining the processes of European integration (see 
Marks & Steenbergen, 2002: 883). However, from 1998 onwards, comparative politics scholars 
began to address the domestic contestation of European integration. Four areas in particular 
stand out as the most relevant to the research question: Eurosceptic party mapping and ideology 
versus strategy (causation); party system impact; single country case studies; and public 
Euroscepticism. However, one strand in particular – Eurosceptic party mapping and ideology 
versus strategy – links most strongly to the research question. This area will receive the most 
attention. The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly the literature on Eurosceptic party 
mapping and causation will be addressed and the themes within the strand will be identified and 
the key literature critically analysed individually. The chapter will progress on to discuss the 
remaining strands: the party system perspective, single country case studies and public 
Euroscepticism by identifying overall themes and critically evaluating the contributions of each 
strand. 
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EUROSCEPTIC PARTY MAPPING AND CAUSATION: IDEOLOGY, STRATEGY OR 
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS 
Comparative academic research on the phenomenon of party-based Euroscepticism has 
extensively focused on the issue of causation and it has become the central debate within the 
literature. In essence, scholars have questioned whether responses to the European integration 
project are derived from the party‟s ideological predispositions; whether they are a strategic 
response to the competitive environment political parties operate in; or whether the structure of 
institutions has a role in providing incentives or indeed restricting the use of Eurosceptic 
arguments during the course of party competition.  
As previously discussed in the introduction, several themes have developed within the causation 
debate. Firstly, amongst those scholars who have contended that Eurosceptic party positions are 
derived from ideology, a number have argued that party families, the left-right dimension or 
broader left/centre/right-wing ideological preferences are the strongest causal factor (Aspinwall, 
2002; Kopecký & Mudde, 2002; Crum, 2007; Hellström, 2008). Another group have contended 
that party competition towards European integration can be understood through the prism of the 
left-right dimension and a further dimension – which was orthogonal (Hix & Lord, 1997; Hix, 
1999). A related cluster of work have argued that multiple dimensions can be collapsed within 
these existing patterns of political conflict and second dimension which is related to the left-right 
dimension but not fused (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks, Hooghe, Nelson & Edwards, 
2006). A further set has argued that party competition towards European integration derives 
from cleavage structures or indeed has constituted a new cleavage structure within party systems 
(Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002; Kriesi, 2007).  
Secondly, strategic factors have been put forward as causal factor. Euroscepticism is a product of 
parties‟ strategic choices in terms of its position within the party system, but also in light of its 
survival, ideology, organisation and the pursuit of office (Taggart, 1998; Taggart & Szczerbiak, 
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2001; 2002; Sitter, 2002; 2003; 2004). Finally, the impact of institutional structures has also been 
put forward as a restriction on the use of Euroscepticism (Lees, 2002; Lees 2008b).  
In discussing this strand of the literature in terms of the themes that dominate the analyses, the 
individual scholarly work has been assigned to the most appropriate category. However, some 
invariably belong to more than one area. The main analyses will be discussed individually, but the 
thesis will draw conclusions surrounding the key strengths and weaknesses more comparatively. 
To start with however, it is useful to cast light on a research note which mapped out party 
attitudes towards European integration. Scholars have extensively used it as a source of data. 
Ray‟s (1999) party mapping work used a quantitative approach to expert survey data. He analysed 
West European parties between 1984 and 1996 and he found that on average there was 
increasing support for integration across the parties over the period under study. In addition, the 
salience of the issue increased over time, but the unanimity within the party decreased as intra-
party dissent became an issue for a number of parties (Ray, 1999: 290-292). Specifically using a 
single dimension of support was the study‟s major weakness – this did not allow for those parties 
that varied in their support towards specific aspects of integration. However, while he was right 
to examine the dynamic aspects of party positioning across four points in time: 1984, 1988, 1992 
and 1996, the methodological approach used increased the potential for positions to be 
contaminated from behaviour observed at other points in time. 
EUROSCEPTICISM AS DERIVED FROM PARTY FAMILIES AND/OR THE LEFT-RIGHT DIMENSION 
Four pieces of research fit within this sub-strand of literature, which is concerned with 
Euroscepticism being derived ideologically in the form of party family behaviour and/or policy 
spaces on the traditional left-right dimension. Aspinwall (2002: 82-85) examined the impact of 
political ideology on the preferences of member state governments towards integration. He 
conceived of ideology not in party family terms, but broad left-wing, centre, and right-wing 
tendencies. Mapping two dimensions of the conflict – the left-right and the domestic-
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international, he found that ideology appeared to be a good indicator of positions towards 
integration. It essentially acts as a “…transmission device between voter choice and party, and 
between parliamentary parties and coalition government”. It explained nearly 70% of both party 
positions on integration and governmental positions on the Amsterdam IGC (Aspinwall, 2002: 
105). Aspinwall‟s (2002) conclusion is particularly important in highlighting the relevance of 
ideology to party positions. However, his decision to simplify ideology in broad left, centre and 
right-wing tendencies can be seen as unwise as it disguises the serious differences within each 
category. 
Kopecký and Mudde (2002: 298-302) developed a new conceptual framework for examining 
support and opposition to Europe, as well as Eurosceptic attitudes in particular, focusing on the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. They distinguished between diffuse support, 
which was concerned about the general ideas of integration, and specific support, which was, 
concerned with the general practice of integration. In addition, they created a fourfold typology 
using the two dimensions identified – Europhiles versus Europhobes for the dimension of 
general ideas of European integration; and EU-optimists versus EU-pessimists on the dimension 
of support for the EU. This led to the following categories: Euroenthusiasts (combining 
Europhile and EU-optimist positions), Europragmatists (combining Europhobe and EU-
optimist positions), Eurosceptic (combining Europhile and EU-pessimist positions), and lastly 
Euroreject (combining Europhobe and EU-pessimist positions). They found that ideology was 
the strongest predictor of positions towards both diffuse and specific support, although party 
strategy had some role to play towards the latter (2002: 319). Kopecký and Mudde‟s (2002) 
utilisation of Easton‟s (1965) concept for diffuse and specific support for regimes was a 
tremendous addition to the area of research. This separation was necessary, but one has to 
question whether specific support should be included in the rubric of Euroscepticism as parties 
will always criticise the practice of a policy or a particular political development, but this criticism 
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does not mean a rejection of the whole process. Secondly, the research was limited by the 
number of case studies incorporated into the study - only four East Central European countries 
were included. 
Crum (2007) examined party stances in the referenda on the 2005 Constitutional Treaty. He 
noted the literature has seen two theoretical explanations - the first argues that it is domestic 
politics that determines the outcomes of the referenda, and the second argues that the outcomes 
reflect the well-considered views of the electorate towards the issue being voted on. In 
identifying the ideological influences of European policy stances he made the case that a core of 
centre-left and centre-right parties have shown strong support for the European integration 
project, but a number of peripheral fringe parties on the left and right were more sceptical. In 
discussing the strategic responses to EU referenda, he argued that governmental parties are 
bound to support Treaty revisions due to their involvement in the process and potential veto.  
With opposition parties, those who are permanently in opposition may be tempted to use the 
opportunity to mobilise against the government. For those not necessarily in permanent 
opposition, they may be reluctant to take this approach as this may alienate potential future 
coalition partners. These points were drawn together into two models: the Competitive Party 
System model, in which governmental parties are left to campaign for the Treaty revisions, with 
all opposition parties campaigning against it; and the Collusive Party Systems model in which the 
major opposition parties join with the government to support the treaty amendments, with only 
fringe parties campaigning against it (Crum, 2007: 64-67).  
Overall, he found that ideology predominates when parties determine their stance in referenda on 
the EU Constitution. In addition, the Collusive Model was found to be dominant in seven out of 
the ten cases. Crum (2007) makes several important contributions, notably in the behaviour of 
governing and the non-permanent opposition in reacting to treaties being put to referenda. One 
question that does arise is how long does a former governing party have to be in opposition 
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before it is considered a permanent state for the party. There are also cases where non-permanent 
opposition parties have engaged in the specific criticism of the Constitutional Treaty – i.e. the 
British Conservatives and the Czech ODS (Civic Democrats). Furthermore, he never makes clear 
whether the impact of ideology on party stances in referenda is a more generalisable finding 
beyond the EU Constitution. 
Hellström‟s (2008: 189-191) article addressed the extent to which ideology influenced party 
stances on the EU issue. He focused on testing three sets of hypotheses focusing on ideology; 
strategic positioning and national context using pooled national manifesto data from the period 
of 1970-2003. However, it is his treatment of the dependent variable, which is analytically flawed. 
He argued that: 
...occasionally parties have the tendency to overemphasise or under underemphasise the  
issue in certain elections, when international or domestic events temporally increase or 
decrease the salience of issues relating to European integration. Thus, data related to 
manifestos published at single points in time do not necessarily accurately reflect the true 
positions of the parties, and data on the dependent variable that have been smoothed in 
an appropriate fashion are more likely to be more robust.... (Hellström, 2008: 196). 
 The critique of Hellström‟s approach is less concerned with the use of manifesto research as an 
appropriate source of party positioning data, but his theoretical justification for the alteration of 
the values of the dependent variable was weak given that his claim was somewhat irrelevant, as 
how can one define what the “true” position of a party is (see Laver & Garry, 2000: 620). 
Manifesto research has been developed purely to address how parties positioned themselves at 
that point in time. Furthermore his emphasis on the issue of autocorrelation and criticism of 
other studies (e.g. Marks et al, 2002, see page 590 – they were aware of the potential for errors 
given the time series nature, but argued that the relationships were robust) with this matter (see 
Hellström, 2008: 198 & 205) are exaggerated. Autocorrelation can be a problem to deal with, only 
if this approaches the critical level of ≤ 1 or ≥ 3.  
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This group of literature has been broadly influential in encouraging a reassessment of ideology as 
a causal factor in determining the positions taken by parties towards the European integration. 
Aspinwall‟s (2002) notion of a transmission device emphasised the continued importance of 
ideology in that it still frames political conflict amongst political parties and between political 
parties and the voter level. The IGC was also a particular arena where more nuanced discussions 
were likely to emerge. Kopecký and Mudde‟s (2002) notion of diffuse and specific support has 
also been incredibly useful for developing the multi-dimensional definition (see chapter one and 
chapter three). Crum‟s (2007) findings of a continued ideologically supportive core and critical 
fringe, raised questions of whether away from the setting of a treaty referendum, the core 
ideological party families do remain supportive, especially as there have been instances of 
Eurosceptic factions identified (see Taggart, 1998) and even in the most supportive states – such 
as Germany, mainstream parties have had a limited but significant engagement with critical 
discourses towards European integration (Reinhardt, 1997; Lees, 2002: 258). Hellström‟s (2008) 
work was particularly important for its decision to examine national manifestos as a data source. 
He used the Comparative Manifestos Project data and applied a single dimension of EU support 
as the dependent variable producing comparable findings to those using expert surveys (for 
example, Marks & Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson & Ray, 2002).  
Critically, however, several weaknesses stood out. In particular, Aspinwall‟s (2002) decision to 
conceptualise ideology in terms of broad left, centre and right-wing tendencies, while easier to 
operationalise, it underestimated the significant differences in policy position within each 
category. Whilst this was not the case with Hellström (2008) his conceptualisation, despite being 
easy to operationalise, lacked clarity given the reliance on the single dimension of pro versus anti-
EU. The rationale for his smoothing exercise of the dependent variable remained unconvincing, 
as the nature of a party‟s true position was unclear.  
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EUROSCEPTIC POLICY SPACE AS IDEOLOGICALLY DERIVED BUT TWO-DIMENSIONAL 
The research on the Eurosceptic policy space being two-dimensional, or at least reducible to two 
dimensions, has proven extremely influential – in particular with ideological environment being a 
constraint on action, as well as the identification of multiple dimensions (even if the thesis has 
disagreed with collapsing them into the two dimensions). Hix and Lord (1997: 26) contended that 
in general main parties force new movements to compete on traditional issues that result in an 
amalgamation into the left-right dimension. However, the division between interests that support 
European integration, and interests that are opposed does not fit into the left-right dimension. 
Furthermore, the main party families represent ideologies about who gets what under a particular 
institutional structure. However, the European issue is determined more by national and cultural 
factors.   
Hix (1999: 71-80) developed this further and explored the cognitive/ideological environment or 
policy space of the EU, utilising a new institutional approach. He argued that the dimensionality 
of the policy space as well as the ideological location of actors is as much a constraint on action 
as institutional rules. Hix presented two main dimensions of competition – an integration-
independence dimension, which he related to the centre-periphery cleavage, and the traditional 
left-right dimension. He separated the latter into a libertarian-authoritarian dimension that is 
concerned with normative aspects of democracy, and the intervention-free market, which is 
concerned with redistribution, employment, public ownership and welfare.  Following on from 
this two/three-dimensional classification he located social interests within this space through 
considering class positions, but also combined this with considering the interests of occupational 
sector interests. In exploring the impact of EU policy space constraints on political parties he 
focused on testing whether there are two dominant dimensions in the EU policy space; the 
location of class and sectoral interests limits the options for party differentiation on the 
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integration-independence dimension; parties would only then compete on the left-right 
dimension; and finally the main parties could be expected to become more integrationist.  
This argument on the ideological constraints posed by previous party programmes resonates 
strongly with this research thesis. This is why in particular it is important to return to examining 
the responses to European integration within party families. However, where the research falters 
slightly is its conception of the main dimensions of competition. With his integration-
independence dimension (which is orthogonal), support for European integration is presented as 
a single dimension. This is a mistake, especially when integration has developed beyond a project 
of economic liberalisation and the potential is that parties may relate to some aspects of the 
process, but not to others. This is a situation, which cannot be captured by this model. 
Furthermore one has to question whether a EU dimension would be orthogonal if it was 
separated to represent the different aspects of integration. The potential is that it would relate 
more easily to existing domestic conflicts. 
Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 965-967) sought to examine whether European integration 
issues were assimilated into the pre-existing left-right dimension and the new politics dimension. 
A key development was the idea of disaggregating the European integration process into multiple 
dimensions. This included a general pro vs. anti integration dimension, as well as dimensions 
representing environmental policy, cohesion policy, asylum policy, fiscal policy, foreign policy 
and the expansion of the powers of the European Parliament. They found that peripheral parties 
were the most Eurosceptic, which surrounded a more pro-integration core of parties. In addition, 
they found that left-right location constrained positions towards environmental policy, cohesion 
policy and employment policy (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002: 985). Later Marks et al (2006) 
further explored the positions of parties towards European integration and whether they relate to 
the basic conflicts inherent in domestic politics, but also introduced a new set of case study 
countries from Eastern Europe. Utilising a two dimensional analysis of left-right positions, and a 
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green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) vs. traditional/authoritarian (TAN) dimension, they found 
that in the West parties were clustered around the Left/GAL and Right/TAN positions. In 
Central and Eastern Europe, the majority of parties are positioned either as Left/TAN or 
Right/GAL. This is due to Communism being a Left tradition combining traditional and 
authoritarian positions. Reforms have been the complete opposite of these positions and parties 
catering for those who lost out in the transition have positioned themselves by emphasising the 
polar opposite of the reforms, hence Left-TAN. Those catering for transition winners wish to 
repudiate authoritarianism and state control and hence Right/GAL positions (Marks et al, 2006: 
156-160). 
 Hooghe, Marks and Wilson‟s (2002) and the later Marks et al (2006) article were two of the 
standout pieces of research within the strand. The key area of improvement in disaggregating 
European integration was a breakthrough in understanding European integration and a 
significant point of focus for this research thesis. However, the choice of examining particular 
policies is a curious one. Being critical of a policy does not necessarily mean that the party is anti-
system, so this does not make clear whether the party position is a rejection of the construction 
of the policy or supranational involvement in the policy area. Conceptual clarity is compromised 
here. 
Overall with this set of research, Hix‟s (1999) argument on the ideological constraints posed by 
previous party positions resonated strongly, as did the multi-dimensionality of the policy space 
identified by Hooghe et al (2002). Yet with Hix and Lord (1997) and Hix (1999), the orthogonal 
nature of the integration-independence dimension and its relationship to the centre-periphery 
cleavage remained unconvincing, given that the multi-dimensionality of integration should mean 
that some political conflicts would relate to the traditional policy space more readily, and that 
where a party was located on the integration-independence dimension was likely to vary from 
process to process. With Hooghe et al (2002) and Marks et al (2006) the selection of dimensions 
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was a curious one as they did not include social policy, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
the expansion of European legal powers, and cultural policy, for example, which one can argue 
have become burgeoning areas of European policy. 
EUROSCEPTICISM AS IDEOLOGICALLY DERIVED FROM CLEVAGE STRUCTURES 
Marks and Wilson (2000) set out to use cleavage theory to explain the variation in positions taken 
by national political parties over the period of 1984 to 1996 - utilising Ray‟s (1999) data. They 
argued that:  
…although the influence of traditional social cleavages has diminished in shaping 
individual voting choice, we hypothesize that such cleavages may still be powerful in 
structuring the way political parties respond to new issues (Marks and Wilson, 2000: 434).  
Interestingly, they posit an important argument as to why policy positions are not a response to 
elector incentives. They believed that a citizen‟s economic interest was not obvious in preferences 
for or against integration. They also conceived a two-dimensional space – economic and political 
(Marks and Wilson, 2000: 435-436). Their analyses showed that party family was a much stronger 
explanatory variable than individual nation-states, though this did vary among the different time 
periods. Marks and Wilson (2000) highlight the importance of pre-existing ties, or constraints on 
party behaviour when considering positions towards integration. Despite, the thawing of the 
original cleavage structures, there is still merit in considering those original responses as a 
framework or prism with which parties view developments. Again it is the conception of 
European integration as two-dimensional, which is where the analysis suffers. On the one hand 
there are both „economic‟ and „political‟ aspects to the project. However, one needs to be careful 
when using these two concepts as resource allocation, the idea of a free market, abolishment of 
internal tariffs, and the establishment of a tariff to trading outside the region are intensely 
political policies. When these two concepts merge, one is left with an analytical blur. It is far 
more prudent to consider European integration as a space of multi-dimensional processes. 
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Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) tested cleavage theory as an explanation for party positions on 
European integration in Western Europe against three alternative theories: national context, 
response to voter issue positions, and finally mainstream parties suppressing competition on this 
dimension, hence extreme party uptake of the issue. Utilising Ray‟s (1999) data, they tested four 
time periods: 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996, as well as Eurobarometer data. They argued that 
cleavage theory remains the strongest explanatory theory. Party family explained almost two-
thirds of the variance in issue positions. The country variables only explained five percent of the 
variance. Interestingly, the hypothesis that political parties position themselves according the 
median voter position explained sixty-two percent of the variance; however, they stated that this 
measure mispredicted the positions of the more Eurosceptic Conservative parties. Marks, Wilson 
and Ray (2002) have similar issues to those of Ray (1999) as they rely on his data, but more 
importantly they rely on a single dimensional conception of support for integration (though it is 
very loosely conceptualised). Furthermore, given the way that they operationalised cleavage 
structures and party families, the independent variables were likely to have shared much of the 
variance, but perhaps not to the levels where multi-colinearity was an issue. 
Kriesi (2007: 84-91) explored the role of European integration in national elections arguing that 
European integration should be considered in the context of a larger set of processes under the 
heading of globalisation or „denationalisation‟.  Interestingly, parties who most successfully 
appealed to the losers of the transformations, he argued, would drive the mobilisation of this 
issue in national politics. In essence he rejected the argument that Euroscepticism was essentially 
the politics of opposition, and instead conceptualised it as a new cleavage. Identifying two 
dimensions of competition – economic and cultural – he compared the positions of political 
parties towards Europe in six countries: Austria, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
the UK. He focused on the political debates reported in newspapers and cross-validated the 
results with manifesto data. Kriesi found that both dimensions were polarising and that cultural 
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integration had been gaining importance during the 1990s and had shifted from cultural 
liberalism and the military to concerns about immigration in five countries with the exception of 
the UK. Euroscepticism was more salient where it had been articulated in cultural terms (Kresi, 
2007: 102-103). Kriesi (2007) put forward an interesting and extremely important proposition – 
that Euroscepticism constituted a new cleavage. This is probably stretching the concept of a 
social cleavage too far as we have yet to see a substantial number of parties appearing on both 
sides and extensive social roots to the issue, for example. His empirical work supported this 
scepticism. However, his exploration of the dimension of cultural integration was particularly 
important and an element that should be included within the multi-dimensional framework used 
in this thesis. 
Overall within this strand, there were several important elements that the thesis needs to take 
account of. Marks and Wilson (2000) fundamentally underlined the importance of pre-existing 
ties and constraints on party positioning. This is of particular theoretical importance in 
considering causal factors behind Euroscepticism. Kresi‟s (2007) analysis provides for the 
understanding of a dimension of conflict which had previously received little attention – that of 
cultural integration. However, Marks and Wilson (2000) and later Marks, Wilson and Ray‟s (2002) 
work suffered from their reliance on the single dimension of pro versus anti-EU, which did not 
take account of the dynamic nature of the integration process. Secondly, it was not clear on the 
level of shared variance between political party families and cleavage structures. Finally, Kresi‟s 
(2007) argument of European integration representing a new cleavage was questionable given the 
lack of a substantial number of parties competing against each other and the lack of social roots 
to the issue. 
EUROSCEPTICISM AS DERIVED FROM STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
Taggart (1998) examined Euroscepticism in West European party systems utilising an approach 
of positioning parties via an informal expert survey (essentially asking around amongst party 
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experts on the various party systems). In particular, he found that: “…even in the most pro-
European countries, it is possible to see significant traces of Euroscepticism” (Taggart, 1998: 
364). Taggart (1998: 384) argued that Euroscepticism is often symptomatic of the reaction by 
certain types of parties to their position within the party system. After applying a twelve-fold 
ideological party family scheme by adapting von Beyme‟s classification, he found that 
Euroscepticism did not easily relate to these party families and different parties in different 
countries were Eurosceptical. Furthermore he employed a four-fold categorisation of 
Eurosceptic parties: single-issue, protest-based parties, established parties, and Eurosceptic 
factions. Protest-based Euroscepticism was the most pervasive type of EU party opposition, but 
it varied in ideology (Taggart, 1998: 369-373).  Clearly, for Taggart Euroscepticism was a 
combination of ideology and strategic considerations, though weighted more towards the impact 
of a party‟s position in the party system. His identification of the four-fold categorisation was 
particularly persuasive and his methodological approach was well suited to identify these various 
types. However, when he argued that Euroscepticism created strange ideological bedfellows, his 
definition did not allow for further nuanced analyses to be conducted, as he could not compare 
the arguments used by parties (as discussed in the introduction).  
Taggart & Szczerbiak (2001) in their collaborative work further developed Taggart‟s (1998) 
conceptualisation of Euroscepticism and applied the typology of hard and soft Euroscepticism 
on cases from Central and Eastern Europe. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 21-29) then provided a 
comparative study of cases in Western and Central and Eastern Europe. They found that while in 
the West it was hard to establish whether party families were more prone to Euroscepticism, in 
Central and Eastern Europe there was a stronger tendency for these to be found on the right of 
the political spectrum. In contrast to Western Europe, soft Euroscepticism could be found 
within governmental and opposition parties in the mainstream of the party system. However, it 
was still a phenomenon of the periphery. It had no clear link between public opinion and party-
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based Euroscepticism, and did not relate to prospects for accession. Euroscepticism also did not 
relate to whether the state was newly independent or an established state. Hard Euroscepticism 
was much more rare than soft Euroscepticism, with high level of elite consensus towards 
accession to the European Union. Here the combination of ideology and strategy clearly 
remained, but with a slightly stronger ideological component for Central and Eastern Europe. 
They made an important step forward understanding the specific context of Euroscepticism 
within the (then) accession states, but their classificatory scheme still did not illuminate the 
specific areas of contestation amongst political parties.  
Sitter (2002: 23-24; also see Sitter, 2003; 2004) specifically focused on the role of strategy when 
he examined whether Euroscepticism was a strategic response to the party environment. He 
argued that it was a product of parties‟ strategic choices in the light of its survival, ideology, 
organisation and the pursuit of office. In addition, that while long-term interests and ideology 
have more impact, the competition between governing and opposition parties can be expected to 
impact on party Euroscepticism in the short term. He identified three factors. The first centred 
on the competition between catch-all parties. Softer forms of Euroscepticism could appear 
during opposition, but in general Euroscepticism amongst these parties was not expected, though 
any examples would reduce the opportunity for „flank‟ Euroscepticism. The second was based on 
territorial opposition. This dimension would form a foundation for Euroscepticism based on the 
extent to which the state was seen as the main form of protection for territorial identity, values 
and interests. Sitter (2002: 24) stated that:  
…the non-economic aspect of opposition may be based on religious or regional identity, 
and/or opposition to supranational governance; the economic aspect on the economic 
costs or benefits of membership.  
Finally, the third factor is based on the incentives for flank parties to adopt Euroscepticism as 
part of their protest profile.  
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Overall one can note several important points with the literature in this sub-section. Despite the 
conclusion in both Taggart (1998) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2001; 2002) that Euroscepticism 
did not relate to ideological party families particularly easily, it is still an area worth exploring. 
Some party families are definitely more predisposed to Euroscepticism than others and 
fundamentally, given the broad nature of the conceptualisation, in addition to the lack of clarity 
with each of the three positions identified, it is an aspect worth returning to. Taggart‟s (1998) 
identification of a four-fold categorisation is particularly important, and was obviously aided by 
the methodological approach utilised. His analysis did suffer from a number of weaknesses. His 
conceptualisation was too broad and constructed in such a fashion that it was particularly difficult 
to apply – especially with the second and third position identified. Taggart did not provide a scale 
in order to determine the saliency of the Eurosceptic positions of the parties he identified (this 
was later added by Rovny, (2004) using Taggart & Szczerbiak‟s later conceptualisation). The 
informal expert surveys were particularly problematic as it has allowed no replication and no 
review of the data, as well giving little clue as to the time frame used, or the extent to which the 
party was Eurosceptic, or even towards which aspects. In essence it was too opaque. 
Sitter‟s theoretical contribution has been a very important step in understanding of political party 
conflict being a combination of strategic choices of ideology and longer-term interests with that 
of its goals as an organisation. With the first and third form one can see to some extent that 
coalition politics and the opposition dynamic may have a role in the emphasis of Eurosceptic 
discourses, but party positions are surely derived from long-term assessments on the ideas of 
integration. Given the long-term nature of European integration it is questionable whether 
overall party Euroscepticism would be based on short-term decision-making. In addition, the 
longer-term territorial opposition could potentially be seen more of a product of the centre-
periphery cleavage, and so it is not so much of a strategy, but a shift of the tension traditionally 
associated towards the nation-state. 
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EUROSCEPTICISM AND THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
Lees‟ (2002; 2008) contributions constitute the missing element in a theoretical understanding of 
Eurosceptic causation amongst political parties. Yet at first Lees‟ (2002) article might seem 
somewhat out of place in a discussion of the strands of comparative literature, as it focuses on 
the case of Germany. In particular, it is the emphasis on the impact of institutions on the 
opportunity structures available for Eurosceptic platforms to succeed which is important.  He 
noted that on the one hand, political elites in Germany have always been seen as an example of a 
model state and the consensus has been stable over time. Yet, there has been the potential for 
Eurosceptic discourse to develop as party elites have flirted or made greater use of the issue. 
There have also been increases in the levels of negative public opinion (Lees, 2002: 244-245). 
However, German Federalism‟s institutional design creates patterns of constraint that limit the 
strategies that can be pursued by political actors. He presented two categories of constraint: polis-
constraining – strategies that attempt to constrain the central polity from without – and polis-
shaping – strategies which allow the modifying, slowing down or vetoing of integrationist 
initiatives by engaging with the pro-European majority directly at the national level. From this he 
presented a further two categories of agenda: sustained agendas – which are developed across 
time and reflect the core values of the actor – and heresthetic agendas – which are exercises in 
manipulation in an attempt to change the balance of political forces by introducing a new 
dimension of issue salience (Lees, 2002: 246-249).  
Lees (2008b: 28-29) noted that party systems could in effect be causal drivers of Euroscepticism 
as the varying institutional settings may impact on „political opportunity structures‟. Quoting 
(Tarrow, 1994:18) Lees described: 
…political opportunity structures as consistent…dimensions of the political 
environment…state structures create stable opportunities, but it is changing 
opportunities within states that provide the openings for political action (Lees. 2008b: 
29).  
 57 
He put forward arguments surrounding the impact of federal and unitary structures, the party 
system and also the electoral system. Lees (2008: 31) theorised that federations should provide 
more opportunities for Eurosceptic parties due to the importance of sub-national party systems 
and the constitutional checks and balances between the tiers of government. In addition, he 
argued that „in principle, majoritarian systems hold the danger of producing a tyranny of the 
majority whilst proportional systems hold the potential to provide a more effective „voice‟ for 
minority positions, including Eurosceptic positions‟, though he admits that this is over-simplified. 
(Lees, 2008: 38-39). In terms of findings he found that it was difficult to identify a clear causal 
relationship between institutions and the presence and relative strength of party-based 
Euroscepticism. This would be difficult to further assess empirically on a large-n study due to 
difficulties of operationalising electoral systems, party systems, and the impact of federations 
versus unitary structures. These surround the appropriate selection of the various classificatory 
schemes and whether the regional party actors would engage at the European level. 
Clearly within the comparative literature on Eurosceptic party mapping and causation, there has 
already been a tremendous amount of scholarly attention. However, there have been some clear 
omissions, and some specific weaknesses, as well as some specific components, which can be 
utilised or explored further.  
Firstly, in terms of focusing on specific arenas where Euroscepticism has been observed, there 
have been two pieces which have examined national elections (Kresi, 2007; Hellström, 2008); one 
which has focused on the Amsterdam IGC (Aspinwall, 2002), one on the Constitution referenda 
(Crum, 2007); and only one which has focused on the European arena (Hix, 1999). The 
remainder have examined Eurosceptic behaviour as a whole. With the exception of Hix, who 
examined Euro party federations, no one has examined the use of Eurosceptic discourse in 
European election campaigns. This is a clear gap in the literature, which the thesis has set out to 
plug. 
 58 
Secondly, as discussed earlier in the introduction, there are various conceptual weaknesses to 
overcome. Taggart‟s (1998) and later Taggart and Szczerbiak‟s (2001; 2002; 2003; 2008) 
framework was too broad – focusing attention on party discourses which were aimed at 
critiquing the benefits of membership, the general ideas behind European integration, and the 
institutions and policies of the EU. This has been improved on by the work of Kopecký and 
Mudde (2002), as well as Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) who treated these as separate dimensions 
of contestation. However, they should be treated as separate phenomena. Euroscepticism should 
refer to diffuse support – support for the general ideas of European integration. In addition, any 
evaluation of party positions also needs to take account of pro-Europeanism as well as 
Eurosceptic positions. This has been taken account of by Flood (2002), as well as those engaged 
in dimensional analyses (for example, Ray, 1999; Marks and Wilson, 2002; Marks, Wilson, and 
Ray, 2002; Hooghe, Marks and Wilson, 2002). Euroscepticism is possible towards multiple 
elements of the integration project, and while this has been taken account of by (Hooghe, Marks 
and Wilson (2002) and Marks et al (2006) these multiple dimensions do not refer to all the major 
areas, nor focus solely on the general ideas of integration. This is a clear area which where some 
of the developments can be utilised, and further progress made.  
PARTY SYSTEM IMPACT 
The third strand that was identified revolved around the party system perspective and considered 
whether European integration had changed the format or the dynamics of existing domestic 
conflict, and specifically whether conflicts over European integration were assimilated into pre-
existing structures of party competition or whether the issue had produced a new cleavage. Mair 
(2000) argued that there has been almost no direct impact of Europeanization on national party 
systems, though there may have been stronger indirect impacts. With the format of the party 
system, he argued that: 
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Europe has clearly generated new parties, particularly within that segment of opinion 
that is hostile or sceptical towards (further) European integration. But while such new 
parties have emerged, they have tended to remain confined to the European electoral 
arena (Mair, 2000: 30-31).  
With mechanics of party competition, Mair (2000: 31-34) stated that while amounting to 17% of 
parties across the party systems of member states, the anti-Europe bloc polls very few votes and 
hence they have little influence. Additional factors such as extreme domestic ideologies explained 
the remaining variation. By Mair‟s own admission the study was limited, and it is fair to say that 
in some countries it had generated what amounted to an electoral cleavage, for example United 
Kingdom and France (Gabel, 2000a: 57).  
Sitter (2002) argued that approaching Euroscepticism as a cleavage brought the question of 
concept stretching into play. He stated, referring to Lipset and Rokkan‟s cleavage model, that in 
the: 
…[with] more sociological interpretations of the model, new cleavages should therefore 
shape party system re-alignment, while mere „issues‟ would have a less dramatic effect 
(Sitter, 2002: 7).  
 
Euroscepticism hsa not provided much evidence of an effect on the social structure, nor on 
values and beliefs or in producing an organisational reaction within parties (Sitter, 2002: 7-9). 
Much of the American literature (for example, Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks, Wilson and Ray, 
2002; Marks et al, 2004), in addition to stating that ideology is strong predictor of support for 
European integration, argued that conflict over European integration has been amalgamated into 
existing patterns of conflict within national party systems, i.e. the left-right dimension.  
Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008; 348-363) noted three patterns of competition, which characterise 
party systems over the European issue. The first is a system of limited contestation. This system 
entails that the major parties display a strong commitment to European integration and that 
integration is not a source of competition for the mainstream. However, this does not imply the 
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absence of Euroscepticism, but it is essentially confined to the periphery. Examples of party 
systems displaying this behaviour include Germany, France, Italy, Finland, Belgium, Ireland and 
Spain (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008: 348-353). The system of open contestation had three 
relevant characteristics: one or more parties of government have taken a position of 
Euroscepticism; European integration is an important component in party competition, but this 
is not to say it is electorally salient; and that the European issue has played a role in either 
determining the make-up of government or played an important role in determining the 
leadership of a major party. Examples included Britain, Greece (in the early period after 
democratisation), Malta, Denmark, Czech Republic, Sweden, Austria, and Norway (Taggart and 
Szczerbiak, 2008: 348-349, & 354-358). The third system is that of constrained contestation. This 
is where European issues play a role and where Euroscepticism is present, but European issues 
do not generally affect party competition as it is framed in the inevitability of involvement in the 
integration process. Here the vast bulk of the 2004 accession member states could be considered 
as examples.  
Clearly, within this strand, there has been considerable disagreement over the impact of Europe 
on the party system. While Mair‟s (2000) argument is fairly clear over the direct impact of Europe 
on party systems, it tends to downplay, or underestimate the issue and despite this, the issue does 
remain important. Europe is not as divisive an electoral issue as the economy, for example. 
However, as Gabel (2000) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) have demonstrated, in some party 
systems Europe has had a more significant impact. What this underlines is the need to assess the 
overall impact of the country of origin of the political parties as a key independent variable. 
SINGLE COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
The single country case study approach, while not the overall focus of this research thesis, has 
been particularly strong at identifying Euroscepticism amongst centralist and peripheral parties in 
the party system, as well as identifying national contextual factors for the use of Euroscepticism 
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amongst political parties and the general public. Most studies have made use of in-depth 
qualitative assessments, or mixed methods with a heavy qualitative bias. They have used a 
mixture of party documents, parliamentary and newspaper archives, interviews; and in some 
cases Eurobarometer data. There were roughly four categories of contextual factors identified in 
the literature: structure of the party system and institutional structures; ideology; geopolitical and 
historical traditions; and utilitarian concerns. However, through necessity these were broad 
categories.  
With the structure of the party system factor, two articles were relevant. Grunberg (2008: 40-41) 
identified several variables in the French political system which help explain the take up of 
European issues by certain parties since 1991 - the position of the party in relation to holding 
office; the alternation between the moderate right and moderate left; the path dependence of 
previous policy choices for both Mitterand and Chirac; the tempered hostility of the Communist 
Party; and finally the neutralization of the issue by Mitterand and Chirac due to internal divisions 
within their respective parties. He found that the development and current situation of 
Eurosceptic parties was closely linked to the structure of the party system. The major left and 
moderate right could not exercise Euroscepticism due to their involvement with the integration 
process. Aylott (2008: 196-199) argued that the translation of those fears was influenced by the 
ideological predisposition of the Swedish Left and Centre Party, as well as the Christian 
Democrats and Greens. The Social Democrats had a similar but weaker Eurosceptic pull. 
However, structural factors also aided the use of Eurosceptic discourse such as the character of 
the party system and Swedish parliamentary democracy. 
The institutional structures factor saw two relevant pieces. As addressed earlier, Lees (2002: 244-
245) noted that on the one hand political elites in Germany have always been seen as example of 
a model state and the consensus has been stable over time. In addition, despite the potential for 
Eurosceptic discourse to develop as party elites have flirted or made greater use of the issue, as 
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well as increases in the levels of negative public opinion, Germany‟s federal system design creates 
patterns of constraint that limit the strategies, which can be pursued by political actors. As far as 
the national parties go, while they did exhibit positions on integration, these were secondary to 
their wider ideological profiles (Lees, 2008: 35-37). 
Three pieces identified ideology as an important contextual factor, though Euroscepticism was 
part of a wider ideological profile. Quaglia‟s (2008: 58-59) study on Italian Euroscepticism 
posited the argument that with the case of Italian Euroscepticism that while the pro-European 
attitudes of citizens have continued, Eurosceptic positions have mostly surfaced in the centre-
right parties. She noted was that there was very little discussion on the direction of integration, 
and the critique of the EU has taken on the appearance of an extension of domestic politics 
(Quaglia, 2008: 73). Gilland (2008: 130-133) found evidence for both soft and hard Irish 
Eurosceptic parties, though most tended to be left-wing. Furthermore, Euroscepticism for these 
parties was only a small part of their wider ideological profile. Salience of the issue remained low 
and this restricted parties aiming to profile themselves on their Euroscepticism, and finally that 
the ideological constraints on parties in the system were quite severe. Overall, Euroscepticism has 
continued to be a peripheral phenomenon in the Irish political system. Fallend (2008: 201-204) 
found that ideology played a dominant role in the positioning of Austrian Christian Democrats, 
Social Democrats, and more lately the Greens who moderated their stance to campaign for EU-
level environmental policy. Before the leadership of the late Jörg Haider, the position of the FPÖ 
could be explained by ideology and afterwards explained more by the position of the party on the 
periphery of the party system. 
A large number of articles did identify particular geopolitical, historical and traditional factors in 
the use of Euroscepticism in the cases under study. This was perhaps the broadest category with 
other factors coming into play as well. Baker, Gamble, Randall and Seawright (2008: 115-116) 
were keen to point out with the British case that while there has been a powerful predisposition 
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to Euroscepticism due to distinctive geopolitical, economic, constitutional interests and 
traditions, the fluctuating usage of Euroscepticism showed political parties adapting to the 
opportunities and constraints provided by the supranational level. Gómez-Reino, Llamazares and 
Ramiro (2008: 148-149) argued that the articulation of Euroscepticism was strongly conditioned 
by the historical characteristics of the Spanish party system. The orientation of parties was also 
conditioned by the ideological views of party politicians. Soft Euroscepticism was connected with 
fears that integration would reduce public expenditure and damage the welfare state. Peripheral 
nationalities were fearful that integration would negatively affect their aims.  
Hainsworth, O‟Brien and Mitchell (2004) explored the Eurosceptic French right wing, noting 
that while it has been at the forefront of the leadership of European integration, it is still a 
country of strong nationalist sentiments, long history of nation-state construction and 
assimilationist-minded imperialism, and therefore not surprisingly does have its own Eurosceptic 
parties. Sunnus (2004) argued that Euroscepticism in Sweden focuses on issues of democracy and 
sovereignty, particularly over neutrality and the influence of smaller states; the inequality in 
federalism; and issues of gender inequality at the supranational level.  
Spiering (2004: 137-147) posited several explanations for the existence of British Euroscepticism 
- the historical position of the UK in the international system; „differentness‟ in terms of political 
structures; the British adversarial political system; psychological reasons such as different 
formative experiences and the „national psyche‟; and national identity. Lastly, Pelinka (2004: 207-
209) argued that there was no significant fundamental Euroscepticism in Austria, but there 
remained significant differences in positioning between the relevant actors. He accounted for this 
variation by arguing that specific Austrian factors were at play – delayed EU membership, 
permanent neutrality, and the geopolitical situation. This was in addition to the traditional 
explanations put forward such as the political and ideological position of actors, left versus right 
and elite versus masses. 
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With the final category, two pieces identified utilitarian concerns behind the use of 
Euroscepticism. The first, Busch and Knelangen (2004: 83-88) explored German Euroscepticism 
both at the level of the public and political party elites. They noted that “...German public 
opinion, social elites, and political parties have harmoniously supported integration...” (2004: 83). 
Yet from the 1990s onwards the level of public support fell below the EU average. They posited 
explanations such as the impact of the single market, legitimacy and democratic quality, and 
aversion to the introduction of the Euro. With the second, Harmsen (2004: 103-120) identified 
Eurosceptic discourse which highlighted the importance of further liberalisation, the abandoning 
of Social Europe, importance of subsidiarity and particularly reductions in budget contributions.  
As Lees (2006: 1096-1097) noted, with the single-country case study literature, the rationale is to 
explain political phenomena by relying on the rich contextual data derived from comparisons 
over time, while balancing the issues of breath versus depth, micro and macro level 
understandings, rich description and abstraction, as well as inductive versus deductive 
approaches. Specifically, weaknesses can arise as the single country perspective can be prone to 
develop models which are more inductively grounded in a specific context, as well as misusing or 
leading to the hybridization of concepts.  The key issue in this thesis though, is to avoid the idea 
that some countries are more culturally bound to be Eurosceptic and to develop a theoretical 
understanding, which is compatible with numerous contexts. In addition for large-n studies, the 
methodological approach is too time consuming and resource intensive to replicate across 
multiple cases. Yet, there is much that this thesis can take from this section of the existing 
research, specifically the importance of assessing the national context as an independent variable 
(though the thesis continues to underline the rejection of the notion of cultural exceptionalism) 
that was mentioned earlier, and the continued underlining of the importance of ideology in 
explaining why parties are more predisposed to the use of Euroscepticism than others – which 
this thesis has stated as a core argument. 
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PUBLIC EUROSCEPTICISM 
Considerable academic attention has been directed towards examining public Euroscepticism and 
public attitudes towards Europe in member states, candidate-states and non-member states. A 
consistent theme when considering public opinion is that a permissive consensus14 existed and 
that this has eroded with citizens becoming more aware post-Maastricht. Eichenberg and Dalton 
(2007:128-134) noted that support for integration grew during the 1980s, but this began to 
decrease the following the ratification of Maastricht Treaty. They found it was EMU, which 
changed the basis on which citizens evaluate EU policy performance. In particular, the pre- and 
post-Maastricht periods show that the implications of EMU became apparent and that citizens 
feared cuts in governmental spending. The evidence also points to the possibility of citizens 
fearing the harmonisation of social security and other policy areas (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007: 
143-145). So while there has been academic attention towards public opinions before 1992, it has 
become much more relevant post-Maastricht, as well as pre- and post-EMU.  
Specifically, the focus has been on attempting to establish causal relationships between individual, 
societal and structural variables and attitudes towards European integration. In particular, 
scholars have concentrated on economic reasoning and utilitarian considerations (Anderson & 
Shawn Reichart, 1996; Gabel, 1998a; McLaren, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Ray, 2003a; Ray, 
2003b; Luedtke, 2005; Christin, 2005; Hooghe, Huo & Marks, 2007; Liebert, 1997; Gabel, 1998b; 
Sørensen, 2008). Attention has also been given as to whether opinions held by citizens are 
nationally derived or whether they are a product of particular EU events and/or an 
understanding of the European integration processes (Anderson, 1998; Kritzinger, 2003; Lubbers 
and Scheepers, 2005; Karp & Bowler, 2006; Carruba, 2001: Ray, 2003b; Hooghe & Marks, 2005; 
Mattila & Raunio, 2006). In addition, an important concern within the literature has been 
whether public Euroscepticism is a product of elite „cueing‟ or whether the public is indeed 
                                                 
14 See Lindberg and Scheingold, 1979 
 66 
cueing Eurosceptic parties to represent their fears and concerns over the process of integration 
(Binzer and Hobolt, 2005; 2006; De Vries, 2007; Gabel and Scheve, 2007; Steenbergen et al, 
2007; Hix, 2007; Hooghe & Marks, 2008). Finally, there have been studies focused on small-N 
studies (for example Haesly, 2001). 
While the thesis has taken the approach of studying Euroscepticism in the arena of national 
political parties, the literature towards public Euroscepticism is still an important influence. In 
particular, the sub-section of research asks an important question on the direction of Eurosceptic 
cueing – whether party Euroscepticism is derived from a Eurosceptic public or whether the 
public becomes Eurosceptic due to the engagement of parties towards the issue within the 
national party system. What the thesis can take from this is the need to consider this cueing effect 
as an important independent variable. It essentially asks whether the party is responsive to the 
position of the median voter.  
SUMMARY 
This detailed review of the literature has highlighted several key areas of improvement, which 
form the main gaps in the literature. There are several improvements that need to be made to the 
conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, which have also been highlighted in the introduction. 
Firstly, with regard to the specific focus of Euroscepticism it has previously been too broad. 
While this aspect of the criticism has received theoretical attention, it can be taken further by 
focusing solely on the general ideas of integration. Secondly, there has been too much focus on 
European integration as a single dimension of pro versus anti-EU and as a dual dimension of 
economic and political integration. While the field has begun to address the multi-dimensionality 
of the European policy space, this is an area in need of further theoretical work – especially 
surrounding the inclusion of further dimensions of political competition, and the focus on 
processes rather than policies. 
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The field of causation has revealed two specific areas in which this thesis innovates. Currently, 
there has been little attention given to how parties behave Eurosceptically during elections, and 
specifically how national parties use Euroscepticism in European elections. There are still 
remaining questions over the strength of the existing causal factors and with a new set of data 
further evidence of party behaviour can be illuminated. In addition, the literature also highlighted 
the extensive use of expert surveys – which were less accurate in time-series analyses, and did not 
allow the analytical focus to be cast solely on election campaigns – be it national elections, or the 
far less studied European elections.  
More generally, each strand of literature has provided some valid insights. In particular, the party 
system mapping and causation literature provided evidence that Euroscepticism was a much 
broader phenomenon and one that now impacted on even the most pro-European countries. It 
also demonstrated the fluidity of Eurosceptic opinions over the time period, and also the 
importance of considering the impact of the ideological party families, cleavage structures and the 
party‟s strategic environment in determining the response to the integration project. 
The party system perspective literature was particularly important in highlighting the general 
agreement surrounding the impact of Euroscepticism on party system dynamics and patterns of 
party competition. Overall, to describe Euroscepticism as the embodiment of an new electoral 
cleavage, in most cases was to stretch the concept of a cleavage structure, but fundamentally 
Euroscepticism amongst some of the member states has become an important component in 
domestic party competition amongst countries such as Britain, Malta, Denmark, Czech Republic, 
Sweden, Austria and Norway.  
The single country case study literature identified several causal factors in the use of 
Euroscepticism. In particular four themes emerged concerning the structure of the party system 
and institutional structure; ideology, geopolitical and historical traditions; and finally utilitarian 
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concerns. Two of these – ideology and geopolitical and historical traditions – will be assessed in 
the comparative analyses. 
Finally, the public Euroscepticism research was significant in understanding the interaction 
between the citizen and political party on the issue of European integration. In particular, the 
scholarly work focused on the theme of the breakdown of the permissive consensus, establishing 
causal relationships between attitudes towards the EU and individual, societal and structural 
variables, whether citizens derived their opinions from national discourses or particular EU 
events, and/or a particular understanding of the process. The critical element was the study of 
elite versus public cueing of positions towards integration, which will be included in the 
comparative analysis in the form of the median voter position. 
Looking forward, the literature review, as well as the contributions in the introduction provides 
several areas, which need substantial theoretical consideration. Clearly, the conceptualisation of 
Euroscepticism needs to be addressed in light of the criticisms detailed above. Two of the core 
elements of the argument emphasise the need for a dynamic and nuanced conceptualisation that 
takes account of the multi-dimensionality of the policy space. In addition, the fourth core 
element in the argument stressed that political parties are predisposed to react to integration in 
certain ways by their party ideology, operationalised in terms of party families. This will be 
investigated theoretically and hypotheses drawn up. Finally, as stated above, there has been a lack 
of research into party positions towards European integration during election campaigns, and 
especially in European election campaigns. This will need to be concentrated on theoretically in 
light of the traditional view of these elections being dominated by national issues. 
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As stated earlier, the thesis has set out with the overall aim to identify the level and usage of 
Eurosceptic discourse by West European political parties in European elections and to examine 
Eurosceptic causation towards the multi-dimensional integration process. The introduction set 
out the five elements of the core argument: the need for a dynamic and nuanced 
conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional 
framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe 
despite the second-order nature of European elections; the role and importance of ideology in 
structuring political party responses to European integration; and finally the importance of using 
a quantitative manifesto research strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns.  
This chapter provides the theoretical underpinnings to four of the core arguments stated above. 
In addressing the first two elements, it returns to the previous discussions on the weaknesses of 
the existing conceptualisations of Euroscepticism examined in chapters one and two, and 
concentrates on adjusting the field of focus for the phenomenon to analyse the critiques of 
parties towards the general ideas of European integration. It opts for dimensional analyses to 
allow the assessment of pro-European attitudes, and addresses the multi-dimensionality of 
European integration by identifing areas of increased integration, which are then later explored 
within the chapter. In examining the third aspect of the core argument - the role of ideology in 
structuring party positions, it utilises the findings from the discussion of ideology in chapter one, 
and adapts Marks and Wilsons (2000) theoretical discussion on the impact of historical 
predispositions of parties, but departs from their theory by underlining the appropriateness of 
party families as the unit of study. With the final core element of the main argument, the chapter 
inserts a caveat into the second-order theory of European elections.  
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The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, several theoretical developments will be utilised to 
identify appropriate dimensions for studying party positions towards European integration. From 
this, the new approach to conceptualising Euroscepticism will be presented and the forms of 
integration individually analysed to understand the background to these processes. The chapter 
will then move on to discuss causation and produce a set of hypotheses for testing, based on a 
modification of von Beyme‟s (1985) party family framework. Finally, the caveat to the second-
order model of European elections will be presented.  
THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS 
It was Hooghe et al (2002: 966) argument surrounding the need to disaggregate European 
integration into its particular components that provided the theoretical impetus for the multi-
dimensional approach. However, the question remains as to how this should be achieved, and 
what should be focused on in the analysis. Hooghe et al (2002: 967) identified seven policy areas: 
EU environmental policy, EU cohesion policy, EU asylum policy, EU employment policy, EU 
fiscal policy and expanding the EP‟s powers. However, this to some extent appears to be quite 
limited. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005: 228) identified several policy areas in their analysis: 
currency; defence; scientific and technological research; foreign policy towards countries external 
to the EU; fight against drugs; protection of the environment; immigration; asylum seekers; 
education; health and social welfare; fighting unemployment; basic rules for broadcasting and the 
press; and cultural policy. While their research was specifically focused on public Euroscepticism, 
they did identify several important areas such as currency, foreign policy, aspects of social policy 
and cultural policy. 
However, the strongest influence was earlier work of Hooghe and Marks (2001: 17-18). They 
identified that Qualified Majority Voting had been extended to policy fields in the first pillar to 
such processes as the single market, competition policy, EMU, regional policy, trade, 
environment, research and development, transport, employment, immigration, social policy and 
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education. It has also been extended to some of the decision-making in the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy pillar and to the Justice and Home Affairs pillar. It is the identification of 
these pillars, which forms the theoretical basis behind considering additional aspects of 
integration.  Clearly the move towards the single market and EMU signified economic forms of 
integration. The dimension of supranational integration takes account of stances towards the 
growing levels of governance at the supranational level. In addition, legal integration has been 
one of the fundamental bases behind the success of economic integration.  
EUROSCEPTICISM  
As discussed earlier in the introduction, within the literature there were two broad approaches to 
conceptualising the phenomenon, the first of which focused on a very inclusive definition of 
Euroscepticism and used qualitative research strategies. The inclusive definition (Taggart, 1998; 
Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2001; 2002; 2003; 2008) incorporated instrumental concerns (such as 
whether membership was of benefit to the country), diffuse support - support for the general 
ideas of integration (see Kopecký and Mudde, 2002), and specific support - support for the 
practice of integration (see Kopecký and Mudde, 2002). Furthermore initially Euroscepticism was 
treated as analytically separate from pro-Europeanism. While some of these issues were later 
addressed by separating the concerns (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005) 
and including pro-Europeanism (Flood, 2002), there were two further issues that were not 
addressed. These were the multi-dimensionality of the European integration project and the 
problem of typologies. Taggart and Szczerbiak‟s (2001; 2002; 2003; 2008) two-category 
classification was very strong in being applicable to multiple cases, but told the analyst very little 
about what the individual parties shared in terms of the their more nuanced positions towards 
European integration. On the other end of the scale Flood‟s (2002) typology had so many 
categories that not only was it difficult to apply to more than one case study due to the extensive 
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qualitative and nuanced data necessary, it suffered from the perennial problem in comparative 
political science of too many variables and not enough cases.  
On the other side of the research field, the analyses dealt with many of the issues facing those 
qualitative researchers mentioned above, but their approach had its own inherent problems. 
Initially, they also suffered from taking a too inclusive approach to studying party positions 
towards integration. While both pro and anti positions were included, they conceptualised the 
policy space as a single pro versus anti-EU dimension (Ray, 1999), and alternatively as high 
versus low regulation (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000 in Marks and Steenbergen, 2002: 886). 
Subsequently, a dual dimensional conceptualisation was used. This included both economic and 
political integration – which were then subsumed within left-right dimension.  
Later, the multi-dimensionality of European integration was addressed which constituted a strong 
step forward within the field (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks et al, 2006). However, 
several issues remain. These revolve around the continued highlighting of the relevance of the 
left-right dimension in which the multiple dimensions they identify are then subsumed, as well as 
whether the dimensions identified are the most relevant new areas of conflict towards 
integration. In addition, the separation of behaviour (whether party positions reflect criticisms 
towards the general ideas behind integration, or specific issues with the content of each policy 
area) needs to be achieved at least at the theoretical level, even if it is more difficult to accomplish 
empirically.     
The new definition used in this research was presented in the introduction, but the theoretical 
rationale behind its construction will be further investigated below.  Having established the multi-
dimensional nature of the contemporary European integration process above, the focus needs to 
be turned towards the essence of the Eurosceptic phenomenon. Katz (2008: 154), in considering 
his own use of the concept of Euroscepticism asked several significant questions and 
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observations. Firstly, he asked what is the „scepticism‟ aspect of the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism. As it has been developed it generally denotes opposition to the European 
project, however the term „scepticism‟ usually refers to doubts and reservations, rather than 
outright rejection. This is a fundamental point in developing the new definition and analytical 
framework. So the question is what can Euroscepticism refer to and in developing a definition of 
the concept what „should‟ it refer to? 
Forster‟s (2002:2) argument that “Euroscepticism can be understood by taking account of its 
multi-faceted nature” is an important consideration when theorising what Euroscepticism 
consists of. Euroscepticism in its simplest form referred to negative opinions towards European 
integration. Potentially this can encompass a broad range of opinions on European integration – 
past, present and future; its nature – whether that is its economic, political, social or cultural 
aspects; its method of organisation – for example its institutions, the perceived lack of 
democratic legitimacy amongst some or all of the institutions; its policy areas – their negative 
externalities towards the interests of member states, and also possibly the growth or decline of 
these areas. It can also include the centralisation of decision-making, the potential and achieved 
efficiency in all areas of interest; the perceived growth of European integration, and finally where 
integration should finish – where should Europe‟s borders lie and how many member states 
should the European Union encompass.  
Picking up on the „finish line‟ of European integration, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970: 24) noted 
when considering how to evaluate the growth and achievements of the EC that:  
One obvious referent is the nation-state, but except among some federalists, a new 
European super-state has never been posited as the necessary end-point of the integrative 
process. 
  
That a new European super-state had never been conceived - especially during the early history 
of the Community - as an end point is an important consideration when evaluating whether 
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scepticism towards a “European state” can be construed as Euroscepticism. Conversely, 
Euroscepticism could also include those opinions, which are critical of the slowing or the current 
rate of European integration. 
Euroscepticism had already been considered as being limited to a more narrow conceptualisation: 
in terms of being pro- or anti-integration (Ray, 1999); high or low regulation (Tsebelis and 
Garrett, 2000 in Marks and Steenbergen, 2002: 886); and an integration-independence dimension 
orthogonal to the left-right (Hix, 1999: 73). However, despite this, it was Hix (1999: 69-70) that 
laid the groundwork necessary to move on from considering integration as uni-dimensional, but 
also the importance of considering its multi-faceted terms. He argued that: 
...the EU is now more of a „political system‟ than an international organisation. The EU 
has a trias politica: with executive, legislative and judicial functions. The amount of 
resources that are directly redistributed through the exercise of these functions may be 
marginal compared to the domestic level in Europe. However, through the convergence 
criteria for EMU, the rules for the Single Market and EU social policy, the regulatory and 
(indirect) redistributional impact of EU decision making is enormous...Moreover, through 
EU environment policy, equal opportunities legislation, provisions on EU citizenship, 
culture and media policies and the emerging policies against racism and xenophobia, the 
EU has an increasing impact on the allocation of values and norms in Europe.   
 
Equally, Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 966) also prepared the way for reconsidering the way 
in which integration is viewed by disaggregating integration into multiple elements – a traditional 
pro vs. anti-integration dimension, environmental, cohesion, asylum, fiscal, foreign policy and EP 
powers dimensions. They found that conflicts on all of these dimensions could be subsumed 
within the traditional left-right dimension along with a new politics dimension capturing green-
libertarian and traditional-authoritarian values. While this thesis disagrees that these dimensions 
can be subsumed within the traditional left-right scale, it is particularly illuminating, that 
integration is viewed in a disaggregated fashion.   
What has been established is the need to approach Euroscepticism in terms of its underlying 
components. As was stated in the introduction, this should take the form of economic 
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liberalisation and economic harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy 
integration. Therefore the following definition of Euroscepticism has been constructed. 
Euroscepticism refers to:  
…the sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards economic, 
supranational, legal, social, cultural integration or foreign policy integration in Europe.  
The disaggregation of integration dimensions raises an important issue of surrounding 
“integration policy packages”. This was raised by Katz (2008: 155) and he argued that unpacking 
Euroscepticism is on the one hand a good idea, but Europhiles have generally adopted the 
strategy of presenting varying levels and foci of scepticism as intertwined. Secondly, while they 
can be separated, proposals put forward for extending integration have usually been presented as 
packages of proposals rather than movement in one area of integration or another. For example, 
the Nice Treaty, set out the groundwork for expansion of the geographic reach of the Union, 
restricted the veto available to member states in around thirty individual policy areas, as well as 
altered the voting power among member states by furthering qualified majority voting.  Katz has 
made a fair point here, but his position is open to criticism. Proposals have never been presented 
fait acompli, and parties of the member state governments will have preferences as to which points 
to press for, which to concede and areas under which they will absolutely reject developments. 
Party actors may be forced to concede in some areas, but these are far from the package deals 
described by Katz at the stage of negotiation. One caveat does exist here in that once they reach 
the member states for ratification then they are presented as package deals, however, parties will 
have been aware of the developments at an early stage.  
Two final observations have had a significant impact on choosing to advance this project with a 
multi-dimensional framework. Firstly Katz (2008: 156) asked should Euroscepticism be 
operationalised in absolute or relative terms and secondly, given that the „European project‟ has 
and continues to evolve over time, “about which one might be sceptical is in effect a moving 
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target”. However it is precisely due to the use of a multi-dimensional framework that this moving 
target is not misunderstood. Using single or dual dimensions provides comparatively little data on 
whether parties across EU member states are indeed focusing their criticisms or their rejectionist 
discourses at the same developments in integration. One can indeed envision a party being 
supportive of the majority of forms of integration, but one particular set of proposals in an area 
of integration may be too far. Less nuanced frameworks will pick this scepticism up and 
potentially classify a party as Eurosceptic, but will not necessarily take the supportive nature of 
party towards the remaining aspects of integration into account.      
Critical to the development of the framework is to select dimensions of competition, which have 
a minimal amount of shared variance that they explain. Tests for multicollinearity using a 
correlation matrix confirm that none of the identified dimensions are very highly correlated with 
each other (≥ 0.75). The highest correlations are between economic harmonisation and foreign 
policy integration (.464**), and between legal integration and foreign policy integration (0.409**). 
See table 1 below: 
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Table 1: Multicollinearity Correlation Matrix 
 
Social 
Integration Supranational Integration 
Legal 
Integration 
Cultural 
Integration 
Economic 
Harmonisation 
Foreign Policy 
Integration 
Economic 
Liberalisation 
Social Integration 1 0.47 0.190** 0.58 0.077 0.128* 0.032 
        
Supranational Integration 0.47 1 0.306** 0.376** 0.173** 0.150** -0.004 
        
Legal Integration 0.190** 0.306** 1 0.201** 0.318** 0.409** 0.261** 
        
Cultural Integration 0.58 0.376** 0.201** 1 0.095* 0.108* 0.017 
        
Economic Harmonisation 0.77 0.173** 0.318** 0.095* 1 0.464** 0.290** 
        
Foreign Policy 
Integration 0.128* 0.150** 0.409** 0.108* 0.464** 1 0.283** 
        
Economic Liberalisation 0.32 -0.004 0.261** 0.017 0.290** 0.283** 1 
n=588; ** Correlation was significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation was significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
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In addition, by disaggregating Euroscepticism into its component elements, it is possible to place 
individual parties‟ campaigns according to specific positions on the individual dimensions of 
Euroscepticism (see figure 216). This graphical representation allows a more simplified 
understanding of shifts in support by each Eurosceptic party. To illustrate the following example 
describes how this operates: Party A, for example, is very sceptical about supranational 
integration and economic liberalisation, but is very positive about economic harmonisation and 
legal integration, and has no stated preferences for social and cultural integration…. Party B, on 
the other hand, is negative about economic harmonisation, legal and supranational integration, 
but is very positive towards economic liberalisation, as well as social integration, and finally has a 
slight preference towards cultural integration.  
Figure 2: Multi-dimensional framework 
 
The British Conservative Party provides an accurate illustration of the need for understanding the 
importance of changes of time and the multi-dimensional nature of the phenomenon. Their 
drastic re-orientation during the late 1980s and early 1990s is a good example of the multi-
dimensional nature of Euroscepticism, the changing nature of the European integration project, 
and the evolving nature of the party. While the party was very much in favour of the single 
market through the enactment of the Single European Act (1986) as it furthered the neo-liberal 
                                                 
16 These diagrams are provided in the appendix for all fifteen party systems over the time period. Parties with 
multiple missing entries for the elections were removed for the later analyses, but plotted on the diagrams. 
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agenda put forward under Margaret Thatcher, it resisted the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty 
(1992), which incorporated much further deepening of supranational integration. Another 
example was the attempted harmonisation of social rights for workers through the enactment of 
the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, which again produced a reorientation of the British 
Conservative Party against European integration. 
To clarify the decisions over the construction of the definition it is necessary to briefly 
deconstruct it and to focus on potential areas of significance. Firstly, the use of the term 
„sustained‟ is important as the majority of parties have engaged in criticising a particular aspect of 
integration or European affairs, but fundamentally a parties‟ discourse should only be classified as 
Eurosceptic when used more substantially. However, this does raise difficulties in 
operationalisation and measurement of the concept of „sustained‟. This has been solved by 
introducing a threshold whereby only parties who have devoted more than five percent of their 
negative discourse to a particular aspect of integration should be classified as Eurosceptic. 
Secondly, the use of the terms critical and rejectionist have also been deliberate. Critical refers to 
the expression of “...adverse or disapproving comments or judgements” (Soanes & Hawker, 
2005: 232-233). The reason for the inclusion of „critical‟ is that it captures harmful and 
disapproving comments or judgements while excluding more general complaints.  To reject refers 
“to dismiss as inadequate or faulty”; “to refuse to consider or agree to”; and finally “to fail to 
show due affection or concern for” (Soanes & Hawker, 2005: 866).  This was included to capture 
the most disparaging comments.  
Euro-rejectionism has been downplayed as it suggests an outright dismissal of the whole 
integration project. This would be an inappropriate classificatory scheme to capture those parties 
who have previously supported and continue to support economic liberalisation and specifically 
the creation of the single market, but reject aspects of further supranational integration and 
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economic harmonisation. This has been the position, to varying degrees, of both the British 
Conservative Party and the Czech ODS (Civic Democrats) under Václav Klaus. 
FORMS OF INTEGRATION 
Having established the need to take account of the multi-faceted nature of Euroscepticism, and 
having provided an alternative definition and framework, it is now crucial to develop the 
theoretical underpinnings of each process of integration.  
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Economic integration has been divided into two sub-dimensions of economic liberalisation and 
economic harmonisation. Economic liberalisation was the foundation of the European 
integration project. It consisted of internal trade liberalisation and underwent three major phases. 
The first, which started with the signing of the Treaty of Rome, was the elimination of customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions, giving „free‟ movement throughout the six signatories to 
goods, services, capital and people. The second period lasted from around 1973 to 1986 which 
saw the expansion of membership, however much of the fervour for further liberalisation was 
lost at this time. Finally the third period, which ended in 1992 with the Maastricht Treaty, saw the 
completion of the single market and the reduction/elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade 
(Sapir, 1992: 1491).17  
Harmonisation involved the removal of further barriers to trade as a result of differing product 
specifications; trading laws; tax regimes; regulatory systems; and currency values. Dashwood 
(1981: 7) argued that it:  
…involves the adoption of legislation by the community institutions that is designed to 
bring about changes in the internal legal systems of the member states.  
However, the aim of harmonisation has not been the complete removal of disparities between 
the member-states national legal systems.  This is because the presence of further disparities in 
                                                 
17 The Economic and Monetary Union project was deliberately excluded from this dimension as it was not strictly necessary to adopt a single 
currency as part of trade liberalisation and instead has been classified as Economic harmonisation 
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some of the legal fields is unlikely to affect the running of the European market all.  Yet, 
harmonisation measures may be needed even if all member states have the same rule due to the 
differences in the way each legal system interprets the rule (Dashwood, 1981: 7-8).  
SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION 
Supranational integration involves the transfer of competencies traditionally associated with 
national governments and administrations. Nugent (1999: 502) argued it:  
…involves states working with one another in a manner that does not allow them to 
retain complete control over developments. That is, states may be obliged to do things 
against their preferences and their will because they do not have the power to stop 
decisions. Supranationalism thus takes inter-state relations beyond co-operation into 
integration, and involves some loss of national sovereignty.  
It is perhaps the growth of supranational governance that has caused the most intense debates 
within national political parties. While intergovernmental decision making on a multi-lateral level 
has involved compromise and in some cases net losses for individual states, the key drivers of 
policy have remained national political leaders. However, supranationalism involves the 
delegation of decision-making powers, and sovereign governments take the decision: 
…to address problems that cannot be dealt with effectively at the national level…jointly 
develop international governance structures. Increasingly, the design of such structures 
involves the delegation of decision-making powers to institutions that are organisationally 
and politically independent of the founding states, and therefore conceived of as 
„supranational‟  (Tallberg, 2002: 23). 
Essentially parties have seen this as an issue of sovereignty and their ability to continue to 
formulate policy based on national priorities. The reality of whether or not nationally derived 
policies are possible in the face of globalisation and the growth of the international economy is 
immaterial. In addition, Tallberg (2002: 23) identifies a further issue over the lack of democracy 
that supranational institutions entail:  
…the evolution of international governance reflects a general development in politics: the 
delegation of political authority from representative organs to non-majoritarian 
institutions, which are neither directly elected by the people nor directly managed by 
elected politicians.  
 82 
LEGAL INTEGRATION 
Legal integration has produced large ramifications for the member states. One difficulty is to 
disentangle the „legal‟ aspects of integration from the other dimensions of political conflict over 
European integration. The treaties have provided some of the means in integrating legal aspects, 
but for the most part it has been the proactive attitude taken by the court in applying the treaty 
clauses and expanding on its own powers. As Garrett argued (1995: 171) the 1957 Treaty of 
Rome and its subsequent amendments - the 1987 Single European Act and the 1993 Treaty on 
European Union – have operated as a de facto constitution. In addition, the impact of 
preliminary references, the doctrines of direct effect, supremacy, indirect effect and governmental 
liability and finally the imposition of a foreign legal culture all have had the capability to generate 
Eurosceptic positions. As Wincott (2000: 5) argued: 
Eurosceptics see the Court as taking up a „political‟, „legislative‟ or „policy-making‟ stance 
and wresting political sovereignty from the member states. 
  
With the creation of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European legal system was 
designed so that a vast majority of European cases could arise through two paths – direct actions 
and preliminary references. The direct actions path referred to cases brought directly to the ECJ 
by the Commission or a member state government. The inclusion of preliminary references was 
an extremely significant step in integration as the path referred to cases brought about when a 
national court referred a case by a private litigant to the ECJ. Once that opinion was passed back 
down to the national court, the national court would then make a final ruling (Carruba & Murrah, 
2005: 400). Originally when it was designed there was little evidence of the potential impact of 
Europeanisation on national courts, indeed until 1963, the enforcement of the Rome treaty, like 
that of any other international treaty, depended entirely on action by the national legislatures of 
the member states of the community (Burley & Mattli, 1993: 42).  
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From the early 1960s onwards the impact of the European Court of Justice began to increase 
dramatically. The greatest period of development of European legal integration was during the 
1962-1979 period. This saw the doctrine of supremacy emerge from the ruling in the case of 
Costa in 1964, which essentially laid down the rule that in any conflict between a Community legal 
rule and the rule of national law, the Community law had to be given primacy over the latter. 
Indeed later in the case of Simmenthal in 1978, the court ruled to the effect that every Community 
rule from the moment of entry into force would automatically render the conflicting piece of 
national legislation inapplicable (Stone Sweet & Brunell, 1998: 66; Carrubba & Murrah, 2005: 
400-402). In addition, the Van Gend en Loos case in 1963 and the 1964 Costa v. ENEL case 
allowed for the emergence of the doctrine of direct effect. Direct effect declared that citizens 
have rights under EU law and, thus, national courts could apply EU law themselves. 
Furthermore, the impact of both of these doctrines on the preliminary rulings was immense as 
charges of non-compliance were no longer limited to direct action and individuals could bring 
charges of non-compliance against governments, agencies, businesses, and other private actors in 
their national courts (Carrubba & Murrah, 2005: 400-402). 
By the 1980s saw the second wave of constitutionalisation, and with that the doctrine of indirect 
effect emerged. It was the 1984 case of Von Colson in particular saw the doctrine of indirect effect 
emerge which inferred the responsibility for national judges to interpret national law so that it 
conformed with EC law. Later in the 1990 case of Marleasing, the court clarified the meaning of 
indirect effect, ruling that when a directive has not been transposed or has been transposed 
incorrectly into national law, national judges were obliged to interpret national law as if it were in 
conformity with European law. The doctrine essentially gave national judges the power to rewrite 
national legislation – in processes of “principled construction” – in order to render EC law 
applicable in the absence of implementing measures (Stone Sweet and Brunell, 1998: 66). 
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The doctrine of governmental liability emerged in the 1991 case of Francovich. According to this 
rule, a national court can hold a member state liable for damages caused to individuals due to the 
state‟s failure to implement a directive properly. The national court could then require the state to 
compensate such individuals for their financial losses (Stone Sweet & Brunell, 1998: 66).  
The integration of private law also had and continues to have the potential for friction. Caruso 
(1997) defined private law as:  
…an integrated system of rules, standards and principles, which together form an 
autonomous subset, conventionally severable from the rest of the legal regime of which 
they are part (Caruso, 1997: 5).  
 
In addition he argued that contemporary private law is supposedly concerned with the horizontal 
dimension of citizens‟ interaction, based on a presumption of the formal equality of individuals. 
While the Treaty of Rome (1957) was essentially public in its legal provisions, there has been 
some evidence of the impact of European legal integration on the national civil codes. This 
however, was limited to matters to ensure the liberalization of the market, for example in the 
field of consumer protection. Yet, this remains a field with potential further future integration as 
for example, in 1989 the European Parliament called for the drawing up of a European Code of 
Private Law (Legrand, 1996: 53). 
Overall, legal systems have their own cultural element. They have their own cultural identity and 
encode national experiences. Essentially rules are “…the outward manifestation of an implicit 
structure of attitude and references, they are a reflection of a given legal culture” (Legrand, 1996: 
57.). However, rules do not constitute the entirety of law, on the contrary „legal‟ cannot be 
separated analytically from the „social‟ that underpins the legal system. In essence, the European 
Union‟s rules signify its own legal culture and have been produced by human agency through 
institutional structures and legal processes containing their own social component (Legrand, 
1996: 57-60). There is something intrinsically national about each national legal system. Legal 
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culture differs state to state, and the European legal system has developed from the growth in the 
activity of the Community. The EU represents a body of law and rules, which have been 
developed from institutional structures and legal processes outside a particular nation state and 
hence have had the potential for a large amount of friction. 
SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
Social integration has been one of the least developed processes of European integration. It can 
generally be defined as “an attempt to correct the negative externalities from economic 
integration from a non-national platform”.  
At the national level social policy has been seen as the use of: 
…political power to supersede, supplement, or modify operations of the economic 
system in order to achieve results which the economic system would not achieve on its 
own (Marshall, 1975: 15). 
 
 For Marshall, social policy was seen in its broadest terms and included maintaining income 
during sickness, unemployment allowance, old age allowance (old age pension) and family 
allowance, as well as housing, education, community services and health care (Marshall 1975: 11-
16).  This has traditionally been the exclusive domain of national government, and national party 
platforms in deciding on the delivery method and funding for these policy areas. 
In examining the supranational level for developments in the field of social integration, one is left 
with the impression that there had been little achieved and there is little scope for action. 
According to Leibfried and Pierson (1995:44) there were no welfare laws at the EU level which 
would grant individual entitlements from Brussels; no direct taxes or funding for a social budget; 
and no Brussels welfare bureaucracy to speak of. This was reiterated by Falkner (1998: 56-60) 
who argued that there were scarce legal competencies for the development of a social policy at 
the European level. The only explicit Community competence was aimed at promoting the 
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freedom of movement for workers by abolishing any discrimination based on nationality in 
regard to employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. Yet, in the 
EEC Treaty there were a small number of concessions for the more „interventionist‟ social policy. 
These revolved around equal pay for both sexes, on maintaining „the existing equivalence 
between paid holiday schemes, and the establishment of a European Social Fund.  
The Commission was given the task of promoting close co-operation between member states in 
the social field, particularly in matters relating to employment; labour law and working 
conditions; basic and advanced vocational training; social security; prevention of occupational 
accidents and diseases; occupational hygiene; the right of association; and collective bargaining 
between employers and workers. In other areas of EEC activity, the Commission was 
empowered to present legislative proposals with a view to Council deliberation of binding EC 
law, however with social policy the Commission could only act in close contact with member 
states by making studies, delivering opinions and arranging consultations both on problems 
arising at national level and on those of concern to international organisations in the social area 
(Falkner, 1998: 56-60).  
Despite this, there were at least some attempts by member state governments to reconfigure 
Community ambitions towards an EC social policy by agreeing to adopt measures on 
employment policy, harmonisation of working conditions, health and safety, but these fell short 
of ambitions. With the Single European Act, social policy did not become a focus for action, 
though health and safety regulations could be issued from the European level through directives 
as these might be used as non-tariff barriers. In addition a social dialogue between management 
and labour at the European level was to be encouraged (Ross, 1995: 360-362). 
The Maastricht Treaty was a turning point in supranational social policy. Here Community 
competencies were extended to include working conditions, the information and consultation of 
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workers, equality between men and women with regard to labour market opportunities and 
treatment at work, and the integration of persons excluded from the labour market. Issues such 
as pay, the right of association, the right to strike, and the right to impose lockouts were excluded 
from the minimum harmonisation standards that the Commission was trying to promote. The 
scope of potential areas of European co-operation was increased to include social security and 
social protection of workers as well as protection for workers made redundant, representation of 
worker and employer issues, for example, but these needed to be agreed unanimously (Falkner et 
al, 2005: 44).  
Subsequently, the Amsterdam summit saw social provisions agreed at Maastricht incorporated 
into the Treaty after the defeat of the British Conservative Government in 1997. The only other 
significant innovation was the new employment policy chapter of the EC Treaty. While this 
excluded harmonisation of domestic laws, it enabled the regular co-ordination of national 
employment policies. It also outlined community action to be undertaken against any form of 
discrimination. The Nice Treaty of 2001 gave the option, within some fields, for the application 
of the co-decision procedure on worker protection with redundancy, representation of collective 
interests and employment of third country nationals. Finally the Union gained the ability to adopt 
more measures to encourage co-operation on all social issues (Falkner et al, 2005: 44-45).  
Clearly, social provisions at the supranational level have not become as integrated as other areas, 
but there have been significant steps forwards, especially during the Maastricht Treaty. Yet it still 
remains a particularly important area which can and has led to political conflict as it touches upon 
traditional nation state competencies, and more fundamentally impacts on the particular type of 
economy the member state runs – i.e. the level of government intervention in the market.  
CULTURAL INTEGRATION 
European integration as a whole has the potential to be seen as a threat to national identity and 
national culture when these are conceptualised as homogenous and unique to the „ethnic‟ 
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community. As Banús (2002: 159) argued there has been the tendency to consider cultural unity 
(and linguistic unity) as an important part of political unity. Inherent to the process of nation 
building seems to have been cultural homogenisation, forging a “cultural identity”. 
It is particularly useful to examine the work of Miller and Yúdice (2002). Culture they suggested 
„is connected to policy in two registers: the aesthetic and the anthropological‟ (Miller and Yúdice, 
2002: 1). The aesthetic register refers to artistic output, and culture within this context is seen as 
an indicator of similarities and differences in terms of taste and status within social groups of a 
particular community (Miller & Yúdice, 2002: 1). Their second category, the anthropological 
register, saw culture as an indication of how a particular group of people, a community, live their 
lives, the senses of place and person, which are grounded in language, religion, custom, time and 
space. Furthermore, it is the anthropological register that articulates differences between 
populations (Miller & Yúdice, 2002: 1).  
Shore (2000: 22-23) suggested five broad categories of usage for the concept of culture: firstly 
culture has been restricted to questions of art, the entertainment industries or the acquisition of 
learning (similar to the aesthetic register of Miller and Yúdice, 2002); secondly, it has been 
construed in terms of acquired learning or „civilisation‟; thirdly, it can refer to organisational 
culture in that it is seen as the informal concepts, attitudes and values of a workforce or formal 
organisational values and practices imposed by management; fourthly culture can be to refer to a 
particular way of life – of a people, period, group or humanity – informed by a common spirit 
(Tyler, 1971 cited in Shore, 2000: 23); and finally culture is presented as an indigenous category.  
So if the European Community/European Union has been promoting a European culture in 
whatever form, what is a „cultural policy‟? Adapting Miller and Yúdice‟s work (2002: 1) cultural 
policy can be seen as a way of „bridging the two registers‟ – institutional supports which promote 
and channel aesthetic creativity and understandings of collective ways of life. Essentially cultural 
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policy is embodied in systematic, regulatory guides to action that are adopted by organisations to 
achieve their goals. In addition within the European member states there have been differing 
national priorities and levels of involvement within cultural policy. Particularly, within countries 
with more liberal traditions (for example, the United Kingdom and some of the Scandinavian 
countries) culture has been considered as a matter of choice, determined by individual freedom, 
where the state should interfere as little as possible. Therefore, there is little tradition of 
„Ministries of Culture‟ in the United Kingdom or in Scandinavian countries. Elsewhere more 
countries have followed the so-called „French‟ model, where the state not only awards direct 
subsidies but also plays a role in cultural management (Banús, 2002: 159). Therefore it is 
necessary to utilise the somewhat loose definition posited above.  
This then raises a further question of what were the goals behind the creation of a supranational 
cultural policy? Legitimacy has been one of the most important factors driving cultural 
integration and a „cultural policy‟ of the EU. European integration has long been seen as an elitist 
project. Yet, in order for the European integration project to continue, some level of popular 
attachment is necessary, as Kostakopoulou (2001: 46) argued: 
 …as an emerging polity, the EC/EU has to foster a sense of solidarity among European 
peoples who would not hesitate to participate in the project of European unification and 
support in times of crises.  
 
This was a point supported by (Pantel, 1999: 46) who argued that: 
…the existence of an overarching European identity is essential for its legitimation. 
Without a common culture to bind together diverse Europeans, they argue, the European 
polity cannot garner the deep-rooted, long-term support it requires from its citizens.  
 
Furthermore a theme, which has emerged out of the security literature, is that the European 
Union‟s position would be strengthened as an international actor by the creation of collective 
identity vis-à-vis the rest of the world (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 14). There were other goals – for 
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example, the protection of European cultural heritage against the impact of globalisation, and the 
promotion of solidarity amongst nation states. 
It is acknowledged within the literature that the real shift towards the development of a cultural 
policy took place during the early 1970s. Pantel (1999: 48) noted that efforts to link cultural unity 
and support for deeper European integration could be found within the founding treaty (Treaty 
of Rome, 1957). Kostakopoulou (2001) acknowledged this, but argued that while the period 
between 1958-1972 did not see an official cultural policy, through the fleshing out and realisation 
of the provisions for freedom of movement of peoples within the Treaty of Rome, its restriction 
to nationals of the founding member states effectively prevented many third-country nationals 
from taking advantage of this provision. This amounted to the creation of the „other‟ in the 
formation of a European identity. 
With the establishment of the programme for political union, it became necessary to have 
Europeans. At the Copenhagen Summit in 1973, the nine Member States adopted a “Declaration 
on European Identity”. This document set out a definition of a:  
European identity based on the principles of the rule of law, social justice, respect for 
human rights and democracy, and in relation to: (i) the status and the responsibilities of 
the nine member states vis-à-vis the rest of the world; (ii) the dynamic nature of the 
process of European unification. The political definition of European identity was 
intertwined with Euro-centric statements invoking a common European civilisation 
whose survival had to be ensured (Kostakopoulou, 2001: 45). 
 
In December 1974, the Paris Summit Conference endorsed the idea of a European identity and 
gave it more concrete substance by specifying policy objectives, such as elections for the 
European Parliament on the basis of direct universal suffrage, special rights for citizens of the 
nine Member States and the creation of passport union. The follow up report on European 
Union proposed the protection of the rights of Europeans, and identified three areas for action: 
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protection of fundamental rights in view of the gradual increase in the powers of European 
institutions; consumer rights; and the protection of the environment (Kostakopoulou, 2001).  
Finally, during the last sixteen years, within the European Commission, there has been a 
Directorate General for Culture and a member of the Commission with special responsibilities 
for Culture; and, there is a specific programme with clear objectives and conditions for 
participating, supported by a budgetary allocation. This budgetary item is dedicated almost 
entirely to the new cultural instrument, the Culture 2000 Programme. This programme followed 
a Council resolution of September 1997, made in response to growing pressure for some 
initiative in this area.  Culture 2000 was intended to contribute `to the promotion of a cultural 
area common to the European peoples' in terms of specific innovative and/ or experimental 
actions, integrated actions, covered by structured, multiannual transnational cultural co-operation 
agreements, and special cultural events with a European or international dimension, such as the 
European Capital of Culture and the Cultural Month. The programme declared the objectives of 
`highlighting the cultural diversity' and the `sharing and highlighting' of `the common cultural 
heritage of European significance' (Banús, 2002: 161). 
FOREIGN POLICY INTEGRATION  
Despite the economic character that dominated the early years of the European Community, 
attempts at co-ordinating and integration in the area of foreign and defence policy have indeed 
been important from the very beginning of European integration. Yet, European foreign policy 
integration is a field which has seen quite a few initiatives that didn‟t live up to their intended 
roles – in particular the European Defence Community failed to get off the ground during the 
1950s, and much more recently the policy actions in the first Gulf War and those during the 
break-up of Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. Jørgensen (2004: 11) identified six significant areas 
addressed by Europe‟s common foreign policy – a bilateral relationship between the US and 
Europe; relations with Eastern Europe and pre/post-Soviet Union; relations with developing 
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countries, especially the ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific); a common trade policy; Europe‟s 
joint policy towards ex-Yugoslavia (though some would rightly argue it was almost a policy 
failure); and finally other geographical and thematic areas such as EuroMed (Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership); Central America; China; dialogues with the Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN); Gulf Co-operation Council; the Southern Common Market (Mercosur); 
negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and UN policy making.  
Foreign policy integration revolves around the promotion of harmonised European positions 
towards third party states, international organisations and in international multilateral 
negotiations. In addition, the promotion of a military capability is important.  Fears over the 
potential consequences of integration have resulted in vetoes from various member states. This is 
perhaps best demonstrated by the institutional set up of the area. Since the early 1970s it has 
involved a complex fusion of several institutional forms: intergovernmental, transgovernmental, 
and supranational (Smith, 1998 in Smith 2004: 740). In particular questions over the role and 
scope of EU centric policy, loss of sovereignty, the undermining of the traditional US-European 
relationship and primacy of NATO. Despite the instances of stuttering progress, the 
developments have been important, and because of this, foreign policy integration is an area 
where strong Eurosceptic discourses potentially can develop. The developments of foreign and 
defence policy integration in the European Community and later European Union are briefly 
outlined below. 
The early arrangements took the form of two French proposals – the European Defence 
Community (EDC) and the Fouchet Plans. The EDC was a French plan devised in 1950 to create 
an integrated European army, but were rejected by France‟s National Assembly in 1954. The 
Fouchet plans, named after French President Charles de Gaulle‟s advisor Christian Fouchet, were 
de Gaulle‟s attempts to create a European political-military grouping distinct from the United 
States. Contradictorily, the French National Assembly rejected the EDC largely because it was 
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too integrated and too Atlanticist, and the Fouchet Plans were rejected by the Belgians and Dutch 
in 1962 because they were not integrated and not Atlanticist enough (Gordon, 1997/98: 83-84). 
The key failures during early 1950s and the solidifying of NATO‟s role as the key defence 
institution, saw Europe as a „civilian power‟ emerge with the emphasis for diplomacy to be 
centred on the economic sphere. During the 1960s some further integration was seen - despite 
the failure of the French Fouchet plan, which had been designed to enable foreign policy co-
ordination. The first significant steps from the purely economic sphere for foreign affairs were 
seen with the emergence of the Davignon plan and the European Political Community. The 1970s 
and early 1980s saw increasingly diplomatic co-ordination among members that were driven by 
factors such as the 1973 enlargement, US initiatives being perceived as risky and the politicisation 
of „economic‟ issues. Furthermore new patterns of co-operation emerged and the period also saw 
the consolidation of the EPC by the London Report of 1981, the Solemn Declaration on 
European Union, and the Single European Act (SEA) (Smith, 2003: 559-561). 
The SEA finally gave the Commission a role in both political and economic aspects of security 
and emphasised the need to avoid vetoing when the potential for consensus existed. However, 
most outcomes were declarations only, had little effect and the EPC remained limited in 
European foreign policy making. However, the EPC improved understanding among member-
state actors and helped harmonise positions (Gordon, 1997/98: 84-85). 
The Maastricht Treaty was a significant step in foreign policy integration. It established the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy, and allowed the possibility of merging the West European 
Union and EU. Furthermore, it provided a new basis for development by consolidating and 
embedding gains from the EPC, as well as providing joint action procedures, which allowed for 
the possibility of Qualified Majority Voting (Smith, 2003: 561). Yet while the Maastricht Treaty 
provisions had moved from „co-operation‟ to common policy, CFSP was left as essentially 
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intergovernmental (Hoffmann, 2000: 193). So in some respects integration had been significantly 
deepened when compared to the reforms seen in the SEA, but despite these steps keeping 
foreign and security policy as a separate intergovernmental pillar diluted the potential impact. 
CFSP was a response to the EPC‟s perceived inadequacy in light of the post-Cold war world. As 
Gordon (1997/98: 85-86) argued:  
…The CFSP created at Maastricht reflected a lowest-common-denominator compromise 
among competing visions and interests of the EC‟s member states. In this case, the 
compromise was between one group of states led by France and Germany, that sought 
significantly to strengthen the existing EPC and to give it more of an integrated and 
binding character, and another group, led by the United Kingdom, that was more 
cautious about giving up its national foreign policy prerogatives and sought to avoid any 
possible threat to the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 further opened the debate on EU 
and WEU convergence, installed a High Representative for CFSP, advanced the possibility of 
QMV and promised budgetary stabilisation. However, there was a significant gap between Treaty 
provisions and practice. Significant progress was made later with the 1998 St Malo declaration, 
which was a British and French plan to build a European Security and Defence Initiative – within 
NATO. This proved to be a catalyst with proposals for a European Rapid Reaction force being 
put into place in the 1999 Cologne EU summit, which were then fleshed out it the Helsinki 
Council meeting. These developments certainly added meat to the EU‟s area of hard security 
(Smith, 2003: 562).   
The EU has been most lacking in the area of military power, with significant concerns over the 
impact on national sovereignty and relationship to NATO. Progress in this area has also been 
seen as doubtful.  Originally, increases in EC/EU military power was promoted by France who 
argued that Europe needed a strategic capability.  Britain and others resisted any possibility of 
undermining NATO. At the Maastricht summit the majority of member states were reluctant to 
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cede sovereignty and compromised on the WEU becoming the defence institution of the EU. 
This was also resisted by Britain and the neutral member states later in the Amsterdam Treaty 
negotiations. There have been some minor instances of EU military operations, and negotiations 
have suggested roles for a specific EU military capability. The Petersberg Declaration listed 
possible operations such as humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and combat tasks in 
crisis management (Gordon, 1997/98: 89-92). 
CAUSATION 
In the introduction, the concept of party ideology was examined and the inclusive definition by 
Seliger (1976: 14) was adopted. This argued that ideology refers to a set of ideas that posit, 
explain, and justify through the means of social action to preserve, to amend, to uproot, or to 
rebuild a given social order. Party ideology essentially acts as a prism, a lens whereby an issue is 
identified, analysed according to a specific worldview and the technical possibilities of action 
(Seliger, 1976: 102). While this ideological lens is historically grounded, it is not fixed, but an 
evolving response to the changing world around the party. This is where it links with the 
theoretical work by Marks and Wilson (2000: 434). Parties do apply existing modes of 
understanding to new developments. While ideology is no straightjacket in tethering a party to a 
particular ideological response it remains a strong influence, and a party needs to weigh up 
considerable potential costs in alienating grass-roots members, members of the parliamentary 
party and elements of their core electorate.  
However, where this thesis departs from Marks and Wilson (2000) is the way in which party 
ideology is operationalised. As stated, earlier ideology is historically grounded, but significantly it 
is not a fixed entity. Marks and Wilson (2000) put forward the argument that cleavage structures 
were powerful predictors in how parties structure their responses to developments in European 
integration. Yet, social cleavages are far more of a fixed historical entity, and less responsive to 
changes in the social world. What is more appropriate is to study party positions towards 
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European integration in terms of party families for two reasons. Firstly, cleavage structures and 
party families are likely to share much of the same variance explained. Secondly, not only do 
party families take account of the historical modes of political conflict, but also they allow for 
later patterns of behaviour to be considered amongst similar parties, as well as geographical 
differences between groups of parties from the same party family. 
The party family independent variables will be empirically tested in multivariate analyses (see 
chapter five) along with a number of other theories. Previously in the literature review chapter, 
several alternative theories of party positioning were identified.  Within the causation research, 
the strategic decisions of parties were put forward as a strong causal influence in how parties 
respond to European integration (Sitter, 2002; 2003; 2004). In particular, he identified a 
government-opposition dynamic in the way that Euroscepticism was used by parties arguing that 
considerations towards the issue of Euroscepticism would fall under short term planning (Sitter, 
2002: 23-24). This thesis rejects that Euroscepticism is a short-term strategic decision, given the 
long-term nature of the integration project. However, the empirical strength of this theory will be 
assessed in the multiple regression analyses in chapter five.  
With several pieces of research it was emphasised that conflicts over European integration were 
amalgamated into existing patterns of political conflict – in particular the classic left-right 
dimension and the new politics dimension18 (Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002; Marks et al, 2006). 
As stated in the introduction, this thesis remains sceptical of the relevance of the left-right 
dimension, due to the „unfreezing‟ of the original cleavage structures, the emergence of post-
materialist values (though the new politics dimension captures competition towards this issue), 
and the cross-national variation in the meaning of the left-right scale. The explanatory value of 
                                                 
18 This thesis utilises the left-right variable which has been created within the Euromanifestos dataset, but in order to construct the new politics 
dimension, the data from three expert surveys conducted by the team at UNC (Chapel Hill) were used. These covered the following time periods: 
1999 (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007); 2002 and 2006 (Hooghe et al, 2008). 
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the left-right dimension, and also the new politics dimension will be tested alongside the strategic 
issue, and party families. 
Within the single-country case study literature, a theme, which became apparent, was that some 
countries were more Eurosceptic than others. This notion of cultural exceptionalism is rejected 
in the thesis given the comparative literature‟s emphasis that there has been some evidence of 
Euroscepticism in even the most pro-European countries (Taggart, 1998: 364). However, it will 
be tested alongside the other independent variables to assess its strength, but in particular to 
ascertain whether some countries are more Eurosceptic towards a particular aspect than others.  
The public Euroscepticism literature focused on the cueing effect, and whether Euroscepticism 
was the result of signals from political parties or whether the public prompted parties to adopt 
Eurosceptic attitudes. This thesis argues that public attitudes towards the multi-dimensional 
nature of Euroscepticism are likely to be cued from elites given that it is unlikely that the public 
will be aware of the benefits or drawbacks of specific forms of integration. This will be tested 
alongside two other groups of independent variables. Firstly the year of election will be tested to 
assess the temporal variance, and secondly the other forms of integration will be included to 
assess whether a party‟s Eurosceptic attitude towards one aspect conditions their response to an 
alternative dimension of integration. 
HYPOTHESES 
Having established the multi-faceted reality of contemporary Euroscepticism, as well as arguing 
that partisan responses are derived from ideology. The thesis will now provide hypotheses for the 
behaviour of each party family towards the multiple dimensions of European integration. For this 
the research utilised the expertise of the Comparative Manifesto Project/Manifesto Research 
Group and Euromanifestos research team when grouping the individual parties according to 
their party ideology. Both research projects employed the modified framework of von Beyme 
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(1985) and this is how the thesis will proceed. Within each sub-section a table of parties, which 
fall under the particular party family label, will be provided. 
Initially the expectation was that European policies of party families should have been addressed 
to a certain degree within the literature, which would facilitate a priori theorising. However, what 
has become fundamentally apparent is the lack of recent attention in the case of some party 
families, or even a lack of attention overall. Therefore the hypotheses need to come with a „health 
warning‟ so to speak, and with some of the party families it is a case of theory generation rather 
than theory testing of party behaviour towards European policy. 
LIBERALS 
The Liberal party family has been selected as a control group for the later regression analyses. 
Control groups are necessary to allow the use of dummy variables without resorting to individual 
regression equations for each sub-category of party family. While the research on the two major 
pro-European part families – Liberal and Christian Democratic – has not been as extensive as 
other party families (which will be examined below), those studies, which have been conducted, 
have highlighted the positive engagement with supranational developments. Marks, Wilson and 
Ray (2002: 587) argued that the Liberal party family was strongly in favour of economic 
integration as it enhanced market competition and economic freedoms. They also noted that the 
family were strongly in favour of political integration as it moderated nationalism, increased 
political freedoms, though it did weaken democracy. Taggart (1998: 378) also highlighted that 
some party families (notably Social Democrats, Liberals and Christian Democrats) seemed to be 
more favourably disposed towards support. Given the existing literature specifically identifies the 
Liberal party family as very supportive, they are the most appropriate category to hold as a 
control group – despite later findings of some caveats to their behaviour (see Chapter Six). 
As mentioned above, Liberal parties in general have not been the subjects of much research in 
recent years and little work has been directed towards the party or its European policies since the 
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1980s. Kirchner‟s (1988) volume and Von Beyme (1985) seminal book were particularly strong 
accounts of the liberal party family and they suggested that Liberal have parties adopted a 
strongly pro-European orientation (see Kirchner and Broughton, 1988: 82; Curtice, 1988: 99 and 
117; Daalder and Koole, 1988: 171; Ruud, 1988: 207). 
Von Beyme (1985: 38-39) noted that Liberal parties have been less eager when compared to the 
Christian Democrats and Socialist and Social Democratic parties in developing comprehensive 
programmes, perhaps with the exception of the Germany FDP, and they preferred a pragmatic 
approach. This potentially complicates hypothesising positions for the family. However, the 
Liberals‟ European programme stressed human and civil rights, pluralism and regionalism, and 
suggested practical ways of improving the institutional structure of the Community. In addition 
the liberals have been more emphatic than most parties in declaring their support for a united 
Europe. 
As stated above, traditionally Liberal parties have been strong supporters of European 
integration, being one of the driving forces of European integration. Considered as a very broad 
church, and despite the wide variances within the ideology, Liberals have supported economic, 
supranational and legal integration from the outset. Therefore it is hypothesised that Liberal 
parties will use positive discourses towards all aspects of integration. The table below shows the 
Liberal parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 2: Liberal Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Liberals  
GER: FDP Free Democratic Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
LUX: PD-DP Democratic Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
NET: VVD Peoples Party Freedom Democracy 1994, 1999, 2004 
Belgian FDF-PRL 1989, 1994, 1999,  
ITA: Ulivo Olive Tree 1999 
ITA: Margherita Daisy 2004 
BEL: VLD Flemish Liberals and Democrats 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: LDP Liberal Democratic Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: RV Radical Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: V Liberals 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
SWE: FP Liberal Peoples Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party 1996, 1999, 2004 
AUT: LF Liberal Forum 1996, 1999 
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CONSERVATIVE 
Historically, the emergence of the political right in Western Europe (as well as in in North and 
South America) can be associated with distinct property-owning classes, the defence of social 
institutions such as the Catholic Church and the rise of a bourgeois civil society linked to the 
development of capitalism (Hanley, 2004: 10). Layton-Henry (1982: 1) argued that attempts to 
clarify and define Conservatism have had little success, but noted that Michels identified two 
major senses – the technical political and the philosophical usage. The first was a tendency to 
maintain the status quo, and the second described the love of authority and tradition. Girvin 
(1988: 2) noted that in its original form, and particularly for most of the nineteenth century, 
conservatism opposed the claims of „modernity‟, that is, the radical consequences associated with 
nationalism, democracy, industrialisation and secularisation. Towards the end of the 19th century, 
a number of Conservatives began to shift away from their reactionary position. It was this ability 
to adapt their ideology that has meant that Conservative parties have maintained their relevance 
in a number of member states over a large period of time. It was precisely the issue of 
Conservative party environmental adaptation, which could impact on the identification of 
ideological traits. 
Despite some scholars arguing that Conservatism is very much a national phenomenon in 
comparison to liberalism and socialism that are seen as more internationalist (Layton-Henry, 
1982: 7), there are three varieties of Conservatism relevant to Western Europe. The first is the 
modern liberal Conservative form. This has been most advanced in Britain and is strongly pro-
capitalist asserting the strongest possible relationship between the market economy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law. The second is Christian Democracy, which is addressed below. The 
third variety is authoritarian conservatism, which is very reluctant to give up control of state 
apparatus. This particular form accepts state intervention in the economy and regulation. The 
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French Gaullists, Irish Fianna Fáil and the German CSU have been the strongest examples of 
this variety of Conservatism (Girvin, 1988: 9-10). 
Pridham (1982: 319) argued that while Christian Democratic parties in particular are renowned 
for their strong ideological commitment to European integration, with Conservative parties this 
European „vocation‟ is less profound. With the liberal Conservative form being strongly pro-
market any measures that improve free-market credentials are likely attract positive discourses, 
but any encroachments on individual liberty and the rule of law such as harmonisation measures, 
and supranational and legal integration are likely to be received more negatively. Given the strong 
market orientation, any supranational social policy is also likely to be received with hostility. The 
authoritarian Conservative variety however is more likely to accept moves towards regulated 
capitalism, as well as accepting supranational and legal integration as necessary to achieve the 
intervention and regulation needed in the European market. As both types have been nationally 
orientated, the promotion and supranational foreign policy is likely to be negatively received.  
Overall, the Conservative party family is likely to be supportive of economic liberalisation, and 
legal integration in the earliest stages, but negative towards harmonisation, supranational 
integration, social integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration throughout the 
time period. The table below shows the Conservative parties that have manifestos available for 
the analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 3: Conservative Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Conservatives  
FRA: RPR Rally for the Republic/UDF Union for French 
Democracy 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
FRA: UMP Union for Presidential Majority 1999, 2004 
ITA: FI Forza Italia Go Italy 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: Conservative Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: KF Conservative Peoples Party 1994, 1999 
IRE: Fianna Fail 1994, 1999 
SPA: AP, PP Popular Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
SPA: CIU Convergence and Union 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
SWE: MSP Moderate Coalition Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
FIN: KK National Coalition 1996, 1999, 2004 
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SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 
Traditionally, Socialism has been seen as the product of the changing conditions for workers 
resulting from the birth of Capitalism and the Industrial Revolution. As Wright (1999: 83) noted  
…in a basic sense Socialism defined itself as the ideological expression of the workers‟ 
movement that arose in resistance and opposition to the depredations of industrial 
capitalism. If „labourism‟ sought to protect and defend the interests of labour in relation 
to this system, „socialism‟ sought to change the system itself. 
Later, the intellectual rupture saw a fissure grow between revolutionary Marxism and reformist 
Social Democracy (Wright, 1999: 85). Revolutionary Marxism sought to overthrow the system, 
whereas reformist Social Democracy could be summarised as the acceptance of the capitalist 
economy, though with extensive state intervention; the use of Keynesian steering mechanisms to 
achieve growth, high wages, price stability and full employment; redistributive policies; and finally 
a working class organised in a Social Democratic party with strong links to the trade union 
movement (Paterson & Thomas, 1986: 3). 
Sassoon (1997:5) identified three large „families‟ before 1989 – Communist parties of central and 
eastern Europe; the „northern‟ social democratic parties – these came to power in relatively well-
developed capitalist countries, with the task of the management of capitalism and proper 
distribution of wealth; and finally the southern European socialist parties – their main objective 
was the modernisation and development of welfare policies where none or few existed 
previously. However, as he also notes that these party groupings have converged extensively 
since the end of the Cold War. Essentially, Sassoon (1997: 4) argued that adopting a defensive 
strategy, parties on the left accepted that market forces could be regulated, but not eliminated; 
co-ordination should be sought multilaterally; public spending should be reduced and extensions 
to the welfare state avoided; privatisation is needed in many areas of state provision; policies of 
equality need to take into account the goal of inducing competition; and finally financial 
institutions and international financial markets could only be contained multilaterally. 
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Featherstone in a number of works examined at the position of socialist and social democratic 
parties towards the process of integration up to the end of the 1980s. He argued that: 
…the process of integration in Western Europe since 1945 has forced the socialist parties 
of these countries to reconcile a contradiction between their aspirations and the reality of 
their situation. Socialism as an ideology professes an internationalist vocation, but the 
gradually-developing integration process has in reality been based on modern capitalist 
principles, at variance with left-wing ideals. [Yet,] …on the Left, neither all support for, 
nor all opposition against the European Community can readily claim to have been 
„more‟ socialist; to the extent that the respective strategies have been governed by 
different national considerations…  (Featherstone, 1988: 339).  
 
With specific regard to European integration, there are four specific strands of thought on the 
West European left. Firstly, the EEC/EU was seen as an agent of multinational capitalist 
exploitation and of German or American hegemony. The second position agreed with most of 
the analysis of the first position, but argued that withdrawal was unrealistic, and therefore only a 
root-and-branch restructure of the EU was a viable solution. The third position saw the 
EEC/EU as a potential agent of social and political change and the regeneration of the European 
left. The final position, so-called „weak reformism‟ saw Europe and the pursuit of integration as a 
primary project of the left, and the outcome is more or less uncritical support (Dunphy, 2004: 4-
6). 
With economic liberalisation it is likely that there would be broad support across the party family 
as the majority of parties have accepted the liberalisation of the market – as Sassoon (1997: 2-3) 
noted that that there had been the “…extraordinary ideological success of the proponents of the 
liberalization of market forces”. However there is the likelihood that two groups of party 
behaviour will be observable for economic harmonisation. Anglo-Nordic social democratic 
parties are likely to be suspicious, for quite different reasons – in the UK, as it generally has 
aimed to keep its labour market as competitive as possible and therefore will generally want to 
avoid harmonising various aspects of economic policy; and for Sweden, Finland and perhaps 
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Denmark they already possessed greater levels of welfare and labour market protection and will 
want to avoid reducing the level of provision down to that of the UK.  
For the dimension of supranational integration, it is possible to argue that most social democratic 
parties like with that of economic liberalisation will show at least an acceptance of the process. 
Featherstone (1988: 243) noted that in particular there was a gradual increase in support for the 
principle of supranational integration. Again, with legal integration, there will be at least an 
observable acceptance of the process due to their support for liberalisation of the market.  
For social integration, a similar trend to that of economic harmonisation will most likely be 
observable as it is entirely contingent on the achievements of the welfare state and the will for 
labour market flexibility. Anglo-Nordic parties are likely to be suspicious, whereas continental 
Social Democratic parties are likely to show support. Cultural integration is likely to receive some 
support due to their reorientation towards more support for integration more generally, but 
traditionally they were grounded at the national level. Finally, with foreign policy integration the 
more left-wing of Socialist and Social Democratic parties are likely to engage in critical 
discourses, but more centre-left parties are likely to give more positive consideration of this issue.  
Overall, Socialist and Social Democratic parties are likely to use positive support towards all 
aspects of integration. However, the only area that may break this pattern is that of social 
integration. During the early part of the time-series more critical discourses may be observable, 
but these should shift later towards more support. The table below shows the Socialist and Social 
Democratic parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 4: Socialist and Social Democratic Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Social Democrats  
FRA: PS Socialist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GER: SPD Social Democratic Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
NET: PvdA Labour Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
NET: D66 Democrats 66 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
BEL: SP Flemish Socialist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: Labour Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
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GB: SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN:  SD Social Democracy in Denmark 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: CD Centre Democrats 1989, 1994, 1999 
IRE: LP Labour Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GRE: KKE Communist Party 1994, 1999, 2004 
SPA: PSOE Socialist Workers Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
POR: PSP Socialist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
POR: PSD Social Democratic Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
SWE: SdaP Social Democratic Labour Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
FIN: SSDP Social Democrats 1996, 1999, 2004 
AUT: SPÖ Social Democratic Party 1996, 1999, 2004 
 
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS 
Christian Democratic parties along with Liberal parties were the original proponents of 
integration in Europe, and have continually supported both the process of deepening and 
widening of the EC/EU. Despite the lack of scholarly attention given to the Christian 
Democratic phenomenon, it has been noted that it is clear that Christian Democratic groups 
have been a major force behind the push for political and monetary union (Hanley, 1994: 1-2).  
In terms of the Christian Democratic ideology, Hanley (1994:3) argued that most political 
scientists see it as a form of moderate conservatism, perhaps with a more recognisable doctrine 
based on Catholic social thought and a commitment to cultural pluralism, as well as a policy style 
that contains a fairly generous welfare element and an attachment to European federalism, in 
addition to uncritical Atlanticism. Irving (1979: xviii) argued that it was not easy to define 
Christian Democracy, as there were considerable variations with the German Christian 
Democrats having many similarities to the British Conservatives, the Belgian and Italian Christian 
Democrats being more orientated towards the Left and the Dutch somewhere between the two 
positions. However, there were three distinctive principles:  
„„Christian principles‟ (in the sense of a broad commitment to basic human rights, 
particularly those of the individual); „democracy‟ (in the sense of a clear-cut commitment 
to liberal democracy); and „integration‟ (in the dual sense of a commitment to class 
reconciliation through the concept of the broad-based Volkspartei and to transnational 
reconciliation, manifested especially through the strong Christian Democratic 
commitment to European integration) (Irving, 1979: xviii). 
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Van Kersbergen (1994: 36) provided a useful summary of some of the key concepts in the 
Christian Democratic movement: 
The key concepts for understanding Christian Democracy are integration, (class) 
compromise, accommodation and pluralism. It is precisely the ceaseless attempt at 
integrating and reconciling a plurality of societal groups with possibly opposed interests 
that makes Christian Democracy distinctive. Christian Democracy voices, translates, 
codifies and restructures societal conflict within itself in the attempt to arbitrate and 
accommodate societal discord. Socialism and liberalism – at least in Christian Democratic 
interpretation – tend to be the political articulations of opposing poles of societal 
difference, disagreement and conflict. 
 
In terms of economic integration (liberalisation and harmonisation), supranational integration 
and legal integration, these were frequently called for during the NEI congresses. During the 
period of the congresses the desire for an economic and political union were emphasised, calls to 
accept decreases in sovereignty were made, economic resolutions (incorporating the fundamental 
ideas behind the Common Market) were set and indeed during the Christian Democratic party 
membership of member state governments they were implemented (see Papini, 1997: 54-67). 
Christian Democratic parties due to their strong commitment to welfare provision are also likely 
to exhibit strong support for social integration. With cultural integration, they led the movement 
for transnational integration and furthermore called for the extension of integration to Central 
and Eastern Europe (see Papini, 1997: 54-67). Finally with foreign policy integration, as Buffotot 
(1994: 202-206) stated, Christian Democratic parties make simultaneous use of the concept of 
defence and security – which involves political, military, economy, ecological, technological and 
psychological aspects. Therefore Christian Democratic parties have made considerable efforts to 
emphasise the importance of freedom and respect for human rights, reductions in the socio-
economic inequalities between states, as well as disarmament. These recurring themes were 
regularly on the agenda of the NEI congresses at the start of integration up until the early 1960s 
(see Papini, 1997: 54-66).  In addition, the imbalance between the US and European allies in 
terms of military capabilities has continued to be of concern for the Christian Democratic parties, 
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and they have attempted to resolve this with their support of the European Defence Community 
(Papini, 1997: 64) and beyond to include the institutional battles of the 1980s (Buffotot, 206-210) 
and support for the moves towards the ESDP and CFSP during the 1990s.  
Overall, it is possible to hypothesise that Christian democratic parties are likely to support all 
aspects of integration. This should be observable at all four data points throughout the time 
period. The table below shows the Christian Democratic parties that have manifestos available 
for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 5: Christian Democratic Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Christian Democrats  
GER: CDU Christian Democrats 1989, 1994, 1999 
GER: CSU Christian Democrats 1989, 1994, 1999 
LUX: PCS-CSV Christian Social Peoples Party 1989, 1994, 1999 
ITA: DC Christian Democrats 1989, 1994, 1999 
NET: CDA Christian Democratic Appeal 1994 
BEL: PSC Christian Social Party 1989, 1994 
BEL: CD&V Christian Democrats 1989, 1994 
IRE: Fine Gael 1989, 1994 
GRE: ND New Democracy 1999, 2004 
SPA: CDS Democratic and Social Centre 1989 
SWE: KdS Christian Democratic Community Party 1994, 1999 
AUT: OVP Peoples Party 1994, 1999 
FIN: KD Christian Democrats 2004 
(POST) - COMMUNIST PARTIES 
Within Western Europe there was a demarcation in policy and orientation between the traditional 
Communist parties with their Eastern outlook and the growth of Eurocommunist parties and 
their acceptance of democratic structures. After 1989 some traditional Marxist parties remained, 
but others split, with one element moving towards the position of a more mainstream social 
democratic party and the other remaining as a traditional Marxist party – for example the Italian 
Communist Party (PCI) split to form Rifondatzioni Communista (RC) and Partito della Sinistra (PDS). 
Ziblatt 19(1998 in Bozoki & Ishiyama, 2002: 5) noted that there were at least two strategies 
utilised successfully - that of leftist-retreat and pragmatic-reform. The leftist-retreat strategy 
involved embracing Marxist traditions and continuing with the status of an anti-system party. The 
pragmatic-reform strategy on the other hand attempted to redefine the party as a left leaning 
                                                 
19 This was originally applied to the cases of Central and Eastern Europe, but still offers some fit with West European cases. 
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European social democratic party. Ishiyama (1998 in Bozoki & Ishiyama, 2002: 5-6) added a third 
strategy – that of national-patriotic. This entailed the continuation of Marxist-Leninist traditions 
but they did not wholly embrace the Marxist-Leninist legacy. There was no attempt to redefine 
the party as a European Social Democratic party. 
Traditionally, Communist parties have opposed all aspects of European integration, as the 
process was dominated by policies designed to enhance the neo-liberal character of West 
European democracies. The European issue was little more than a distraction up until the Second 
World War. However, they became aggressively hostile after the founding of the Komitern in 1947. 
They saw Europe as capitalist, Atlanticist, reformist and a rampart against the revolution. This 
was the case amongst both traditional Marxist and those parties having adopted Euro-communist 
values post-1970 (Bell, 1996: 220-222). Gramsci‟s notion of reification perhaps summed up 
Communist objections. Reification referred to a process:  
…whereby men and women become passive spectators of the social forces that structure 
their lives. The origins of this passivity lie in capitalism‟s dehumanization of the worker, 
who is reduced to a marketable commodity, a „thing‟, to be bought in the market, just like 
any other instrument of production or consumption (Femia, 1999: 114-115).  
 
The market-orientated reforms have done much to promote the free movement of goods, 
services, workers, and capital. With the free movement of workers, this can be seen as 
dehumanizing the worker and forcing them to market their labour like any other commodity. 
Traditional Communist parties, as well as post-communist parties taking the left-retreat and 
national-patriotic strategies are likely to reject both the processes of economic liberalisation, as 
well as economic harmonisation. As Bell (1996: 228-229) has remarked that with the process of 
the ratifying of the Maastricht Treaty, Communist parties attacked it “because it undermined the 
purely national forms of defence available to the worker”. As Chan (2001: 157) notes 
„Communist and ex-Communist parties have in recent years frequently been described as 
 109 
„conservative‟ because of their scepticism towards market-oriented reforms and democratization‟.  
Those post-Communist parties following the path of pragmatic-reform are likely to continue to 
support both economic liberalisation and harmonisation, as this is crucial for the continuing 
membership of the European Union.  
The process of supranational integration provides conflicting patterns within this party family. 
Like the twin processes of economic liberalisation and harmonisation it should be observed that 
traditional Communist, as well as those taking the left-retreat and national-patriotic strategies are 
likely to reject supranational integration. Bell (1996: 229) in his examination of the reaction of 
West European Communist parties to the Maastricht Treaty found that all the parties emphasised 
a democratic deficit of the European Union.  
Positions towards legal integration are likely to be unpronounced with the pragmatic reformists 
parties due to the need accept the acquis communtaire and the rules surrounding the running of the 
single market as a fundamental element of continued membership of the EU. Unsurprisingly, the 
remaining categories of traditional Marxist, leftist retreat and national-patriotic parties are likely to 
reject legal integration given their positions towards economic and supranational integration.  
With social integration, three considerations need to be taken into account. Firstly, to what extent 
does the (post)-communist party believe that national social welfare policies have failed? 
Secondly does the party consider it necessary to develop policies to support those losing out the 
European market reforms? Finally, linking in with the second point, how do those parties intend 
to achieve the implementation of those policies – at the national or European level?  
Finally, traditional, left-retreatist and national-patriotic post-communist parties are likely to view 
both NATO and European foreign policy structures with suspicion and therefore reject them 
outright, but the pragmatist reformist parties with their attempt to be seen as a left-leaning social 
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democratic party are more likely to engage in less critical discourse, but are likely to remain 
suspicious.  
To sum up and simplify, (post)-Communist parties are likely to exhibit the following behaviour. 
Traditional Communist parties (those relatively unreformed since 1989) are likely to continue to 
reject towards all aspects of integration, with the exception of social integration to which they 
would show no overall position. On the other hand, the reformed (post)-Communist parties are 
likely to show support for all dimensions with the exception of social and foreign policy 
integration, where they are likely to show no overall position towards the former, and use critical 
discourses towards the latter. The table below shows the (post)-Communist parties that have 
manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 6: (Post)-Communist Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Post-Communists  
FRA: PCF Communist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GER: PDS Party of Democratic Socialism 1994, 1999, 2004 
NET: SP Socialist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
IRE: Workers Party 1989, 1994, 1999 
GRE: KKE Communist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
SPA: IU United Left 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
POR: PCP Communist Party 1989, 1994, 1999 
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists 1994, 1999, 2004 
SWE: VP Left Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
FIN: VL Left Wing Alliance 1996, 1999, 2004 
 
AGRARIAN  
European Agrarian party origins were found in the influence of two principal cleavage structures 
– that of the rural-urban and centre-periphery cleavages. Despite common roots, the 
interpretation of these societal cleavages into the ideological and strategic behaviour of political 
parties depended on the contextual situation the agrarian parties found themselves in. Wider 
developments in the party system and liberal democracy have led to very different outcomes 
across Europe. In addition with the shrinking of the agricultural sector, some significant changes 
were observable – the changing of party names in order to widen their appeal; the adoption of 
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some catch-all features; and even encroaching on the territory of the extreme right. So essentially 
within the party family, the factors outlined above presented the possibility for greater variance in 
the positions of agrarian parties towards European integration (Batory and Sitter, 2004: 523-527). 
Agrarian parties have particularly critical of the process of European integration. In particular 
they represent peripheral communities and displayed a strong dislike of any centralising features. 
Hence their particular dislike of transfers of sovereignty to the supranational level. Again due to 
the nature of the constituency, they tend to be critical of the complete liberalisation of the market 
and the banning of state subsidies to particular industries. A caveat must be inserted here. As 
representatives of farming communities, they have and continue to benefit from the impact of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments hence this may sway their opinions on the 
liberalisation of the market. 
In summary, Agrarian parties are likely to use critical and rejectionist discourses towards all 
aspects of economic, supranational and legal integration. They are also likely to be extremely 
critical of the remaining forms of integration: social, cultural and foreign policy integration. The 
table below shows the Agrarian parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter 
five and chapter six: 
Table 7: Agrarian Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Agrarian  
SWE: CP Centre Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
FIN: SK Finnish Centre 1996, 1999, 2004 
 
REGIONAL/ETHNO-REGIONAL  
Regionalist parties form the peripheral opposition of the centre-periphery cleavage (see Lipset & 
Rokkan, 1967). Not only are they extremely diverse (Türsan, 1998: 4-7) but also difficult to study 
– due to a lack of a commonly shared definition (Muller-Rommel, 1998: 18). Perhaps in no small 
part due to this diversity, they have been prevalent in virtually all West European states (Türsan, 
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1998: 1). Regional party behaviour has been intensely context driven and has been entirely 
dependent on the position of the regions within the nation state, where some have enjoyed 
relative autonomy within their territorial area, while others have had very little scope to influence 
policy.  This has made them both interesting to study especially with regards to European 
integration, but also has thrown up hurdles when attempting to produce broad hypotheses in 
order to predict their behaviour. For example, an examination of the broad objectives illuminates 
this lack of convergence within the party family, and for this Türsen‟s (1998: 6) extensive 
research is particularly useful. He argued that: 
Much like nationalism, ethnoregionalism is a mobilisation concept. It shares with 
nationalist philosophy the priority of the interests of the persons within the national unit 
(citizens) vis-à-vis those external to it. The most prominent feature of ethnoregionalist 
parties is undoubtedly their demand for political reorganisation of the national power 
structure, or for some kind of „self-government‟. In addition to the defining 
characteristics of identity and territory, the centrality of the demand for empowerment of 
the regional group distinguishes this type of party from other party „families‟ that translate 
sociostructural cleavages to the party competition arena. 
 
It is the „some kind of self-government‟ which is particularly relevant, in that it can encompass 
forms of decentralisation, from a few competencies to wholesale autonomy, or towards 
independence and full-independency. This was then where the EU could frustrate moves towards 
autonomy and independence, replacing one (national) centre with a new supranational centre, or 
indeed even promote it through subsidiarity, engagement with regional actors in the Committee 
of the Regions or a reliance on the monitoring capabilities of regional authorities. 
As Lynch (1998: 198) stated with regionalist parties within the European Free Alliance though 
are “…. largely support the principle of European integration, they are often suspicious of the 
practice of integration and the attitudes of the large member states”. A caveat is necessary here, 
the European Free Alliance does not contain all regionalist parties within the EU, and so this 
cannot be taken as a full generalisation of the behaviour exhibited by the parties. 
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Economic Liberalisation is a particularly interesting issue with regionalist parties. Peripheral 
regions while extremely diverse can be considerably weaker economically than the centre. There 
are obvious exceptions – for example the Basque and Catalan regions of Spain have been 
considerably wealthier than the Castilian centre and historically have subsidised the poorer 
regions of Spain. Liberalisation opens peripheral regions to much greater competition and has 
allowed resources – workers, capital, services and production to enter or exit. Hence this 
provided the potential for negative discourses especially approaching the signing of Maastricht. 
Yet as Kincaid Jolly (2007: 111) points out the European Union makes smaller states more viable 
by diminishing the advantages of larger states, often through suitable regional policies.  
Economic harmonisation is likely to cause considerable friction amongst peripheral regions. 
Harmonisation of fiscal policies together with the consequences of competition promotion 
through economic liberalisation could potentially disadvantage a peripheral region, especially as 
some state aid, preferential policies on tax and/or subsidies are now illegal. In addition, due to 
the large number of regions and small level of available EU subsidies territorial disparities have 
remained large (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002: 488). In addition it could negatively impact 
inward investment – as economic integration opened the way for capital and labour to flow to 
other regions of the EC/EU.  
Supranational integration on the one hand has been a process of transferring policy competencies 
away from the traditional dominant national centre to a supranational organisation. Yet on the 
other hand it has constituted an amplification of the “democratic deficit” defined in terms of 
distance between decision-makers and the beneficiaries of public policy (De Winter & Gomez-
Reino, 2002: 489). Essentially, supranational integration can be seen as a mixed blessing, it has 
removed some of the competencies from the traditional centre, but on the other hand replaced 
the national centre with another centre, but further away. This potentially means that the aim of 
autonomy is more difficult to achieve. Yet, the promotion of a Europe of the Regions, especially 
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with the Commission having sought to engage regional bodies, through consultations, 
subsidiarity and also through regional bodies monitoring of legislation and regulations has the 
potential to facilitate greater autonomy.  
Two potential positions exist when examining the position of regionalist parties towards aspects 
of Legal integration. On the one hand supranational law further distances decision-makers and 
their beneficiaries and reduced the potential influence of regional actors; yet supranational law 
may help to undermine the traditional sovereignty of the centre – the nation-state. Social 
integration provides the potential to correct the negative externalities of the market created by 
further economic liberalisation and economic harmonisation. Peripheral regions can be 
particularly at risk from increased competition and the potential loss of workers, capital, and the 
production of goods and services within the particular geographical locality. Policies, which aim 
to improve the position of the peripheral regions within the market, are likely to be widely 
supported amongst regionalist parties.  
The ethnic theme is particularly salient amongst regional parties due to two developments – de-
territorialisation via globalisation of market forces and the resurgence of the salience of 
territoriality of political forces (Türsan, 1998: 3). The defence of a unique group identity against 
the centralising nation state has been a recurring theme amongst the parties, but replacing the 
nation state with a centralising supranational state is likely to be resisted as much. However, with 
the promotion of individual identities within a broad European umbrella this has the potential to 
be seen much more positively.  
Finally, with foreign policy integration, regionalist parties are likely to show a greater diversity 
than with other forms of integration. Traditionally, foreign and defence policy has been provided 
by nation-states and hence regionalist parties may not have particularly developed policies. 
Positions towards this aspect will depend on the level of self-government regionalist parties are 
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aiming for. Certainly for those aiming for independence will show more positive discourses as it 
reduces the expenditure needed. However, another variable is whether each region is aiming for 
neutrality, whereby supranational foreign policy will be viewed with suspicion.  
Overall, the ethno-regionalist party family is likely to show positive discourses towards economic 
liberalisation, legal, social and cultural integration. Towards supranational integration the family is 
likely to show a heterogeneous pattern of behaviour, and towards harmonisation, the parties are 
likely to be negative. The table below shows the ethno-regionalist parties that have manifestos 
available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 8: Ethno-Regionalist Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Ethno-regionalist  
FRA: RPF Rally for France 1994, 1999, 2004 
ITA: SVP South Tyrol People's Party 1999, 2004 
BEL: VB Flemish Block 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
BEL: NVA New Flemish Alliance 1989, 1994, 2004 
GB: PC Party for Wales 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: SNP Scottish National Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: FP Progress Party 1989, 1994, 1999 
DEN FB: People‟s Movement 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: JB June Movement 2004 
SPA: PNV-EAJ Basque Nationalist Party 1989, 1994, 2004 
SPA: EA Basque Solidarity 2004 
SPA: ERC Catalan Republican Left 1989, 1994, 1999 
SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok 1994, 1999, 2004 
SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc 1994, 1999 
FIN: RKP-SFP Swedish Peoples Party 1996, 1999, 2004 
 
NATIONALIST 
Nationalists and the extreme right form an uneasy party grouping given the extreme diverse 
nature of its members20. Nationalist parties are generally found at the extremes of the party 
system and by their very nature extremely suspicious of the impact of European integration on 
the integrity of the nation state – often both sovereignty based issues, and issues of the cultural 
impact of integration. The party family has perhaps contained some of the harshest critics 
towards the EU.  
                                                 
20 Ignazi (2003) addressed the wide variety and meanings of the right, and in particular the widening of the extreme right in the 1980s with the 
emergence of a new political cultural discourse fostered by neo-conservative and the new right (Nouvelle Droite). See Chapters 1 and 2.  
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Ramet (1999: 4) linked the concept of radical right and organised intolerance to argue that the 
term radical right was generally applied to twentieth-century incarnations of organised 
intolerance. Furthermore organised intolerance was defined as:  
…that segment of the political landscape which arose, historically, as a dimension of 
cultural “irrationalism,” and is inspired by intolerance (of any defined as “outsider”), and 
hostility to notions of popular sovereignty or popular rule (Ramet, 1999:4).   
 
This conception touches upon an important element of nationalist/extreme right parties – that of 
the “outsider” – this was somewhat of a floating concept in that it can refer to other member 
states or those outside the EU and this has varied over time and parties. 
Stöss (1991 in Ramet, 1999: 6) identified four characteristics with right-wing extremism: 
exaggerated nationalism involving hostile attitudes towards other states or peoples; denial that all 
people had equal rights of life, liberty, security, conscience and religion, opinion and speech, 
assembly and association, and the denial of the equality of human worth; a rejection of 
parliamentary-pluralist systems; and finally a folk-ethnocentric ideology. With Stöss‟ 
characteristics once again the hostile attitudes towards other states, and furthermore anti-system 
characteristics are apparent. Finally examining Griffin‟s definition one can see interesting 
additions to the two previous attempts. Griffin (1999: 154) defined nationalism as: 
…an ideology whose affective driving force is the sense of belonging to and serving a 
perceived national community. The carriers of this ideology attribute to their nation a 
distinctive cultural identity, which sets apart from other nations and gives it a special 
place in the historical process. This Community is (usually subliminally) identified with a 
unique set of characteristics allegedly deriving from constitutional, historical, 
geographical, religious, linguistic, ethnic and/or genetic realities. The sentiments aroused 
by the sense of being a member of this community may be confined to a keen sense of 
pride in national culture and traditions without being associated with political demands 
(„cultural nationalism‟). On the other hand, when such sentiments play a major role in the 
dynamics of a official movement, the thrust of nationalism is generally for the national 
community to be assumed to form „naturally‟ a state (whether autonomous or part of a 
federation or confederation of states) in which the sovereignty held to reside in the 
people is exercised by its elected or self-appointed representatives within territorial 
boundaries recognised by the international political community. 
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In addition to the distinctive national culture and the setting the country apart by emphasising its 
uniqueness/superiority; characteristics such as the historical importance of the nation state, 
particular linguistic and ethnic distinctiveness, and finally the importance of sovereignty is 
particularly important. These three definitions/examinations of the characteristics of 
nationalists/extreme right ideology suggested a rejection on most if not all the dimensions under 
investigation. However, the previous literature suggested a more complex picture of reality.  
With economic integration, nationalist and extreme right parties are likely to accept the 
liberalisation of the market, but with continuing strict controls on imports from outside of the 
free trade area (Mudde, 2007: 169). As Mudde (2007: 159) noted, many West European parties 
were supportive of European integration during the 1980s and the turning point was the 
ratification of the Maastricht Treaty with parties attacking it as “neoliberal” and “socialism”.  
Supranational integration is a clear process that has received strong critical and rejectionist 
discourses. As Mudde (2007: 168) noted most populist radical right parties denounced the 
current form of European co-operation and did not want further loss of independence, a 
European super-state, and preferred a confederalist model. Fieschi, Shields and Woods, 1996: 
237) in their study of German, French and Italian extreme right parties found that the parties 
stated an adamant rejection of any loss of national sovereignty to a centralised European 
bureaucracy.  
Nationalist parties are likely to view supranational law as taking away the independence of the 
member states and therefore likely to be critical or outright rejectionist. Social integration is also 
likely to be seen very critically as Maastricht has been criticised as too “socialist” as mentioned 
above. However, as Mudde (2007:169) has noted that a few parties have called for a „social 
Europe‟ yet others feel that this is the domain of the nation state.  
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Consideration of the dimension of cultural integration leads to two potential predictions. On the 
one hand, much of the discourse of the extreme right/nationalist parties has been flavoured by 
the mythical visionary treatment of the continent and Europe‟s pre-eminence as a civilisation. 
Indeed, as Fieschi et al (1996: 239) noted that during the 1984 European election the French 
National Front (FN) called for a “European patriotism”. Yet nationalist parties are primarily 
concerned with the nation state, and so while this may be found in the discourse of nationalist 
parties during the 1980s, during the 1990s and beyond it is likely that the parties are critical or 
rejectionist discourses towards this aspect of integration. Finally, with foreign policy integration, 
parties are likely to be supportive of some collective security arrangements, without necessarily 
losing any national sovereignty. Several parties have called for Europe to be independent from 
NATO and European co-operation in this field has been seen as a means of achieving this.  
Overall, nationalist parties are likely to be critical of the majority of dimensions, but with the 
exception of liberalisation and foreign policy integration. With the market-orientated reforms it is 
likely that the data will reveal that initial support will shift towards more critical discourses later in 
the time series. For foreign policy integration nationalist parties are likely to exhibit support for 
the process. The table below shows the Nationalist parties that have manifestos available for the 
analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 9: Nationalist Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Nationalist  
GER: REP The Republicans 1989, 1994, 1999 
FRA: FN National Front 1994, 1999, 2004 
  ITA: AN National Alliance 1994, 1999, 2004 
ITA: LN Northern League 1994, 1999 
BEL: FN National Front 1999, 2004 
DEN: DF Peoples Party 1999, 2004 
 
GREEN PARTIES 
The Ecological/Green/New Politics party family can be considered as an umbrella term for a 
diverse range of positions. As Freeden (1996: 526) noted, existing analyses position green 
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ideology into a number of categories. Some position it within new social movements, and others 
see it as exhibiting socialist and anarchist elements. In addition, it can be seen as left-ecological, 
neither left or right, a post-modern demand for radical democracy, a development of 19th 
century anti-capitalist and liberationist movement, new form of conservatism, or finally as a new 
protest phenomenon. Dobson (1999) has clearly differentiated between “Maximalism” and 
“Minimalism”, as well as “anthropocentrism” and “biocentrism” (also referred to as eco-
centrism). Maximalism and Minimalism refer to how broad political-ecological thought should be 
defined – Maximalists define ecologism tightly, whereas minimalist‟s definitions of ecologism are 
subject to fewer constraints. The second distinction is extremely important. The foundation of 
anthropocentrism is the belief that the: 
…world has been made for human beings, and that human beings are not only the source 
but the measure of all value. Biocentrists posit the view that all life and not just human 
life has value (Dobson, 1999:235-239). 
 
Green parties have been faced with a dilemma when dealing with the issue of engagement with 
the EU. The EU represents much that greens will instinctively oppose, such as technocratic 
policymaking, closed decision-making procedures, distant institutions, and the dominance of 
inter-governmental bargaining. Policy influence has relied on coalitions and this has meant the 
dilution of green principles. Yet for the Greens the EU offers a new forum in which to pursue 
reform and further decentralisation. Membership in the European Parliament has provided 
Greens with access to decision-making particularly with policy areas such as environmental, 
energy, regional and single market policies. Furthermore the EU‟s growing global influence has 
meant the possibility of negotiated global action on issues such as global warming, deforestation 
and ozone depletion (Bomberg, 1998: 3). 
Greens have rejected of unlimited and unregulated economic growth that is seen as a 
fundamental threat to the ecological balance (Poguntke, 1993: 36). Greens espouse the concept 
 120 
of conserver society and thus the more materialist and consumer-oriented society is completely at 
odds with this ideology (Richardson, 1995: 9).  A commitment to the liberalisation of the market 
and the freedom of movement is underpinned by the importance of promoting economic growth 
and hence green parties are deeply opposed to this process.  Yet the EU also provides the 
opportunity for regulated capitalism and the potential structures for the promotion of policies to 
promote ecological balance.   
Green ideology and in particular eco-socialists have emphasised the importance of Community 
and bottom-up participatory democracy (Freeden, 1996: 540-542; Bomberg, 1998: 2). Greens 
have rejected the notion of the EU developing into a new super-state and emphasise the 
importance of subsidiarity (Rüdig, 1996: 264), but environmental problems clearly operate across 
borders creating a dilemma in whether to use European structures to enable cross-border co-
operation.  
In a move away from focusing solely on post-materialist values Greens have adopted positions 
towards the traditional national areas of political competition, often adopting the approaches of 
left-wing parties. Despite this however, Greens emphasise the importance of a new global order 
to deal with cross-national concerns such as peace, social welfare and environment (Bomberg, 
1998: 62). This emphasis on peace has been a strong feature of their ideology. Poguntke (1993: 
10) argued that „New Politics‟ demands included unilateral disarmament during the Cold War. 
Rüdig (1996: 261) examined the German Greens and argued that they emphasised the 
importance of the EU remaining a civil-economic alliance rather than developing any military 
capability. 
With their ideological focus being global Greens have contended the EU is neither European nor 
a Community and argued that co-operation and solidarity shouldn‟t stop at the borders and 
therefore should include all of Eastern Europe as well as anyone else wishing to join (Bomberg, 
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1998: 62). Green/Ecologist parties have traditionally been opposed to military expenditure and 
action. Furthermore due to a strong interest in the promotion of third world issues, any exercise 
of hard power and diplomacy is likely to invoke strong critical discourses.  
In summary, from this discussion it is possible to predict that Green parties are likely to reject 
both forms of economic integration, legal, cultural and foreign policy integration throughout the 
period. It is also likely to be the case with supranational integration but later in the period there 
may well be a discernible shift towards more positive positions. Finally with social integration, 
with the exception of “eco-socialists” this is unlikely to provoke much debate and therefore the 
hypothesis is that Green parties will exhibit no overall position. The table below shows the Green 
parties that have manifestos available for the analyses in chapter five and chapter six: 
Table 10: Green Parties from Euromanifestos Dataset 
Party Year 
  
Green Parties  
GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
BEL: ECOLO Francophone Ecologists 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
BEL: AGALEV Flemish Ecologists 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
 NET: GL Green Left  1994, 2004 
GB: Green Party 1994, 1999, 2004 
IRE: Greens 1999, 2004 
SWE: Green Ecology Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
FIN: VL Green Union 1996, 1999, 2004 
AUT: GA Green Alternative 1996, 1999, 2004 
 
The following table provides a summary of the hypothesised positions:
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Table 11: Hypothesised Party Positions (* reformed versus non-reformed) 
 Economic Integration Economic Integration Supranational Integration Legal Integration Social Integration Cultural Integration Foreign Policy Integration 
Party Family Liberalisation Harmonisation      
        
Liberals Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
        
Conservative Positive Positive Negative 
Positive (more 
negative later) Negative Negative Negative 
        
Social Democrats Positive Minor positive Negative (positive later) Positive Positive Positive Positive 
        
Christian 
Democrats  Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive Positive 
        
(Post) - Communist Negative/Positive* Negative/Positive* Negative/Positive* Negative/Positive* No overall position Negative/Positive* Negative 
        
Agrarian Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative 
        
Nationalist 
Positive (negative shift 
later) Negative Negative Negative Negative Negative Minor Positive 
        
Regional Positive Negative Positive Positive Positive Positive No overall position 
        
Green Negative Negative Negative Negative No overall position Negative Negative 
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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AS SECOND ORDER 
The second-order nature of European elections has been one of the more enduring theories from 
the field of political science. Across all non-national elections – local, regional and European, 
there is the tendency for issues specific to those arenas to have a less important role. The 
traditional view is that European Parliamentary elections are fought over national issues 
(Carrubba & Timpone, 2005: 260).  
General elections for parliament in European countries, as well as most parliamentary 
democracies have been seen as first-order elections as they play a role in deciding who governs 
and which electoral platform should be put into practice. They are elections of great consequence 
for actors with the national context. Other elections which decide on regional, local, 
supranational, individual questions (referenda), and non-executive heads of state, play no role in 
deciding who governs at the national level and hence are referred to as „second-order‟ national 
elections (Van der Eijk, Franklin and Marsh, 1996:150; Koepke & Ringe, 2006:324). 
In investigating second-order elections, Reif and Schmitt (1980: 8-15) developed a model of 
electoral behaviour, in which they argued that while European elections have no institutionally 
binding consequences to governmental or opposition policies at the national level, there remains 
the perception that there is a connection with political configurations at the European and 
national stage. Hence frequently national issues become relevant. Consequentially, there is less at 
stake and there are lower levels of participation, greater successes for smaller parties, 
governmental parties generally lose out and there are higher levels of invalidated ballots. 
However, there is some importance to the specific arena – parties, platforms, candidates, policy 
areas and positions of control are at stake, and while at the time the arena was new, it 
transcended borders; has grown in power and developed a complex system of coalitions.  
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The Reif and Schmitt (1980) model was revisited by a number of scholars21 reaching similar 
conclusions (for Western Europe). Marsh (1998: 606) found that EP elections had a pattern of an 
anti-government swing; a shift of votes from bigger to smaller parties; EP elections were pointers 
to subsequent general elections; and finally the results were characteristic of party systems where 
the norm is government alternation. It is indeed the finding that EP elections are pointers to later 
elections as parties can treat the election as a poll on its electoral performance, which particularly 
underlines the focus on national electoral issues. Schmitt (2004: 668) found that in Western 
Europe the elections were still second-order, with participation remaining low, governmental 
parties still losing support and smaller parties performing more strongly. In addition, East 
European results suggested that participation was lower, abstentions were very high, and the 
elections had a Eurosceptical element. Governmental losses did not follow a cyclical pattern and 
small parties did not perform better in European elections. The findings towards the behaviour 
of voters in Central and Eastern Europe by Koepke and Ringe (2006: 341) also confirm that 
protest votes were not cast against the governmental parties. 
The caveat22 to the model that this thesis develops, picks up on the Eurosceptical element found 
by Schmitt (2004). It argues that while undoubtedly the weight of empirical evidence infers that 
parties utilise national issues in their campaigns, the elections will still invariably and unavoidably 
be about Europe in some fashion for most parties and hence there should be at least some 
reference to Europe in the party policies. This is despite the lack of an emergence of a truly 
supranational party system that would allow voters to pick up voting cues (Kousser, 2004: 2) 
from competing electoral blocs with varying conceptions on the development of European 
integration (Bogdanor, 1989:214 in Van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996; 160). While 
                                                 
21 See Reif, 1984; Schmitt, 1990; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh, 1996; Marsh, 1998 Schmitt, 2004; 
Koepke & Ringe, 2006;  
22 Irwin, 1995‟s results would tend to disagree with the caveat this thesis inserts into the model (see p192). However, 
analysing the manifestos from the transnational groupings tells the analyst nothing about national parties‟ election 
manifestos. Furthermore, the transnational groupings are indeed wide in terms of their membership and very much 
heterogeneous.  
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discussions on Europe may not take up a large proportion of the campaign in quantitative terms, 
there should be at least some salience23 to the issue. Indeed it is when one focuses on party 
manifestos that this should be the most obvious given that the manifesto is one of the only 
predetermined extensive policy statements a party makes during an electoral cycle. One can argue 
that with first-order elections the likelihood is that the greater weight of the policy issues 
addressed during the campaign will focus on national issues and not European, and hence 
European elections can provide a greater amount of data to analyse with regard to party 
positioning. 
This caveat is supported by the work of Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004).  They argued that the 
traditional theoretical position regarding the issue of Europe in European elections was 
essentially that Europe did not matter, it was a second-order election and that domestic concerns 
were paramount. However, their study suggests that European elections are, at least in part, 
about Europe. They noted that:  
…political parties may run Euro-campaigns that utilise national policy issues to mobilize 
habitual supporters in order to demonstrate their strength in the national „first-order‟ 
arena. In turn, voters may indeed largely tune out during such campaigns and then take 
advantage of the insignificance of European elections to vote sincerely, or to express 
their anger through a protest vote. Nonetheless, as we have shown, parties experiencing 
deep Euro-divisions suffer substantial desertions in elections to the European parliament, 
as voters behave in a way that is consistent with seeing through and punishing, intra-party 
fractionalization (Ferrara & Weishaupt, 2004: 301-302).   
 
Both the caveat and the empirical contribution from Ferrara and Weishaupt (2004) suggest that 
while this does not amount to a wholesale rejection of forty years worth of empirical 
contributions, the role of European elections is perhaps more complex than previous research 
has given credit for. This caveat will be empirically assessed through analysing the salience of 
quasi-sentences towards European issues, which were coded across member states in the 
Comparative Manifestos Project (Klingemann et al, 2006) and the Euromanifestos Project 
                                                 
23 Salience is discussed in detail in the fourth chapter of this thesis. 
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(August 2007). One issue that needed to be accounted for before any conclusions could be drawn 
was the potential for electoral behaviour to be different between national and European 
elections. Given that European elections do not impact on the distribution of seats at the 
national level there may be fewer constraints on party behaviour towards European integration. 
In order to assess this potential for party behaviour to differ substantially, this will be empirically 
assessed through the use of multiple OLS regression utilising comparable variables found in both 
studies. The dependent variable for this analysis will be the single pro versus anti-EU dimension 
found in both datasets. 
SUMMARY 
This chapter addressed the theoretical underpinnings of four core areas of the overall argument – 
the need for a more dynamic and nuanced definition, the need for a multi-dimensional 
framework to apply this conceptual evolution, that ideology is the strongest causal explanation of 
the use of Euroscepticism, and finally that European elections are important for understanding 
the way in which parties compete towards the issue of European integration. First and secondly, 
it addressed the issue of the conceptualisation of Euroscepticism and the development of a multi-
dimensional framework. As has previously been discussed in the introduction and in chapter two, 
existing conceptualisations were too broad in their focus and the behavioural aspects they were 
attempting to capture. In addition, the way in which they conceptualised European integration 
did not capture the dynamic nature of the process. As an alternative, the thesis set out that 
Euroscepticism should be defined as: 
…the sustained espousal of a critical or rejectionist argument towards economic, 
supranational, legal, social, cultural integration or foreign policy integration in Europe.  
 
In doing so, it focuses on party positions towards the general ideas of integration only (which 
Kopecký  & Mudde (2002) define as diffuse support), allows a dynamic nature of the process to 
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be captured by positioning on the basis of multiple dimensions, and finally captures pro-
European attitudes as well. 
Thirdly, the chapter examined the issue of Eurosceptic causation, and applied Seliger‟s (1976) 
definition of party ideology, as well as adapting Marks and Wilson‟s (2000) theory on the impact 
of the historical dispositions of parties. This underlined the major impact that ideology has on 
party positions towards European integration, and was operationalised on the basis of party 
families. Furthermore it discussed other existing theories of Eurosceptic causation – party 
strategy, the impact of the left-right dimension and the new politics dimension, the impact of 
national location, and the cueing effect from public attitudes towards integration. It then created 
a set of hypotheses for each dimension based on a modified version of von Beyme‟s (1985) party 
family framework.  
Finally, the chapter tackled the issue surrounding whether European elections were appropriate 
sources of data for positioning parties given their second-order nature. It was argued that despite 
the dominance of national issues in the election campaigns, Europe is still important and in the 
area in which parties set out their predetermined positions – the European election manifestos- 
there is likely to be a greater discussion of the issue. 
Looking forward to the next chapter, it will present the first element of the empirical analyses. It 
is focused on demonstrating that the European issue is both salient and that parties behave in a 
similar fashion between national and European elections towards the issue. Critically this 
provides the empirical justification for applying the multi-dimensional definition and framework 
in the subsequent analyses. 
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CHAPTER 4: EUROPEAN ELECTION RELEVANCY 
As discussed in the introduction, the thesis has set out with the overall aim to identify the level 
and usage of Eurosceptic discourse by West European political parties in European elections and 
to examine Eurosceptic causation towards the multi-dimensional integration process. The 
introduction set out the five elements of the core argument: the need for a dynamic and nuanced 
conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional 
framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe in 
European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses 
to European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research 
strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns.  
The focus of this chapter is to empirically examine the case put forward in the theoretical chapter 
– that in European elections, the issue of European integration is of importance to party 
competition and this will be investigated through a comparison of the data between national 
election manifestos (from the Comparative Manifestos Project) and European elections (from the 
Euromanifestos Project). It also provides the justification for carrying out further empirical work 
in chapter five and chapter six using the multi-dimensional framework by demonstrating the 
importance of European elections in understanding party positions towards European 
integration. After operationalising the saliency tests and the behavioural comparison of the two 
elections, the mean average saliency for each party family will be calculated towards twelve major 
election issues: Economic Policy; Social Welfare; Foreign Policy; European integration; 
Internationalism; Agricultural Policy; Performance of Government; Military; Democracy Issues; 
Crime Issues; Cultural Issues; and Environmental Issues. This will provide a general indication of 
the level of importance of each issue in the four European elections. Subsequently, Eurosceptic 
parties will be identified from each data source. Eurosceptic parties will be divided up by party 
family of origin and selected according to whether their manifestos featured five percent of 
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negative European discourses.  Finally, using multiple OLS regression, predicted positions for 
parties will be analysed and constructed using similar independent variables to those selected for 
the later examination. However, a single pro vs. anti-EU dimension was selected for the analysis. 
This enables the comparison of both comparative manifesto data (where the coding structure 
restricts the ability to perform multi-dimensional analyses) and the Euromanifesto data.  
The data indicates that Europe is the most salient issue within European election manifestos for 
all the party families. In addition, the Euromanifesto (Autumn 2007) data allows a greater 
number of Eurosceptic parties to be identified using a similar single dimension of support versus 
opposition to the EU when analysing the Comparative Manifesto Project data (Klingemann et al, 
2006). While this initially suggests that parties are more Eurosceptic in European elections, a 
comparison of the predictive power of several sets of independent variables suggests that parties 
still behave in similar ways in both national and European elections. 
OPERATIONALISING A TEST OF EUROPEAN ISSUE SALIENCY 
Netjes and Binnema (2007:39-40) specifically examined the issue of the salience of European 
integration. As they pointed out the term is used quite impressionistically, but it is important due 
to two reasons – it can be used to explain how a party competes, and secondly, is relevant to 
understand the relationship between party positions and European voters.  
Budge and Farlie (1983: 23-24) developed a theory of party saliency arguing that the tradition 
view of government spokesmen defending their programmes, and the opposition criticising it 
and presenting its own preferred policies was only supported by limited evidence. They argued 
instead that parties tend to ignore opponents‟ plans as far as possible and attempt to deflect 
attention to other policies. Those parties then attempt to promote their own preferred issues. 
They essentially do not compete directly, but try to promote the policy areas that they specialise 
in or own. Netjes & Binnema (2007: 40) second approach theorises saliency differently. This 
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concentrates on political parties heightening the importance of issues by framing them in partisan 
terms to attract voters; they essentially promote new issues to beat the incumbent or front 
running party. As such there are two definitions of saliency in these two approaches – one which 
is associated with the emphasis/frequency of policy areas by parties, and the other the extent to 
which an issue creates conflict. This thesis is focused on saliency approach, which is concerned 
with the emphasis a party makes towards a policy area. 
Budge & Farlie (1983: 26-30) identified several policy areas which electors see issues falling into. 
They listed fourteen which focused on: civil order; constitutional; foreign relationships; defence; 
candidate reactions; government record and prospects; moral-religious; ethnic; regional; urban-
rural; socio-economic redistribution; government control and planning; government regulation in 
favour of the individual; and finally initiative and freedom. 
In order to analyse the difference in issue salience of Europe between national and European 
elections, variables were identified which were similar in both datasets and that fitted within the 
categories identified by Budge and Farlie (1983). Twelve categories were created: economic 
policy; social welfare; foreign policy; European integration; internationalism; agricultural policy; 
performance of government; military; democracy issues; crime issues; cultural issues; and 
environmental issues. The table below details the variables used for each category of policy. New 
„sum‟ variables were created by combining the frequency of each individual variable and dividing 
the totals by the sum total of sentences in each manifesto. Means were then calculated and the 
results plotted for each party family of origin utilising both datasets. The Comparative Manifesto 
codes are shown in Table 12 and the Euromanifesto codes are shown in Table 13:
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Table 12: Comparative Manifestos Project Codes 
National Elections 
Variable  Description Variable  Description 
    
Economy  European Policy  
Per 401 Free Enterprise: Positive Per 108 European Integration: Positive 
Per 402 Incentives: Positive Per 110 European Integration: Negative 
Per 403 Market Regulation: Positive   
Per 404 Economic Planning: Positive Internationalism  
Per 405 Corporatism: Positive Per 107 Internationalism: Positive 
Per 406 Protectionism: Positive Per 109 Internationalism: Negative 
Per 407 Protectionism: Negative   
Per 408 Economic Goals Agricultural Policy  
Per 409 Keynesian Demand Management: Positive Per 703 Farmers: Positive 
Per 410 Productivity: Positive   
Per 411 Technology and Infrastructure: Positive Performance of Government  
Per 412 Controlled Economy: Positive Per 303 Governmental and Administrative Efficiency: Positive 
Per 413 Nationalisation: Positive Per 304 Political Corruption: Negative 
Per 414 Economic Orthodoxy: Positive Per 305 Political Authority: Positive 
Per 415 Marxist Analysis: Positive   
Per 416 Anti-Growth Economy: Positive Military  
  Per 104 Military: Positive 
Social Welfare  Per 105 Military: Negative 
Per 504 Welfare State Expansion: Positive   
Per 505 Welfare State Limitation: Positive Democracy Issues  
Per 506 Education Expansion: Positive Per 201 Freedom and Human Rights: Positive 
Per 507 Education Limitation: Positive Per 202 Democracy: Positive 
    
Foreign Policy  Crime Issues  
Per 101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive Per 605 Law and Order: Positive 
Per 102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative Per 606 Social Harmony: Positive 
Per 103 Anti-Imperialism: Positive   
Per 104 Military: Positive Cultural Issues  
Per 105 Military: Negative Per 601 National Way of Life: Positive 
Per 106 Peace: Positive Per 602 National Way of Life: Negative 
Per 107 Internationalism: Positive Per 603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
Per 108 European integration: Positive Per 604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
Per 109 Internationalism: Negative Per 607 Multiculturalism: Positive 
Per 110 European Integration: Negative Per 608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
    
  Environmental Issues  
  per 501 Environmental Protectionism: Positive 
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Table 13: Euromanifestos Project Codes 
European Elections 
Variable  Description Variable  Description 
    
Economy  European Policy  
v1_401 Free Enterprise v2_301 Decentralisation: Positive 
v1_402 Incentives v2_3011 Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Negative 
v1_403 Market Regulations v2_302 Decentralisation: Negative 
v1_404 Economic Planning v2_3021 Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive 
v1_405 Corporatism v2_303 Executive and Administrative Efficiency 
v1_406 Protectionism: Positive v2_304 Political Corruption 
v1_407 Protectionism: Negative v2_305 Political Authority 
v1_408 Economic Goals v2_306 Competences of the European Parliament: Positive 
v1_4081 Creating Jobs v2_307 Competences of the European Parliament: Negative 
v1_4082 Labour Migration: Positive v2_308 Competences of the European Commission: Positive 
v1_4083 Labour Migration: Negative v2_309 Competences of the European Commission: Negative 
v1_409 Keynesianism Demand Management v2_310 Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Positive 
v1_410 Productivity v2_3101 Unanimity in the (European) Council 
v1_411 Technology and Infrastructure v2_311 Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Negative 
v1_412 Controlled Economy v2_3111 Majority voting in the (European) Council 
v1_413 Nationalisation v2_312 Competences of the European Court of Justice: Positive 
v1_414 Economic Orthodoxy v2_313 Competences of the European Court of Justice: Negative 
V1_415 Marxist Analysis v2_314 Competences of other EC/EU Institutions: Positive 
V1_416 Anti-Growth Economy v2_3141 Positive mentions of the European Central Bank 
  V2_315 Competences of other EC/EU Institutions: Negative 
Social Welfare  v2_3151 Negative mentions of European Central Bank 
v1_504 Welfare State Expansion v2_316 EC/EU Enlargement: Positive 
v1_5041 WSE: Job Programmes v2_317 EC/EU Enlargement: Negative 
v1_5042 WSE: Pensions v2_318 Complexity of the EC/EU Political System 
v1_5043 WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service   
v1_5044 WSE: Social Housing Internationalism  
v1_5045 WSE: Child Care v1_107 Internationalism: Positive 
v1_505 Welfare State Limitation v1_109 Internationalism: Negative 
v1_5051 WSL: Job Programmes   
v1_5052 WSL: Pensions Agricultural Policy  
v1_5053 WSL: Health Care and Nursing Service v1_7031 Agriculture and Farmers: Positive 
v1_5054 WSL: Social Housing v1_7032 Agriculture and Farmers: Negative 
v1_5055 WSL Child Care   
v1_506 Education Expansion Performance of Government  
v1_507 Education Limitation v1_303 Executive and Administrative Efficiency 
  v1_304 Political Corruption 
Heath Policy  v1_305 Political Authority 
v1_5043 WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service   
v1_5053 WSL: Health Care and Nursing Service Military  
  v1_104 Military: Positive 
Foreign Policy  v1_105 Military: Negative 
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v1_101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive   
v1_102 Foreign Special Relationships: Negative Democracy Issues  
v1_103 Anti-Imperialism sum2011 Freedom 
v1_104 Military: Positive sum2012 Human Rights 
v1_105 Military: Negative sum202 Democracy 
v1_106 Peace   
v1_107 Internationalism: Positive Crime Issues  
v1_108 Europe, European Community/Union: Positive v1_605 Law and Order 
v1_109 Internationalism: Negative v1_606 Social Harmony 
v1_110 Europe, European Community/Union: Negative   
  Cultural Issues  
  v1_601 National/European Way of Life: Positive 
  v1_6011 Immigration: Negative 
  v1_602 National/European Way of Life: Negative 
  v1_603 Traditional Morality: Positive 
  v1_604 Traditional Morality: Negative 
  V1_607 Multiculturalism: Positive 
  v1_608 Multiculturalism: Negative 
    
  Environmental Issues  
  v1_501 Environmental Protection 
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OPERATIONALISING THE BEHAVIOURAL COMPARISON OF PARTIES IN NATIONAL 
AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
The multiple OLS regression tests were conducted using the Comparative Manifesto Project 
dataset from 1989-2003/5, and Euromanifesto dataset, which was artificially restricted to the 
time period of 1989-2004 (originally the data stretched from 1979-2004). Four models were 
created, which mirrored the models constructed for the multi-dimensional analysis in chapter 
five. The independent variable of year was included to control for any temporal effects due to the 
time-series nature of the panel data. National elections were at different points in time compared 
to other member states, while the European elections were held at specific points in time. 
The first model was designed to isolate the impact of the party family by creating dummy 
independent variables for the following party families: Conservative, Socialist and Social 
Democratic, Christian Democratic, Communist, Agrarian, Ethno-regionalist, Green, and Special 
Issue. The Liberal party family was held as a control variable. The second model added thirteen 
country dummy variables:  Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Portugal, Germany, Austria, Great Britain, and Ireland. Luxembourg was held as the control 
variable and the analysis excluded the Netherlands dummy variable. The inclusion of this 
additional set assessed whether some member states have a greater propensity towards 
Euroscepticism than others.  
The third model added a selection of „general ideological‟ independent variables. These were 
included to relate the dimension of European integration to traditional sources of conflict within 
national party systems. The independent variables included the following categories (which 
incorporated positive and negative usage): foreign special relationships, military, internationalism, 
decentralisation, centralisation, free enterprise, market regulation, welfare, national way of life, 
multiculturalism, and constitutionalism. This is where the regression analyses differed 
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significantly to the later multi-dimensional regression tests that instead included other elements in 
the multi-dimensional framework.  
The fourth model took the previous selection of independent variables and added the alternative 
theories utilised in the later analyses – Left-Right position, GAL-TAN position and an indicator 
of the public position of each member state towards membership of the EU25. The public‟s 
position was derived from the data provided by Eurobarometer surveys from 1989-2004 and the 
question of whether one considered EU membership to be a good thing. 
Before moving on to discuss the results of the saliency tests, the Eurosceptic party identification, 
and the multiple regression results, the following table will provide information on which parties 
were included in the analyses from the Comparative Manifesto Project and to which party family 
they were assigned. The Euromanifestos party allocation tables were presented in the previous 
chapter.26  
                                                 
25 The three GAL-TAN position variables were calculated from various expert surveys carried out by Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe at the 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. The 1999 values were from the 1999 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Steenbergen & Marks, 2007). The 
2002 values were derived from the 2002 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al, 2008). Finally the 2006 GAL-TAN values were derived from 
the 2006 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Hooghe et al, 2008). 
26 Please note that this thesis has used the pre-existing party family allocations from the actual datasets themselves. For many academics the party 
family of origin for many political parties is a topic of much debate. 
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Table 14: Comparative Manifesto Project Parties 
Party Year 
  
Liberal  
SWE: FP Liberal Peoples Party 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
DEN: RV Radical Party 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 
DEN: V Liberals 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 
FIN: LKP Liberal Peoples Party 1991 
FIN: NSP Progressives-Young Finns 1995 
BEL: PVV Party of Liberty and Progress 1991 
BEL: VLD Flemish Liberals and Democrats 1995, 1999, 2003 
BEL: PRL Francophone Liberals 1991 
BEL: PRL-FDF Liberal Reformation-Democratic Front 1995 
BEL: PRL-FDF-MCC Alliance 1999 
NET: VVD Peoples Party Freedom Democracy 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003 
NET: LN Liveable Netherlands 2002, 2003 
LUX: PD-DP Democratic Party 1994, 1999 
ITA: PRI Republican Party 1992 
ITA: PLI Liberal Party 1992 
ITA: Margherita Daisy 2001 
GER: FDP Free Democratic Party 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002 
AUT: LF Liberal Forum 1994, 1995 
GB: LDP Liberal Democratic Party 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 
IRE: PD Progressive Democrats 1992, 1997, 2002 
  
Conservative  
SWE: MSP Moderate Coalition Party 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
DEN: KF Conservative Peoples Party 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 
FIN: KK National Coalition 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
FRA: UDF Union for French Democracy 1993, 1997, 2002 
FRA: RPR Rally for the Republic 1993, 1997 
FRA: UMP Union for Presidential Majority 2002 
ITA: FI Forza Italia Go Italy 1994, 1996, 2001 
ITA: NPSI New Socialist Party 2001 
ITA: Casa delle Liberta House of Freedom 2001 
SPA: PP Popular Party 1993, 1996, 2000 
SPA: CiU Convergence and Union 1993, 1996, 2000 
GB: Conservative Party 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 
GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party 1992, 1997, 2001 
IRE: Fianna Fail 1992, 1997, 2002 
  
Socialist & Social Democratic  
SWE: SdaP Social Democratic Labour Party 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
DEN: SD Social Democratic Party 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 
DEN: CD Centre Democrats 1990, 1994, 1998 
FIN: SSDP Social Democrats 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
BEL: SP Flemish Socialist Party 1991, 1995, 1999 
BEL: PS Francophone Socialist Party 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
NET: PvdA Labour Party 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003 
NET: D66 Democrats 66 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003 
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party 1994, 1999 
FRA: PS Socialist Party 1993, 1997, 2002 
ITA: Lista Sgarbi-Panella 1992, 1994, 1996 
ITA: PSI Socialist Party 1992, 1994 
ITA: RI Italian Renewal 1996 
ITA: Ulivo Olive Tree 2001 
ITA: PSDI Democratic Socialist Party 1992 
GRE: PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 
GRE: DIKKI Democratic Social Movement 1996 
SPA: PSOE Socialist Workers Party 1993, 1996, 2000 
POR: PSP Socialist Party 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 
POR: PSD Social Democratic Party 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 
GER: SPD Social Democratic Party 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 
AUT: SPÖ Social Democratic Party 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002 
GB: Labour Party 1992, 1997, 2001, 2005 
IRE: LP Labour Party 1992, 1997, 2002 
  
Christian Democrats  
SWE: KdS Christian Democratic Community Party 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
DEN: KrF Christian Peoples Party 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 
FIN: SKL Christian Union 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
BEL: CVP Christian Peoples Party 1991, 1995, 1999 
BEL: CD&V Christian Democrats 2003 
BEL: PSC Christian Social Party 1991, 1995, 1999 
 137 
BEL: CDH Christian and Humanist Party 2003 
NET: CDA Christian Democratic Appeal 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003 
NET: CU Christian Union 2002, 2003 
LUX: PCS-CSV Christian Social Peoples Party 1994, 1999 
ITA: DC Christian Democrats 1992 
ITA: PPI Italian Popular Party 1994, 1996 
ITA: CCD Christian Democratic Centre 1996 
ITA: Biancofiore White Flower 2001 
ITA: PI Pact for Italy 1994 
ITA: AD Democratic Alliance 1994, 1996 
SPA: CDS Centre Democrats 1993 
GRE: ND New Democracy 1990, 1993, 1996, 2000 
GRE: Pola Political Spring 1993, 1996 
Por: CDS Centre Social Democrats 1991 
POR: PP Popular Party 1995, 1999, 2002 
GER: CDU-CSU Christian Democrats 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 
AUT: OVP Peoples Party 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002 
IRE: Fine Gael 1992, 1997, 2002 
  
(Post)-Communist  
SWE: Vp Left Party 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
DEN: EL Red-Green Unity List 1994, 1998, 2001 
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party 1990, 1994, 1998, 2001 
FIN: VL Left Wing Alliance 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
NET: SP Socialist Party 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003 
FRA: PCF Communist Party 1993, 1997, 2002 
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001 
ITA: PDCI Italian Communists 2001 
ITA: PDS Democratic Party of the Left 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001 
SPA: IU United Left 1993, 1996, 2000 
GRE: KKE Communist Party 1993, 1996, 2000 
GRE: SAP Progressive Left Coalition 1990, 1996, 2000 
POR: BE Left Bloc 1999, 2002 
POR: PCP Communist Party 1991, 1995, 1999 
POR: CDU Unified Democratic Coalition 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002 
GER: PDS Party of Democratic Socialism 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 
AUT: KPO Communist Party 2002 
GB: Sinn Fein 1997, 2001 
IRE: DLP Democratic Left Party 1992, 1997 
  
Agrarian  
SWE: CP Centre Party 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
FIN: SK Finnish Centre 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
FIN - SMP Rural Party 1991, 1995 
FIN: PS True Finns 1999, 2003 
  
Ethno-regionalist  
FIN: RKP-SFP Swedish Peoples Party 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
BEL: FDF Francophone Democratic Front 1991 
BEL: VU Peoples Union 1991, 1995, 
BEL: VB Flemish Block 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
BEL: VU-ID21 Peoples Union-ID21 1999 
SPA: PNV-EAJ Basque Nationalist Party 1993, 1996, 2000 
SPA: EA Basque Solidarity 1993, 1996, 2000 
SPA: PAR Aragonese Regionalist Party 1993, 2000 
SPA: ERC Catalan Republican Left 1993, 1996, 2000 
SPA: PA Andalusian Party 1993, 2000 
SPA: CC Canarian Coalition 1993, 1996, 2000 
SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc 1996, 2000 
GB: SNP Scottish National Party 1992, 1997, 2001 
GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party 1992, 1997, 2001 
  
Nationalist  
DEN: DF Peoples Party 1998, 2001 
FRA: FN National Front 1993, 1997, 2002 
ITA: MSI-DN Social Movement Right Nationalist 1992 
ITA: AN National Alliance 1994, 1996, 2001 
ITA: LN Northern League 1992, 1994, 1996, 2001 
NET: LPF List Pim Fortuyn 2002, 2003 
  
Green Parties  
SWE: Green Ecology Party 1991, 1994, 1998, 2002 
FIN: VL Green Union 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
BEL: ECOLO Francophone Ecologists 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 
BEL: AGALEV Flemish Ecologists 1991, 1995, 1999 
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NET: GL Green Left 1994, 1998, 2002, 2003 
LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative 1994, 1999 
FRA: Greens 1993, 1997, 2002 
FRA: GE Ecology Generation 1997 
ITA: FdV Green Federation 1992, 1994, 1996 
ITA: Il Girasole Greens-Social Democrats 2001 
GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002 
AUT: GA Green Alternative 1990, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2002 
IRE: Greens 1992, 1997, 2002 
  
Special Issue  
SWE: NyD New Democracy 1991 
DEN: FP Progress Party 1990, 1994, 1998 
LUX: ADR Democracy and Pension Justice 1994, 1999 
ITA: DE European Democracy 2001 
ITA: List Di Pietro of Values 2001 
ITA: LR Network-Movement for Democracy 1992, 1994 
POR: PSN National Solidarity Party 1991 
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party 2001 
IRE: Sinn Fein Ourselves III 1997, 2002 
 
RESULTS: SALIENCY COMPARISON 
The graphs presented below show the results for the equivalent party families from each data 
source and demonstrate the importance of the European issue across parties in European 
elections, but conversely shows the disinterest of parties towards the issue in the national 
elections. One should note these are mean percentage values across all political parties from the 
EU-15 and therefore the percentages should be seen as a general indication of use: 
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LIBERAL PARTIES 
Figure 3: Liberal European Issue Saliency Results     
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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Figure 4: Liberal National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
For Liberal parties, in the European elections, European integration was clearly the most salient 
concern. It peaked at approximately 75-80% in 1995 and 1999. Foreign policy, democracy issues 
and economic policy were also important concerns. In the national elections, Liberal parties 
focused primarily on economic policy. However, concerns over social welfare, democracy issues, 
the performance of government, crime, and foreign policy were all salient. Europe had little 
importance, peaking at approximately 4%. 
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CONSERVATIVE PARTIES  
Figure 5: Conservative European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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Figure 6: Conservative National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
Examining Conservative parties, it was possible to see that European integration was again the 
most salient. However, in 1994 economic policy also saw an average usage of approximately 
58%. As both European policy and economic policy saw values in this region it is possible that 
one or two parties have outliers, which shifted the mean score much higher. European 
integration was clearly the most salient across the time period. Other important concerns 
included democracy, and foreign policy issues. In national elections, economic policy was clearly 
the most salient with values in the region of 12.5-28%. Other important policy foci were social 
welfare, foreign policy, and the performance of government. European integration only peaked at 
approximately 5%. 
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SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES 
Figure 7: Social-Democratic European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004  
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Figure 8: Social-Democratic National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
Examining social democratic parties, in the European elections, European integration was clearly 
the most important issue. It saw mean scores of between 30-40% with the exception of the 1995 
and 1996 elections for the 1995 accession group. Other important issues included economic 
policy, democracy issues, social welfare and foreign policy. Repeating the observed behaviour of 
the two preceding party families, social democratic parties in national elections focused their 
manifestos on economic policy, social welfare, foreign policy, performance of government, and 
democracy issues. European integration barely saw any use, peaking at approximately 2.5%. 
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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES 
Figure 9: Christian Democratic European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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Figure 10: Christian Democratic National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
For Christian Democratic parties, Europe took priority with approximately 20-48% sentences 
devoted to the policy area. Democracy issues, foreign policy and economic policy were also 
important. In national elections the use of European integration discourses was similar to the 
preceding party families, peaking at approximately 5% of usage. However, while prioritizing 
issues such as economic policy; cultural issues also saw strong salience across the time period. In 
addition social welfare, performance of government, foreign policy, and crime issues were also 
important. 
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(POST)-COMMUNIST PARTIES 
Figure 11: Post-Communist European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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Figure 12: Post-Communist National Issue Saliency Results 
 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
Among the (post)-Communist parties, during the European elections the most important issue 
was European integration, especially during the 1999 election where the parties devoted 
approximately 60% of their manifesto towards the issue. Other important and salient concerns 
were economic policy, democracy issues, social welfare and foreign policy. By complete contrast, 
in national elections, economic policy while it fluctuated accounted for 15% plus of the 
manifesto, while European integration only accounted for less than approximately 3% over the 
time period. Other important issues included social welfare, foreign policy, the performance of 
government, and democracy issues. 
 149 
AGRARIAN PARTIES 
Figure 13: Agrarian European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004  
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Figure 14: Agrarian National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
Analysing the results for Agrarian parties, it is again possible to see strong salience for European 
issues. Other important concerns included foreign policy, democracy issues and agricultural 
policy. In national elections, economic, and agricultural policy were the most salient. Europe 
peaked at approximately 2.5%. Other important foci included social welfare, performance of 
government and cultural issues. 
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ETHNO-REGIONALIST PARTIES 
Figure 15: Ethno-regionalist European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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Figure 16: Ethno-Regionalist National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
Examining the ethno-regionalist party family, it was still possible to see the pattern demonstrated 
by the preceding party families. European integration was clearly the most salient issue in 
European elections. Other concerns focused on in the manifestos included economic policy, 
democracy issues, foreign policy and cultural issues. With national election manifestos economic 
policy, cultural issues, social welfare and performance of government were the most salient. 
Democracy issues were also important. Europe for this party family was not very important with 
references only reaching approximately 2.5% of the manifesto length. 
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NATIONALIST PARTIES  
Figure 17: Nationalist European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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Figure 18: Nationalist National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
With nationalist parties, in the European manifestos it was possible to observe the increasing 
salience of Europe from 5% in 1989 to 35% in 1999. Interestingly cultural issues declined from 
27% in 1989 to 10% in 2004. Other important concerns included economic policy and foreign 
policy. In national elections, economic policy, cultural issues and the performance of government 
were clearly the most salient. Other important policy foci were foreign policy, social welfare, 
democracy issues and crime. European integration references peaked at approximately 5%. 
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GREEN PARTIES 
Figure 19: Green Party European Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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Figure 20: Green Party National Issue Saliency Results 
 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
Finally, for the Green parties in the European election manifestos, the chief concerns across the 
time period were European integration issues, democracy issues, social welfare, performance of 
government, and foreign policy. The saliency of European integration was clearly the most 
important issue for the party family. One important point to note was the drop in issue saliency 
for the 1995/1996 elections. This result needs to be interpreted carefully read as it only applies to 
Green parties from the 1995 accession group. Despite saliency being <20% it was still clearly the 
most important issue. Amongst the remaining elections, the importance of European integration 
was clear with usage having a range from 37% to 78%. By contrast in national elections, Green 
parties focused on the environment and economic policy. The use of European related 
discourses only peaked at 5% in 1997. Other significant issue areas that saw a salience value of 
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greater than 10% during some of the elections were the performance of government, democracy 
issues and foreign policy issues. 
RESULTS: IDENTIFYING EUROSCEPTIC PARTIES 
Having established that Europe is a key policy area in European election manifestos, it is 
necessary to explore whether party behaviour differs substantially between national and 
European elections. If parties behave in a similar way towards Europe in both national and 
European elections, European election data from manifestos could be key to a deeper 
understanding of how parties position themselves towards European integration. Firstly, 
Eurosceptic parties will be identified using both Comparative Manifesto Project data from 1989-
2003/5 utilising the dependent variable of pro vs. anti-EU, which subtracted the percentage of 
anti-European statements from percentage of pro-European statements. Reporting those parties 
that used 5% or more of their manifesto towards criticising Europe, there were only a small 
number of cases: 
Table 15: Eurosceptic Parties Identified in National Election Manifestos 
Parties Eurosceptic in Election Year 
Green Parties:  
SWE: Green Ecology Party 1991, 1994, 1998 
Post-Communist Parties:  
SWE: VP Left Party 1994 
DEN: EL Red-Green Unity List 1998, 2001 
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party 1990 
GRE: KKE Communist Party 1993, 1996, 2000 
Nationalist Parties:  
DEN: DF Peoples Party 1998, 2001 
Special Interest Parties:  
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party 2001 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5 
Overall, it is possible to see that amongst West-European parties, with the few Eurosceptic cases 
identified, the majority are confined to the peripheries of the party system, thus confirming 
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previously observed positions. Furthermore all are confined to peripheral member states in the 
Union, and later accession groups.  
Comparing the above results to the parties identified from the Euromanifestos Project data from 
1989 to 2004, it is possible to identify far more cases across an almost identical timeline:  
Table 16: Eurosceptic Parties Identified in European Election Manifestos 
Parties Eurosceptic in Election Year 
Liberal Parties:  
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party 
1996, 1999, 2004 
Conservatives:  
GB: Conservative Party 1999, 2004 
Socialist and Social Democrats:  
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party 1989 
Christian Democrats:  
NET: CU Christian Union 1989 
Post-Communist:  
SWE: VP Left Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
NET: SP Socialist Party 1989, 1994, 1999 
FRA: PCF Communist Party 1989, 1994 
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists 1994 
GRE: KKE Communist Party 1994, 1999, 2004 
POR: PCP Communist Party 1989, 1994, 1999 
IRE: Workers Party 1999 
Regionalist Parties:  
DEN FB: People‟s Movement 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
DEN: FP Progress Party 1994 
DEN: JB June Movement 1994, 1999, 2004 
FRA: RPF Rally for France 1994, 1999 
SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok 1999 
SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc 1999 
GER: REP The Republicans 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
BEL: VB Flemish Block 1999, 2004 
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 
GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party 1999 
Nationalist Parties:  
DEN: DF Peoples Party 1999, 2004 
FRA: FN National Front 1994, 1999, 2004 
ITA: LN Northern League 2004 
BEL: FN National Front 2004 
Green Parties:  
SWE: Green Ecology Party 1995, 1999, 2004 
LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative 1994 
GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90 1989 
AUT: GA Green Alternative 1996 
GB: Green Party 1999 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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The Euromanifestos data identifies far more Eurosceptic parties from all of the party family 
groupings. In addition a significant number of parties became Eurosceptic by the 1999 and 2004 
European elections. What this could suggest is that it is misleading to argue that Euroscepticism 
is confined to the peripheries of the party system, it now could be argued that Euroscepticism is 
something that parties from all party families use at different points in time. However, any 
conclusions drawn from this data need to be qualified. Firstly, the number of party manifestos 
available expanded during the time period, and secondly the greater number of parties identified 
as Eurosceptic could be due to parties behaving in a less inhibited way given that European 
elections do not impact on the seat distribution at the national level. However, if one focuses 
again on the results, the number of Eurosceptic parties within the central core of party families: 
Social Democrats, Liberal Parties, Christian Democrats and Conservatives there are only a few 
examples when compared to the large number of Eurosceptic parties from the Greens, (post)-
Communists, Nationalists and Regionalist groupings.   
RESULTS: MULTIPLE OLS REGRESSION 
The Comparative Manifesto data revealed that the models accounted for between 12.7 and 
49.7% of the variance explained. The Durbin-Watson statistic suggests a minor case of negative 
autocorrelation, but this is well within acceptable standards: >=1 and =<3. The Euromanifestos 
project (August 2007) data in comparison produced some similar results with the party family 
dummies, although more were statistically significant. The data did produce different coefficients 
for the country, general ideological and alternative theories independent variables. The data 
reveals that the models produced an adjusted R2 range from 34.3% and 50% of the variance 
explained. In addition, there was almost no evidence of autocorrelation: 2.048. 
The Comparative Manifesto Project results and Euromanifestos project regression results are 
presented below: 
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Table 17: National Election Regression Results  
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Party Families     
Conservative .008 -.019 -.016 .062 
Socialist and Social Democratic -.055 -.103 -.088 -.105 
Christian Democrat -.005 -.033 -.046 -.041 
Communist -.334*** -.425*** -.327*** -.309*** 
Agrarian -.060 -.053 -.083 -.015 
Ethnic-Regional -.014 -.081 -.145 -.087 
Nationalist -.250*** -.335* -.139 -.068 
Green/Ecologist -.202* -.262*** -.218** -.285** 
Special Issue -.118 -.090 -.066 -.013 
     
Country     
Sweden  -.058 -.106 -.147 
Denmark  -.102 -.139 -.121 
Finland  -.085 -.071 -.089 
Belgium  .030 .006 .080 
France  .141 .086 .111 
Italy  .058 -.027 .014 
Spain  .081 .076 .117 
Greece  -.032 -.002 .025 
Portugal  .025 .020 .014 
Germany  .195** .194** .238** 
Austria  -.097 -.074 -.045 
Great Britain  -.093 -.114 -.085 
Ireland  -.120 -.144* -.057 
     
Year of Election   .056 .035 
     
General Ideological Variables     
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive   .314*** .311*** 
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative   -.003 .003 
Military: Positive   .092 .113 
Military: Negative   -.112 -.093 
Internationalism: Positive   .194** .193** 
Internationalism: Negative   -.137 -.126 
Decentralisation: Positive   .063 .044 
Centralisation: Positive   -.013 .009 
Free Enterprise: Positive   .073 .058 
Market Regulation: Positive   -.227*** -.215*** 
Welfare: Positive   -.026 .006 
Welfare: Negative   -.136* -.113 
National Way Life: Positive   -.148* -.111 
National Way Life: Negative   .070 .064 
Multiculturalism: Positive   -.082 -.060 
Multiculturalism: Negative   -.161* -.139* 
Constitutionalism: Positive   -.056 -.038 
Constitutionalism: Negative   .065 .047 
     
Alternative Theories     
Left-Right Position    .021 
Gal-Tan Values 2006     .520* 
Gal-Tan Values 2002     -.744** 
Gal-Tan Values 1999     .039 
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Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data     -.084 
     
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.208 0.481 0.497 
Durbin Watson 1.796 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5     
Excluded Variables:  Diverse Alliance, Northern Ireland 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***)     
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Table 18: European Election Regression Results 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
     
Party Families     
Conservative .039 -.016 .067 .212** 
Socialist and Social Democratic .169* .151 .108 .091 
Christian Democrat .160* .198** .178** .343*** 
Communist -.422*** -.474*** -.432*** -.476*** 
Agrarian -.024 -.026 -.036 .071 
Ethnic-Regional -.026 -.057 -.069 -.018 
Nationalist -.251*** -.377*** -.317*** -.161 
Green/Ecologist -.201** -.199** -.234** -.421*** 
Special Issue -.070 -.062 -.065 -.028 
     
Country     
Sweden  -.135* -.149* -.131 
Denmark  .103 .078 .076 
Finland  .118 .075 .103 
Belgium  .004 -.025 -.085 
France  .042 .043 .071 
Italy  .184* .127 .097 
Spain  .035 -.013 -.046 
Greece  -.062 -.030 -.052 
Portugal  .022 -.007 -.032 
Germany  .035 -.042 -.062 
Austria  -.115 -.175** -.130 
Great Britain  -.018 .010 .002 
Ireland  -.035 -.076 -.130 
     
Year of Election   -.002 .032 
     
General Ideological Variables     
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive   -.021 -.002 
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative   .019 .032 
Military: Positive   -.065 -.109 
Military: Negative   .042 .044 
Internationalism: Positive   .021 .001 
Internationalism: Negative   -.196*** -.156** 
Decentralisation: Positive   .045 .001 
Centralisation: Positive   .007 .023 
Free Enterprise: Positive   -.050 -.020 
Market Regulation: Positive   -.012 .016 
Welfare: Positive   .019 -.005 
Welfare: Negative   .014 -.005 
National Way Life: Positive   .061 .079 
Nat Way Life: Negative   .023 .098 
Multiculturalism: Positive   -.056 -.023 
Multiculturalism: Negative   -.063 -.002 
Constitutionalism: Positive   .203** .152* 
Constitutionalism: Negative   -.151* -.162* 
     
Alternative Theories     
Left-Right Position    .038 
Gal-Tan Values 2006     .056 
Gal-Tan Values 2002     -.147 
Gal-Tan Values 1999     -.383* 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data     .084 
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Adjusted R2 .343 .396 .457 .500 
Durbin Watson 2.048 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004     
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Northern Ireland 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***)     
 
Examining all the models within the CMP data, the party family variables significant results were 
confined to the Green/Ecologist, Communist and Nationalist parties. The Green/Ecologist 
party family saw significant negative coefficients ranging from -.202* to -.285**. Communist 
parties saw significant coefficients ranging from -.309*** to -.425***. Nationalist parties saw two 
significant negative coefficients which were confined to models 1 and 2, and ranged from -
.250*** to -.335*. With the EMP data, amongst the party family variables, the significant 
coefficients were spread across the Green/Ecologist, Communist, Socialist and Social 
Democratic, Christian Democratic, Conservative, and Nationalist party family dummies. The 
Green/Ecologist party family had four significant negative coefficients ranging in strength from-
.199** to -.421***. The Communist party family had four significant negative coefficients ranging 
in strength from -.422*** to -.476***. By contrast to the CMP, the EMP data produced one 
significant result for the Socialist andSocial Democrats (.169* in model 1), four significant 
coefficients for the Christian Democrats ranging from .160* to .343***, and one significant 
coefficient for Conservative parties (.212** in model 4). Nationalist parties saw three significant 
coefficients ranging in strength from -.251*** to -.377***.  While the CMP data did produce 
fewer significant coefficients, the negative coefficients produced for Green/Ecologist, 
Communist and Nationalist party families were comparable with those produced by the EMP 
data. Interestingly the data from the EMP continued to demonstrate the applicability of the 
inverted u-curve of support for European integration mentioned above. With regard to the party 
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family independent dummy variables, the behaviour observed appears to be broadly inline with 
the Comparative Manifesto data, as well as previous studies27.  
Examining the country dummy variables for the CMP data, only two significant coefficients were 
produced – for Germany and Ireland. Germany saw three positive coefficients ranging from 
.194** to .238**. For Ireland there was only one significant coefficient in model 3, which was of 
minor strength: -.144*. For the EMP, the country dummy variables only produced significant 
coefficients for three countries. Sweden saw negative coefficients in model 2 (-.135*) and model 
3(-.175**). Austria saw a single significant negative coefficient: -.175** (model 3), while Italy saw 
a minor positive coefficient: .184*. Across both sets of data the coefficients were different, but 
the pattern suggests that for most parties, national contextual factors within each individual 
member state have little impact on party behaviour towards European integration28.  
In terms of the general ideological variables (in the CMP data), several produced significant 
coefficients. Foreign special relationship: positive saw two significant positive coefficients ranging 
from .311*** to .314***. Military: negative produced two similar coefficients at the value of 
.193** and .194**. Market Regulation: positive produced two significant negative coefficients 
ranging from -.215*** to -.227***. National way of life: positive and welfare: negative produced 
one significant negative coefficient each: -.148 and -.136 respectively. Finally, multi-culturalism: 
                                                 
27 Marks and Wilson (2000: 441) demonstrated that party family had a powerful impact on party positioning towards European integration, 
explaining 63% of the variance. Marks, Wilson & Ray (2002: 590) identified the most favourably oriented parties were the Liberals and Christian 
Democrats, followed by the Social Democratic, and regionalist parties. They then listed the Agrarian, Conservative and Green party families. 
Finally, they noted that the Protestant, Extreme Right and Communist/Extreme Left were the most Eurosceptic. Kresi (2007: 98) noted that the 
radical left and greens, as well as the national conservatives and populist right were predominantly Eurosceptic. Hellström (2008: 199) noted the 
same with regard to party families, identifying the Greens, former Communists and nationalists as the most Eurosceptic – this is not surprising 
given the use of the same dataset, though he did alter the dependent variable through a smoothing exercise.   
28 This contradicts findings by Hellström (2008: 203) who argued that national contextual factors were important sources of variation, but 
conforms to findings by Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002: 591) whose data suggested while several country variables were highly significant their 
explanatory power was very weak. They concluded that national location and political cleavages did not appear to be contending sources of 
sources of party positioning with national location account for just 5% of the total explained variance. This was mirrored by Aspinwall (2002: 91) 
who found that despite the predictions of most mainstream theories of national preference formation, there was little evidence of a correlation 
between nationality of a party and its views and position towards European integration.  
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negative produced two significant negative correlations ranging from -.139 to -.161. For the EMP 
data, the general ideological variables only three produced significant coefficients. 
Internationalism: negative saw two negative coefficients ranging from -.156** to -.196***. 
Constitutionalism: positive produced two significant positive correlations ranging from .152* to 
.203**. Constitutionalism: negative produced two significant coefficients: -.151* to -.162*. These 
results are somewhat surprising as the general ideological variables were included to ascertain 
whether positions towards the traditional sources of conflict in domestic politics had a 
constraining effect on position taken towards the EU and the European integration. With the 
CMP data one can see evidence of this taking place. Those parties advocating market regulation 
were likely to view integration quite sceptically as the initial drive of the Community and later the 
Union was for market liberalisation, and not supranational market regulation. Those supporting 
national way of life (National way of life: positive, and multi-culturalism: negative) were also 
inline with expectations for those advocating national autonomy and national culture to be 
critical. This pattern was not replicated in the European election data. The predicted values for 
internationalism: negative were of little surprise, and in line with expectations, but with the 
exception of Constitutionalism: positive and negative, no other independent variables were 
significant. This may suggest that traditional sources of conflict are less constraining in European 
elections, but this is difficult to tally up with the common regarded status of European elections 
being second-order.    
The alternative theories variables produced contradictory values. The variable utilising values 
from the 2006 Marks and Hooghe survey for GAL-TAN position (Green-Alternative-Libertarian 
vs. Traditional-Authoritarian) produced a coefficient which was strongly positive, and statistically 
significant: .520*. However, examining the variable utilising values from the 2002 Marks and 
Hooghe survey for GAL-TAN position produced a very strongly negative and significant 
coefficient: -.744**. This is a very strange result and does focus questions on whether one can 
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accept the results from these two independent variables. The result may well be spurious or 
driven by the fact that some of party positions were not available for all expert surveys, but this 
seems unlikely as this did not apply to all parties. It is also doubtful that shifts in position on this 
dimension could have driven such a change, as they would have been drastic reorientations. One 
can conclude that while the result cannot dismiss the relevancy of the GAL-TAN dimension to 
party positioning, it does call for further research29.   For the Euromanifestos, among the 
alternative theories variables only the GAL-TAN values from 1999 produced a significant 
coefficient (-.383*). This is a strong negative coefficient, but is overall weaker than some of 
coefficient results among the party family dummies and in addition for one to accept the strength 
of the GAL-TAN continuum it would be expected that all three GAL-TAN coefficients would 
be significant.  In addition, in neither the Comparative Manifesto Project data nor the 
Euromanifesto data produced significant coefficients for left-right position30 or the median voter 
position independent variables. 
Two points to note are that the R2 values for the model peak at approximately 50% of the 
variance for both the Comparative Manifesto Project and Euromanifesto Project data. This is a 
reasonably strong result, but this also considerably lower than values seen in the previous 
academic literature. However, the previous work has relied on expert survey data in which the 
                                                 
29 Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 973) ran a Multiple Ordinary Least Squares regression for party positioning and found for the dimension of 
General EU Integration that GAL-TAN produced a coefficient of -.53 which was significant to the value of p<. 01. In fact across the multiple 
dimensions GAL-TAN produced only negative coefficients, with only employment policy and cohesion policy producing coefficients, which were 
not statistically significant (2002: 976). Marks, Hooghe, Nelson and Edwards (2006: 164)‟s statement that the GAL/TAN divide is considerably 
powerful than the Left-Right dimension in predicting party positioning does seem to be confirmed by the results including the EMP on the single 
dimension of pro vs. anti integration, but the contradictory CMP results do cast some doubt.   
30 Marks, Wilson & Ray (2002: 592) found that left-right extremism competed directly with the political cleavage hypothesis and was significant. 
Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 970) did note that Left-Right extremism did have a powerful effect on the dependent variable of support for 
European integration. Furthermore, after testing three models of behaviour they found that in general Left/Right contestation shapes positioning 
only on European policies that are concerned with redistribution and regulating capitalism. Once controls were put in place for GAL/TAN and 
Left/Right extremism the results suggested that integration and Left/Right contestation were independent of each other. Hellström (2008: 199) 
noted that the effect sizes of a party‟s left/right position were medium to large (0.25-0.35). 
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range of values and standard deviation in the mean of the dependent variable will be much lower. 
Secondly, year of election had no effect in either dataset. 
SUMMARY 
In the previous chapter and introduction the thesis emphasised that the focus of European 
elections was not only national issues, but included European issues as well. Essentially this 
means that while national issues invariably form part of European election campaigns, Europe is 
still an important component; and the most significant aspect of the campaign where Europe will 
be a part is in the election manifesto as it is a document that can contain the most extensive 
predetermined policy statements made by parties (Budge, 1994: 455).   
From the graph data, one can see there is consistently greater use of European policy discourses 
in the European elections. In fact, with all four elections and most party families it is the case that 
European integration is the most politically salient issue in European elections, despite the 
complete lack of attention given to it in other parts of the campaign (see Lodge 1989; 1996; 2001; 
2005). By contrast, in national elections it is a minor issue compared to the remaining 
dimensions. In particular, national elections focused on the economy, social welfare, performance 
of government, democracy issues and foreign policy. In particular, Kresi (2007: 94) examined the 
salience of European integration in national elections between the 1970s and 1990s. He found 
that on average issues relating to European integration made up only 2.5% of all issue related 
statements in the 1970s campaigns, but close to 7.0% in the campaigns of the 1990s. European 
integration then has remained a rather unimportant issue in national elections. Although the 
study by Kriesi only overlaps slightly in terms of the period under study, the results are broadly 
similar, despite the different methodological strategy utilized (newspaper analyses), different time 
period, and only using six West European case studies. In addition, he also found that the three 
most salient issue categories remained the same as in the 1970s: welfare (16.4% share), cultural 
liberalism (12.4% share) and economic liberalism (12% share). 
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Given that much of the second-order election literature (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1984; 
Schmitt, 1990; 2004; Irwin, 1995; Van der Eijk et al, 1996; Marsh, 1998) has emphasised the 
importance of national issues and national priorities for political parties in European elections, 
this is a very significant finding which suggests at least with the case of the manifestos, that 
European policy priorities are important to some degree, even if they focus their campaign 
priorities on more national issues. 
With the identification of Eurosceptic party results, clearly they suggest a greater number of 
parties are Eurosceptic in European elections. In the national elections only seven parties could 
be identified as Eurosceptic, whereas in the European elections forty-two parties were 
Eurosceptic. One of the first conclusions could be that parties exhibit greater Eurosceptic 
behaviour in European elections than in national elections. Here one could posit that the reason 
for this is that parties feel less inhibited by the results, as this would not necessarily bar them 
from joining government coalitions, for example. However, this conclusion should be regarded 
as premature. Already identified above is the lack of discourses devoted to European issues in 
national elections is on average incredibly small at around 5% across the time period and party 
families. One would expect a greater number to be identifiable when parties can more easily 
discuss European issues. Secondly, in both sets of data, the inverted u-curve pattern (see 
Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002: 970; Aspinwall, 2002: 85; Kresi, 2007: 98; Hellström, 2008: 203) 
is clearly identifiable from the results. There are greater numbers of parties who are Eurosceptic 
at the peripheries of the party systems, whereas in the centre the majority of parties are more 
positive towards integration, with only a few identifiable outliers. A more valid tentative 
conclusion from this is that in both elections Euroscepticism it is a peripheral minority protest 
against a largely pro-European centre, but Euroscepticism has now become a phenomenon that 
has seeped into the potential toolkits of all party families. Next, this needs to be further 
investigated by comparing the predicted positions of parties between national and European 
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elections. Attention should be paid to the coefficients for party families, as this will provide an 
empirically derived understanding of the differences in the use of Euroscepticism in national and 
European elections. 
With the regressions results, in terms of predicted behaviour between the two elections one can 
see similar behaviour for the families of Green/Ecologist, Post-Communist, and Nationalist 
parties, though the Euromanifestos data produced stronger coefficients. The Euromanifestos 
data differed because it also produced positive significant coefficients for Social Democratic and 
Christian Democratic Parties. While this differed from the Comparative Manifesto data this has 
not predicted behaviour, which is contradictory for results derived in previous studies. However, 
this does point out that while the Eurosceptic parties identified with the Euromanifestos data 
suggests Euroscepticism to be spread across the party families it is still most likely to be found in 
the periphery of the party system. One further point to note is that few of the remaining 
independent variables produced similar coefficients. 
So what can be concluded? Firstly, there does appear to be similar behaviour predicted between 
national and European elections by the party families, though this is not conclusive. It is 
important to note that there is no evidence of parties being outrageously critical of European 
integration despite the lack of consequences on the national level. However, the ability to work in 
the transnational federations post-election must surely act as a constraining factor should the 
parties be inclined to behave more critically. This comparability should allow for meaningful 
conclusions to be drawn from the multi-dimensional analyses. 
Secondly, while the Euromanifestos data has thrown new light on the Eurosceptic behaviour of 
parties from all party families, the trend is still very much to see Eurosceptic behaviour at the 
peripheries of the party system. However, this is the conclusion to be drawn from examining a 
single dimension of party positions towards European integration, rather than necessarily from 
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multi-dimensional analyses. The results also do indicate while some parties are more ideologically 
predisposed to Euroscepticism, the results also do give some weight to Taggart‟s (1998: 379) 
assertion that: 
…it is clear that knowing a party‟s ideology is not necessarily a guide to its position on 
the EU. There is too much variance for us to reliably focus on particular party families. In 
addition it is also clear that Euroscepticism can come from opposite parts and from 
across the range of the political spectrum. Nevertheless, ideology clearly is a component 
in explaining EU opposition. Parties do not place themselves in positions which simply 
maximize their electoral support because they are constrained by ideological position. 
 
Given that this chapter demonstrates the importance of Europe in European elections, that it is 
the most salient issue within party manifestos across the party families and that parties do not 
differ too significantly between elections to draw out wider generalisations on how they behave 
towards the issue of European integration. However, in order to move the study of Eurosceptic 
parties and party positioning, the theoretical framework presented in chapter three will need to be 
operationalised and party behaviour investigated. Looking forwards the next chapter will use the 
Euromanifesto data (August, 2007) and will address each dimension from the multi-dimensional 
framework separately to understand causation in a more nuanced setting. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ASSESSING THE 
BEHAVIOUR OF WEST EUROPEAN PARTIES IN 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
The research question set out the aim to investigate the level and nature of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Western Europe, and to fundamentally reassess causation. The introduction 
highlighted several core aspects to the argument of the thesis: the need for a dynamic and 
nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional 
framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe in 
European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses 
to European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research 
strategy to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns. 
This chapter pushes the study forward by testing Eurosceptic causation within a multi-
dimensional setting. The theoretical framework presented in chapter three will be operationalised 
and each dimension analysed individually as a dependent variable. These will then be used in 
seven multiple regression analyses and tested using six models. The first model will focus on the 
explanatory power of party families. The second model will add the national location 
independent variables. The third model will include the independent variable of year of the 
election to control for impact of the temporal element of time series studies. It will also insert 
another group – the other forms of integration identified in the multi-dimensional framework. 
Model four adds the left-right dimension variable, while model five includes the three variables 
representing GAL-TAN values from 1999, 2002 and 2006. The final model, model six will add 
the two remaining variables from the alternative theories group – the first examines the 
government-opposition dynamic, and the second examines the impact of the median voter 
position - calculated from Eurobarometer data between 1989-2004 (Eurobarometer, 31-62). 
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Importantly, for all seven of the regression analyses the variables selected have been weighted 
equally. The chapter is organised as follows: the first section presents how the multi-dimensional 
framework theorised earlier was operationalised for empirical analyses. The following sections 
then look at the following dimensions separately: liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational 
integration, legal integration, social integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration. 
The results indicate that party ideology remains a strong causal factor in determining the way 
parties respond to developments in European integration. When considered on its own the 
amount of variance explained declines when considering the newer dimensions of social, cultural 
and foreign policy integration, but in combination with the other factors produces a number of 
strong coefficients. With the majority of the dimensions the existing alternative theories produce 
few statistically significant coefficients. The set of variables, which have the greatest impact are 
the forms of integration variables increasing the amount of variance explained dramatically, and 
producing a number of strong statistically significant coefficients.  
OPERATIONALISING THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Euromanifestos Dataset categories are organised into three levels – national, European, no-
level/world. Utilising the definitions in the theoretical framework chapter a number of 
appropriate variables were selected. Most were from level 2 which indicated that the quasi-
sentences addressed the level of the European Union.  
In order to analyse each form of integration a number of appropriate variables for each form 
were summed to give an appropriate value for each election manifesto. Initially positive and 
negative mentions were treated separately. The negative variables were then subtracted from the 
positive variables to give an overall position on each aspect of European integration identified in 
the theoretical framework. This is what Ray (2007: 16) refers to as additive scaling.  
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Creating a dimension for Economic Liberalisation, the party responses for the following variables 
were summed: Labour migration: positive; Single-Market: positive; Protectionism: negative; 
Incentives; and finally Free Enterprise. The following negative variables were also summed and 
subtracted from the pro-liberalisation values: Labour Migration: negative; Single Market: negative; 
Corporatism; Protectionism: Positive; Controlled Economy; Economic Orthodoxy; and Marxist 
Analysis. Both the positive and negative variables were all from level two – reporting quasi-
sentences, which referred to the EU-level. 
Creating a dimension for Economic Harmonisation was more difficult given the limited number 
of appropriate variables. Unfortunately, in operationalising this dimension, party positions 
towards the harmonization of standards were not present within the framework and this 
dimension has had to focus solely on Economic and Monetary Union. The following two 
positive variables were summed: Economic Monetary Union/European Currency: Positive; and 
Positive Mentions of the European Central Bank. Two negative variables were summed and 
subtracted: Economic Monetary Union/European Currency: Negative; and negative Mentions of 
the European Central Bank. All four individual variables were from level two. 
Fortunately, the dataset had a strong number of variables to construct an appropriate dimension 
for supranational integration. The statements which were positive towards the process were first 
summed: Competences of the European Parliament: Positive; Competences of the European 
Commission: Positive; Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Negative; 
Majority voting in the European Council; Competences of Other EC/EU Institutions: Positive; 
Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive; and Decentralisation: Negative.  Next the negative 
statements and subtracted from the sum of the positive statements: Transfer of Power to the 
EC/EU: Negative; Decentralisation: Positive; Competences of the European Parliament: 
Negative; Competences of the European Commission: Negative; Competences of the European 
Council/Council of Ministers: Positive; Unanimity in the (European) Council; Competences of 
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other EC/EU Institutions: Negative; and Complexity of the EC/EU. All individual variables 
were from level two. 
Like Economic Harmonisation, Legal integration was also restricted in terms of the number of 
appropriate variables to construct an appropriate dimension. The dataset had two pairs of 
appropriate variables, which focused on constitutionalism and the ECJ. Firstly the pro-legal 
statements were summed. These included: Constitutionalism: Positive; and Competences of the 
European Court of Justice: Positive. The anti-legal statements were then summed and subtracted 
from the positive references: Constitutionalism: Negative; and Competences of the European 
Court of Justice: Negative. Both pairs were from level two. 
The positive and negative statements relevant to creating an appropriate dimension for social 
integration centred around two pairs of categories – welfare state expansion (WSE) and welfare 
state limitation (WSL), each containing five individual variables. Firstly, the following pro-Social 
integration variables were summed: Welfare State Expansion (WSE); WSE: Job Programs; WSE: 
Pensions; WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service; WSE: Social Housing; and WSE: Child Care. 
The negative statements were then summed and subtracted from the positive summed variables: 
Welfare State Limitation (WSL); WSL: Job Programs; WSL: Pensions; WSL: Health Care and 
Nursing Service; WSL: Social Housing; and WSL: Child Care. All variables were from level two. 
The appropriate variables for Cultural integration came from both level one and two (national 
and European sentences) and consisted of three pairs focused on national, European ways of life, 
and immigration. The pro-cultural statements were first summed: National way of life: Negative; 
Immigration: Positive; and European Way of Life: Positive. The negative statements were then 
summed and subtracted: National Way of Life: Positive; Immigration: Negative; and European 
Way of Life: Negative. 
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Finally with foreign policy integration, the appropriate themes identified in the dataset related to 
foreign special relations, the military, peace, imperialism and internationalism. The construct of 
this dimension also makes use of both national and European level statements. Firstly the pro-
foreign policy related statements were summed: Foreign Special Relationships: Positive 
(European-level); Military: Positive (European-level); Peace (European-level); Anti-Imperialism 
(European-level); and Internationalism: Positive (European-level). The negative statements were 
then summed and subtracted from the summed positive statements: Foreign Special 
Relationships: Negative (European Level); Foreign Special Relationships (National Level); 
Military: Negative (European Level); Military: Positive (National Level); Internationalism: 
Negative (European Level); and Internationalism: Positive (National Level). 
Table 19: Variables used for the Construction of Quantitative Dimensions 
  
Variable  Description 
  
Pro-Economic Liberalisation  
  
v2_4082 Labour Migration: Positive 
v2_4084 Single Market: Positive 
v2_407 Protectionism: Negative 
v2_402  Incentives 
v2_401 Free Enterprise 
  
Anti-Economic Liberalisation  
  
v2_4083 Labour Migration: Negative 
v2_4085 Single Market: Negative 
v2_405 Corporatism 
v2_406 Protectionism: Positive 
v2_412 Controlled Economy 
v2_413 Nationalisation 
v2_414 Economic Orthodoxy 
v2_415 Marxist Analysis 
  
Pro-Economic Harmonisation  
  
V2_4086  European Monetary Union/European Currency: Positive 
V2_3141 Positive Mentions of the European Central Bank 
  
Anti-Economic Harmonisation  
  
V2_4087 European Monetary Union/European Currency: Negative 
V2_3151 Negative Mentions of the European Central Bank 
  
Pro-Supranational Integration  
  
v2_306 Competences of the European Parliament: Positive 
v2_308 Competences of the European Commission: Positive 
v2_311 Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Negative 
v2_3111 Majority voting in European Council 
v2_314 Competences of the Other EC/EU Institutions: Positive 
v2_3021 Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Positive 
v2_302 Decentralisation: Negative 
  
Anti-Supranational Integration  
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v2_3011 Transfer of Power to the EC/EU: Negative 
v2_301  Decentralisation: Positive 
v2_307  Competences of the European Parliament: Negative 
v2_309  Competences of the European Commission: Negative 
v2_310  Competences of the European Council/Council of Ministers: Positive 
v2_3101  Unanimity in the (European) Council 
v2_315  Competences of other EC/EU Institutions: Negative 
v2_318  Complexity of the EC/EU 
  
Pro-Legal Integration  
  
v2_203 Constitutionalism: Positive   
v2_312 Competences of the European Court of Justice: Positive 
  
Anti-Legal Integration  
  
v2_204 Constitutionalism: Negative 
v2_313 Competences of the European Court of Justice: Negative 
  
  
Pro-Social Integration  
  
v2_504  Welfare State Expansion 
v2_5041 WSE: Job Programs 
v2_5042  WSE: Pensions 
v2_5043 WSE: Health Care and Nursing Service 
v2_5044 WSE: Social Housing 
v2_5045 WSE: Child Care 
  
Anti-Social Integration  
  
v2_505 Welfare State Limitation 
v2_5051 WSL: Job Programs 
v2_5052 WSL: Pensions 
v2_5053 WSL: Health Care and Nursing Service 
v2_5054 WSL: Social Housing 
v2_5055 WSL: Child Care 
  
Pro-Cultural Integration  
  
v1_602 National way of life: Negative 
v2_6011 Immigration: Positive 
v2_601 European Way of Life: Positive 
  
Anti-Cultural Integration  
  
v1_601   National Way of Life: Positive 
v2_6021  Immigration: Negative 
V2_602 European Way of Life: Negative 
  
Pro-Foreign Policy Integration  
  
v2_101 Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (European-level) 
v2_104  Military: Positive (European-level) 
v2_106  Peace (European-level) 
v2_103 Anti-Imperialism (European-level) 
v2_107 Internationalism: Positive (European-level) 
  
Anti-Foreign Policy Integration  
  
v2_102    Foreign Special Relationships: Negative (European Level) 
v1_101  Foreign Special Relationships: Positive (National Level) 
v2_105  Military: Negative (European Level) 
v1_104 Military: Positive (National Level) 
v2_109  Internationalism: Negative (European Level) 
v1_107  Internationalism: Positive (National Level)  
Source: Euromanifestos Project Dataset 
As briefly mentioned above, Ray (2007: 16) pointed out that there are several techniques to 
reduce a number of themes to a single dimension. The simplest technique utilised examined pro-
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EU references and anti-EU references in isolation. The second technique used by Carruba (2001 
in Ray, 2007) was to subtract anti-EU from pro-EU references in order to calculate the net 
support for the EU from each party. However, the main issue with this is that, as Ray (2007: 16) 
points out is that „this approach does not distinguish between a political party whose manifesto 
contains five positive references to the EU with no offsetting negative references, and another 
party which may have 25 positive references to the EU, but also 20 offsetting negative references. 
It would seem that the latter party is more ambivalent about the EU than the first party, and that 
the net measure should by divided by the sum of positive and negative mentions to produce a 
relative, rather than absolute count of references to the EU‟. This is the third technique. For this 
thesis it was vital to have a dimension, which reflected the overall position of a party rather than 
a scale that would indicate the amount of references. Having an overall position was a key 
element in the research question and to understanding the impact of ideology on party positions. 
The reason why the third technique was less appropriate to use was that in some of the 
dimensions, a party‟s preference for a national solution was also utilised and hence dividing by 
the sum of all EU related sentences would have been misleading. Finally a point to note about 
the very important criticism levelled at the second method. Ray is absolutely right that by 
subtracting the negative references from the positive score will tend to mask any ambivalent 
behaviour a party may adopt towards European integration and present a party which may be 
more supportive or more critical than is actually the case. However, this applies mostly to single-
dimensional studies. When a multi-dimensional model is used, it is highly unlikely that a party‟s 
ambivalence will be hidden given that each dimension looks at a particular process of integration 
which is much more specific. 
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MULTIPLE OLS REGRESSION: THE RESULTS 
LIBERALISATION 
Table 20: Multiple Regression results – DV (Liberalisation) 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 331 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Party Families       
Conservative -.149 -.147 -.063 -.071 -.073 -.071 
Socialist and Social Democratic -.408** -.407*** -.326** -.313** -.295* -.288* 
Christian Democrat -.171 -.230* -.210* -.217* -.226* -.226* 
(Post)-Communist -.611*** -.632*** -.327** -.315** -.302* -.280* 
Agrarian -.147 -.218* -.093 -.089 -.095 -.098 
Ethnic-Regional -1.39 -.178* -.152* -.153* -.153 -.153 
Nationalist -.206* -0.72 -.013 -.021 -.039 -.038 
Green/Ecologist -0.411*** -.462*** -.303** -.294** -.273* -.258* 
       
Country       
Sweden  0.21 .059 -.067 .058 -.010 
Denmark  -.228* -.181 -.169 -.177 -.225 
Finland  -.034 -.012 .002 -.003 -.063 
France  -.433*** -.385*** -.379*** -.392*** -.436** 
Italy  -.203* -.166 -.159 -.164 -.181 
Greece  -.071 -.093 -.102 -.120 -.146 
Portugal  -.069 -.031 -.031 -.034 -.048 
Germany  .041 .008 -.004 -.022 -.074 
Austria  -.251** -.198* -.194* -.209* -.276 
Ireland  -0.86 -.067 -.058 -.074 -.077 
       
Year of Election   -.041 -.047 -.052 -.063 
       
Forms of Integration       
Economic Harmonisation   .205* .203* .197* .204* 
Supranational Integration   .179 -.181 .182 .173 
Legal Integration   .159 .152 .160 .168 
Social integration   -.185* -.174 -.178 -.181 
Cultural Integration   .033 .034 .035 .031 
Foreign policy integration   .101 .105 .110 .108 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    .038 .045 .049 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      -.079 -.082 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      .130 .147 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -.017 -.024 
In Government when manifesto published      -.028 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data32       -.080 
       
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.495 0.636 0.636 0.637 0.638 
Durbin Watson 1.89733 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***) 
 
If we first focus on the impact of the models, we can see that on its own the party family 
dummies accounted for 28.5% of the variance. The two substantial increases in the adjusted R2 
                                                 
31 Please note that from Model 3 onwards both the unstandardised beta value and the standard error for the Constant increased dramatically. In 
addition the standard error was larger than the Constant. The tables for these can be found in the appendix. 
32
 The independent variable representing the median voter was calculated using the data supplied by the Eurobarometer surveys over the period 
1989-2004 (European Opinion Research Group Eurobarometer 31-62). It focused on the question of whether the respondent thought EU 
membership was a good thing. 
33 Importantly the Durbin-Watson statistic shows that while there is some evidence of positive autocorrelation, this is not critical. Any value <1 
would indicate a need for a lagged dependent variable. This can mean that some of the statistical significance is underestimated. 
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value came from the addition of the country dummy variables (to 49.5%) and the forms of 
integration (to 63.6%). The later models did not account for more of the variance. 
Incredibly with the dependent variable of liberalisation, almost all party families produced 
significant negative coefficients. The exception was the Conservative party family, which had no 
significant coefficients. The three party families with the strong coefficients were the 
Green/Ecologists (-.462 *** in model 2), (post)-Communists (-.632*** in model 2) and the 
Socialist and Social Democrats (-.408**). Also noteworthy was a set of slightly weaker negative 
coefficients for Christian Democratic parties with the strongest value being found in Model 2 (-
0.230*). Further weaker significant coefficients were visible with Agrarian (-0.218* in model 2) 
and eEthnic-Regional parties (-0.178* in model 2, -0.152* in model 3, and -0.153* in model 4). In 
addition nationalist parties also had a significant negative coefficient in model 1 (-0.206*). Most 
party family independent variables have produced significant coefficients. The data suggests that 
for a one-unit change in the independent variable for the Green/Ecologist, (Post)-Communist, 
Social Democrat, and Christian Democratic, Nationalist, Agrarian and Ethno-regional dummies 
should all produce a negative shift in the dependent variable (liberalisation). This confirms three 
of the hypotheses, but suggests liberalisation does attract a much more negative stance across the 
party system than expected. One should note that the coefficients for Christian Democrats, 
Nationalist, Agrarian and Ethno-Regional are quite weak suggesting a very small negative shift. 
The results are also surprising for (post)-Communist parties as it suggests that the general trend is 
towards negative discourse suggesting that a number of the cases remain unreformed Communist 
parties and continue to be critical. In addition the inverted u-curve, which was so apparent with 
the single dimensional analysis of pro vs. anti-EU in both national and European election 
analyses earlier, was not visible. This is a considerably different finding from previous research 
(for example see Hellström, 2008).  
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The Country dummy variables produced some surprising results. Amongst the country dummy 
variables, two countries produced significant negative coefficients that stood out in multiple 
models. France registered negative coefficients from Model 2-6 with the strongest value being in 
Model 6 (-0.436**). Austria saw negative coefficients from Models 2-5 with the strongest 
coefficient in Model 2 (-0.251**). There was some evidence of a geographical peripheral trend in 
potential critical positioning with both Sweden and Austria producing significant but weak 
coefficients with a range of -.194 to -.251. However there was some indication of critical 
behaviour amongst the traditional core parties with the coefficients of France as described above, 
but also Italy in Model 2 produced a coefficient of -.203 *.  
In terms of the other significant predictors, Model 3 saw a negative coefficient for social 
integration (-0.185*) and positive coefficients for economic harmonisation in models 3-6. Model 
3 produced the strongest positive coefficient (0.205*).  No other independent variables produced 
significant coefficients. These results are less surprising as those that would potentially support 
social integration, could be more fearful of increased liberalisation, which can be at the detriment 
of welfare policies. Those that support harmonisation are likely to also support liberalisation, 
given that the two integration processes are fundamentally linked. Importantly, however, within 
the European election data neither the left-right dimension nor the alternative theories have 
produced significant coefficients, despite this being the case in data from previous studies. 
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HARMONISATION 
Table 21: Multiple Regression results – DV (Harmonisation) 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Party Families       
Conservative -.100 -.132 -.059 -.084 .047 .033 
Socialist and Social Democratic -.101 -.097 .015 .056 .109 .082 
Christian Democrat -.060 -.076 -.038 -.059 .084 .087 
Communist -.551*** -.585*** -.312 -.272 -.283 -.348* 
Agrarian -.183* -.216 -0.93 -.080 -.017 -.007 
Ethnic-Regional -.005 -.032 .017 .016 -.001 -.002 
Nationalist -.142 -.156 -.106 -.129 .016 .014 
Green/Ecologist -.316** -.350** -.183 -.154 -.200 -.244 
       
Country       
Sweden  .132 .203 .227 .138 .448 
Denmark  .052 .180 .216 .114 .334 
Finland  .139 .200 .243 .208 .478* 
France  .073 .267* .284* .193 .392* 
Italy  .096 .137 .158 .089 .167 
Greece  .116 .165 .134 .033 .144 
Portugal  -.021 .056 .057 .005 .071 
Germany  .250* .234* .246* .107 0.339 
Austria  .019 .167 .180 .092 .403 
Ireland  .062 .173 .197 .053 .069 
       
Year of Election   -.094 -.111 -.140 -.091 
       
Forms of Integration       
Economic Liberalisation   .296* .291* .252* .254* 
Supranational Integration   .146 .151 .086 .117 
Legal Integration   -.043 -.063 -.083 -.119 
Social integration   .022 .053 .030 .045 
Cultural Integration   .145 .148 .105 .115 
Foreign policy integration   .197* .210 .223* .221* 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    .119 .181 .171 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      -.617 -.590 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      .649 .571 
Gal-Tan Values 1999     -.353 .324 
In Government when manifesto published      .085 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data       .371 
       
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.196 0.331 0.328 0.38 0.386 
Durbin Watson 1.735 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU 
Accession Year 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***) 
Examining the amount of variance explained by the six models, it is possible to see that initially 
party families only explained approximately 21.3%. With Model 2‟s country dummy variables, the 
variance explained decreased to 19.6%. The introduction of Model 3 saw the largest increase 
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variance explained to 33.1%. Finally with Model 6 the amount of variance explained increased to 
38.6%. 
The regression for the dependent variable of economic harmonisation produced only a few 
significant coefficients. With the party family dummy variables, the Green/Ecologist parties saw 
significant coefficients in Model 1 (-0.316**) and Model 2 (-0.350**). The (post)-Communist 
parties saw three instances of significant negative coefficients in Model 1 (-0.551***), Model 2(-
0.585***) and Model 6 (-0.348*). The Agrarian party family also produced one significant 
negative coefficient in Model 1 (-0.183*). Importantly it appears that only the peripheral parties 
produced significant coefficients, but from a hypotheses testing standpoint it is possible to 
confirm the hypotheses for Green parties, Agrarian parties and (Post)-Communist parties – 
though with one caveat. (Post)-Communist parties include both the reformed and unreformed 
examples. However, the predicted behaviour is strongly critical across both. The coefficient was -
.348 (model 6) to -.585 (model 2). 
A key observation amongst the country dummy variables is that the significant coefficients were 
all positive. In addition there is a clear identifiable group of countries producing weak to strong 
significant positive coefficients with a range of .234 to .478.  Finland saw one significant 
coefficient in Model 6 (0.478*). France saw three significant coefficients in Models 3 (0.267*), 
Model 4 (0.284*) and Model 6(0.392*). Germany saw three significant coefficients in Model 2 
(0.250*), Model 3 (0.234*) and Model 4 (0.246*).  
Finally, the „forms of integration‟ variables also produced significant positive coefficients. 
Liberalisation saw four significant coefficients in Model 3 (0.296*), Model 4 (0.291*), Model 
5(0.252*), and Model 6 (0.254*). Foreign policy integration saw three significant coefficients in 
Model 3 (0,197*), Model 5 (0.223*) and Model 6 (0.221*). The results from this group of 
independent variables are not particularly surprising given that those particularly supportive of 
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economic liberalisation are likely to see economic harmonisation as a natural progression and the 
realisation of a fully functioning single market. In addition those that supported foreign policy 
integration are likely to be strongly supportive of most integration processes. Furthermore, when 
examining the impact of the alternative theories, it is surprising that none have produced 
significant coefficients, especially as aspects of this dimension would have been covered by the 
economic integration dimension used in previous studies (for example, see Marks, Wilson and 
Ray, 2002). However, in the case of European election manifestos this has not proven to be the 
case. 
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SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION 
Table 22: Multiple Regression results – DV (Supranational Integration) 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Party Families       
Conservative -.015 -.012 .119 .140 .226* .225* 
Socialist and Social Democratic .221 .163 .345** .308* .268 .284* 
Christian Democrat .071 .042 .157 .174 .302* .286* 
Communist -.170 -.213 .191 .158 .070 .153 
Agrarian -.243** -.234* -.148 -.157 -.076 -.085 
Ethnic-Regional .044 .038 .108 .108 .108 .101 
Nationalist -.072 -.064 .075 .094 .220 .218 
Green/Ecologist .032 .028 .303** .278* .149 .201 
       
Country       
Sweden  -.292* -.322** -.342*** -.327** -.558* 
Denmark  -.239* -.138 -.168 -.156 -.326 
Finland  -.217 -.206* -.242* -.217 -.428* 
France  -.228* -.181 -.196 -.142 -.305 
Italy  -.207 -.080 -.098 -.087 -.149 
Greece  -.099 -.070 -.044 -.038 -.137 
Portugal  -.127 -.126 -.126 -.149 -.198 
Germany  -.349** -.432*** -.440*** -.434*** -.610*** 
Austria  -.264* -.237* -.248* -.231* -.471* 
Ireland  -.153 -.194 -.215* -.233 -.235* 
       
Year of Election   -.009 .007 .009 -.032 
       
Forms of Integration       
Economic Liberalisation   .220 .221 .214 .196 
Economic Harmonisation   .125 .129 .078 .106 
Legal Integration   .404*** .419*** .361** .379*** 
Social integration   -.081 -.107 -.097 -.107 
Cultural Integration   -.404*** -.405*** -.424*** -.424*** 
Foreign policy integration   .067 .054 .051 .041 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -.100 -.111 -.083 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      .098 .077 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      -.064 .008 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -.350 -.364 
In Government when manifesto published      -.121 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data       -.290 
       
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.134 0.428 0.425 0.433 0.441 
Durbin Watson 1.017 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU 
Accession Year 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***) 
 
With the dependent variable of supranational integration, the adjusted R2 variable showed that 
the amount of variance explained by Model 6 was a more modest 44.1%. The party family 
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dummy variables explained only 11.3%, and the largest increase in variance explained was seen 
with Model 3 with the forms of integration independent variables that jumped to 42.8%. 
In terms of significant coefficients, the party family dummies saw a significant spread. The 
Green/Ecologist parties had two significant coefficients in Model 3 (0.303**) and Model 4 
(0.278*). Social Democratic parties had three significant coefficients in Model 3 (0.345**), Model 
4 (0.308*) and Model 6 (0.284*). Conservative parties had two significant coefficients in Model 5 
(0.302*) and Model 6 (0.225*). Finally Agrarian parties produced two instances of significant 
coefficients in Model 1 (-0.243**) and Model 2 (-0.234*). The results did produce some extremely 
interesting findings regarding the hypotheses. Firstly the positive coefficients for the Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats confirmed the hypotheses. Secondly, the negative 
coefficients for Agrarian parties also confirmed the hypotheses. It was the positive coefficients 
for Green/ecologist parties and Conservative parties contradicted the original hypotheses. For 
both party families the coefficients were weak, but suggest that for the Green parties‟ further 
transfers of sovereignty will be seen as more of an opportunity to achieve Green goals at the 
European level. The values for Conservative parties also suggest that any scepticism is limited to 
a small number of cases and that the family is supportive of transfers of sovereignty to the 
supranational level. 
The country dummies saw a number of significant coefficients. Sweden saw five in Model 2 (-
0.292*), Model 3 (-0.322**), Model 4 (-0.342***), Model 5 (-0.327**) and Model 6 (-0.558*). 
Denmark saw one significant coefficient in Model 2 (-0.239*). Finland saw three significant 
coefficients in Model 3 (-0.206*), Model 4 (-0.242*) and Model 6 (-0.428*). France had one 
significant coefficient in Model 2(-0.228*). Germany saw significant negative coefficients across 
Model 2 (-0.349***), Model 3 (-0.432***), Model 4 (-0.440***), Model 5 (-0.434***) and Model 6 
(-0.610***). Austria saw significant coefficients in Model 2 (-0.264*), Model 3 (-0.237*), Model 4 
(-0.248*), Model 5 (-0.231*) and Model 6 (-0.471*). Lastly, Ireland had one instance of a 
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significant coefficient in Model 6 (-0.235*). Importantly with the country dummy variables is that 
all significant coefficients are negative. The coefficients are spread across the member states, 
giving the impression that some scepticism is present in almost all member states, with the only 
exceptions in the results being Italy, Greece and Portugal. 
Furthermore the „forms of integration‟ variables suggest that those parties who support legal 
integration will also support supranational integration, but those cases who support cultural 
integration will be critical of further transfers of sovereignty. Legal integration had four positive 
coefficients – model 3 (0.404***), Model 4 (0.419***), Model 5 (0.361***), and Model 6 
(0.379***). Cultural integration also had four significant negative coefficients – Model 3 (-
0.404***), Model 4 (-0.405***), Model 5 (-0.424***), and Model 6 (-0.424***). 
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LEGAL INTEGRATION 
Table 23: Multiple Regression results – DV (Legal Integration) 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Party Families       
Conservative -.226* -.178 -.150 -.199 -.122 -.135 
Socialist and Social Democrats -.076 -.043 -.141 -.045 -.103 -.118 
Christian Democrat -.005 -.045 -.078 -.121 -.009 -.005 
Communist -.416*** -.366** -.230 -.136 -.209 -.245 
Agrarian -.042 .033 .104 .126 .173* .171* 
Ethnic-Regional -.082 -.033 -.049 -.051 -.054 -.058 
Nationalist -.127 -.109 -.051 -.099 .069 .069 
Green/Ecologist .020 -.020 -.068 -.005 -.143 -.171 
       
Country       
Sweden  -.169 -.003 .053 .068 .438* 
Denmark  -.210 .009 .089 .086 .343* 
Finland  -.133 -.027 .073 .095 .410* 
France  -.047 .127 .163 .187 .408** 
Italy  -.002 -.018 .030 .027 .115 
Greece  -.078 .040 -.028 .030 .142 
Portugal  -.114 .012 .014 .009 .084 
Germany  .234* .302** .316*** .348*** .597*** 
Austria  .106 .215* .237** .278*** .630** 
Ireland  -.001 .171 .220* .239* .256** 
       
Year of Election   .083 .039 .042 .085 
       
Forms of Integration       
Economic Liberalisation   .167 .153 .152 .153 
Economic Harmonisation   -.031 -.044 -.061 -.087 
Supranational Integration   .345*** .344*** .292* .305*** 
Social Integration   .353*** .406*** .393*** .394*** 
Cultural Integration   .179* .181* .158 .160 
Foreign policy integration   .162 .186* .170* .160 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    .261* .255 .266* 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      .076 .064 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      -.394 -.409 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -.007 -.002 
In Government when manifesto published      .021 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data       .435* 
       
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.222 0.512 0.529 0.54 0.551 
Durbin Watson 1.55 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU 
Accession Year 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***) 
 
The dependent variable of legal integration saw 55.1% of the variance explained by Model 6. 
Initially, the party family dummy variables accounted for only 11.3% of the variance. With the 
addition of country variables this was pushed up to 22.2%. The largest jump in variance 
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explained was due to the addition of the „forms of integration independent variables where the 
variance accounted for was 51.2%. 
The party family dummies produced few significant coefficients that could be utilised for the 
purpose of hypotheses testing. The Conservative and (post)-Communist party hypotheses were 
confirmed, though with one caveat for the Communist group. The overall prediction is for weak 
to strong negative behaviour (with coefficients ranging from -.366 and -.416) for the party family 
despite a number of parties being of the reformed variety. The Agrarian coefficients while very 
weak were positive and this contradicted the original prediction of the hypotheses. (Post)-
Communist parties saw two significant negative coefficients in Model 1 (-0.416***) and Model 2 
(-0.366**). Conservative parties saw one instance of a significant coefficient in Model 1 (-0.226*). 
Agrarian parties had two significant coefficients in Model 5 (0.173*) and Model 6 (0.171*).  
As noted there were an extensive number of significant positive correlations amongst the country 
dummy variables. These were spread across the accession groups and ranged from weak 
coefficients of .215 to strong coefficients of .630. Overall for this dimension, the country 
dummies were a more accurate predictor of positions than party family dummy variables. There 
were a large number of coefficients, which were statistically significant especially with Model 6. 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and France saw one significant coefficient each in Model 6 (0.438*; 
0.343*; 0.410*; and 0.408** respectively). Germany saw five significant coefficients in Models 2-6 
(0.234*; 0.302**; 0.316***; 0.348*; and 0.597* respectively). Austria saw significant coefficients in 
Models 3-6 (0.215*; 0.237**; 0.278***; and 0.630** respectively). Finally, Ireland saw significant 
coefficients in Models 4-6 (0.220*; 0.239*; and 0.256** respectively). 
The „forms of integration‟ saw a number of significant coefficients. Supranational integration saw 
four positive coefficients in Models 3-6 (0.345***; 0.344***; 0.292*; and 0.305*** respectively). 
Social integration had four significant positive coefficients in Models 3-6 (0.353***; 0.406***; 
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0.393***; 0.394*** respectively). Interestingly given how much the process of legal integration is 
bound up with the processes of economic integration one would have expected a relationship. 
However, legal integration also includes the moves towards creating a European Constitution and 
hence those parties who support social, cultural and foreign policy integration were likely to (and 
it was predicted) support the process. 
Lastly, two of the alternative theories also had examples of positive significant coefficients. Left-
Right position in Models 4 and 6 had the following weak coefficients: 0.264* and 0.266* 
respectively. The Median Voter Position in Model 6 produced a reasonably strong coefficient of 
0.435*.  
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SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
Table 24: Multiple Regression results – DV (Social Integration) 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Party Families       
Conservative .064 .049 .111 .208* .204 .213 
Socialist and Social Democrats .348** .368** .302* .076 .118 .128 
Christian Democrat .056 .059 .031 .120 .098 .095 
Communist .270* .270* .286* .075 .104 .132 
Agrarian .136 .167 .074 .009 -.008 -.012 
Ethnic-Regional .085 .098 .071 .068 .061 .065 
Nationalist .035 -.097 -.041 .068 .036 .034 
Green/Ecologist .358** .327** .247* .090 .135 .155 
       
Country       
Sweden  -.140 -.083 -.186 -.210 -.430 
Denmark  -.177 -.159 -.301** -.327** -.479* 
Finland  -.089 -.050 -.245* -.256 -.444 
France  .021 -.111 -.180 -.221 -.357 
Italy  .185 .119 .005 -.015 -.068 
Greece  -.189 -.175 -.016 -.058 -.126 
Portugal  -.116 -.093 -.084 -.089 -.133 
Germany  .012 -.139 -.176 -.219 -.375 
Austria  .059 -.082 -.134 -.169 -.386 
Ireland  -.114 -.158 -.251* -.288 -.301* 
       
Year of Election   -.053 .036 .019 -.008 
       
Forms of Integration       
Economic Liberalisation   -.287 -.234 -.237 -.239 
Economic Harmonisation   .024 .050 .031 .048 
Supranational Integration   -.102 -.117 -.110 -.125 
Legal Integration   .523*** .541*** .551*** .572*** 
Cultural Integration   -.076 -.086 -.080 -.084 
Foreign Policy Integration   .042 -.028 -.014 -.013 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -.533*** -.499*** -.505** 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      -.263 -.256 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      .329 .346 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -.004 -.007 
In Government when manifesto published      -.017 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data       -.260 
       
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.134 0.277 0.371 0.356 0.348 
Durbin Watson 2.269 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, 
EU Accession Year 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***) 
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Social integration saw a low R2 value for all six models peaking at model 4 with 37.1% of the 
variance explained. The party family dummies only explained 7.9% and the addition of country 
dummy variables only increased this to 13.4%. 
Examining the party family dummies that there are clearly significant positive coefficients 
amongst the Green/Ecological, (post)-Communist and Social Democratic parties in Models 1-3. 
Green parties saw 0.358*** in model 1, 0.327** in model 2, and 0.247** in model 3. (Post)-
Communist parties produced 0.270* in model 1, 0.270* in model 2, and 0.286* in model 3. 
Lastly, Socialist and Social Democratic parties produced 0.348** in model 1, 0.368** in model 2, 
and 0.302* in model 3.  
In terms of the hypotheses testing the results were important for the Green/Ecologist parties as 
originally it was argued that they would most likely have no overall position towards social 
integration. However, the results suggest that Green parties will adopt positive positions and this 
leads to an argument that the parties have broadened their ideological appeal to include social 
welfare elements and that this can be achieved at the supranational level. In addition it was also 
argued that (post)-Communist parties would also have no overall position towards social 
integration. However, despite the critical positions towards many of the other dimensions, (post)-
Communist parties favoured improving social welfare at the EU-level. The Conservative dummy 
variables also contradicted the hypotheses as it was expected that they would be negative towards 
the process. However, the behaviour for the majority of the cases is actually positive, giving the 
impression that the negative behaviour may only be confined to one or two cases. This will be 
explored later in the next chapter. Finally, the hypothesis for Socialist and Social Democratic 
parties was confirmed. 
The country dummy variables produced few significant coefficients with the exception of 
Denmark, Finland and Ireland. Denmark produced significant coefficients in model 4 (-0.301**), 
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in model 5 (-0.327**) and model 6 (-0.479*). Finland produced one significant coefficient in 
model 4 (-0.245*). Ireland produced two significant coefficients in model 4 (-0.251*) and model 6 
(-0.301*). Interestingly, all the significant coefficients were negative, and were also confined to 
the peripheries – Denmark, Finland and Ireland, potentially suggesting a geographical peripheral 
scepticism towards the process. 
The final two independent variables of legal integration and left-right position produced strong 
coefficients. Legal integration produced positive coefficients varying in size between 0.523*** 
and 0.572*** in models 3-6. Left-right position produced negative coefficients varying in size 
between -0.499*** and -0.533*** in models 4-6. The fact that the Left-Right coefficient has 
produced a very strong negative coefficient is of little surprise given that social welfare is a 
traditional element of the dimension and source of conflict in national party politics. It is 
important to note this conflict has continued on to the supranational level. 
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CULTURAL INTEGRATION 
Table 25: Multiple Regression results – DV (Cultural Integration) 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Party Families       
Conservative -.026 -.011 .084 .104 .180 .180 
Socialist and Social Democrats -.018 .052 .240 .207 .175 .187 
Christian Democrat .071 .092 .142 .157 .278* .273* 
Communist -.003 -.010 .186 .155 .072 .122 
Agrarian -.051 .006 -.045 -.054 .027 .020 
Ethnic-Regional -.013 .008 .062 .063 .079 .075 
Nationalist .220* .137 .179 .197 .260 .261 
Green/Ecologist .175 .183 .353** .330* .222 .254 
       
Country       
Sweden  -.167 -.307** -.325** -.302* -.400 
Denmark  -.053 -.109 -.137 -.096 -.170 
Finland  -.063 -.172 -.206 -.187 -.279 
France  -.156 -.243 -.257* -.164 -.237 
Italy  .210 .097 .080 .107 .078 
Greece  .019 -.032 -.008 -.015 -.064 
Portugal  -.145 -.173* -.173* -.198 -.221* 
Germany  .157 -.150 -.159 -.179 -.262 
Austria  .011 -.127 -.137 -.140 -.245 
Ireland  -.144 -.202 -.221* -.246* -.246 
       
Year of Election   .010 .024 .039 .018 
       
Forms of Integration       
Economic Liberalisation   .051 .053 .052 .046 
Economic Harmonisation   .157 .162 .122 .136 
Supranational Integration   -.513*** -.516*** -.537*** -.552*** 
Legal Integration   .266* .281* .247 .259 
Social integration   -.077 -.100 -.089 -.094 
Foreign Policy Integration   .154 .143 .126 .119 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -.092 -.150 -.128 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      .343 .327 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      -.039 .003 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -.535* -.547* 
In Government when manifesto published      -.078 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data       -.431 
       
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.106 0.274 0.268 0.283 0.272 
Durbin Watson 1.572 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU 
Accession Year 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***) 
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Cultural integration had very little of the variance explained by the six models peaking at 28.5% 
in model 5. The party family dummy variables only explained 1.6% of the variance. The country 
dummy variables pushed this up to 10.6%. 
In terms of the coefficients there were only a few independent variables, which produced 
significant results. Among the party family dummy variables the Green/ecologist parties 
produced two significant coefficients in model 3 (0.353**) and model 4 (0.330*). Christian 
Democrat parties produced two significant coefficients in model 5 (0.278*) and model 6 (0.273*). 
Nationalist parties produced one significant coefficient in model 1 (0.220*). Despite the lack of 
significant coefficients there still important results and conclusions to draw from the party family 
dummies in regard to hypotheses testing. The Green parties contradicted the original hypotheses 
in having a positive coefficient. Nationalist parties were also predicted to position positively and 
this was in contradiction of the original hypotheses. This does suggest that their cultural 
discourse may not be as „national‟ as expected. Finally the Christian Democrat positive 
coefficients supported the original hypotheses. 
With the dummy country independent variables, Sweden produced three significant coefficients 
ranging in strength between -0.302* and -0.325** in models 3-5. France had one significant 
coefficient in model 4 (-0.257*). Portugal had three instances of significant coefficients varying in 
strength between -0.173* and -0.221* in models 3-6. Ireland had two instances of significant 
coefficients in models 4 and 5 (-0.221* and -0.246*). It is important to note that all of the 
significant coefficients are negative and with the exception of France the countries can be 
described as the more peripheral members of the European Union – perhaps indicating a 
geographical peripheral scepticism towards the process.  
 The „forms of integration‟ independent variables produced two interesting results. Supranational 
integration produced four negative and strongly significant results varying in strength between -
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0.513*** and -0.552*** in models 3-6. Legal integration also produced two significant positive 
coefficients in models 3 (0.266*) and model 4 (0.281*). Finally the GAL-TAN values from 1999 
produced two strongly significant negative coefficients in model 5 (-0.535* and -0.547*). The 
GAL-TAN dimension does relate quite significantly to cultural and the extreme TAN aspect 
(Traditional/Authoritarian) was likely to conflict significantly with any promotion of a 
supranational European cultural identity and hence this is not a surprise to observe a pair of large 
negative coefficients. 
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FOREIGN POLICY INTEGRATION 
Table 26: Multiple Regression results – DV (Foreign Policy Integration) 
 Standardised Coefficients 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
Party Families       
Conservative -.123 -.148 -.051 .009 -.008 -.014 
Socialist and Social Democrats -.179 -.183 -.126 -.217 -.269 -.260 
Christian Democrat .066 .072 .117 .161 .162 .159 
Communist -.347** -.402** -.083 -.169 -.193 -.155 
Agrarian -.092 -.131 -.047 -.074 -.056 -.061 
Ethnic-Regional .004 -.029 .005 .009 .023 .016 
Nationalist -.096 -.168 -.107 -.050 -.048 -.042 
Green/Ecologist -.250* -.307** -.197 -.254 -.286 -.262 
       
Country       
Sweden  .006 .075 .013 .055 .096 
Denmark  -.136 -.026 -.110 -.050 -.026 
Finland  .030 .074 -.033 -.017 .010 
France  -.033 .075 .029 .102 .113 
Italy  .105 .095 .042 .081 .085 
Greece  -.055 -.035 .036 .094 .086 
Portugal  -.064 .018 .015 .025 .029 
Germany  .169 .057 .025 .088 .103 
Austria  -.084 -.052 -.083 -.033 .000 
Ireland  -.217 -.177 -.230* -.163 -.153 
       
Year of Election   -.023 .020 .050 .045 
       
Forms of Integration       
Economic Liberalisation   .158 .159 .162 .158 
Economic Harmonisation   .213* .221* .257* .261* 
Supranational Integration   .084 .067 .065 .053 
Legal Integration   .240 .279 .264* .259 
Social integration   .042 -.032 -.015 -.014 
Cultural Integration   .154 .138 .125 .118 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -.276 -.333* -.299 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      .494 .472 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      -.475 -.439 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -.021 -.038 
In Government when manifesto published      -.077 
Is EU Membership a good thing? Eurobarometer data       .043 
       
Adjusted R2 0.067 0.114 0.276 0.292 0.286 0.275 
Durbin Watson 1.803 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage 
Theory, EU Accession Year 
P values: P < 0.5 (*), P<0.1 (**) P< 0.01 (***) 
Lastly the dependent variable of foreign policy integration, like the previous two regression 
results only had a small amount of the variance explained (27.5% by Model 4). The party family 
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dummy variables only explained 6.7% of the variance. The country dummy variables increased 
this to 11.4% and forms of integration to 27.6%. 
The party family dummy variables saw Green/ecologist parties produced -0.250* in model 1 and 
-0.307** in model 2. (Post)-Communist parties also produced two significant coefficients in 
model 1 (-0.347**) and model 2 (-0.402**). In terms of hypotheses testing, with very few 
coefficients to allow conclusions to be drawn, this is inevitably limited. The negative coefficients 
for Green/Ecologist and (Post)-Communist party families both support the original hypotheses. 
The country dummy variables had only one significant coefficient – Ireland in Model 3 (-0.230*). 
With the „forms of integration‟ independent variables, economic harmonisation produced four 
significant coefficients between 0.213* and 0.261* in models 3-6. Ireland‟s negative coefficient 
can be explained by the country‟s traditional neutrality in matters of military action. 
In terms of the forms of integration group of variables, economic harmonisation produced 
coefficients in the range of .213* and .261* in models 3 to 6. Legal integration produced a 
coefficient of 0.264* in model 5. The left-right position produced a significant coefficient -0.333* 
in model 5. The positive coefficients for economic harmonisation and legal integration indicate 
those cases that exhibit support for these two processes will support further integration for 
foreign policy and defence. Finally, the negative coefficient for the variable of Left-Right position 
suggests that further unit increases (i.e. shift towards the right) will result in increases in the use 
of negative discourses. This was the only independent variable from the alternative theories 
group to produce a significant coefficient. 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
To summarise the findings in terms of predicted positions, the explanatory power of party 
families declined with the newer dimensions of European integration. Yet the existing theories 
struggled to explain the variance in party positions across the dimensions. With the process of 
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liberalisation, there were very surprising results with the party family coefficients in that almost all 
were negative towards the unconstrained single market. The country dummy variables added 
significantly to the amount of variance explained. There was a strong relationship between social 
integration and liberalisation, as well as harmonisation and liberalisation.  There was also no 
impact from the alternative theories and no evidence of an inverted u-curve with support for 
liberalisation. 
For the process of harmonisation, the findings showed that existing theoretical explanations were 
less successful at predicting positions than liberalisation. Party families were shown to still be one 
of the comparatively stronger explanatory variables. The forms of integration variables 
demonstrated that support for harmonisation was related to support for economic liberalisation, 
but also foreign policy integration. Again, the alternative theories had little explanatory value. 
With supranational integration, the party family variables accounted for a smaller proportion of 
the variance, but identified core supporters amongst the Conservative, Socialist and Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats, and also the Greens. The Agrarian party family were identified 
as critical. All country dummy variables producing significant coefficients were negative – with 
both geographical core and peripheral member states. The forms of integration of integration 
demonstrated a strong positive relationship between supranational integration and legal 
integration, as well as a strong negative relationship with cultural integration. The alternative 
theories offered no significant coefficients. 
Legal integration showed that the party family dummy variables explained a small amount of the 
variance. However, the country dummies showed support from both geographical core and 
peripheral member states. There was a positive relationship between legal integration and 
supranational, social, cultural, and foreign policy integration. The left-right dimension 
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demonstrated right-wing support, and the process linked strongly (positively) with the median 
voter theory. 
For the process of social integration, the amount of variance explained by party families was 
weak, but the coefficients showed strong left-wing support from Socialist and Social Democratic, 
(post)-Communist and the Green/Ecologist parties. There was evidence of negative relationships 
with the country dummy variables of the geographical peripheral member states. The forms of 
integration variables showed a strong positive relationship between social and legal integration. 
The left-right dimension demonstrated a strong right-wing critique and finally there was no 
evidence of a relationship with the existing theories. 
With cultural integration, the data showed that party families only explained a small portion of 
the variance, but demonstrated support amongst the Nationalist, Green/Ecologists and Christian 
Democrats. The country dummy variables also showed negative relationships from Sweden, 
France, Portugal, and Ireland. There was a strong negative relationship between cultural 
integration and supranational integration, but a positive relationship with legal integration. 
Finally, the GAL-TAN dimension showed a negative position from the 
Traditional/Authoritarian aspect of the scale. 
Lastly, with the dimension of foreign policy integration, the amount of variance explained by 
party families was very weak, but it still identified negative relationships for the (post)-
Communists and the Green/Ecologists. There was a positive relationship identified between 
foreign policy integration and harmonisation, as well as legal integration. The left-right dimension 
variable highlighted a right-wing critique of the dimension. 
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COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS34 
If one takes a broad comparative view of what the regression analyses reveal, the data provides a 
number of empirically significant findings. Starting with the major theme of the thesis that party 
ideology is the strongest predictor of party positions towards the dimensions of European 
integration, the results are somewhat mixed. Focusing on the R2 value – i.e. the amount of 
variance explained by each model we see a general decline, across the dimensions, in the variance 
explained by the party family model alone (model 1). For liberalisation, almost 30% was 
explained by party family dummy variables. However, by cultural integration the variance 
explained was approximately 1.6%. This suggests that the newer dimensions of integration are 
perhaps independent of traditional party family stances, and that parties have not subsumed these 
issues into their existing ideology or developed common responses. Interestingly when this is 
compared to the findings in the literature party family had a much larger impact on the variance – 
in Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002: 590-591) the variable explained two-thirds of the variance. 
Marks and Wilson (2000: 441) also reported similar results. Interestingly when looking at the 
regression results from Hellström (2008: 200-201) the models containing party families only saw 
R2 values of approximately .30. There does appear to be some disparity here between the results 
derived from manifesto and expert survey data. Furthermore when examining the literature using 
multiple dimension analyses the R2 values were much weaker, though they did not decline in 
similar areas (Hooghe et al, 2002: 973, Table 2) 
Continuing with examining the variance explained by each model, the results reveal that with the 
exception of the dimension of liberalisation, model 2 –national location – explains only a small 
proportion of the variance with each dimension. Despite some examples of moderate to strong 
coefficients, the low R2 weakens the explanatory power of Country variables and suggests that 
                                                 
34 Given the lack of multi-dimensional analyses it restricts the comparisons that can be made with the findings of existing research. Two 
exceptions were produced by academics at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Hooghe et al, 2002; and Marks et al, 2006). With the 
remainder of the comparative literature the only comparisons can be made with party positions towards the dimensions of liberalisation and 
supranational integration. 
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some member states are not necessarily more Eurosceptic towards some or all of the aspects of 
European integration. This finding was supported by previous results in Marks, Wilson and Ray 
(2002: 590-591) who reported that country dummies only had a small amount of influence and 
explained only around 5% of the variance. This was also the conclusion in Marks and Wilson 
(2000: 441). However, Hellström (2008: 199) noted that national and party strategic factors were 
also found to be important. This was a result that was not mirrored here. 
A group of variables, which have had a strong influence, were the „forms of integration‟ 
independent variables. Across the majority of dimensions, this group has substantially increased 
the variance explained. For example, with liberalisation the variance explained increased by 21%. 
For supranational integration the increase in variance explained was 29.4%. The relevance of 
these variables does suggest that being Eurosceptic towards one dimension increases the 
likelihood of being Eurosceptic towards another aspect of European integration. In this sense it 
emphasises the protest nature of the phenomenon. Lastly, the final three models added the 
alternative theories variables. What was evident was that these variables only added a few 
percentage points to the variance explained across the dimensions. This does weaken the 
explanatory power of those variables that were significant. 
Moving on to focus on the values of coefficients. There was no evidence of the inverted u-curve 
(see Hooghe, Marks & Wilson, 2002: 970; Aspinwall, 2002: 85; Kresi, 2007: 98; Hellström, 2008: 
203). This was a result that was similarly reported by Hooghe et al (2002: 973) for the dimension 
of employment policy (as well as cohesion and environmental policy). They found that there was 
a highly significant downward sloping line from a pro-integrationist left to a less integrationist 
right. This was not completely replicated amongst the dimensions. 
Liberalisation saw a pattern for the party family variables, which consisted of moderately to 
strongly negative values amongst the left-wing parties, but the strength of those coefficients 
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declined towards the party families located in the centre and right-wing of the party system. As all 
significant coefficients were negative only three of the hypotheses were confirmed (Greens, non-
reformed Communists, and Agrarian parties). Despite this, ideology does appear to be a driver of 
positions towards Liberalisation, especially when constructed as a more inclusive concept (as by 
Seliger, 1997: 14). This is not particularly surprising that the left-wing parties produced the 
strongest predicted negative coefficients given the relationship of economic liberalisation to 
conflicts at the national level surrounding the construction of the national economy as more 
laissez faire versus regulated capitalism in Western Europe during this time period.  
Economic Harmonisation did not see a similar pattern. There were significant coefficients only 
amongst the Green/Ecologist, (post)-Communist, and Agrarian party families. Again only three 
hypotheses were confirmed amongst the same three party families. For the Greens and (post)-
Communists the coefficients were moderately to strongly negative, while for the Agrarian parties 
the coefficient was relatively weak. Without significant coefficients for the remaining party 
families it is difficult to conclude that a Eurosceptic periphery exists with this dimension, though 
the first tentative evidence at least suggests the possibility. If one considers Seliger‟s (1976) dual 
conception of ideology, only the restrictive concept seems to apply to this, where ideology is 
restricted to the peripheral parties. Here this would suggest that ideology is a strong predictor of 
positions, but this is unsatisfactory and when the inclusive concept is used, ideology appears 
weaker. 
For supranational integration, the previous elements of patterns, which were extractable from the 
results for liberalisation and harmonisation, did not continue with the new dimension. 
Moderately strong positive coefficients were found amongst the Green/Ecologists, Social 
Democrats, Christian Democrats, and Conservatives. The Agrarian party family produced 
moderately strong negative coefficients. Three of the hypotheses were confirmed by the results 
(Social Democrats (later), Christian Democrats, and Agrarian party families). The results suggest 
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a right-wing critique, although this is difficult to conclude conclusively given the lack of a 
significant coefficient for nationalist parties, as well as the lack of an inverted u-curve. The most 
surprising results were for the Conservative parties, and in particular the Green/Ecologists 
positive coefficients in models 3 and 4, suggesting a complete reorientation towards working 
within EU structures to further Green policies. This possibility was noted in chapter three. Using 
Seliger‟s (1976) inclusive concept, ideology does appear to be a strong predictor of party 
positions, but this conclusion is significantly weakened R2 value as reported above. 
If one moves on to consider Social integration, the results report a significant left-wing bias in 
the identification of significant coefficients. For Green/Ecologists, (post)-Communist, Social 
Democrats, and Christian Democrats all the results were moderately positive. No other 
significant coefficients were produced. Furthermore only two hypotheses were confirmed. 
However, for the Green/ecologists and (post)-Communists it was hypothesised that the parties 
would have no overall position, given the likelihood that while they could possibly support the 
process it would conflict with their overall critique of European integration. Being confined to 
the left wing with the exception of the Christian Democrats does not sit well when considering 
whether ideology is a strong predictor using either of Seliger‟s (1976: 14) two concepts, especially 
with the R2 value being so low. 
With the dimensions of legal, cultural and foreign policy integration, the strength of ideology as a 
predictor declines dramatically. Legal integration saw three party families with significant 
coefficients, and with only two hypotheses confirmed. Cultural integration saw three party 
families with significant coefficients (all positive), but with only one hypothesis confirmed. 
Finally for foreign policy, only two party families had significant coefficients (both were 
negative), and two confirmed hypotheses. These results, using either of Seliger‟s (1976: 14) 
concepts suggest that ideology is a weak causal factor for these three dimensions. This conclusion 
was supported by the weak R2 values reported above. 
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If ideology‟s strength as a causal variable towards party positioning is to be questioned at least on 
the latter dimensions, how do some of the alternative theories fared which have previously been 
developed in the existing academic literature? 
The national location variables were generally a weak explanatory factor. The exceptions were for 
the dimensions of supranational integration and legal integration. For the former, despite the 
minor 1.9% increase in the R2 between model 1 and model 2, the regression saw six countries 
register moderately to strongly negative coefficients, though there does not appear to be a clear 
pattern as both old and new member states have produced significant coefficients. It is 
important, however, that there were a large number of negative values, which emphasises a 
Eurosceptic undercurrent towards supranational integration. With the latter the majority of 
significant coefficients only appeared in model six. Again, a pattern was difficult to discern as 
national-locations included member states from the majority of accession groups, but there 
appears to be widespread support for legal integration, and that it is a stronger predictor of party 
positions than ideology for this dimension. 
The group of variables, which have had the most impact, has been the „forms of integration‟ 
independent variables. Not only have they increased the variance explained dramatically, with the 
majority dimensions they have produced some of the strongest statistically significant 
coefficients. For liberalisation, the economic harmonisation independent variable produced a 
positive coefficient of .205* (model 3). For supranational integration, the legal integration 
independent variable produced a coefficient of .419*** (model 4) and the cultural integration 
independent variable produced a negative coefficient of -.424*** (models 5 and 6). The impact of 
these variables emphasises that parties supporting one dimension of integration are likely to 
support further dimensions. However, it also highlights the protest element of Euroscepticism.   
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Finally, in a comparative sense the impact of the alternative theories was rather small. They had 
no significant impact on the dimensions of liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational 
integration. However, they did have an impact on the later dimensions. Legal integration saw 
moderate to strong positive coefficients towards left-right position and median voter position. 
This suggested that right-wing parties were more likely to support legal integration developments, 
and those countries with greater support amongst the public was likely to translate into greater 
support for legal integration. Social integration and foreign policy integration saw strong negative 
coefficients indicating a right-wing critique of these developments. These results were very 
surprising. Marks et al (2006: 162-165) found that the left-right dimension constrained positions 
towards integration on policies, which were concerned about the regulation of the market. This 
finding was not repeated with this dataset. Governmental participation seemed to have no 
statistically significant impact, in contrast to the findings of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002: 
968), Hellström (2008: 199) and the theoretical work of Sitter (2003). However, the results similar 
to Kresi (2007: 98) who found that while the opposition hypothesis was not entirely wrong, its 
explanatory power was very weak. Finally, cultural integration produced the only instance where 
the GAL-TAN dimensions produced significant coefficients (-.547* in model six). This suggests 
a rejection by the traditional-authoritarian parties of European cultural integration, which is not 
surprising given the relationship of GAL-TAN to „new politics‟. Hooghe et al (2002) as well as 
Marks et al (2006) were keen to stress that the new politics dimension related best to EU issues 
which engaged with lifestyle, gender, environment, participatory decision making and national 
culture  (Marks et al, 2006: 164). However, GAL-TAN did not have the same impact on the 
other dimensions with this dataset as it did in the Hooghe et al (2002: 973 Table 2) dataset 
results. 
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SUMMARY 
The European election data demonstrated that again ideology continues to remain an important 
element in structuring party responses to European integration. Importantly however, the study 
has unearthed some important caveats to consider. Party family alone does not explain a large 
proportion of the variance. In addition its explanatory power is limited to the original processes 
of integration – for example economic liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational. For 
newer developments in European integration, ideology has less influence in structuring party 
positions, though with social integration it clearly correctly predicts the position of left-wing 
parties. Only a proportion of the hypotheses were confirmed for party families and this decreased 
when the newer dimensions were examined. This is broadly in line when Taggart (1998: 3979) 
argued that it “it is clear that knowing a party‟s ideology is not necessarily a guide to its position 
on the EU.” Essentially positions cannot be read off from a party family, but it still does 
structure responses on the original processes.  
National location was found to have little impact on whether a party is Eurosceptic or not. 
Comparatively, for each dimension country returned a low R2 value and produced a few weak 
coefficients, with few exceptions. These were for supranational and legal integration where a 
number of strong coefficients were produced (negative for supranational and positive for legal 
integration), but an examination of these proved difficult to identify particular patterns to the 
strength of these results. However, again the variance explained remained low even for these 
exceptions.  
The major influence was found to be the platform taken by each individual party on the other 
dimensions of integration. Those parties more supportive of one aspect of integration were likely 
to be supportive towards other dimensions. Critically, it highlighted the protest aspect of 
integration and emphasised its peripheral nature. Finally, the alternative theories simply did not 
have a significant impact across the dimensions. There were some exceptions – legal social and 
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foreign policy integration saw significant coefficients with the Left-right dimension independent 
variable, and GAL-TAN for cultural integration. However their impact on the amount of 
variance explained was very weak. With this new data, they were mostly inadequate at explaining 
party behaviour. 
The findings clearly demonstrate the need for a multi-dimensional understanding of party 
positioning towards European integration, as well as the importance of understanding European 
party platforms in the EP elections. It does demonstrate that party discourse is influenced by 
ideological predispositions. There are a large number of statistically significant coefficients from 
the party family dummy variables across the majority of dimensions. There are also other 
indicators. The forms of integration variables show that positive support is repeated towards 
other dimensions demonstrating the peripheral and protest nature of the phenomenon.  The left-
right dimension is a strong predictor in the case of social and foreign policy integration. 
However, caveats need to be inserted in the overall argument surrounding the predictive power 
of ideology. Party families are certainly the strongest predictor amongst the existing causal 
theories previously put forward, but their explanatory power weakens towards the newer 
dimensions, indicating that these emerging areas of competition have yet to be interpreted by 
parties in traditional terms. So in some respects the picture is much more complicated and while 
ideology remains a very strong causal factor, it is not the case that one can read off positions on 
the basis of the party family. Furthermore it suggests that there still continues to be a number of 
hidden causal factors, which explain more of the remaining variance. 
The subsequent chapter will move on to focus more heavily on the ideological element with a 
specific heavy focus on Eurosceptic party behaviour. In particular it focuses on the observed 
behaviour from the Euromanifestos data. The previous chapter demonstrated that ideology 
remains an important causal factor, and one of the strongest when compared to the existing 
causal theories, but this is not wholly conclusive towards all aspects of integration. The final 
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empirical chapter aims to subject the theory of ideological causation to a stronger analytical 
spotlight and introduces two further analytical distinctions within the party family – as to whether 
there are further ideological patterns when one groups those parties according to their accession 
group, and whether their member state is in the geographical core or periphery of the EU. 
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CHAPTER SIX: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: IDEOLOGY AS AN 
ACCURATE PREDICTOR? 
As stated earlier, this research has aimed to investigate the level and nature of party-based 
Euroscepticism in Western Europe, and to fundamentally reassess causation. In so doing has 
presented five core aspects to the overall argument revolving around: the need for a dynamic and 
nuanced conceptualisation of Euroscepticism; the importance of developing a multi-dimensional 
framework to analyse Eurosceptic parties based on that definition; the importance of Europe in 
European elections; the role and importance of ideology in structuring political party responses to 
European integration; and finally the importance of using a quantitative manifesto research strategy 
to examine Euroscepticism in election campaigns. 
This final empirical chapter examines ideology in isolation from other causal factors. As such it 
utilises the new definition presented earlier, to identify Eurosceptic parties in each party family from 
the raw data used to generate the previous analyses. Firstly these are compared to those identified 
through the use of the single dimension of support and opposition for European integration. The 
Eurosceptic parties on the multiple dimensions are identified by assessing whether a party dedicates 
>= 5% of its manifesto towards criticising or rejecting a particular dimension of integration35 
Secondly, a more nuanced approach is taken and individual parties within the party families will be 
tested as to whether they conform to the hypotheses. In order to assess whether there are further 
patterns of support within the party families, parties will be analysed according to accession group, as 
well as whether the party was from a central or peripheral member state.  
                                                 
35 Minor support or criticism was =< 5%; strong support or criticism was =>5% and =< 10%; and finally extreme 
support or criticism was  =>10%. 
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The chapter finds that a far greater number of Eurosceptic parties are identifiable through the use of 
the multi-dimensional definition and framework. Secondly, with only a few exceptions it accurate 
identifies Eurosceptic parties, which were previously identified using the more common single 
dimension of support versus opposition to the EU. The findings clearly underline the impact of 
ideology, as with all party families the data suggests that there is an ideological component to the 
Eurosceptic positions of the identified parties, and even with the more general behaviour of the 
entire party family. However, the results indicate that the hypotheses and groupings within the party 
families are most accurate in predicting positions towards those parties who are more left wing. With 
those on the right patterns are harder to discern indicate a much more fragmented and 
heterogeneous response among party families of the right.  
EUROSCEPTIC PARTY COMPARISON 
The table below presents the parties identified by the single dimension of integration on the left hand 
side to those identified through the multiple dimensions on the right hand side. Further details on 
which aspects the parties are Eurosceptic towards are available later in the chapter. 
Table 27: Comparison of Eurosceptic Parties from the European elections  
Eurosceptic Parties Identified (Single-dimensional analysis) Eurosceptic Parties Identified (Multi-dimensional analysis) 
  
Liberal Parties: Liberals 
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party LUX: PD-DP Democratic Party 
Conservatives: 
BEL: VLD Flemish Liberals and Democrats 
GB: Conservative Party 
DEN: V Liberals 
Socialist and Social Democrats: 
GB: LDP Liberal Democratic Party 
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party 
AUT: FPÖ Freedom Party 
Christian Democrats: 
Conservatives 
NET: CU Christian Union 
ITA: FI Forza Italia Go Italy 
Post-Communist: 
FRA: UMP Union for Presidential Majority 
SWE: VP Left Party 
GB: Conservative Party 
NET: SP Socialist Party 
DEN: KF Conservative Peoples Party 
FRA: PCF Communist Party 
SPA: CiU Convergence and Union 
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists 
Socialist and Social Democratic 
GRE: KKE Communist Party 
LUX: POSL-LSAP Socialist Workers Party 
POR: PCP Communist Party 
FRA: PS Socialist Party 
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IRE: Workers Party 
BEL: PS Francophone Socialist Party 
Regionalist Parties: 
POR: PSP Socialist Party 
DEN FB: People‟s Movement 
GRE: PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
DEN: FP Progress Party 
FIN: SSDP Social Democrats 
DEN: JB June Movement 
Christian Democrats 
FRA: RPF Rally for France 
GER: CSU Christian Democrats 
SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok 
NET: CU Christian Union 
SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc 
LUX: PCS-CSV Christian Social Peoples Party 
GER: REP The Republicans 
IRE: Fine Gael 
BEL: VB Flemish Block 
SWE: KdS Christian Democratic Community Party 
GB: UKIP UK Independence Party 
FIN: KD Christian Democrats 
GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party 
(Post)-Communist 
GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party 
FRA: PCF Communist Party 
Nationalist Parties: 
NET: SP Socialist Party 
DEN: DF Peoples Party 
ITA: RC Newly Founded Communists 
FRA: FN National Front 
DEN: SF Socialist Peoples Party 
ITA: LN Northern League 
IRE: Workers Party 
BEL: FN National Front 
GRE: KKE Communist Party 
Green Parties: 
POR: PCP Communist Party 
SWE: Green Ecology Party 
SWE: Vp Left Party 
LUX: GLEI-GAP Ecological-Alternative 
FIN: VL Left Wing Alliance 
GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90 
Agrarian 
AUT: GA Green Alternative 
SWE: CP Centre Party 
GB: Green Party 
FIN: SK Finnish Centre 
 Ethno-regionalist 
 FRA: RPF Rally for France 
 BEL: VB Flemish Block 
 BEL: NVA New Flemish Alliance 
 ITA: SVP South Tyrol People's Party 
 GB: SNP Scottish National Party 
 GB: PC Party for Wales 
 GB: UKIP UK Independence Party 
 GB: DUP Democratic Unionist Party 
 GB: UUP Ulster Unionist Party 
 DEN: FP Progress Party 
 DEN FB: People‟s Movement 
 DEN: JB June Movement 
 SPA: PNV-EAJ Basque Nationalist Party 
 SPA: ERC Catalan Republican Left 
 SPA: EH Basque Euskal Herritarrok 
 SPA: BNG Galician Nationalist Bloc 
 SPA: EA Basque Solidarity 
 Nationalists 
 GER: REP The Republicans 
 FRA: FN National Front 
 ITA: AN National Alliance 
 ITA: LN Northern League 
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 BEL: FN National Front 
 DEN: DF Peoples Party 
 Greens 
 BEL: AGALEV Flemish Ecologists 
 GER: Greens-90 Greens-Alliance 90 
 GB: Green Party 
  
SWE: Green Ecology Party 
 
As is made clear by the table, the multi-dimensional definition and framework identify a greater 
number of Eurosceptic parties than the single dimension. In addition, with only one or two 
exceptions (for example the Luxembourg Green party), the more nuanced definition includes all the 
Eurosceptic parties previously identified. 
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EUROSCEPTIC LIBERAL PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as 
Eurosceptic: 
 Luxembourg PD DP – towards foreign policy integration in 1989; towards supranational 
integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 
1999;  
 Belgian VLD – towards cultural integration in 2004; 
 Danish V – towards supranational integration in 1994; 
 British Liberal Democrats – towards supranational integration in 2004; 
 Austrian FPÖ – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1996; and towards 
supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1999; 
The Liberal party family saw almost all accession groups saw the use of Eurosceptic arguments, with 
the exception being that of the southern enlargement of 1981 and 1986. Importantly, it is clear that 
these Eurosceptic Liberal parties did share some of the same strong criticisms of European 
integration. In particular, the Luxembourg PD DP, Danish V, British Liberal Democrats and 
Austrian FPÖ were all sceptical towards supranational integration, with the PD DP, V and FPÖ 
being critical in the 1994 election campaign (though the Austrian election was two years later – 1996 
– after accession in 1995). Critically this points to a strong critique of the Maastricht provisions of 
1992. The Luxembourg PD DP and Austrian FPÖ also were both critical of foreign policy 
integration in 1999. The 1999 election took place just before the Nice European Council where new 
military structures brought in to the Council of the European Union. Furthermore QMV was 
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extended to aspects of CFSP. With this party family much of the observed Eurosceptic behaviour 
appears to have been a reaction to the same developments. 
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis hypothesised that Liberal parties would be positive towards all dimensions of European 
integration: liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy 
integration. There were clearly many of the parties which were supportive towards many of the 
dimensions, but the initial examination of the liberal party responses also revealed subtle differences 
suggesting that at least in some respects it is a heterogeneous party family grouping. 
In the 1989 elections (see table 28) the German FDP conformed to the predicted positions. In 
addition four other parties matched the majority of the predicted positions: the Belgian FDF-PRL 
(except supranational integration – no overall position); Belgian VLD (except social and cultural 
integration – no overall position); the British Liberal Democrats (except cultural integration – no 
overall position); and finally the Danish V (except three no overall positions – harmonisation, legal 
and foreign policy integration). 
The two parties that did not conform to the hypotheses accurately were the Luxembourg PD DP 
and the Danish RV. The Luxembourg PD DP was extremely negative towards supranational 
integration and foreign policy integration. It also demonstrated no overall position towards legal, 
social and cultural integration. The Danish RV were less critical – using minor negative discourse 
towards legal integration and demonstrating no overall position towards harmonisation, 
supranational integration, social integration and cultural integration. 
The 1994 elections (see table 28) saw a similar pattern to the 1989 elections with only one party 
completely conforming to the predictions – the Belgian VLD. There were only four other parties 
 215 
who fitted the hypotheses with reasonable accuracy: the Dutch WD (except for cultural integration – 
minor negative); British Liberal Democrats (except for cultural integration – no overall position); 
Danish V (except for supranational integration – strong negative and legal integration – no overall 
position); and finally the Austrian LF (except for social integration – no overall position). 
There were six parties that did not fit the hypotheses – the German FDP, Luxembourg PD DP, 
Belgian FDF-PRL, Danish RV, Swedish FP, and finally Austrian FPO. The German FDP had 
become more negative since the 1989 elections and had focused minor criticism on supranational 
and social integration indicating some concern over the increasing transfers of sovereignty and 
creation of a social Europe. The Luxembourg PD DP continued to be extremely negative towards 
supranational integration, but did not develop their manifesto to examine other dimensions. The 
Belgian FDF-PRL became more negative by 1994 using minor negative discourse towards 
liberalisation and supranational integration, but the party remained supportive of the other 
dimensions. The Danish RV continued with its minor criticisms towards legal integration, but did 
not develop its manifesto particularly beyond that – three no overall positions toward liberalisation, 
harmonisation and cultural integration. The Swedish FP was strongly supportive of the free market 
element of integration, but it was clear that they had minor reservations towards supranational and 
cultural integration. Finally the Austrian FPÖ was critical towards liberalisation, harmonisation, 
supranational and legal integration. This is not surprising given that the party developed a much 
more nationalistic stance under the control of Jörg Haider. 
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Table 28 – Liberal Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989 to 1994-1996: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1989 German FDP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Luxembourg PD DP Extreme Positive Extreme Positive Extreme Negative No Overall No overall No Overall Extreme Negative 
  Yes Yes No No No No No 
 Belgian FDF-PRL Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian VLD Extreme Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
 British Liberal  Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
 Democrats Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Danish RV Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Minor Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive 
  Yes No No No No No Yes 
 Danish V Strong Positive No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall 
  Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
1994 German FDP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
 Luxembourg PD DP No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall 
  No No No No No No No 
 Dutch WD Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Belgian FDF-PRL Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Extreme Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian VLD Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 British Liberal  Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
 Democrats Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Danish RV No Overall  No Overall Extreme Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Danish V Extreme Positive Strong Positive Strong Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
(1995) Swedish FP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
(1996) Austrian FPO Minor Negative Strong Negative Extreme Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
(1996) Austrian LF Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
    Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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The 1999 European elections continued the trend of non-conformity. The Austrian LF was the only 
party to confirm the hypothesised positions. Five other parties exhibited behaviour similar to the 
original predictions – the Italian Ulivo electoral alliance (two no overall positions – liberalisation and 
social integration); Belgian FDF-PRL (two no overall positions – liberalisation and social 
integration); British Liberal Democrats (one no overall position – cultural integration); Danish V 
(one no overall position – cultural integration); and finally the Swedish FP (one minor negative – 
cultural integration). 
Focusing on the non-conforming cases, the German FDP continued the behaviour observed in 
1994, but also did not formulate a position towards cultural integration. The Luxembourg PD DP 
continued with the behaviour observed over the two previous elections. It rejected supranational and 
foreign policy integration (strong and extreme negative use respectively). The Dutch WD only 
focused their manifesto on supporting harmonisation and supranational integration. Surprisingly, the 
Belgian VLD shifted from its position of conformity in 1994 to using minor criticism towards social 
and cultural integration. Finally, the Danish RV continued with a similar manifesto to that of 1989 
and 1994. It remained critical of legal integration, was positive towards supranational and foreign 
policy integration, but had no overall position towards the remaining dimensions. 
By the 2004 election, the party family still remained heterogeneous. Eleven parties exhibited 
behaviour which was mostly conformist. However fourteen parties did not fit the hypotheses 
accurately at all. The German FDP became more conformist by 2004, but it was strongly critical of 
supranational integration. The Luxembourg PD DP changed dramatically from previous elections 
being supportive of all processes, but with one no overall position (cultural integration). The Dutch 
WD was supportive, though like the PD DP had one no overall position (cultural integration). The 
Italian electoral alliances – Ulivo and La Margherita behaved in a similar fashion with support for all 
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but cultural integration (minor negative). The Danish RV developed its manifesto far more 
extensively supporting liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and social integration. It also 
remained critical of legal integration. 
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Table 29 – Liberal Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
1999 German FDP Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
 Luxembourg PD DP No Overall No Overall Strong Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative 
  No No No No No No No 
 Dutch WD No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
 Italian Ulivo No Overall Strong Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 Belgian FDF-PRL No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Belgian VLD Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
 British Liberal  Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
 Democrats Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Danish RV No Overall  No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive 
  No No Yes No No No Yes 
 Danish V Minor Positive Strong Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Swedish FP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Austrian FPO No Overall Minor Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Strong Negative 
  No No No No No No No 
 Austrian LF Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2004 German FDP Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No - 
 Luxembourg PD DP Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
 Dutch WD Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
 Italian Ulivo Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
 Italian DS/SDI/ Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative - 
 La Margherita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
 Belgian VLD Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative Strong Negative - 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No - 
 British Liberal  Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
 Democrats Yes Yes No Yes Yes No - 
 Danish RV Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes Yes No Yes No - 
 Danish V Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall No Overall - 
  Yes No No Yes No No - 
 Swedish FP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative - 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No - 
 Austrian FPO Minor Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive - 
  No No No No No Yes - 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004 
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In terms of the non-conforming liberal parties, the Belgian VLD continued its critique of social 
integration, but also became strongly critical of cultural integration. The Danish V became slightly 
critical of supranational integration, but also did not develop positions towards harmonisation, social 
and cultural integration. The Swedish FP behaved in a similar fashion to the 1995 and 1999 elections 
with minor negative discourse directed at supranational and cultural integration. The Austrian FPO 
did not develop their manifesto in a particularly detailed fashion towards the issues represented by 
the dimensions, but used minor negative discourse towards liberalisation and social integration.  
LIBERAL PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS 
Within the original six member states Liberal parties during the 1989 elections as a group were 
coherent with their positive positions towards liberalisation, harmonisation, legal integration 
(Luxembourg‟s PD DP was the exception with no overall position), cultural integration (except 
Luxembourg‟s PD DP – no overall position), and foreign policy integration (except Luxembourg‟s 
PD DP – extreme negative). The major exception did prove to be the Luxembourg PD DP, which 
was negative towards supranational and foreign policy integration, but supportive towards the 
economic aspects – liberalisation and harmonisation. This does suggest that the party may well have 
been more inclined to espouse economic liberalism. In the 1973 accession group the three Liberal 
parties were all supportive towards liberalisation. However, with the remaining dimensions two of 
the parties – the Danish RV, and Danish V did not develop as many positions as the British Liberal 
Democrats. There was still a pattern to discern for supranational integration, social integration and 
foreign policy integration, where two of the parties indicated support and the remaining party had no 
overall position. 
The 1994 election saw a decrease in the consistency within which Liberal parties in the original six 
member states adopted similar positions. Only three parties (the German FDP, the Dutch WD, and 
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Belgian VLD) adopted positive positions towards liberalisation. The FDF-PRL adopted a negative 
stance and the PD DP had no overall position. The majority supported harmonisation, legal, and 
foreign policy integration. The exception to all of them was the PD DP, which failed to develop a 
position towards the dimensions. In addition, three parties developed negative positions towards 
supranational integration – the German FDP, Luxembourg PD DP and Belgian FDF-PRL. In the 
1973 accession group it continued to be difficult to extract patterns of behaviour. The Danish RV‟s 
manifesto remained less developed. However, the three parties were consistent in their support 
towards social integration and foreign policy integration. In addition the British Liberal Democrats 
and Danish V supported liberalisation and harmonisation. Furthermore, both the Liberal Democrats 
and Danish RV supported supranational integration, but the Danish V rejected this. The 1995 
accession group was altogether much more negative. This is partly due to the membership FPÖ, 
which may have been nominally liberal at the outset, but had developed far right tendencies. Within 
the group two of the parties (Swedish FP and Austrian LF) supported liberalisation, harmonisation, 
and legal integration. In addition, both the Swedish FP and Austrian FPÖ supported social 
integration; the FPÖ and LF supported cultural integration; and all three supported foreign policy 
integration. 
By the 1999 elections, the Liberal parties of the original six had surprisingly developed manifestos 
without much if any emphasis on the process of liberalisation. They focused more on harmonisation 
– which all, but the Luxembourg PD DP supported (no overall position), supranational integration – 
which all but the Luxembourg PD DP supported, and foreign policy integration – which was 
supported by the German FDP, Italian Ulivo, Belgian FDF-PRL, and Belgian VLD. The 
Luxembourg PD DP rejected it, and the Dutch WD had no overall position. The 1973 accession 
group saw a similar pattern of inconsistency amongst the member parties as was observable in 1989 
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and 1994. The only consistent behaviour was found to be towards supranational and foreign policy 
integration (all parties were positive); and finally cultural integration (all parties had no overall 
position). The 1995 accession group was again split by the behaviour of the Austrian FPÖ. The 
Swedish FP and Austria LF exhibited similar support towards all, but cultural integration. Here the 
Swedish FP was critical and the Austrian LF offered minor support. 
Finally, the 2004 elections saw a remarkable change in the pattern of support and an increase in the 
consistency of the behaviour of Liberal parties in the „original six‟. All parties supported liberalisation 
and harmonisation. All parties supported the processes, with the exception of the German FDP 
(strong negative) towards supranational integration, and the Belgian VLD (no overall position) with 
legal integration and social integration (minor negative). Only with cultural integration was it possible 
to see less consistent behaviour with the German FDP, Luxembourg PD DP, Dutch WD having no 
overall position, and the Italian Ulivo, Italian La Margherita, and Belgian VLD using negative 
discourse. The 1973 accession group did not see a similar change in their consistency in terms of 
their behaviour towards the dimensions. All three supported liberalisation. The British Liberal 
Democrats and Danish RV supported both harmonisation and social integration with the Danish V 
having no overall position. All three parties adopted no overall position towards cultural integration. 
Interestingly both the British Liberal Democrats and Danish V were critical towards supranational 
integration. In the 1995 accession group, only two parties – the Swedish FP and Austrian FPÖ 
remained, and they took opposite positions on liberalisation, social integration, and cultural 
integration. For the remaining dimensions the FPÖ had no overall position. This makes it impossible 
to extract meaningful patterns of behaviour within this sub-grouping.  
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
When attempting to derive theoretical implications for the Liberal party family, one is struck by the 
broad ideological traditions within the Liberal party family. Yet if one first focuses on the identified 
Eurosceptic parties, it is clear that there is an ideological component identifiable with their 
behaviour. There were clear patterns of opposition towards the Maastricht provisions and their 
criticism of supranational integration. Furthermore, there was also a clear pattern of opposition 
towards the Nice provisions and the growth of competences within the foreign policy integration 
dimension. 
However, when the party family is taken as a whole at first there appears to be some heterogeneity 
amongst the member parties. Yet, it is clear that many of the parties supported many of the 
dimensions, indicating that the differences were subtle. There was an increase in conformity when 
split into accession groups especially during the 1989 and 2004 elections for the parties of original six 
member states.  
Looking at particular variations within the broad Liberal ideological tradition, Marks and Wilson 
(2000: 448-449) identified three variations in Liberal party ideology: liberal radicalism; liberal-
conservatism; and the agrarian/centre variety (dealt with separately here). The Liberal-radical variety 
is left of centre on economic issues and supports a broad interpretation of democratic rights. They 
also favour substantial state intervention. There were clearly parties, which supported liberalisation, 
but significantly also supported social integration at the EU-level and these appear to fit several of 
the parties (for example the Swedish FP, Danish RV, and British Liberal Democrats). The Liberal-
Conservatives emphasise economic freedom, are more right-of-centre and advocate a minimal role 
for the state. They have opposed any project to introduce regulated capitalism. At times this did 
appear to fit the behaviour of the Danish V and Belgian VLD, though these distinctions were not 
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completely obvious from the positions taken towards the various aspects of integration where the 
parties appeared to waiver between the two types. Despite this however, there were five parties who 
were identified as Eurosceptic, with supranational integration being the most feared – which did fit 
somewhat with the argument by Marks and Wilson (2000: 449) that Liberal-Conservatives would 
reject „political‟ integration. It was only the British Liberal Democrats who were critical towards 
supranational integration by 2004, the remainder were critical up to 1994, which may have been more 
a product of the discomfort towards Maastricht. 
Overall, when one looks at the results ideologically inspired Euroscepticism has clearly been used by 
a significant number of Liberal parties. However, the party family does remain broadly pro-
European, but a closer inspections reveals significant, but subtle differences between the parties. 
There appears to be a number of parties that fit the Liberal-radical grouping who espouse support 
for a form of regulated capitalism, and some instances of the Liberal-Conservative variety, though 
this is less conclusive. 
 225 
EUROSCEPTIC CONSERVATIVE PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able that the following parties could be classified as Eurosceptic: 
 Italian FI – towards supranational integration in 1994; 
 French UMP – towards supranational integration in 1999; 
 British Conservatives – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards supranational 
integration in 1999; towards supranational integration in 2004; 
 Danish KF – towards supranational integration in 1999; 
 Spanish CIU – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards supranational integration 
in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999; 
With the Eurosceptic Conservative parties it is quite clear that there is a significant ideological 
component to their use of Euroscepticism as all were hostile towards supranational integration with 
instances of its use in all four elections. The Italian FI, British Conservatives and Spanish CIU were 
critical in 1994. This can potentially be attributed to the Maastricht Treaty provisions. The French 
UMP, British Conservatives, Danish KF and the Spanish CIU were all hostile in 1999.  
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis argued that Conservative parties would be positive towards the key economic aspects of 
European integration – liberalisation and harmonisation, as well as being positive towards legal 
integration at first (up to 1994), but would be negative towards supranational, social, cultural and 
foreign policy integration. The initial analyses suggest the depth of scepticism towards the later 
processes of integration – social, cultural and foreign policy was ill founded, and general scepticism 
in this area was mostly a British phenomenon. However, Conservative party responses were broadly 
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in line with expectations for economic liberalisation and harmonisation, as well as supranational 
integration. 
In 1989 (see table 30) only one party demonstrated a reasonable level of fit with the hypotheses – the 
French RPR/UDF, though it had one no overall position towards social integration and one strongly 
positive position towards foreign policy integration. The three remaining parties – the British 
Conservatives, Spanish AP PP, and Spanish CIU met most of the hypotheses for the dimensions of 
harmonisation (except British Conservatives – no overall position), supranational integration (except 
Spanish AP PP – minor positive) and legal integration (except British Conservatives – no overall 
position). However, interestingly enough instead of the parties indicating negative support for the 
remaining dimensions of social, cultural and foreign policy integration all three parties indicated 
minor to strong positive positions. 
In the 1994 European elections (see table 30) there was only one party that demonstrated a 
reasonable level of fit with the hypotheses – the Irish Fianna Fáil (confirmed all hypotheses except 
for legal integration – no overall position and social integration – minor positive). With the 
remaining parties it was possible to see a very similar pattern to the one in 1989. With the exception 
of the following observations, the parties all met the predictions for liberalisation, harmonisation, 
and supranational integration (legal integration had six out of nine parties adopting no overall 
position): French RPR UDF – liberalisation (minor negative); British Conservatives – harmonisation 
(minor negative); Danish KF – harmonisation (no overall position) and supranational integration 
(minor positive); and finally Spanish AP PP – harmonisation (no overall position). Six out of the nine 
parties used minor positive discourse towards social integration (the three remaining – no overall 
position). A similar pattern was observable with cultural integration – five parties used positive 
discourses, one party minor negative discourses and the remaining had no overall position. Finally 
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with foreign policy integration, only the Irish Fianna Fáil used negative discourse with the remaining 
demonstrated minor to extreme levels of positive support. 
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Table 30 – Conservative Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1989 French RPR/UDF Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
 British Conservatives Extreme Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No No 
 Spanish AP,PP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No No 
 Spanish CIU Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
1994 French RPR/UDF Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  No Yes Yes Yes No No  No 
 Italian FI Strong Positive Minor Positive Extreme Negative No Overall Strong Positive Strong Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 British Conservatives Extreme Positive Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
 Danish KF Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes No No No No No No 
 Irish Fianna Fail Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
 Spanish AP,PP Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No No 
 Spanish CIU Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
(1995) Swedish MSP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
(1996) Finnish KK Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
    Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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The pattern established in the 1989 and 1994 European elections continued with Conservative 
parties in the 1999 elections (see table 31). Firstly there were no parties that accurately fitted all of the 
hypothesised positions. However, there were only a few parties which did not fit the hypotheses for 
the first three dimensions – liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration – the French 
RPR/UDF (liberalisation – minor negative); French UMP (liberalisation); Italian FI (harmonisation – 
no overall position); British Conservatives (harmonisation – minor negative); Danish KF 
(harmonisation – no overall position); and finally the Irish Fianna Fail, Spanish AP PP, and Finnish 
KK (supranational integration – no overall position). Also important to note was that there was no 
perceivable shift from support for legal integration to negative support. Indeed only one party used 
minor negative discourse, with seven parties using minor positive discourse and two having no 
overall position. With the remaining dimensions, for social and foreign policy integration the 
majority of parties used minor to extreme positive discourse – social integration saw seven out of ten 
parties showing positive support. Foreign policy integration was not criticised at all. Lastly, cultural 
integration showed mixed results – four parties supported the process, three parties used minor 
criticism and three had no overall position. 
By the 2004 European elections (see table 31) the pattern had not altered much. The British 
Conservatives were the only party that offered a reasonable fit to the hypotheses (with the exception 
of harmonisation – minor negative and social integration – no overall position). Overall the 
behaviour remained constant with liberalisation – there was one exception of no overall position out 
of ten parties (French UMP). There were more exceptions for harmonisation, but over half the 
parties did still conform to the predicted positions. For supranational integration there were only 
four parties that behaved in a manner that did not conform to the hypothesis (French RPR/UDF, 
Italian FI, Danish KF, Irish Fianna Fail). The results remained similar for the final three dimensions 
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of legal, social and cultural integration. The majority of parties were supportive of the processes, 
indicating that a revision of the understanding of how Conservative parties behave towards Europe 
is most definitely needed. 
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Table 31 – Conservative Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1999 French RPR/UDF Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
 French UMP No Overall Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Extreme Positive Extreme Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
 Italian FI Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Strong Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No No 
 British Conservative Extreme Positive Minor Negative Extreme Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes No 
 Danish KF Extreme Positive No Overall Strong Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No No 
 Irish Fianna Fail Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
 Spanish AP,PP Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
 Spanish CIU Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 Swedish MSP Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 Finnish KK Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No No No No No 
2004 French RPR/UDF Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive - 
  Yes Yes No No No No - 
 French UMP No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Extreme Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  No Yes Yes No No No - 
 Italian FI Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive - 
  Yes No No No No No - 
 British Conservatives Strong Positive Minor Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative No Overall Minor Negative - 
  Yes No Yes Yes No Yes - 
 Danish KF Strong Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No - 
 Irish Fianna Fail Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes No No No No - 
 Spanish AP,PP Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No - 
 Spanish CIU Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No - 
 Swedish M Extreme Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative - 
  Yes No Yes No No Yes - 
 Finnish KOK Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  Yes No Yes No No No - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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CONSERVATIVE PARTIES BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS 
Within the „original six‟ member states there were only a few cases across the time period. In the 
1989 election, only the manifesto of the French RPR/UDF was available. The key patterns 
identifiable were the support for economic, legal and foreign policy integration and the criticisms 
directed at supranational and cultural integration. Examining the responses from the 1973 accession 
group, the parties in the 1989 election adopted a generally positive set of positions, with the 
exception of supranational integration. The 1981-1986 accession group was similar in the positions it 
adopted. The Spanish AP PP and Spanish CIU positioned themselves positively on all dimensions, 
with the exception of supranational integration where the Spanish CIU used strong negative 
discourse.  
In the 1994 election, the two parties from the „original six‟ did stay reasonably consistent with the 
previous behaviour. While the parties were positive towards harmonisation, foreign policy 
integration, and negative towards supranational integration, they were split on the issue of 
liberalisation. In addition, a new trend of positive support for social integration emerged. The 1973 
accession group did not display much consistency in their behaviour. All parties supported 
liberalisation; two of the parties (British Conservatives and Irish Fianna Fail) were negative towards 
supranational integration, and two parties (British Conservatives and Danish KF) supported foreign 
policy integration. With the remainder of the dimensions the party positions towards the dimensions 
were split. The 1981-1986 accession group by contrast remained consistent in its behaviour. It was 
supportive of liberalisation, social integration, cultural and foreign policy integration. It was also 
critical towards supranational integration. With the remainder, only the Spanish CIU positioned itself 
(minor positive). In the 1995 accession group, the two parties were consistent in their behaviour 
towards liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration, which they supported, and 
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supranational integration that they both criticised. With the remaining dimensions, one or both had 
no overall position. 
In the 1999 election, the three Conservative parties of the „original six‟ still remained split over 
liberalisation, and the two parties (French RPR/UDF and UMP) were positive towards 
harmonisation, and the Italian FI had no overall position. With supranational integration all were 
negative. Finally, the three parties positioned themselves positively towards the remainder of the 
dimensions. In the 1973 accession group, during the 1999 election the parties lacked consistency in 
their group behaviour. While all were positive towards liberalisation and foreign policy integration, 
one or more parties either had no overall position or adopted the opposite view. Supranational and 
cultural integration still had the majority of parties adopting critical discourses. The 1981-1986 
accession group was by contrast much more consistent. Both parties supported liberalisation, 
harmonisation, legal integration, social integration and foreign policy integration. Towards 
supranational integration only the Spanish CIU took a position (a strong negative one). Cultural 
integration saw a split.  With the 1995 accession group, both parties used similar positions towards 
liberalisation, harmonisation, legal integration, cultural integration (no overall position) and foreign 
policy integration. With the remainder one party took a position towards supranational integration 
(Swedish MSP – negative) and one took a position towards social integration (Finnish KK – 
positive). The other party of the pair with both dimensions had no overall position.   
Finally with the 2004 elections, the three Conservative parties of the „original six‟ remained 
supportive towards legal integration. With the dimensions of liberalisation, economic harmonisation, 
social and cultural integration, two of the three parties were supportive of the process with one party 
adopting no overall position. Supranational integration saw the French UMP‟s criticism split the 
positive support from the French RPR/UDF and Italian FI. The 1973 accession group still remained 
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a fairly unpredictable group of parties, with the only consistent behaviour being towards 
liberalisation. Both the Danish KF and Irish Fianna Fail supported both harmonisation and social 
integration, whilst both the British Conservatives and Danish KF criticised legal integration, the 
remainder of parties were split.  The 1981-1986 group was a complete contrast again, with both 
parties being supportive of liberalisation, harmonisation, legal integration, and social integration. 
They were both critical of supranational integration. The only exception was cultural integration 
where the CIU did not have a position. The 1995 accession group was very similar with consistent 
behaviour towards liberalisation (positive), harmonisation (no overall position), supranational 
integration (negative), and legal integration (positive). The remainder saw one party position itself 
(Finnish KK – positive towards supranational integration and Swedish MSP – negative towards 
cultural integration). The other party of the pair had no overall position with both dimensions.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The Eurosceptic Conservative parties focused their attention and hostility towards supranational 
integration. For all other dimensions, any criticism levelled was less than 5% of the manifesto. 
Theoretically this is extremely significant as it suggests that the party family‟s biggest fear is further 
loss of national sovereignty. European integration on the other dimensions identified is strongly 
supported by almost all Conservative parties. The British Conservative party appears to be the 
outlying case, and perhaps can best be described as the „British exception‟. 
The most surprising results were the positive utilisation of discourse towards legal, social, cultural 
and foreign policy integration. Conservative parties have always been nationally orientated and 
Girvin‟s (1988:9-10) three type Conservative typology identified that the first and third remained 
nationally orientated. With the exception of the British Conservative party meeting the general 
criteria for the modern liberal Conservative form, there appears to have been a convergence of the 
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remaining parties towards the behaviour, at least in regards to the issue of European integration, 
expected of Christian Democratic parties. This is evidenced by the observation that Conservative 
parties have generally shown a strong level of support towards liberalisation of the market – 
economic liberalisation, harmonisation and legal integration (to tie partner states to the agreements). 
However, the convergence is most obvious when considering the level of support for a social policy 
at the supranational level. Theoretically this is extremely significant as one can posit the argument 
that the British Conservative party is the exception rather than the rule, and in line with previous 
findings in the comparative literature (see for example, Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2002) 
that Euroscepticism is still very much a peripheral phenomenon, and is not to be found in the 
centre-right, despite the visually dominating case of the British Conservative party. 
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EUROSCEPTIC SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as 
Eurosceptic: 
 Luxembourg POSL LSAP – towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 
1989; towards cultural integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999;  
 French PS – towards liberalisation in 1994;  
 Belgian PS – towards liberalisation and social integration in 1999; 
 Portuguese PSP – towards cultural integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration 
and legal integration in 2004; 
 Greek PASOK – towards foreign policy integration in 1994; 
 Finnish SSDP – towards liberalisation in 1999; 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties have become one of the most pro-European party families, 
and the use of Eurosceptic discourse by Socialist and Social Democratic parties was sporadic, with 
only six parties using it at different points in the period of study. It was identifiable in most of the 
accession group parties, with the exception of the 1973 accession member states. Some of the parties 
did share similar criticisms of the integration processes. The Luxembourg POSL LSAP and 
Portuguese PSP shared criticisms towards supranational integration, though in different elections. 
The Luxembourg POSL LSAP shared Eurosceptic behaviour towards cultural integration with the 
Portuguese PSP in the same election year. Finally, the Belgian PS and Finnish SSDP were both 
critical of liberalisation during the same election. There is some evidence of shared Eurosceptic 
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behaviour between parties at the same election suggesting that they were reacting to the same 
political stimuli, but there were a significant number of instances where this was not the case. 
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis hypothesised that Socialist and Social Democratic parties would be positive towards 
liberalisation, harmonisation, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. With supranational 
integration, party behaviour was expected to demonstrate negative discourses in the 1989 and 1994 
elections. From the 1999 election onwards it was expected that there would be a reorientation with 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties being positive in the 1999 and 2004 European elections. A 
general observation to note for all four elections is the level of conformity amongst the parties. 
Across the majority of parties there is a high level of conformity and a number of cases with 
complete conformity. The expected shift towards support and engagement with the supranational 
level took place before the 1989 elections with the majority of Socialist and Social Democratic parties 
In the 1989 elections (see table 32), the German SPD and Irish LP conformed to all the hypotheses 
without exception. A large number of the other cases had positions which mostly conformed to 
previously predicted positions: the French PS (except supranational integration; Luxembourg POSL 
LSAP (except cultural integration and two no overall positions); Dutch Pvda (except supranational 
integration); Dutch D66 (except supranational integration and one no overall position); Belgian SP 
(except supranational integration and one no overall position); Northern Irish SDLP (except 
supranational integration and one no overall position); Spanish PSOE (except supranational 
integration and one no overall position); and finally the Portuguese PSD (except  supranational 
integration). As one can see a large number of the parties were supportive of the process of 
supranational integration, suggesting that if they had been previously suspicious of a supranational 
authority, they had certainly shifted their position towards minor positive support. 
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The British Labour party, Danish SD and Portuguese PSP were the three cases that did not fit the 
hypotheses. They share a minor suspicious attitude towards supranational integration, as well as 
poorly developed positions to a number of dimensions in the case of the Danish SD and PSP, but 
have little else in common. The British Labour party were the most critical with minor negative 
positions towards the three key processes of liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational 
integration. 
In the 1994 elections (see table 32) it was possible to observe that once again the German SPD 
conformed to all of the hypotheses. Significantly, a similar pattern to the one analysed above 
appeared. Twelve parties showed strong conformity to the hypotheses, but supported the process of 
supranational integration: Luxembourg POSL LSAP (though with one strong negative – cultural 
integration and one no overall position) Dutch Pvda, Dutch D66, Belgian SP, British Labour 
(though with one no overall position), Northern Irish SDLP (very positive apart from three no 
overall positions), Danish SD (though with one no overall position), Irish LP (though with one 
minor negative – cultural integration), Greek PASOK (though with one minor negative – 
liberalisation), Portuguese PSD (though with two no overall positions), the Finnish SDP (with one 
minor negative – liberalisation and two no overall positions), and finally the Austrian SPÖ (with one 
minor negative – liberalisation). Clearly the majority of cases within the 1989 and 1994 election 
periods support supranational integration indicating as stated earlier that a revision of the theoretical 
background informing the hypotheses needs some qualification.    
There were five cases that did not fit the predictions as accurately. Firstly the French PS had seen 
quite a change from its 1989 manifesto. It had become strongly negative towards liberalisation, and 
demonstrated minor criticisms towards supranational integration, cultural integration and foreign 
policy integration. The Danish CD had not developed their manifesto to address the issues 
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surrounding the seven forms of integration – they had three no overall positions and one minor 
negative position towards cultural integration. The Spanish PSOE like the French PS had become 
more negative towards liberalisation and supranational integration, but remained positive towards 
four of the remaining dimensions. The Portuguese PSP demonstrated minor negative criticisms 
towards liberalisation and was extremely negative towards cultural integration, but also did not 
address three of the dimensions at all in their manifesto – harmonisation, supranational and legal 
integration. Finally, the Swedish S demonstrated minor criticisms of harmonisation, supranational 
and cultural integration, as well as two no overall positions towards liberalisation and legal 
integration. As one can note from the observations above, with the exception of the French PS and 
Spanish PSOE it is again difficult to establish any overlap in the behaviour of these five cases, which 
separate the parties from the party family norm. 
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Table 32 – Social Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1989 French PS Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 German SPD Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Luxembourg POSL LSAP Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative Extreme Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
 Dutch Pvda Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Dutch D66 Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian SP Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
 British Labour Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Northern Irish SDLP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
 Danish SD No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Negative 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
 Danish CD No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall 
  No No No No No No No 
 Irish LP Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Spanish PSOE Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall  Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
 Portuguese PSP No Overall No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive No Overall No Overall 
  No No Yes No Yes No No 
 Portuguese PSD Extreme Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1994 French PS Strong Negative  Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative 
  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
 German SPD Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Luxembourg POSL LSAP Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Dutch Pvda Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Dutch D66 Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian SP Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 British Labour Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Northern Irish SDLP Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes No Yes 
 Danish SD Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
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  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Danish CD No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Extreme Positive 
  No No No No Yes No Yes 
 Irish LP Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Greek PASOK Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Spanish PSOE Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall  Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
 Portuguese PSP Minor Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Positive Extreme Negative Minor Positive 
  No No No No Yes No Yes 
 Portuguese PSD No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall  Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
(1995) Swedish S No Overall Minor Negative Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
(1996) Finnish SSDP Minor Negative Strong Positive Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  No Yes No No Yes No Yes 
(1996) Austrian SPÖ Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
    No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset: 1979-2004 
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In the 1999 European election (see table 33) the Belgian SP conformed to the hypothesised positions 
accurately. Eight parties met the majority of the hypotheses: the French PS (except for liberalisation 
– no overall position and harmonisation – minor negative); the German SPD (except for 
liberalisation – no overall position and supranational integration – minor negative); Dutch Pvda 
(except for liberalisation – minor negative and legal integration – no overall position); Dutch D66 
(except for cultural integration – no overall position); British Labour (except for liberalisation – no 
overall position and supranational integration – minor negative); Danish CD – (except for cultural 
integration – no overall position); Spanish PSOE (except for supranational integration – minor 
negative and legal integration – no overall position); and finally the Finnish SSDP (except for 
liberalisation – strong negative and legal integration – no overall position). Furthermore, both the 
Portuguese cases (PSP and PSD) were positive towards the aspects of European integration, 
however their manifestos were not so developed towards some of the dimensions – with three no 
overall positions each. 
Focusing on the non-conforming cases, amongst the eight cases, five of the parties demonstrated 
minor-strong levels of negative discourse towards liberalisation (Luxembourg POSL LSAP, Belgian 
PS, Northern Irish SDLP, Danish SD, and Austrian SPÖ). Six cases demonstrated minor-strong 
levels of negative discourse towards supranational integration (Luxembourg POSL LSAP, Northern 
Irish SDLP, Danish SD, Irish LP, Swedish S and Austrian SPÖ). With the remaining instances of 
negative discourses among the non-conforming cases no obvious pattern emerges – one party 
showed minor negative discourse towards harmonisation (Danish SD), one party showed strong 
negative discourse towards social integration (Belgian PS), two parties showed minor negative 
discourse towards cultural integration (Luxembourg POSL LSAP and Irish LP), and two parties 
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showed minor-extreme positive levels of discourse towards foreign policy integration (Northern Irish 
SDLP and Greek PASOK). 
In addition a large number of the cases had become critical of liberalisation – Luxembourg POSL 
LSAP, Dutch Pvda, Belgian PS, Northern Irish SDLP, Danish SD, Finnish SDP, and Austrian SPÖ. 
Furthermore, seven parties used minor negative discourse towards supranational integration – 
German SPD, Luxembourg POSL LSAP, British Labour, Northern Irish SDLP, Danish SD, Irish 
LP, Spanish PSOE, Swedish S, and Austrian SPÖ. There was wide acceptance of social and foreign 
policy integration (with one case of strong negative discourse towards social integration – Belgian PS; 
and two cases – one minor negative by Northern Irish SDLP and one extreme negative by the Greek 
PASOK).  
Finally, the 2004 European elections (see table 33) saw the Greek PASOK conform to the predicted 
electoral behaviour, supporting all dimensions with minor positive levels of discourse. Across all 
political parties one can note that harmonisation had little impact on Socialist and Social Democratic 
parties in 2004 and positioning towards cultural integration was also limited. The following parties 
fulfilled most predicted party positions: French PS (except liberalisation – minor negative and 
harmonisation – no overall position); Luxembourg POSL LSAP (except three no overall positions – 
harmonisation, social and cultural integration); Dutch Pvda (except harmonisation – no overall 
position); Dutch D66 (except harmonisation – no overall position); Belgian SP (except 
harmonisation – no overall position); British Labour (except supranational integration – minor 
negative and social integration – no overall position); Northern Irish SDLP (except supranational 
integration – minor negative); Irish LP (except liberalisation – minor negative and harmonisation – 
no overall position); and Finnish SSDP (except harmonisation – no overall position. 
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With this election there were eleven cases where the predictions proved fairly inaccurate. Two key 
observations to note here were that eight of the eleven cases demonstrated minor negative discourse 
towards economic liberalisation (French PS, Belgian PS, Danish SD, Irish LP, Spanish PSOE, 
Portuguese PSP, and Austrian SPÖ). For supranational integration four of the cases demonstrated 
minor to strong levels of negative discourse (British Labour, Northern Irish SDLP, and Portuguese 
PSP). With the remaining dimensions there were no discernible patterns with only one extremely 
negative case (Portuguese PSP) towards legal integration. 
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Table 33 - Social Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1999 French PS No Overall Position Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 German SPD No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Luxembourg POSL LSAP Minor Negative Strong Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Dutch Pvda Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 Dutch D66 Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Belgian SP Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian PS Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Strong Negative No Overall Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
 British Labour No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Northern Irish SDLP Minor Negative Strong Positive Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative 
  No Yes No No Yes Yes No 
 Danish SD Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Danish CD Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Irish LP No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Greek PASOK Extreme Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Negative 
  Yes No No No Yes No No 
 Spanish PSOE Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall  Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 Portuguese PSP Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Portuguese PSD No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall  Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Swedish S Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes No Yes 
 Finnish SSDP Strong Negative Strong Positive Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 Austrian SPÖ Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2004 French PS Minor Negative No Overall Position Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 German SPD No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive - 
  No No No Yes No Yes - 
 Luxembourg POSL LSAP Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall No Overall - 
  Yes No Yes Yes No No - 
 Dutch Pvda Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
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  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Dutch D66 Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Belgian SP Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Belgian PS Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
 British Labour Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes No Yes No Yes - 
 Northern Irish SDLP Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes - 
 Danish SD Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  No No Yes Yes Yes No - 
 Irish LP Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Greek PASOK Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Spanish PSOE Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  No No Yes Yes Yes No - 
 Portuguese PSP Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Negative Extreme Negative Minor Positive No Overall - 
  No Yes No No Yes No - 
 Swedish S Minor Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall Strong Positive No Overall - 
  Yes No No No Yes No - 
 Finnish SSDP Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Austrian SPÖ Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive No Overall - 
  No No Yes Yes Yes No - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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SOCIALIST AND SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION 
GROUPS 
Amongst the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of the „original six‟ member states during the 
1989 elections, there was a very high degree of conformity in the behaviour of the parties towards 
almost all of the dimensions. All parties were supportive of liberalisation and foreign policy 
integration. All but one party (Luxembourg POSL LSAP – no overall position) were supportive 
towards harmonisation and social integration. The pattern was similar with cultural integration, but 
the Luxembourg POSL LSAP was extremely negative while the remainder supported the process. 
With the process of supranational integration two parties were negative (German SPD and 
Luxembourg POSL LSAP), while the remainder were supportive. This suggests that the Luxembourg 
party has remained orientated towards a national solution to its socialist aims.  Legal integration saw 
three positive parties – the French PS, German SPD and Dutch Pvda, while the rest had no overall 
position. The 1973 accession group behaved in a much less predictable manner than the original six 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties. The results were very mixed towards liberalisation, 
harmonisation, supranational integration and foreign policy integration. The responses were mostly 
positive towards legal, social and cultural integration, but there were many of the parties had no 
overall position to one or more of those dimensions. The 1981 to 1986 accession group 
demonstrated strong similarity in the behaviour of the Spanish PSOE and Portuguese PSD, but the 
exception to the group was the Portuguese PSP who did not develop positions towards the 
dimensions, but positioned themselves negatively towards supranational integration and positively 
towards social integration. 
In the 1994 elections, the behavioural pattern of the original six continued with a large degree of 
conformity amongst the parties across the dimensions. Harmonisation, legal integration and social 
integration all saw the parties in complete support. Liberalisation and foreign policy integration saw 
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all but the French PS in support. Cultural integration had two parties position negatively towards it 
(the French PS and Luxembourg POSL LSAP), while the remainder were supportive. Finally 
supranational integration saw a split in support with two parties being critical (French PS and 
German SPD), one with no overall position (Luxembourg POSL LSAP) and the remainder were 
supportive.  
By 1994, the 1973 accession group did demonstrate some conformity in their positions. Four out of 
the five parties (the exception was the Danish CD – no overall position) were positive towards 
liberalisation, all were positive towards supranational integration and social integration and foreign 
policy integration. With the remaining dimensions some of the parties did not position themselves. 
With harmonisation only the British Labour Party and Irish LP positioned themselves (both using 
minor positive discourse) with the remainder having no overall position. With legal integration three 
of the parties used minor positive discourse (British Labour, Danish SD and Irish LP) with the 
remaining two having no overall position. Lastly the positions towards cultural integration were 
mixed with the Danish CD and Irish LP being critical, the Danish SD using minor positive 
discourse, and the remaining two parties having no overall position.  
The 1981 to 1986 accession group by 1994 demonstrated some consistency in their positions. The 
majority were now critical of liberalisation, as well as positive towards harmonisation and cultural 
integration, and all were positive towards social and foreign policy integration. For the remaining 
dimensions of supranational integration and legal integration, the former saw a mix of two positive 
positions (Greek PASOK and Portuguese PSD), one negative position (Spanish PSOE) and one no 
overall position. For the latter, only the Greek PASOK positioned itself on this dimension (minor 
positive). The 1995 accession group saw some similarities in the behaviour of the parties, especially 
between Finnish SSDP and Austrian SPÖ towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational 
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integration. All three parties (Swedish S is the additional member of the group) used similar 
discourses towards social integration and foreign policy integration.  
By the 1999 elections the consensus, which had existed in the previous two elections amongst the 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties of the original six began to show some cracks. Liberalisation 
saw the French PS and German SPD take no overall position, saw the Luxembourg POSL LSAP 
and Belgian PS adopting critical positions with the remainder showing support. Harmonisation did 
remain supported by the majority, though the French PS began to use some critical discourses. 
Supranational integration saw mostly positive responses, though the German SPD and Luxembourg 
POSL LSAP were negative towards the process. Legal integration saw all but the Dutch Pvda (no 
overall position) using positive discourse. The Belgian PS also used negative discourse towards social 
integration, but the remainder of the group positioned themselves positively. Cultural integration saw 
a split in the behaviour of the parties, with one party being critical (Luxembourg POSL LSAP), two 
with no overall position (Dutch D66 and Belgian PS) and the remainder were positive. Finally all 
parties supported foreign policy integration.  
The 1973 accession group showed reasonable consistency with their positions towards the 
dimensions, though there are two major exceptions – liberalisation and cultural integration. With 
liberalisation both the Northern Irish SDLP and Danish SD used minor negative discourse, the 
Danish CD used minor positive discourse, and British Labour and Irish LP had no overall position. 
With cultural integration, both the British Labour Party and Northern Irish SDLP used minor 
positive discourse, the Irish LP used minor negative discourse and the remaining two parties had no 
overall position. In addition, four of the five parties used minor negative discourse towards 
supranational integration (the Danish CD was the exception). Within the 1981 and 1986 accession 
group there were some similarities identifiable amongst the parties. The majority of parties supported 
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liberalisation (the exception was the Portuguese PSD – no overall position). The majority also 
supported foreign policy integration (the exception was the Greek PASOK – extreme negative 
discourse). Social integration saw all parties in support and legal integration saw all parties having no 
overall position. Cultural integration only saw one party position itself (Spanish PSOE- minor 
positive). The final two dimensions of harmonisation and supranational integration saw a mix of 
positions. For the former the Spanish PSOE and Portuguese PSD both positioned themselves 
positively, while the remaining two had no overall position. For the latter, the Portuguese parties 
used minor positive discourse, the Spanish PSOE used minor negative discourse and the Greek 
PASOK had no overall position. The 1995 accession group behaved in a similar way to the previous 
election with the Finnish SSDP and Austrian SPÖ adopting similar positions towards liberalisation, 
harmonisation, and cultural integration. All three parties adopted similar positions towards social 
integration and foreign policy integration. In addition both the Swedish S and Austrian SPÖ were 
negative towards supranational integration.  
In the 2004 election, it was possible to observe a more consistent set of positions between the parties 
of the original six member states. All parties supported the process of legal integration. The majority 
supported supranational integration (the exception was the German SPD – no overall position), 
social integration (the exceptions were the German SPD and Luxembourg POSL LSAP – no overall 
position), and cultural integration (the exceptions were Luxembourg POSL LSAP and Belgian PS – 
no overall position). Finally, all but the Belgian PS (minor positive) had no overall position towards 
harmonisation. In the 1973 accession group there was a real observable split in the behaviour of the 
four parties. With liberalisation both the British Labour Party and Northern Irish SDLP supported 
the process, but the Danish SD and Irish LP positioned negatively towards it. With supranational 
integration the British Labour Party and Northern Irish SDLP were negative towards the process, 
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while the Danish SD and Irish LP were positive towards the process. With the remaining dimensions 
all parties were supportive towards legal integration, the majority of the parties were supportive 
towards social integration (the exception was British Labour – no overall position) and cultural 
integration (the exception was the Danish SD – no overall position). Lastly, with harmonisation only 
two parties positioned themselves towards it (British Labour and Northern Irish SDLP – strong-
minor positive). The 1981 to 1986 accession group saw some similarities between the parties in terms 
of their positions, but this was not particularly strong.  The Greek PASOK adopted similar positions 
to the Spanish PSOE towards supranational, legal and social integration. The Portuguese PSP was 
the most critical using negative discourse towards liberalisation, supranational and legal integration. 
Again the 1995 accession group showed reasonable similarities in the positions adopted by the 
parties. All three parties used positive discourse towards social integration and no overall position 
towards harmonisation.  In addition, both the Swedish S and Finnish SDP adopted positive positions 
towards liberalisation (with the SPÖ against). Supranational and legal integration saw the both the 
Finnish SSDP and Austrian SPÖ adopting positive positions. Lastly, the 2004 accession group saw 
strong consistent behaviour towards liberalisation, legal integration, and social integration with 
almost all adopting positive positions (with the remainder having no overall position). Notable was 
the lack of positions towards harmonisation, supranational integration and cultural integration by 
some of the parties.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The examination of the positions taken by the identified Eurosceptic Socialist and Social Democratic 
parties reveal that there is a strong ideological influence in taking up those positions. Amongst two 
of the Socialist parties, as well as the Finnish Social Democratic party there is a clear discomfort with 
the liberalisation of the market. With the Luxembourg Workers party, as well as the Portuguese 
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Socialist party there is a clear discomfort with cultural integration, indicating that the preference for 
member state solution and a general orientation towards the national still remains very salient. 
Beyond those Eurosceptic parties, the general trends from the entire party family showed that in 
most cases the hypotheses were clearly supported and that Socialist and Social Democratic parties are 
in general supportive of the individual processes of European integration. There was very little 
evidence of any sustained critical discourses used against any of the dimensions, indicating that the 
major shift in support identified by Featherstone (1988) had already made its mark. Other academics 
have picked up on this and posited explanations for this change. Bailey (2005: 14) for example, 
argued that: 
From the 1980s onwards, the European Union has been presented as an institutional 
opportunity for the re-intervention in, and re-regulation of an increasingly integrated socio-
economic space…support for the European Union has been used by social democratic 
parties to compensate for failure and retrenchment at the national level. 
 
This explanation is borne out by the results, especially the evidently strong support for the process of 
social integration.  If one returns to the discussion in the hypotheses section, and focuses on the four 
strands identified by Dunphy (2004: 4-6) - the EEC/EU as an agent of multinational capitalist 
exploitation and to be withdrawn from immediately; as before, but withdrawal as unrealistic; the 
EEC/EU as a potential agent for social and political change; and finally Europe as the primary 
project of the left. Clearly the evidence fits the third strand strongly. Socialist and Social Democratic 
parties in general, have adapted their ideology to overcome restrictions at the national level and the 
potential for major national reforms to be derailed by the exit and reduction in foreign direct 
investment, by seeking to introduce and expand on a social element at the supranational level. 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties have sought to underline their pro-European credentials in 
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the election and hence the party family is mostly supportive across accession groups and in central as 
well as peripheral member states. 
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EUROSCEPTIC CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as 
Eurosceptic: 
 German CSU – towards cultural integration in 1989; towards supranational integration in 
1994; towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration in 
2004; 
 Dutch CU/SGP – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards supranational 
integration and cultural integration in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999; 
 Luxembourg PCS CSV – towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 1994; 
 Irish Fine Gael – towards foreign policy integration in 1999; 
 Swedish KD – towards supranational integration in 1999;   
 Finnish KD – towards supranational integration in 1999 and 2004; 
Interestingly among the Eurosceptic Christian Democratic parties many shared a specific hostility 
towards supranational integration – the German CSU, Dutch CU/SGP, Luxembourg PCS CSV, 
Swedish KD and Finnish KD. In addition, the German CSU, Dutch CU/SGP and Luxembourg 
PCS CSV were all critical in the 1994 election. In the 1999 election, the German CSU, Dutch 
CU/SGP, Swedish KD and Finish KD were all Eurosceptic towards supranational integration. The 
other dimensions, which received critical discourses from these Eurosceptic parties, were cultural 
integration (German CSU in 1989; Dutch CU/SGP and Luxembourg PCS CSV in 1994) and foreign 
policy integration (Irish Fine Gael in 1999). What this may suggest is that these parties, though 
Christian Democratic in terms of the party family they have been assigned to, these perhaps occupy 
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the more conservative end of the group, and share some ideological components with the broader 
Conservative party family tradition. Given their consistent criticism of supranational integration, 
there clearly is an identifiable ideological component to the use of this Eurosceptic discourse. 
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis hypothesised that Christian Democratic parties, as one of the driving forces behind the 
whole process of European integration, would espouse positive discourses towards all processes of 
integration: liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy 
integration. In addition this would stay consistent throughout the period of 1989 to 2004. The initial 
analyses confirmed the accuracy of the hypotheses for 1989 only. Support for the individual 
processes decreased over the time period – and hence the accuracy of the fit between the predictions 
and party positions. However, there is a danger of overplaying this. Yes, there was a decrease in the 
fit, but overall the party family was still very pro-European. The main issues of non-conformity 
surrounded the dimension of supranational and cultural integration.  
In 1989 (see table 34) eight cases were Christian Democratic parties and out of those three parties 
matched the hypotheses exactly: Luxembourg PCS CSV, Belgian CD&V and finally the Spanish 
CDS. A further four parties behaved in a reasonably consistent manner vis-à-vis the hypotheses: 
German CDU (except two no overall positions: social and cultural integration); Italian DC (three no 
overall positions: legal, social and cultural integration); Belgian PSC (one minor negative – 
supranational integration and one no overall position – legal integration); and finally Irish Fine Gael 
(except for three no overall positions – legal, social and cultural integration). The German CSU was 
the only party to deviate from the norm – it used minor negative discourse towards supranational 
integration and strong negative discourse towards cultural integration. This can be explained by the 
unique situation the Bavarian CSU finds itself in given the particularly strong regional identity of the 
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Bavarian state. The party also had no overall position towards harmonisation, legal, and social 
integration. 
By 1994 (see table 34) only one case out of ten fitted the hypotheses exactly- the German CDU. 
There were four other parties which fitted the majority of hypotheses: the Belgian PSC (except for 
supranational integration – minor negative); Belgian CD&V (except for cultural integration – no 
overall position; Irish Fine Gael (except for cultural integration – no overall position); and finally in 
1996 the Austrian OVP (except for legal and cultural integration – no overall position). 
There were five non-conforming parties – the German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV, Dutch CDA, 
Italian DC, and Swedish KD. Interestingly four out of five were negative towards supranational 
integration with the CSU and PCS CSV being strong and extremely negative respectively. 
Additionally the only two remaining instances (the rest were no overall positions) were a minor and a 
strong negative position towards cultural integration by the CSU and PCS CSV. 
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Table 34 – Christian Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989 to 1994-1996: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1989 German CDU Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
 German CSU Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall No Overall Strong Negative Extreme Positive 
  Yes No No No No No Yes 
 Luxembourg PCS CSV Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Italian DC Extreme Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall No overall No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 Belgian PSC Extreme Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian CD&V Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Irish Fine Gael Minor Positive No Overall  Extreme Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 
 Spanish CDS Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
1994 German CDU Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 German CSU Minor Positive Strong Positive Strong Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Negative Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes No No  No No Yes 
 Luxembourg PCS CSV Extreme Positive Minor Positive Extreme Negative Minor Positive No Overall Strong Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
 Dutch CDA No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive Extreme Positive 
  No Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
 Italian DC No Overall  Strong Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 Belgian PSC Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian CD&V Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Irish Fine Gael Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
(1995) Swedish KD Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
(1996) Austrian OVP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive No Overall  Strong Positive 
    Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004
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In the 1999 elections, (see table 35) there were no parties that fitted the predictions exactly. 
However, six parties behaved in a consistent manner with the hypotheses, though with a couple of 
exceptions per case: the Dutch CDA (cultural integration – no overall position); Irish DC 
(liberalisation – no overall position); Belgian PSC (harmonisation – no overall position); Belgian 
CD&V (except social integration – no overall position); Irish Fine Gael (except cultural integration – 
no overall position and foreign policy integration – extreme negative); and finally the Austrian OVP 
(liberalisation – no overall position).  
In this election, there were six non-conforming parties – German CDU, German CSU, Luxembourg 
PCS CSV, Greek ND, Swedish KD, and Finnish KD. The Greek ND is excluded from this element 
of the analysis, as it was included amongst the non-conforming parties due to having no overall 
position six times. One can again observe that the pattern of non-conformity is greatest surrounding 
the issue of supranational integration. All five remaining parties used minor to extreme levels of 
negative discourse. In addition, further negative discourse could be found with the CSU – minor 
negative discourse towards social and cultural integration – and the PCS CSV – minor negative 
discourse towards cultural integration. 
Finally, with the 2004 elections (see table 35) one party conformed to the hypotheses exactly – the 
Greek ND. This time only three parties behaved in a manner consistent with the predictions, but 
with exceptions. These were the Belgian CD&V (harmonisation - no overall position); Irish Fine 
Gael (harmonisation – no overall position); and Greek ND.  
Interestingly, amongst the seven non-conforming parties, the pattern that emerges is a consistent use 
of negative discourse towards supranational integration – with only two exceptions. In addition, a 
four parties engaged in minor criticisms towards cultural integration Furthermore, three parties used 
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minor negative discourse towards liberalisation for the first time – German CSU, Luxembourg PCS 
CSV, and Austrian OVP.  
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Table 35 – Christian Democratic Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1999 German CDU Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
 German CSU Extreme Positive Strong Positive Strong Negative No Overall Minor Negative Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
 PCS CSV Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes 
 Dutch CDA Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
 Italian DC No Overall  Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian PSC Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Belgian CD&V Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 Irish Fine Gael Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
 Greek ND No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall 
  No No No No No Yes No 
 Swedish KD Minor Positive No Overall Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Austrian OVP No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Finnish KD Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes No Yes 
2004 German CDU Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative - 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No - 
 German CSU Minor Negative Minor Positive Extreme Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative - 
  No Yes No Yes No  No - 
 Luxembourg PCS CSV Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative - 
  No Yes Yes Yes No No - 
 Dutch CDA Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes No No Yes No - 
 Belgian CD&V Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Irish Fine Gael Strong Positive No Overall  Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Greek ND Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes - 
 Swedish KD Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes No No Yes Yes No - 
 Finnish KD No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  No No No Yes Yes No - 
 Austrian OVP Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative - 
  No Yes Yes Yes No No - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS  
In the 1989 elections, the Christian Democratic parties from the original six did adopt similar 
patterns of behaviour towards liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration. All parties 
were supportive towards liberalisation and foreign policy integration and the majority were 
supportive towards harmonisation. Supranational integration saw a divided set of positions, with 
little indication of a pattern of support amongst the six countries. Of those parties who positioned 
themselves towards legal integration and social integration all were supportive. Cultural integration 
saw a real mix of positions, with the German CSU and Dutch CU/SGP being critical, the 
Luxembourg PCS CSV, Belgian PSC and CD&V making positive statements and the remainder 
having no overall position. Within the 1973 accession states there was only one Christian Democratic 
Party – the Irish Fine Gael. This party was positive towards liberalisation, supranational integration, 
legal integration and foreign policy integration. It had no overall position towards the remaining 
dimensions. In this election it did not behave in a particularly different manner to those parties from 
the original six member states. 
In the 1994 election, the parties from the original six were still consistent in their support for 
liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration. However, there was a majority of the 
parties who were critical of supranational integration – German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV, Dutch 
CU/SGP, Dutch CDA, and Belgian PSC. For legal and social integration, it was possible to see the 
same pattern as in 1989 – of those who took positions, all were positive. With cultural integration, 
there was a group of three parties – the German CSU, Luxembourg PCS CSV and Dutch CU/SGP 
who were negative, three parties who were positive – German CDU, Dutch CDA and Belgian PSC, 
and the remaining parties had no overall position.  In the 1973 accession group, the Irish Fine Gael 
remained supportive with a consistent pattern of behaviour similar to the more supportive parties 
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from the original six. Amongst the 1995 accession group parties, both the Swedish KD and Austrian 
OVP were supportive towards liberalisation, and the Austrian OVP supportive towards 
harmonisation. Both were supportive social integration and foreign policy integration. 
In the 1999 election, there was much greater uniformity amongst the Christian Democratic parties of 
the „original six‟. All, with the exception of the Italian DC (for liberalisation) and Belgian PSC (for 
harmonisation), supported both processes of economic integration. All parties also supported 
foreign policy integration. In addition, with legal integration there were only two parties that did not 
position themselves positively (the German CSU and Luxembourg PCS CSV – no overall position). 
Social integration saw most parties positioning themselves positively (the exceptions were the 
German CDU and Belgian CD&V – no overall position, and German CSU – minor negative). The 
two interesting dimensions were supranational and cultural integration. Here it was possible to see 
two groups of responses. With supranational integration, the German CDU and CSU, Luxembourg 
PCS CSV and Dutch CU/SGP all positioned themselves negatively towards the process. However, 
the Dutch CDA, Italian DC, Belgian PSC and Belgian CD&V all positioned themselves positively. 
The same pattern was repeated with cultural integration. Here the German CSU, Luxembourg PCS 
CSV and Dutch CU/SGP all used minor negative discourse. The Italian DC, Belgian PSC and 
Belgian CD&V used minor to extreme levels of positive discourse. In the 1973 accession group, the 
Irish Fine Gael only differed from the most positive examples of the previous accession group in 
that it was extremely negative towards foreign policy integration. In the 1981 and 1986 accession 
group, the results for the Greek ND provide little comparative material as it only had one position – 
being extremely positive towards cultural integration. In the 1995 accession group, there were only a 
couple of examples of uniformity in the behaviour of the parties. All were positive towards social 
and foreign policy integration. In addition, the Swedish KD and Finnish KD took similar positive 
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positions towards liberalisation and similar negative positions towards supranational integration. 
Finally, both the Swedish KD and Austrian OVP shared similar positions towards legal integration. 
In the 2004 elections for the original six, there was a key trend of support for liberalisation, 
harmonisation, and legal integration. However, there were two exceptions with the dimension of 
liberalisation (German CSU and Luxembourg PCS – minor negative). There was also a key trend of 
criticism towards supranational integration (with the exception of the Luxembourg PCS CSV – 
minor positive and Belgian CD&V – strong positive). This was also the case with cultural integration 
where four of the parties using minor negative discourse (the two exceptions were Dutch CDA – no 
overall and Belgian CD&V – minor positive). Finally, social integration was only salient with the 
Dutch and Belgian parties (minor to strong positive). 
In the 1973 and 1981-1986 accession groups, the behaviour was very positive towards the 
dimensions by the Irish Fine Gael and Greek ND and overall these parties were very similar to the 
behaviour exhibited by the Belgian CD&V. In the 1995 accession group, the patterns of behaviour 
were more difficult to decipher with liberalisation, harmonisation and cultural integration. Legal 
integration saw all three parties being supportive, and two of the three (the Austrian OVP being the 
exception – no overall position) were supportive of social integration. Finally, two of the parties were 
also critical towards supranational integration (again the Austrian OVP was the exception – minor 
positive).  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results from the Christian Democratic analyses have theoretical significance. Traditionally 
Christian Democratic Parties have been the driving force behind European integration, and it was 
specifically hypothesised that the party family would espouse positive discourses towards all 
dimensions throughout the time period. The pattern of behaviour, in fact, suggests that Christian 
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Democratic support for the processes of European integration has been on the decline from 1994 
onwards and this may be explained by the developments instigated by Maastricht and beyond. 
However, it is important to underline that Christian Democratic parties remain supportive despite 
the identification of more critical discourses being used. Six parties were identifiable as Eurosceptic 
with all, but the Irish Fine Gale being critical of supranational integration – this was very surprising 
given the support for a federal Europe, though federal structures obviously do not necessarily mean 
greatly increasing the power of the supranational centre. Johansson (2002: 880) noted the preference 
for subsidiarity as well as a federal Europe. Half of the parties were critical of cultural integration, 
which may reflect the party family‟s general distaste for nationalist discourses and a general 
discomfort of European identity and culture being promoted in the same or a similar manner. 
Supranational and cultural integration were the two dimensions to see the increase in minor, as well 
as critical discourses. These results highlight the relevance of an observation made by Irving (1976: 
405) in the context of the Italian DC. He noted that some Christian Democrats had doubts about the 
way in which European integration developed, though the DC was fundamentally united in a 
commitment to the developing a closely integrated Europe. 
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EUROSCEPTIC (POST)-COMMUNIST PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify a significant number of parties that could be classified 
as Eurosceptic: 
 French PCF – towards liberalisation, harmonisation and foreign policy integration in 1989; 
towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 1994; 
and towards liberalisation in 2004. 
 Dutch SP – towards liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration in 1994; 
towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1999; and liberalisation in 2004; 
 Italian RC36 – towards liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration in 1994; 
towards liberalisation in 1999; and towards harmonisation in 2004; 
 Danish SF – towards supranational integration in 1994;  
 Irish WP – towards liberalisation in 1989; towards liberalisation in 1994; and towards 
liberalisation and harmonisation in 1999; 
 Greek KKE – towards liberalisation in 1989 and 1994; towards liberalisation and legal 
integration in 1999; and towards liberalisation, supranational integration, and legal integration 
in 2004; 
 Portuguese PCP – towards liberalisation in 1989; towards supranational integration in 1994; 
and towards harmonisation in 1999; 
                                                 
36 The Italian RC‟s behaviour is roughly in line with Conti‟s (2003: 25) observations that they consider the EU as “an 
instrument for the globalisation of capitalism and market-economies against the interests of the masses”.  
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 Swedish V – towards harmonisation in 1995; towards harmonisation, supranational 
integration, and foreign policy integration in 1999; and towards supranational and legal 
integration in 2004; 
 Finnish VL Left Wing – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1996; 
towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards liberalisation in 2004; 
As one can observe that there are Eurosceptic (post)-Communist parties spread across the accession 
groups and amongst both core and peripheral members. The majority appear to consist of the 
remaining unreformed Communist Party type. Consistently, the majority of the Eurosceptic parties 
rejected the processes of liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. This clearly is 
influenced by the ideological predispositions of the parties. Interestingly, this scepticism rarely 
extended to the other dimensions. The French PCF and Swedish V were critical of legal integration 
and foreign policy integration, but no other parties joined them with this critique and furthermore, 
no parties exhibited critical discourses at the level to be considered Eurosceptic. Importantly, and 
unlike some of the Eurosceptic behaviour exhibited by the Green parties, a number of the 
dimensions showed Eurosceptic behaviour during the same election suggesting that in these cases it 
was a response to the same integration development stimuli. 
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis had hypothesised that there would be divergence of behaviour amongst (post)-
Communist parties. Those that were unreformed were likely to exhibit negative discourse towards all 
but social integration where the parties were likely to have no overall position. The reformed post-
Communist parties were likely to be positive towards all dimensions with the exceptions of social 
integration (where the parties were likely to have no overall position) and foreign policy integration 
where the parties were likely to be negative. Overall, it was possible to observe examples of parties 
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across the elections conforming to the behaviour predicted by the hypotheses. However, much of 
the data points to a more complex picture. An observation of strong significance is the almost 
universal support for social integration, leading to the conclusion that (post)-Communist parties on 
the whole do not see the EU‟s expansion into social policy as a threat to the achievements of 
national welfare state policies. In addition, another important observation to note was the strong 
homogeneity of party responses towards foreign policy integration. The majority of the parties 
supported the process strongly. One can argue that this response was due to the traditional American 
bias in western security structures and that a EU foreign and defence policy would allow European 
independence. 
During the 1989 elections (see table 36), four parties were critical of economic liberalisation – French 
PCF, Irish WP, Spanish IU and Portuguese PCP. The Irish WP was extremely negative towards 
liberalisation – suggesting a rejection of the common market and moves towards the single market - 
and demonstrated minor negative discourse towards foreign policy integration, but the remaining 
dimensions saw minor positive support – which would be the expected behaviour of a reformed 
Communist party. The Spanish IU demonstrated minor negative support for liberalisation, and no 
overall position towards harmonisation, legal and cultural integration, but the remaining dimensions 
saw minor to strong levels of positive discourse.  
By the 1994 European elections (see table 36) it was possible to see many more parties conforming 
to the predictions on the majority of the integration dimensions. In terms of the behaviour of 
unreformed Communist parties, almost all rejected liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational 
integration (French PCF, Dutch SP, Danish SF, Spanish IU, Portuguese PCP, Finnish VL Left Wing 
and Italian RC). The Irish WP party also did not fit the predictions accurately. While it was extremely 
negative towards the liberalisation of the market in was positive towards harmonisation and 
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supranational integration. The final party, which did not completely fit the pattern, was the Swedish 
V party. It had no overall position towards liberalisation, was strongly negative towards 
harmonisation, but showed minor positive towards supranational integration. 
The two remaining dimensions – legal and cultural integration saw some interesting results. Legal 
integration saw the majority of unreformed parties reject with minor negative discourse (the Spanish 
IU being an exception). However, with Cultural integration, the majority of parties show 
minor/strong positive positions (the exceptions being the Dutch SP and Portuguese PCP – no 
overall position, and Danish SF – Minor negative position). 
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Table 36 - Post-Communist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
1989 French PCF Extreme Negative Strong Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 Dutch SP No Overall No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  No No Yes No No No No 
 Danish SF No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative  No Overall No Overall Minor Positive 
  No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
 Irish WP Extreme Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative 
  Yes No No No No No Yes 
 Greek KKE No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive Extreme Positive 
  No No No No Yes No No 
 Spanish IU Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive No Overall  Strong Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes No No No No No No 
 Portuguese PCP Extreme Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Negative Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No 
1994 French PCF Extreme Negative Strong Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
 German PDS Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes No No Yes No Yes No 
 Dutch SP Strong Negative Strong Negative Extreme Negative No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall No Overall 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 Italian PDS Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
 Danish SF Minor Negative Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Negative  Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
 Irish WP Extreme Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No No No No No No 
 Greek KKE Strong Negative No Overall Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes No Yes Yes No No No 
 Spanish IU Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 Portuguese PCP Minor Negative Minor Negative Extreme Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
 Italian RC Extreme Negative Strong Negative Extreme Negative No Overall Extreme Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative 
    Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
(1995) Swedish V No Overall Strong Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative 
  No Yes No No No Yes Yes 
(1996) Finnish VL Left Wing No Overall Strong Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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In the 1999 European election (see table 37), the majority of the parties conformed to the 
predictions with reasonable accuracy. If the results from social and foreign policy integration are 
ignored – which have already been addressed, we find the following. The French PCF, Dutch SP, 
Danish SF, Greek KKE, Swedish V and Italian RC all conformed to the predictions. With the Irish 
WP, Portuguese PCP and Finnish VL left Wing, all demonstrated strong conformity with the 
exceptions of minor positive positions towards legal integration (Irish WP and Finnish VL Left 
Wing) and cultural integration (Portuguese PCP). 
With the remaining reformed Communist parties the German PDS demonstrated some conformity 
towards the predictions. The PDS utilised discourses indicating minor positive towards liberalisation, 
legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. The party showed minor criticisms towards 
harmonisation and supranational integration. The Italian PDS on the other hand showed conformity 
to all but social and foreign policy integration. It used minor to extremely positive discourse towards 
all the dimensions. 
Finally with the 2004 European elections (see table 37) only three parties conformed to the set 
predictions for unreformed Communist parties towards the dimensions liberalisation, harmonisation, 
supranational and legal integration. These were the French PCF, Greek KKE and Swedish V. 
However, there were many more that conformed to the predictions on some of the dimensions. The 
Dutch SP used minor to strong positive discourse towards supranational, social and cultural 
integration. The Italian RC followed the same pattern. The Danish SF exhibited minor levels of 
positive discourse towards liberalisation, legal and social integration, and minor negative discourse 
towards harmonisation and supranational integration. Finally, the Finnish VL Left Wing party used 
strong levels of negative discourse towards liberalisation and minor to strong levels of positive 
discourse towards legal and social integration. 
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The reformed Communist parties behaved quite differently to previous elections. The German PDS 
had become negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration (minor 
levels); the Spanish IU was negative towards liberalisation and legal integration (minor levels). 
Surprisingly the Dutch CU/SGP exhibited behaviour towards European integration akin to that of a 
reformed Communist party – showing minor positive support towards liberalisation, harmonisation, 
legal and social integration.  
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Table 37 – Post-Communist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1999 French PCF Minor Negative Minor Negative No Overall Position Minor Negative Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No Yes No Yes No 
 German PDS No Overall Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  No No No Yes No Yes No 
 Dutch SP Minor Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative No Overall Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
 Italian PDS Minor Negative Extreme Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes Yes No No No 
 Danish SF Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative  Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 Irish WP Extreme Negative Strong Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
 Greek KKE Strong Negative No Overall No Overall Strong Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes No No Yes No No No 
 Spanish IU Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes No No No No No 
 Portuguese PCP Minor Negative Extreme Negative Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 Swedish V No Overall Strong Negative Extreme Negative No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Strong Negative 
  No Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 
Finnish VL Left 
Wing No Overall Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Extreme Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
 Italian RC Strong Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative No Overall Extreme Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
2004 French PCF Extreme Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Extreme Positive No Overall Position - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No - 
 German PDS Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  No No No Yes No Yes - 
 Dutch SP Strong Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No - 
 Italian RC Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive - 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No - 
 Danish SF Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  No Yes Yes No No No - 
 Greek KKE Extreme Negative Minor Negative Strong Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No - 
 Spanish IU Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Extreme Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No No Yes No No - 
 Swedish V Minor Negative Minor Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No - 
 
Finnish VL Left 
Wing Strong Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  Yes No No No No No - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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 (POST)-COMMUNIST PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN ACCESSION GROUPS 
When comparing (post)-Communist parties within each accession group, the task is somewhat 
complicated by two behavioural patterns identified vis-à-vis the number of cases. In the 1989 
elections, within the „original six‟ accession group, while French PCF adopted extreme negative 
discourse towards liberalisation and the Dutch SP having no overall position) it is possible to identify 
homogenous patterns of behaviour towards supranational integration where both parties adopted 
negative discourses, and social integration where both parties adopted minor positive discourses. 
Within the 1973 accession group, there were only two cases – the Danish SF and Irish WP, both of 
which behaved in an unreformed manner (the Danish SF appeared to re-orientate its position in 
2004). The only dimension where the parties behaved consistently was towards supranational 
integration - utilising minor positive discourse. In the 1981 and 1986 accession group, the lack of 
development towards the manifestos is apparent with the Greek KKE and Spanish IU. Within this 
group the majority of parties were critical towards liberalisation and all were positive towards foreign 
policy integration. 
By 1994, among the original six, there were two reformed (the German PDS and Italian PDS) and 
three unreformed parties (the French PCF, Dutch SP and Italian RC). The behaviour of the 
reformed parties was consistent to establish identifiable patterns of behaviour. The parties adopted 
similar positions towards liberalisation, legal, social, cultural and foreign policy integration. They 
differed in their attitude towards harmonisation and supranational integration with the German PDS 
using minor negative arguments towards both and the Italian PDS using minor positive arguments 
towards both. The unreformed parties were consistent in the behaviour towards liberalisation, 
harmonisation, supranational integration, and social integration, though the level of usage did vary on 
two of the dimensions. In addition, both the French PCF and Italian RC adopted similar positions 
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with cultural and foreign policy integration, while the Dutch SP had no overall position. In the 1973 
accession group, the parties did not behave consistently to establish patterns of behaviour. The two 
exceptions were liberalisation and social integration. The Danish SF used minor negative discourses 
and the Irish WP used extreme negative discourse towards liberalisation. Both utilised minor positive 
discourse towards social integration. Within the 1981 and 1986 accession group there was strong 
conformity across the dimensions. For the following processes all three parties took comparable 
positions: liberalisation (minor to strong negative discourses), supranational integration (minor to 
extreme negative discourses), social integration (minor to strong positive) and foreign policy 
integration (extreme positive discourses). However, the level of usage did vary amongst the three 
parties. In addition, with the remaining three dimensions, two of the parties used similar discourses – 
harmonisation (minor negative, except Greek KKE – no overall position), legal integration (minor 
negative, except Spanish IU), and cultural integration (minor positive, except for Portuguese PCP – 
no overall position). The behavioural pattern amongst the two parties of the 1995 accession group 
was much harder to discern. The Swedish V and Finnish VL Left Wing both used strong negative 
discourse towards harmonisation, and had no overall position towards liberalisation, but with the 
remaining dimensions they took opposite positions. 
In the 1999 elections, the pattern remained similar between the unreformed Communist parties of 
the „original six‟ member states. The French PCF, Dutch SP and Italian RC adopted similar positions 
towards liberalisation, harmonisation, social and cultural integration. They were negative to all, with 
the exception of social integration. On the remaining dimensions, supranational integration saw both 
the Dutch SP and Italian RC adopt negative positions (French PCF – no overall position).  
Similarities in the behaviour of reformed Communist parties were harder to identify. The German 
and Italian PDS were only similar with their positions toward legal, social and foreign policy 
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integration. In the 1973 accession group, the Danish SF and Irish WP similarly adopted negative 
stances towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration and cultural integration, 
though their level of usage varied. They also both adopted minor positive positions towards social 
integration. The 1981 and 1986 accession group did not match this pattern. They only adopted 
similar behaviour towards social and foreign policy integration, though they differed in the intensity 
of the usage. The 1995 accession group behaviour was similar to that observed for the 1973 parties. 
The Swedish V and Finnish VL Left Wing were both negative towards harmonisation, supranational 
integration, positive towards social integration, and finally both offered no overall position towards 
liberalisation and cultural integration.  
Lastly in the 2004 elections, the original six member states saw very similar behaviour exhibited 
across the dimensions by the parties. Towards liberalisation, all parties were negative though the level 
of use of the discourse did vary. The negative behaviour was evident towards harmonisation where 
all parties used minor to strong levels of negative discourse. Supranational integration saw a split in 
the behaviour of the parties with the French PCF and German PDS using minor negative discourse, 
but the Dutch SP and Italian RC using minor positive discourse. The split was less pronounced for 
legal integration with three of the parties using minor negative discourse, and only the German PDS 
using minor positive discourse. Finally both social and cultural integration saw extensive use of 
positive discourse. Within the 1973 accession group, there was only one party – the Danish SF. This 
party did behave in a similar fashion to those parties of the original six member states in that it was 
negative towards harmonisation and supranational integration, and took positive positions towards 
legal and social integration. It did take a minor positive position towards liberalisation. In the 1981 
and 1986 accession group, the Greek KKE and Spanish IU did take similar positions towards 
liberalisation (though the level of negative discourse did vary considerably), legal integration (again 
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the level of negative discourse did vary) and social integration (the level of positive discourse did 
vary). They both took opposing positions towards harmonisation and supranational integration. 
Within the 1995 accession group, there were few examples of similar patterns of behaviour between 
the Swedish V and Finnish VL Left Wing. Both were negative towards liberalisation, both positive 
towards social integration and both had no overall position towards cultural integration.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The research was able to identify a significant number of Eurosceptic parties within the party family, 
which was expected. Amongst the identified Eurosceptic (post)-Communist political parties there is 
a clear ideological component to their use of Euroscepticism towards the three traditional aspects of 
integration – economic liberalisation, economic harmonisation and supranational integration. This is 
in regards to their deep rejection of any process that leads to unrestrained capitalist economies. 
Delving further into the extensive party positioning data, theoretically one can extrapolate several 
behavioural traits for (post)-Communist parties towards European integration. Firstly, there were 
very few reformed post-Communist parties and in general they were very positive towards the 
majority of the processes of integration – for example, the Italian PDS and the Spanish IU.  
Secondly unreformed Communist Parties have remained Eurosceptic throughout the period focusing 
their rejectionist discourse on the fundamental elements of integration – liberalisation, harmonisation 
and supranational integration. One can therefore argue that the phenomenon of Euroscepticism has 
maintained an element of extreme left rejectionism throughout the period and should continue to do 
so.   
Thirdly, the really significant finding is that there appears to have been a tremendous ideological 
shift. The literature and the hypotheses pointed to the argument that the majority of parties within 
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the party family amongst the unreformed type would attempt to avoid engaging with Europe, given 
its strong free-market roots. However, amongst the majority of (post)-Communist parties there was a 
strong will to engage with European structures to correct the negative externalities of the market 
through social integration. It amounted to almost universal support. There was also a strong 
homogenous response towards foreign policy integration. Communist parties re-orientated 
themselves towards western structures with the Euro-Communism reforms during the 1970s and 
1980s, but it is still surprising that they supported European common policies on foreign and 
defence matters. However, this may well be a response to the continued American bias in western 
defence structures – i.e. NATO – despite evidence of a diminishing importance post-Cold war and 
its search for a new role.  
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EUROSCEPTIC AGRARIAN PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as 
Eurosceptic: 
 Swedish Centre – towards supranational integration in 1995; and towards supranational 
integration in 1999; 
 Finnish SK – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1996; and towards 
supranational integration in 1999; 
Of the two West European Agrarian parties both shared Eurosceptic positions towards 
supranational integration in 1995/6 and 1999. In addition, the Finnish SK differed by also being 
Eurosceptic towards harmonisation in 1996. Unfortunately, given the number of cases within the 
party family (i.e. two cases across multiple years) it is difficult to generalise beyond this.  
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis argued that Agrarian parties would mostly likely position themselves negatively towards 
all dimensions towards European integration. From the results, an important issue has arisen in that 
the number of Agrarian parties within Europe that had European manifestos available was extremely 
limited. There were only two individual parties – the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK. This obviously 
makes hypotheses testing and generalisations difficult as it is based on a small sample size.  
If one takes all three elections as a whole for the purpose of the analysis one can see that there were 
very few instances of negative discourse towards liberalisation. This potentially can be explained by 
the fact that within the farming constituencies they represent, the liberalisation of the markets has 
not been so damaging to these peripheral communities given the impact of the Common 
Agricultural Policy.  In addition two parties – the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK supported legal, 
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social, and foreign policy integration. The parties were clearly suspicious towards supranational 
integration with minor to extreme negative discourse being used. Lastly the Swedish and Finnish 
Centre were negative towards harmonisation in 1995/1996 and one was in 1999 (Swedish Centre). 
AGRARIAN PARTIES BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS 
By their very nature they are peripheral parties within Europe, being mostly found amongst 
Northern and Scandinavian member states. What one can note is that within the 1995 accession 
group the two parties – the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK are much more positive – especially 
towards liberalisation, legal and social integration – across three elections.  
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Table 38 – Agrarian Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1994/95-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
(1995) Swedish Centre Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
(1996) Finnish SK Minor Negative Strong Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
1999 Swedish Centre Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
 Finnish SK Strong Positive Minor Positive Extreme Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  No No Yes No No No No 
2004 Swedish Centre Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  No No Yes No No No - 
 Finnish SK Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  No No No No No No - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004
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THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results of the hypotheses testing indicate a lack of success, with only harmonisation (1995/1996) 
and supranational integration (1995/1996 and 1999) returning confirmations. Clearly the theoretical 
implications are unfortunately very limited for party family generalisations. However from this 
limited sample one can reject the assumption that Agrarian parties are very critical of the process of 
integration. Their hostility is much more nuanced. Indeed the clear instances of rejectionist discourse 
are confined to the dimension of supranational integration. This is in line with the peripheral roots of 
the party family and indeed the location of these two parties‟ constituencies being on the edge of 
Europe. The surprising results are the general support for liberalisation given the potential 
detrimental effects of opening up the markets of these traditional farming constituencies that 
support agrarian parties to competition and the reorientation to supporting harmonisation for both 
the Swedish Centre and Finnish SK. One can conclude that harmonisation measurements have 
allowed the improvement in the possibility of trading for the constituencies who support agrarian 
parties. This is especially the case as the Common Agricultural Policy remains paramount to 
artificially raising the income of farmers and improving the competitiveness vis-à-vis third world 
imports due to the impact of subsidies. The results for social integration do have an impact on the 
theoretical understanding of Agrarian party behaviour. Both parties have been supportive throughout 
the time period. Given that they are both from member states with strong state welfare support this 
is surprising. Whether the parties support this as it will increase welfare provision or will lead to a 
reduction in support is unclear. This is an area that will need further research in the future. 
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EUROSCEPTIC ETHNO-REGIONALIST PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as 
Eurosceptic: 
 French RPF – towards liberalisation and supranational integration in 1994; towards 
liberalisation, harmonisation, and supranational integration in 1999; towards supranational 
integration, legal integration and cultural integration in 2004; 
 Belgian VB – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards supranational integration 
and cultural integration in 2004; 
 Belgian NVA – towards supranational integration in 2004; 
 Italian SVP – towards supranational integration in 1999; 
 British SNP – towards cultural integration in 1989; towards cultural integration in 1994; and 
towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 2004; 
 British PC – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards supranational integration in 
1999; and towards supranational integration in 2004; 
 British UKIP – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards harmonisation, 
supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1999; and supranational integration 
and legal integration in 2004; 
 Northern Irish DUP – towards liberalisation, supranational integration and cultural 
integration in 1989; towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 1994; 
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towards supranational and cultural integration in 1999; and towards harmonisation, 
supranational integration and legal integration in 2004; 
 Northern Irish UUP – towards harmonisation and supranational integration in 1989; towards 
supranational integration in 1994; towards liberalisation in 1999; and towards harmonisation, 
supranational integration, and legal integration in 2004; 
 Danish FrP – towards supranational integration and foreign policy integration in 1989; and 
towards supranational integration and legal integration in 1994;  
 Danish FB – towards liberalisation, supranational integration, legal integration, and foreign 
policy integration in 1989; towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational integration, 
legal integration and foreign policy integration in 1994; towards harmonisation, supranational 
integration, legal integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration in 1999; 
towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 2004; 
 Danish JB – towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and legal integration in 1994; 
and supranational integration and legal integration in 2004; 
 Spanish PNV – towards supranational integration in 1989;  
 Spanish ERC – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards supranational integration 
in 1994; and towards supranational integration in 1999; 
 Spanish EH – towards supranational integration in 1994; towards liberalisation and cultural 
integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration in 2004; 
 Spanish BNG – towards liberalisation in 1994; and towards liberalisation in 1999; 
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 Spanish EA – towards liberalisation in 2004; 
Examining the regionalist Eurosceptic parties, one can immediately observe that the parties are 
critical of multiple dimensions. This is a very Eurosceptic party family. The majority are hostile 
towards supranational integration and cultural integration, and this demonstrates a clear ideological 
component to their Eurosceptic discourse. Only a small number of parties have criticised 
liberalisation (French RPF in 1994 and 1999; Northern Irish DUP in 1989; Danish FB in 1989 and 
1994; Spanish BNG in 1994 and 1999; and finally the Spanish EA in 2004). It is interesting that few 
of these parties remained Eurosceptic towards liberalisation beyond 1999. Harmonisation, like 
liberalisation saw critical discourses from a small number of regionalist parties (French RPF in 1999; 
British UKIP; Northern Irish DUP in 2004; Northern Irish UUP in 1989 and 2004; Danish FB in 
1994, 1999 and 2004; and finally the Danish JB in 1994). Legal integration also saw criticism from 
only seven out of the seventeen Eurosceptic regionalist parties (French RPF in 2004; British UKIP 
in 2004; Northern Irish DUP in 2004; Northern Irish UUP in 2004; Danish FrP in 1994; Danish FB 
in 1989, 1994, 1999 and 2004; and finally the Danish JB in 1994 and 2004). Lastly, only one 
regionalist party – the Danish FB was Eurosceptic towards foreign policy integration in 1994 and 
1999. As one can see there is significant evidence of parties using similar discourses in each 
European election suggesting this is a reaction to similar political developments and stimuli. 
COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
The thesis argued that Regionalist parties would position themselves positively towards liberalisation, 
supranational, legal, social and cultural integration. The parties would see harmonisation negatively, 
but have no overall position towards foreign policy integration. 
From the results it is possible to observe that none of the parties accurately conformed to the 
predicted positions. However, while it is easy to conclude that regional parties are difficult to group 
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together given the rather heterogeneous makeup of regions in the EU, under close analysis it is 
possible to extract patterns of behaviour across all four elections. 
In 1989 (see table 39), there was clear support across all the regionalist parties under analysis for 
liberalisation as seven parties supported the process and only two were negative – Northern Irish 
DUP (extreme negative) and Danish FB (Strong Negative). For harmonisation, a pattern is more 
difficult to establish as three parties were in support and two parties who were opposed. 
Supranational integration was much clearer, only one party supported the process, while eight were 
negative – Belgian NVA (minor negative); British SNP (minor negative); Northern Irish DUP 
(extreme negative); Northern Irish UUP (extreme negative); Danish FrP (strong negative); Danish 
FB (extreme negative); Spanish PNV (strong negative); and Spanish ERC (extreme negative).  
Positions towards legal and social integration were much more positive. Legal integration saw five 
parties in support and two opposed – Danish FrP (minor negative) and Danish FB (strong negative). 
Social integration saw six parties in support and none opposed. Cultural integration saw similar 
results to harmonisation. It was difficult to see a discernable pattern of behaviour with three parties 
in support and two opposed – British SNP (strong negative); and Northern Irish DUP (extreme 
negative). Finally with foreign policy integration saw five parties in support and only two parties 
opposed – the Danish FrP (extreme negative) and Danish FB (extreme negative). 
By 1994 (see table 39), there was an increasing number of parties who were opposed to liberalisation, 
however nine parties still supported the process, compared to five parties against – French RPF 
(extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Danish FB (strong negative); Spanish EH 
(minor negative); and finally the Spanish BNG (strong negative). Support for harmonisation 
increased slightly with five parties in support, however three parties were still negative - Northern 
Irish DUP (minor negative); Danish FB (strong negative); and finally Danish JB (strong negative). 
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Supranational integration continued to be seen negatively with two parties in support, but thirteen 
opposed – French RPF (extreme negative); Belgian VB (strong negative); British PC (extreme 
negative); British UKIP (extreme negative), Northern Irish DUP (strong negative); Northern Irish 
UUP (extreme negative); Danish FrP (extreme negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB 
(extreme negative); Spanish PNV (minor negative); Spanish ERC (strong negative); Spanish EH 
(strong negative); and Spanish BNG (minor negative). The pattern of support changed considerably 
for legal integration. By 1994, there were five parties in support and eight opposed – French RPF 
(strong negative); Belgian VB (minor negative); British UKIP (minor negative); Northern Irish DUP 
(minor negative); Danish FrP (extreme negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (strong 
negative); and finally Spanish EH (minor negative). Social integration saw the same pattern as in 1989 
– twelve parties in support and none opposed. Cultural integration saw a similar shift in support as 
legal integration, with five parties in support and eight in opposition – Belgian NVA (minor 
negative); British PC (minor negative); British SNP (strong negative); Northern Irish DUP (strong 
negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor negative) Danish FB (minor negative); Danish JB (minor 
negative); and finally Spanish EH (minor negative). The pattern of support became clearer for 
foreign policy integration. Twelve parties were positive, while only two were negative towards the 
process – Danish FB (extreme negative); and finally Danish JB (minor negative). 
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Table 39 – Regional Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1989 Belgian VB Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive No overall Strong Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
 Belgian NVA Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive 
  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
 British SNP Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes No No 
 Northern Irish DUP Extreme Negative No Overall Extreme Negative Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall 
  No No No Yes No No Yes 
 Northern Irish UUP Minor Positive Strong Negative Extreme Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall 
  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
 Danish FrP Extreme Positive Extreme Positive Strong Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative 
  Yes No No No No No No 
 Danish FB Strong Negative Minor Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative 
  No Yes No No No No No 
 Spanish PNV Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
 Spanish ERC Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Negative Strong Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
1994 French RPF Extreme Negative No Overall Extreme Negative Strong Negative No Overall Extreme Positive Minor Positive 
  No No No No No Yes No 
 Belgian VB Minor Positive No Overall Strong Negative Minor Negative Strong Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
 Belgian NVA No Overall No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
 British PC Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes No No Yes Yes No No 
 British SNP Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Minor Positive Strong Negative Strong Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes No No 
 British UKIP Strong Positive Strong Positive Extreme Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall 
  Yes No No No No No Yes 
 Northern Irish DUP Minor Negative Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive 
  No Yes No No Yes No No 
 Northern Irish UUP Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes No No 
 Danish FrP Extreme Positive No Overall Extreme Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall 
  Yes No No No No No Yes 
 Danish FB Strong Negative Strong Negative Extreme Negative Extreme Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Extreme Negative 
  No Yes No No Yes No No 
 Danish JB No Overall Strong Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Negative 
  No Yes No No Yes No No 
 Spanish PNV Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
 Spanish ERC Minor Positive No Overall Strong Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No No No Yes Yes No 
 Spanish EH Minor Negative No Overall Strong Negative Minor Negative Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
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  No No No No Yes No No 
 Spanish BNG Strong Negative No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive 
  No No No Yes No Yes Yes 
(1996) Finnish RKP SFP Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
    Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004
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By the 1999 election (see table 40), the party family became increasingly unclear in terms of its 
adopted patterns of behaviour. Support for liberalisation dropped to five parties with seven parties 
opposed – French RPF (extreme negative); Italian SVP (minor negative); Belgian VB (minor 
negative); Northern Irish UUP (strong negative); Spanish EH (strong negative); Spanish BNG 
(extreme negative); and finally the Finnish RKP SFP (minor negative). The responses to 
harmonisation were equal with five in support and five in opposition - French RPF (strong negative); 
British UKIP (extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor 
negative) and finally the Danish FB (extreme negative). Supranational integration remained stable 
with two parties in support and eleven in opposition – French RPF (strong negative); Italian SVP 
(extreme negative); British PC (extreme negative); British SNP (minor negative); British UKIP 
(extreme negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB 
(minor negative); Spanish ERC (extreme negative); and Spanish BNG (minor negative). Legal 
integration was inconclusive as four parties took positions of support and four took positions of 
opposition – British UKIP (minor negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (minor 
negative); and finally Spanish ERC (minor negative). Social integration remained stable with seven 
parties in support and none against the process. Cultural integration saw support decrease and 
negative discourse amongst parties increase – eight parties were now in opposition compared to 
three for the process. The following parties used negative discourse – Belgian VB (minor negative); 
British SNP (minor negative); British UKIP (minor negative); Northern Irish DUP (extreme 
negative); Northern Irish UUP (minor negative); Danish FB (strong negative); and finally Spanish 
EH (extreme negative). Finally foreign policy integration remained stable in its pattern of behaviour 
with seven parties using positive discourse and only three parties using negative discourse – British 
UKIP (strong negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); and finally Spanish EH (minor negative). 
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Lastly, in the 2004 election (see table 40) only three dimensions offered definitive patterns of 
behaviour for the regionalist party family – liberalisation, supranational integration and social 
integration. Liberalisation saw seven parties in support and two against – Belgian VB (minor 
negative); and Spanish EH (minor negative). Harmonisation saw four parties using positive discourse 
and six using negative discourse – French RPF (minor negative); Belgian VB (minor negative); 
Northern Irish DUP (extreme negative); Northern Irish UUP (strong negative); Danish FB (strong 
negative); and Danish JB (minor negative). Supranational saw fifteen parties against and none for the 
process – French PRF (extreme negative); Italian SVP (minor negative); Belgian VB (extreme 
negative); Belgian NVA (strong negative); British PC (strong negative); British SNP (extreme 
negative); British UKIP (extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (strong negative); Northern Irish 
UUP (extreme negative); Danish FB (extreme negative); Danish JB (extreme negative); Spanish PNV 
(minor negative); Spanish EA (extreme negative); Spanish EH (strong negative); and finally Finnish 
RKP SFP (minor negative). Legal integration was inconclusive with six parties in support and six 
parties against – French RPF (extreme negative); Belgian VB (extreme negative); British UKIP 
(extreme negative); Northern Irish DUP (Strong negative); Danish FB (strong negative); and Danish 
JB (strong negative). Social integration saw seven parties in support and none in opposition. Lastly 
cultural integration was inconclusive with five parties using positive discourse and six using negative 
discourses – French RPF (strong negative); Belgian VB (extreme negative); British PC (minor 
negative); British SNP (strong negative); Northern Irish DUP (minor negative); Danish FB (minor 
negative); and finally Danish JB (minor negative). 
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Table 40 – Regional Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1999 French RPF Extreme Negative Strong Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Strong Positive 
  No Yes No Yes No No No 
 Italian SVP Minor Negative Minor Positive Extreme Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  No No No No Yes Yes No 
 Belgian VB Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive No overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive 
  No No Yes No Yes No No 
 British PC No Overall  Extreme Positive Extreme Negative Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Minor Positive 
  No No No Yes No No No 
 British SNP Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall 
  Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes 
 British UKIP Extreme Positive Extreme Negative Extreme Negative Minor Negative No Overall Minor Negative Strong Negative 
  Yes Yes No No No No No 
 Northern Irish DUP No Overall Minor Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall 
  No Yes No No No No Yes 
 Northern Irish UUP Strong Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Negative No Overall 
  No Yes No No No No Yes 
 Danish FrP Extreme Positive Extreme Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive No Overall No Overall 
  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
 Danish FB No Overall Extreme Negative Extreme Negative Extreme Negative No Overall Strong Negative Extreme Negative 
  No Yes No No No No No 
 Danish JB Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes No No No No No No 
 Spanish ERC Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No No No Yes Yes - 
 Spanish EH Strong Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative Minor Negative 
  No no No No No No No 
 Spanish BNG Extreme Negative No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  No No No Yes Yes Yes No 
 Finnish RKP SFP Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Extreme Positive 
  No No No No Yes No No 
2004 French RPF No Overall Minor negative Extreme Negative Extreme Negative No Overall Strong Negative - 
  No Yes No No No No - 
 Italian SVP Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No No No Yes Yes - 
 Belgian VB Minor Negative Minor Negative Extreme Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Extreme Negative - 
  No Yes No No Yes No - 
 Belgian NVA No Overall No Overall Strong Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive - 
  No No No Yes No Yes - 
 British PC No Overall  Minor Positive Strong Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Negative - 
  No No No No No No - 
 British SNP Minor Positive Strong Positive Extreme Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative - 
  Yes No No Yes Yes No - 
 British UKIP No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall - 
  No No No No No No - 
 Northern Irish DUP Minor Positive Extreme Negative Strong Negative Strong Negative No Overall Minor Negative - 
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  Yes Yes No No No No - 
 Northern Irish UUP Extreme Positive Strong Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes No No No Yes - 
 Danish FB Minor Positive Strong Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative No Overall Minor Negative - 
  Yes Yes No No No No - 
 Danish JB No Overall Minor Negative Extreme Negative Strong Negative No Overall Minor Negative - 
  No Yes No No No No - 
 Spanish PNV Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes No No Yes Yes Yes - 
 Spanish EA No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  No No No Yes Yes No - 
 Spanish EH Minor Negative No Overall Strong Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall - 
  No No No Yes Yes No - 
 Finnish RKP SFP Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative  Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
    Yes No No Yes Yes Yes - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004 
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ETHNO-REGIONALIST BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS 
The „original six‟ parties in the 1989 election only consisted of two cases. However, both were 
positive towards liberalisation, social integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration. 
The only remaining dimension where the parties took opposing positions was supranational 
integration where the Belgian VB took a minor positive position and the Belgian NVA took a minor 
negative position. With the 1973 accession group, parties differed significantly from the previous 
category. All were critical of supranational integration. The dimensions of liberalisation, 
harmonisation, legal, and foreign policy integration saw splits in the positions taken across five 
parties. For social, and cultural integration two of the parties took positions – social integration was 
positive (SNP and UUP) and cultural integration was negative (SNP and DUP). The rest of the 
parties had no overall position. The 1981-1986 accession group was more similar in its behaviour to 
the „original six‟. There was a strong degree of consistency amongst the two cases. Both supported 
liberalisation, legal, social and foreign policy integration. They both criticised supranational 
integration. With the remaining dimensions of harmonisation and cultural integration the Spanish 
PNV took a positive position, while the Spanish ERC had no overall position. 
In the 1994 elections, the „original six‟ parties were less consistent in their behaviour than previously 
observed. All were still supportive of foreign policy integration, and all had no overall position 
towards harmonisation. No pattern of behaviour was observable with liberalisation. With the 
remaining dimensions, two of the parties took similar positions while the other took an opposing 
view on supranational integration and legal integration (French RPF and Belgian VB – negative); 
social integration (Belgian VB and Belgian NVA – positive); and cultural integration (French RPF 
and Belgian VB – positive). In the 1973 accession group, there was some consistency amongst a 
number of the parties on each dimension, but this was limited. All, but the British SNP (no overall 
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position), took negative stances towards supranational integration. The majority of parties took a 
positive position towards social integration and a negative position towards cultural integration, with 
the exceptions of the British UKIP and Danish FrP (no overall position). For liberalisation, there 
were three exceptions to the positive discourse used by the group (Northern Irish DUP and Danish 
FB- negative, and Danish JB – no overall position). For the dimension of harmonisation the parties 
were divided with the British PC, British SNP and British UKIP using positive discourse; the 
Northern Irish DUP, Danish FB and Danish JB using negative discourses; and the remainder having 
no overall position. Foreign policy integration saw the British PC, British SNP, Northern Irish DUP 
and Northern Irish UUP take positive positions; the Danish FB and Danish JB take negative 
positions; and the remainder having no overall position. In the 1981-1986 accession group, there was 
some evidence of consistent behaviour amongst the parties. Supranational integration saw all parties 
use negative discourse and for foreign policy integration all parties used positive discourse. There 
was a split with the positions towards liberalisation with the Spanish PNV and Spanish ERC using 
positive discourse, and the Spanish EH and Spanish BG using negative discourse. Legal integration 
was also split. Lastly with social integration, the majority of the parties used positive discourse, with 
the exception of the Spanish BNG who had no overall position. The 1995 accession group response 
differed remarkably. There was only one case – the Finnish RKP SFP. The party was positive 
towards all dimensions with the exception of cultural integration (no overall position). 
In the 1999 election, the regional parties of the „original six‟ continued the previously observed 
behaviour. The three parties were critical of liberalisation and supportive of foreign policy 
integration. There were two instances where the majority of parties took a similar position – 
supranational integration and social integration. Supranational integration saw the French RPF and 
Italian SVP take negative positions, and social integration saw the Italian SVP and Belgian VB take 
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positive positions. The 1973 accession group saw a real mix of positions with a lack of real 
consistency in the group behaviour towards the dimensions. Supranational integration saw the most 
similar behaviour between the parties where seven out of the eight parties were critical towards 
supranational integration. The Danish FrP was the exception (strong positive). The 1981-1986 
accession group‟s parties also lacked consistent behaviour. Towards liberalisation both the Spanish 
EH and Spanish BNG were critical. Harmonisation saw all three parties have no overall position. 
The Spanish ERC and Spanish BNG took similar positions towards supranational integration 
(negative), social integration (positive) and cultural integration (positive). Lastly, the Finnish RKP 
SFP case in the 1995 accession group saw the party differ considerably from the previous election 
and did not behave in a similar way to parties in other accession groups. It was negative towards 
liberalisation, positive towards harmonisation, social integration and foreign policy integration, but 
had no overall position towards the remaining dimensions. 
Finally in the 2004 elections, the regionalist parties of the „original six‟ showed little consistency in 
behaviour with only supranational integration seeing all parties position themselves negatively. In the 
1973 accession group, all parties criticised supranational integration. The majority of parties 
supported liberalisation, and criticised harmonisation, legal, and cultural integration. In the 1981-
1986 accession group there was more consistent behaviour between the three Spanish cases. All 
parties criticised supranational integration and supported legal and social integration. Finally, the 
single case from the 1995 accession group was more positive than any of the other parties from the 
various accession groups, supporting all, but supranational integration. 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Theoretically, the ethno-regionalist party family has produced some extremely significant behaviour. 
As a whole it is extremely Eurosceptic especially towards the processes of supranational integration 
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and cultural integration. This clearly relates to Ethno-regionalist party ideology. More specifically, as 
theorised by De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002: 489) the weight of empirical evidence shows that 
regionalist parties are hostile to supranational integration throughout the time period, suggesting that 
the party family does indeed see transfers of sovereignty as an amplification of the democratic deficit 
in the EU. However, the weight of empirical evidence also points to the strong support for social 
integration and foreign policy at the EU-level, which indicates the willingness and support EU 
efforts to improve social welfare in the peripheral regions, and in the case foreign policy integration – 
completely contradicting the hypotheses - that this may indicate that for a public good such as 
defence and foreign policy it gives smaller regions the opportunity to contribute and to have a 
standing above their population size and economic might, but fundamentally reduces the costs 
associated with this. 
One must note that the empirical data produced here generally supported much of the theoretical 
work of De Winter and Gomez-Reino (2002: 485-489), but significantly the data contradicted most 
of their findings from the examination of Ray‟s (1999) survey data. They found that on average that 
the regionalist party family was the most pro-European of all party families; when taking all EU 
countries together regionalists were the most homogenous party family; and that the regionalist party 
family had become more pro-European. These findings were not replicated here and have little 
support once the more nuanced data was used (De Winter & Gomez-Reino, 2002: 491). However, 
with their distinction of more nationalist regionalist parties they found that they were less pro-
European than other traditional party families in Belgium, Spain, Italy, UK and Finland. Returning to 
their theoretical work – they put forward the argument that the political space for these parties had 
been growing; that the party family was becoming less homogenous; that the ideological 
cohesiveness was low; and that the transfers of competencies from the national level to a higher level 
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constitutes an amplification of the democratic deficit and distance between decisions and the public. 
In addition, they argued that European integration posed both political and constitutional challenges 
due to the erosion of competencies in policy domains of regional federal states and that member 
states do act as gatekeepers on European policies creating new grievances (De Winter & Gomez-
Reino, 2002: 489). These theoretical concerns of regionalist parties seem to be strongly supported by 
the Euromanifesto data, where the majority of parties were against supranational transfers of 
sovereignty and legal integration. Kincaid Jolly‟s (2007: 124) empirical work was also contradicted by 
the Euromanifesto data. He argued that:  
Unlike other fringe parties in Western Europe, regionalist parties are Europhile. They are 
pro-EU across time and issue area. The existence of this Europhile fringe contradicts the 
expectations of the mainstream versus fringe party theories on support for European 
integration. 
 
Given the number of Eurosceptic regionalist parties identified their assertions are clearly not the case 
and that the regionalist party family does produce a substantial number of Eurosceptic parties. 
Between 1989 and 1999, the pattern of behaviour on the dimension of liberalisation was intriguing. 
As noted above the majority of regionalist parties were supportive towards the process, as had been 
previously hypothesised. However, by 1994 the number of parties against the process had increased 
to five (although the majority were still in support). One can explain this change by the enactment of 
the Maastricht Treaty, which finally removed all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade (with the 
exception of currency exchange) and exposed the regions to the full extent of the internal market. 
This continued in 1999 with support for liberalisation dropping to five parties, with seven opposed. 
However, by 2004 the data suggested that this trend might be reversing. There were still five parties 
against the process and six parties with no overall position, but those parties in support had grown to 
seven. This suggests that regionalist parties may slowly be coming to terms with at least the reality of 
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the single market. Legal integration followed a similar pattern during the 1989 and 1994 elections at 
first the majority of parties were supportive, but post-Maastricht the number of parties against the 
process had increased dramatically – to five parties in support and eight opposed. For the two 
remaining elections of the time period the parties remained divided over the process, though at least 
some of the parties had no overall position. This is unsurprising as while it created a level playing 
field in terms enforcing set standards and the running of the single market, but it increased the 
democratic deficit even further as it was enforcing laws made in the supranational centre rather than 
laws made by peripheral regions. 
The process of harmonisation has proven to be a dimension that has split the party family. 
Throughout the time period the parties were split fairly evenly. However, there remained a significant 
number of parties in each election suggesting for that member state, harmonisation failed to become 
a significant electoral issue. This was especially the case with the Spanish regionalist parties. The bulk 
of the criticism is confined to Northern Irish and Danish regionalist parties, two member states in 
northern Europe and peripheral to the core member states.   
During the period, the hostility towards cultural integration increased dramatically. The European 
election of 1989 was inconclusive for identifying a general pattern amongst the parties, however 
during the 1994 and 1999 elections the hostility towards the process increased dramatically 
suggesting that amongst a large number of regionalist parties were fearful of replacing the nation 
state with a centralising supranational entity and impact of integration on their unique sub-national 
identity. 
Theoretically, the impact of considering whether accession groups saw similar behaviour did not 
illuminate any further patterns of behaviour. In addition, given the peripheral nature of regionalist 
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parties in general it is difficult to derive theoretically significant behaviour from core versus 
peripheral regionalist parties. 
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EUROSCEPTIC NATIONALIST PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as 
Eurosceptic: 
 German REP – towards harmonisation, supranational integration, and cultural integration in 
1989; towards harmonisation and foreign policy integration in 1994; and towards 
harmonisation, supranational integration, cultural integration and foreign policy integration in 
1999;  
 French FN – towards liberalisation and supranational integration in 1994; towards 
liberalisation and cultural integration in 1999; and towards liberalisation, harmonisation and 
supranational integration in 2004; 
 Italian AN – towards supranational integration in 2004; 
 Italian LN – towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards supranational integration 
in 2004; 
 Belgian FN – towards supranational integration and cultural integration in 2004; 
 Danish DF – towards supranational integration in 1999; and towards supranational 
integration in 2004; 
Analysing nationalist parties, one can see that all parties were hostile towards supranational 
integration, with most being critical in the 1999 and 2004 European elections. This again clearly 
relates to the national orientation of their ideology. The German REP and French FN extended their 
critique to present Eurosceptic arguments towards economic integration, cultural integration and 
foreign policy integration. 
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COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis originally hypothesised that Nationalist parties would initially support liberalisation, but 
become increasingly sceptical over time. They would also be likely to be quite critical of 
harmonisation, supranational, legal, social, and cultural integration. Nationalist parties would also be 
likely to be positive to foreign policy integration. 
Taking the 1989 and 1994 elections (see table 41) together (due to a lack of cases, i.e. one case for 
the 1989 elections) the first thing to note is the lack of development in the manifestos. A large 
number of responses showed no overall position towards the individual dimensions. Furthermore 
some of the parties were much more positive than expected – the Italian AN, and also the LN. The 
German REP was negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and cultural 
integration. In 1994 they focused their manifesto being extremely critical of harmonisation and 
foreign policy integration. The French FN focused on different dimensions being strongly negative 
towards liberalisation, extremely negative towards supranational integration and offered minor 
criticisms of cultural integration. The two more positive cases were as follows. The Italian AN 
strongly supported liberalisation, social and foreign policy integration, while offering minor support 
to cultural integration. It was slightly critical of supranational integration. The LN used minor 
negative discourse towards liberalisation, but was positive towards harmonisation and cultural 
integration. It was strongly positive towards supranational, legal and foreign policy integration.  
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Table 41 – Nationalist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1989 German REP Minor Negative Extreme Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall 
  No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
1994 French FN Strong Negative No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall  Minor Negative No Overall 
  No No Yes No No Yes No 
 German REP No Overall  Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall - Extreme Negative 
  No Yes No No No - No 
 Italian AN Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Extreme Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No Yes 
 Italian LN Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive Strong Positive No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive 
    No No No No No No Yes 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-200
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In the 1999 elections (see table 42), there was a mix of positions amongst the parties on the majority 
of the dimensions. Liberalisation saw two parties using negative discourse and three using positive 
discourse, cultural integration saw three parties using positive discourse and two using negative 
discourse. The exception was supranational integration. Four out of the six parties used negative 
discourses with two using extremely negative arguments – the German REP and Danish DF. The 
trend of narrow focused manifestos continued with a large number of instances of no overall 
position. The French FN used extreme negative discourse towards liberalisation and strong negative 
discourse towards foreign policy integration. In addition, it used minor negative criticism towards 
harmonisation, but minor positive discourses towards social and cultural integration.  
The German REP was clearly negative towards more dimensions. The party was extremely negative 
towards harmonisation and supranational integration, strongly negative towards cultural and foreign 
policy integration. Finally they used minor negative criticism towards liberalisation. The Italian AN 
became slightly more critical, though it still used strong positive discourse towards liberalisation and 
minor positive discourse towards social integration. It also used minor criticism towards 
supranational and cultural integration. The Italian LN was still mostly positive with minor positive 
discourse being used towards liberalisation, harmonisation, legal and social integration. It also used 
strong positive discourse towards foreign policy integration, and extremely positive discourse 
towards cultural integration. The Belgian FN only positioned itself on two dimensions – 
supranational and cultural integration – where it used extreme levels of positive discourse. Lastly, the 
Danish DF only positioned itself on three dimensions using strong positive levels of discourse 
towards liberalisation, minor negative levels of discourse towards cultural integration, and extreme 
levels of negative discourse towards supranational integration. 
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Table 42 - Nationalist Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1999 French FN Extreme Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative 
  Yes Yes No No No No No 
 German REP Minor Negative Extreme Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall Strong Negative Strong Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No 
 Italian AN Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative No Overall 
  No No Yes No No Yes No 
 Italian LN Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Strong Positive 
  No No Yes No No No No 
 Belgian FN No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall 
  No No No No No No No 
 Danish DF Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Minor Negative 
  Yes No Yes No No No No 
2004 French FN Extreme Negative Strong Negative Extreme Negative Minor Negative No Overall  Strong Positive - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No - 
 Italian AN No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative Strong Positive No Overall Extreme Positive - 
  No No Yes No No No - 
 Italian LN Minor Negative Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes Yes Yes No No - 
 Belgian FN Minor Positive No Overall Strong Negative No Overall No Overall Extreme Negative - 
  No No Yes No No Yes - 
 Danish DF Minor Negative No Overall Extreme Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall - 
  Yes No Yes Yes No No - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1989-2004 
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In the 2004 European elections (see table 42), the same pattern was identifiable from previous 
elections. On a number of dimensions there was a mix of positive and negative positions on 
liberalisation, legal and cultural integration. Social integration only saw those parties that positioned 
themselves on this dimension did so positively. The party responses towards supranational 
integration were similar to the 1999 election results and were mostly strong to extremely negative. 
The French FN used minor negative discourse towards legal integration, strong negative discourse 
towards harmonisation, and extremely negative discourse towards liberalisation and supranational 
integration. In addition, it used strong positive discourse towards cultural integration. The Italian AN 
used extreme negative discourse towards supranational integration, strong positive discourse towards 
legal integration and extreme positive discourse towards cultural integration. The Italian LN‟s 
positions shifted completely with minor negative discourse being used towards liberalisation, 
harmonisation and legal integration. Strong negative discourse was used towards supranational 
integration, but minor positive discourse was used social and cultural integration. The Belgian FN 
was strongly to extremely critical of supranational and cultural integration, but was shown to offer 
minor support to liberalisation. The Danish DF used minor negative discourse towards liberalisation 
and legal integration, but was extremely critical towards supranational integration.  
NATIONALIST PARTIES BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN THE ACCESSION GROUPS 
In the 1989 election across all accession groups only one manifesto was available for analysis. The 
German REP was negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational and cultural 
integration. In particular it was extremely negative towards harmonisation, supranational and cultural 
integration. With the remaining dimensions of legal, social and foreign policy integration the party 
took no overall position.  
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In the 1994 elections, the „original six‟ accession group showed very little uniformity in its behaviour. 
Liberalisation saw both the French FN and Italian LN take negative positions. The Italian AN took a 
strong positive position and the German REP had no overall position. This behaviour was very 
similar to that observed for supranational integration. Across all the dimensions there is at least one 
case of a party taking no overall position – with legal integration (Italian LN – strong positive) and 
social integration (Italian AN – extreme positive) only one party took a position with the remainder 
having no overall position. 
In the 1999 elections, the „original six‟ accession group again saw very little uniformity in the 
behaviour of parties across the dimensions. The only possible exception to this was the three parties 
who positioned themselves negatively towards supranational integration, although all used the 
discourse to massively varying degrees. With the dimensions of liberalisation, harmonisation, cultural 
integration and foreign policy integration support is „fairly‟ evenly divided between negative support, 
no overall position and positive support. The 1973 accession group only had one nationalist party 
with manifestos available – the Danish DF. In this election it did not develop many positions 
towards the dimensions – being strongly positive towards liberalisation, extremely negative towards 
supranational integration and using minor negative discourse towards foreign policy integration. It 
had no overall position towards the remaining dimensions.  
In the 2004 elections, the “original six” accession group saw a slight increase in the uniformity of the 
behaviour of nationalist parties. All parties were negative towards supranational integration, and 
three out of four parties (the Belgian FN was the exception) were positive towards cultural 
integration.  Social integration only saw the Italian LN take a position (minor positive); with 
liberalisation, harmonisation and legal integration seeing the parties „fairly‟ evenly divided between 
negative support, no overall position and positive support. The 1973 accession group party – the 
 307 
Danish DF still had a manifesto lacking development towards the dimensions of harmonisation, 
social and cultural integration. It shifted its support towards liberalisation using minor negative 
discourse, and was extremely negative towards supranational and legal integration, taking similar 
positions to the French FN and Italian LN on the relevant dimensions.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The results show that only liberalisation and supranational integration had significant number of 
confirmed positive returns, with most dimensions seeing a partial confirmation. Although the 
positions did not completely conform to the predictions for all parties, the behaviour of parties in 
the 1989 and 1994 European elections was broadly in line with existing theoretical understandings of 
nationalist party behaviour. Focusing on the behaviour of the Italian AN, at first one could argue 
that its strongly positive support for liberalisation, social and foreign policy integration and minor 
support for cultural integration suggests an exception, an outlier or a case which could question 
previously held assumptions. However, Mudde (2007: 168-169) has already noted that parties have 
accepted a free trade area, though with strict controls on imports from outside, as well as a few 
parties calling a social Europe, and some calling for a Europe to be independent of NATO. Even the 
minor support for cultural integration, has previously been observed in that parties have treated 
Europe in an almost mythical fashion. Neither can the Italian LN‟s behaviour be taken as another 
outlier between 1994 and 1999 when it was supportive of most processes of European integration 
and in 2004 became much more sceptic towards most processes of integration – with the exception 
of social and cultural integration. This has been explored elsewhere (see Quaglia, 2003) and can be 
explained by the LN secessionist claims for the north of Italy first being helped by regional policies 
being developed in the EU, and then post-EMU hampering its aims. 
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Examining the remaining results one can note the extreme heterogeneity of the family and that with 
the possible exceptions of liberalisation (as of 2004), supranational integration and cultural 
integration, party positions towards aspects of integration remain grounded in national contextual 
factors. This is evidenced by the lack of uniformity across the parties and over the time period. 
However, theoretically one can support the conclusion that parties remain wedded to the concept of 
national sovereignty and are extremely hostile to transfers of sovereignty to the European Union. Yet 
they remain taken with the vision of Europe in a cultural sense and this is somewhat surprising given 
how nationalist parties are grounded in the nation state. 
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EUROSCEPTIC GREEN PARTIES: 
The analysis of the results was able to identify that the following parties could be classified as 
Eurosceptic: 
 Belgian AGALEV – towards liberalisation and foreign policy integration in 1989; 
 German Greens – towards supranational integration in 1994; 
 British Green Party – towards supranational integration in 1989; towards liberalisation and 
supranational integration in 1994; and finally towards harmonisation, supranational 
integration and social integration in 1999. 
 Swedish Greens – towards harmonisation, supranational integration and foreign policy 
integration in 1995; and towards supranational integration in 2004; 
As one can observe that there are Eurosceptic Green parties across the accession groups and 
amongst both core and peripheral members. However, post-1994 it is only those peripheral member 
states that have continued to see Eurosceptic behaviour. Interestingly, the few Green parties, which 
could be considered Eurosceptic, did not necessarily share similar criticisms.  Three of the parties – 
the German Greens, the British Greens and the Swedish Greens were critical towards supranational 
integration. Two of the parties were critical towards liberalisation – the Belgian AGALEV and 
British Green party. In addition, the Belgian AGALEV and Swedish Greens were critical of foreign 
policy. However, these were not necessarily during the same election campaign and hence would 
almost certainly been reactions to different political stimuli.  
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COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS 
This thesis had hypothesized that the Green parties would exhibit negative discourse towards all 
dimensions, with the exception of social integration (where the Greens would have no overall 
position). During the 1989 European elections (see table 43), the Green parties that took part did not 
fit the predictions particularly well. Indeed they adopted much more positive discourse in addressing 
the underlying issues represented by the integration dimensions.  
There was still a pattern of negative discourse towards liberalization across all but the Belgian E.F. 
Ecologists (who adopted a minor positive position). None of the parties engaged with the issue of 
harmonisation. The surprising results were the positions towards supranational integration (the 
Luxembourg Greens saw supranational integration extremely positively and the Belgian AGALEV 
who used minor positive discourse); towards social integration (all but the Luxembourg Greens 
adopted a position – demonstrating minor to strong positive support); and foreign policy integration 
– where three parties adopted minor positive support (German Greens, Belgian E.F. Ecologists and 
the British Greens).   
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Table 43 - Green Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1989-1994: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
         
1989 German Greens Minor Negative No Overall Minor Negative No overall Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No Yes No 
 Luxembourg Greens Minor Negative  No Overall Extreme Positive No Overall No Overall No Overall No Overall 
  Yes No No No Yes No No 
 Belgian E.F.  Minor Positive  No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
 Ecologists No No Yes No No Yes No 
 Belgian AGALEV Strong Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Strong Negative 
  Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
1994 German Greens Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No No 
 Luxembourg Greens Minor Negative  Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes No No No No No 
 Dutch GL Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  Yes No No Yes No No No 
 Belgian E.F.  Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
 Ecologists Yes Yes No No No Yes No 
 Belgian AGALEV Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative 
  Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes 
 British Greens Strong Negative Minor Negative Extreme Negative No Overall Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
(1995) Swedish Greens Minor Negative Extreme Negative Extreme Negative No Overall No Overall Minor Negative Strong Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
(1996) Finnish VL Greens No Overall Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  No Yes Yes No No No No 
(1996) Austrian GA Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
    Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004
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The results were surprising as certainly during the 1980s the EC was seen as promoting a neo-liberal 
agenda – it was moving quickly towards the realization of the single market project and a key 
architect of this was the European Commission. In addition for Greens to show support towards 
social and foreign policy integration was also interesting as many of the parties were still very much 
single issue (hence the surprise of developing a discourse towards social policy) and very much peace 
promoting. 
During the 199437 European elections (see table 43), the only party to closely follow the pattern of 
behaviour established in the theoretical chapter and hypotheses was the Swedish Greens. The party 
showed minor to extreme negative discourse towards liberalisation, harmonisation, supranational, 
cultural and foreign policy integration. 1 The Swedish Green party has previously been identified as a 
protest based Eurosceptic party (see Taggart, 1998: 368) so the fact that it met all the hypothesised 
positions is of little surprise. Interestingly, Bomberg (2002: 33) noted that Swedish Greens, were 
wary of supranational integration in the form of a “superstate”, but were supportive of co-operation 
traditional green issue areas. It was possible to observe developing patterns across all of the Green 
parties – the continued rejection of economic liberalisation, the developing support for social 
integration and the growing support for foreign policy integration. The parties were mostly negative 
towards economic harmonisation and for supranational integration there was a cluster of minor 
support by the Luxembourg, Dutch and Belgian Green parties. Finally, with legal integration support 
fluctuated and a pattern of behaviour is difficult to identify. However support could be found 
amongst the German Greens, Luxembourg Greens, Belgian E.F. Ecologists, the Finnish VL Greens 
and Austrian GA. 
                                                 
37 It was acknowledged that the new member states had elections later in the electoral term, but for the purpose of the study they were included in with 
the positions towards the 1994 European elections. 
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In the 1999 European election (see table 44) none of the Green parties fitted the pattern of 
behaviour established in the theoretical chapter. Indeed, 1999 saw substantial changes to the 
observable positions across the party family. There was the start of a visible reorientation with the 
dimension of economic liberalisation. While there is an obvious continuation of criticism towards the 
dimension, the Luxembourg Greens, Dutch GL and the Swedish Greens have shifted towards 
espousing minor to strong levels of positive discourse. Patterns of support towards legal, social and 
foreign policy integration have become established. With the exception of two parties who adopted 
no overall position (the Belgian AGALEV and Finnish VL Greens) all of the parties demonstrated 
minor positive support. The British Greens were the only party to strongly critique social integration, 
the remainder offered minor to strong positive support (the Swedish Greens had no overall 
position). 
With the exception of three parties – the Belgian AGALEV, Irish Greens and Swedish Greens (who 
demonstrated minor negative criticism) – the remaining parties showed minor to strong positive 
support towards foreign policy integration. Supranational integration saw four parties support the 
process, however the only continuity from the previous election was by the Luxembourg Greens and 
Dutch GL and therefore a pattern is difficult to discern. This is very similar to economic 
harmonisation. Two parties supported the processes – the German Greens, and Belgian E.F. 
Ecologists, three parties adopted no overall position and five parties showed minor to strong 
negative discourse (Dutch GL, Belgian AGALEV, British Greens, Irish Greens, and Austrian GA). 
Finally in 2004 (see table 44), it waspossible to observe the continuation of the reorientation in 
positions towards liberalisation. Seven parties now supported the process – German Greens, 
Luxembourg Greens, GL, E.F. Ecologists, Belgian AGALEV, and the Swedish Greens. There was 
clear support amongst the original members by this stage, and a clear rejection by parties from the 
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1973 entrants, but this pattern of behaviour amongst other accession groups did not continue. 
Neither was it possible to observe behavioural patterns consistent with core and peripheral members. 
Economic harmonisation remained a dimension of less importance to Green parties – seven parties 
demonstrated no overall position. One party supported the process (Dutch GL) and three parties 
criticised it (Swedish Greens, Finnish VL Greens and Austrian GA. Like with liberalisation, 
supranational integration has seen support grow, though there was not a discernable reorientation of 
the entire party family. Seven parties demonstrated minor to extreme positive positions (Dutch GL, 
Belgian E.F. Ecologists, Belgian AGALEV, Irish Greens, Finnish VL Greens, and the Austrian GA). 
Support for legal and social integration continued in a similar pattern to that of previous elections. 
Finally, with cultural integration sporadic support amongst Green parties continued in a similar 
fashion to previous elections. The German Greens, the Luxembourg Greens, Dutch GL, Finnish VL 
Greens and Austrian GA all demonstrated minor support, whereas the two Belgian Green parties, 
and the British Greens all demonstrated minor to strong levels of negative discourse. 
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Table 44: Green Party Positions and Confirmation/Rejection of Hypotheses 1999-2004: 
    Forms of Integration     
Year Party Economic  Economic  Supranational Legal  Social  Cultural Foreign Policy  
    Liberalisation Harmonisation  Integration Integration Integration  Integration Integration 
1999 German Greens Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes No Yes No No No No 
 Luxembourg  Minor Positive No overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
 Greens No No No No No No No 
 Dutch GL Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive 
  No Yes No No No No No 
 Belgian E.F.  Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Strong Positive Minor Negative Minor Positive 
 Ecologists Yes No No No No Yes No 
 Belgian AGALEV Minor Negative Minor Negative Strong Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative 
  Yes Yes No No No No Yes 
 British Greens Minor Negative Strong Negative Strong Negative Minor Positive Strong Negative No Overall Minor Positive 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
 Irish Greens Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative 
  Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 
 Swedish Greens Strong Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Positive No Overall Minor Negative Minor Negative 
  No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 Finnish VL Greens Minor Negative No Overall No Overall No Overall Strong Positive No Overall Strong Positive 
  Yes No No No No No No 
 Austrian GA Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Strong Positive 
  Yes Yes No No No No No 
2004 German Greens Minor Positive No overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  No No Yes No No No - 
 Luxembourg  Minor Positive No overall Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
 Greens No No Yes No No No - 
 Dutch GL Minor Positive Minor Positive Extreme Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  No No No No No No - 
 Belgian E.F.  Minor Positive  No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative - 
 Ecologists No No No No No Yes - 
 Belgian AGALEV Minor Positive No Overall Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Negative - 
  No No No No No Yes - 
 British Greens Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Negative No Overall Minor Positive Minor Negative - 
  Yes Yes Yes No No Yes - 
 Irish Greens Minor Negative No Overall Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive No Overall - 
  Yes No No No No No - 
 Swedish Greens Minor Positive Minor Negative Strong Negative Minor Negative No Overall No Overall - 
  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No - 
 Finnish VL Greens Minor Negative Minor Negative Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes No No No No - 
 Austrian GA Minor Negative Minor Negative Strong Positive Strong Positive Minor Positive Minor Positive - 
  Yes Yes No No No No - 
Source: Euromanifestos Dataset 1979-2004
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GREEN PARTY BEHAVIOURAL PATTERNS IN ACCESSION GROUPS 
Separating Green parties into their accession groups does not immediately throw up clear 
identifiable patterns of behaviour. No parties fulfilled the hypotheses in the group of „original 
six‟. In 1989, three out of the four parties used negative liberalisation (the Belgian E.F. Ecologists 
were the exception). All the parties had no overall position towards harmonisation with the 
remainder of dimensions seeing very fragmented and heterogeneous positions – supranational 
integration saw two parties supportive of the process (Luxembourg Greens and Belgian 
AGALEV) and two against (German Greens and E.F. Ecologists). Amongst the 1973 entrants, 
the analysis suffers from too few cases – the only party was the British Greens in 1989. At this 
point in the time series, the behaviour was extremely similar to that of the previous group; 
however the party was much more negative towards supranational integration. 
In 1994, there were clearer patterns of behaviour towards four dimensions. All parties used 
minor negative discourse towards liberalisation. Four out of five parties used minor positive 
discourse towards supranational integration (the exception was the German Greens). All parties 
supported social integration and finally four out of five parties supported foreign policy 
integration (the exception was Belgian AGALEV). The 1973 group still had only one Green party 
during the 1994 elections and again its behaviour was fairly consistent with that of the original 
six, but was altogether more negative towards the first three dimensions – liberalisation, 
harmonisation and supranational integration. In the 1995 accession group, the three parties – 
Swedish Greens, Finnish VL Greens, and Austrian GA – were, like the 1973 accession group, 
strongly negative towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration (the 
exception was the Finnish VL Greens towards liberalisation – no overall position). Two of three 
parties were positive towards legal, social and foreign policy integration. 
By 1999, the behaviour was fragmented towards liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational 
integration. The majority of parties were supportive of legal and foreign policy integration, and all 
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parties supported social integration. In the 1973 accession group, the behaviour by the British 
and Irish Greens was more homogenous and more negative. Both were negative towards 
liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. Both were positive towards legal 
integration and both demonstrated no overall position towards cultural integration. The 
remaining dimensions showed no clear pattern. In the 1995 accession group, the positions were 
much more fragmented. Two of the parties clearly remained negative towards liberalisation, but 
positive towards social and foreign policy integration (Finnish VL Greens and Austrian GA). In 
addition, the Swedish Greens and Austrian GA also supported legal integration. 
Finally, in 2004 the results for the original six were more homogenous. All parties supported 
liberalisation, legal, and social integration. The majority of parties from the group also supported 
supranational and cultural integration. The British and Irish Greens from the 1973 accession 
group remained negative towards liberalisation, but were positive towards social integration. On 
the remaining dimensions no clear pattern of behaviour emerged. The 1995 group clearly 
remained sceptical of some of the dimensions, unlike the original six. Two of the parties were 
critical of liberalisation and all were critical of harmonisation. With the remainder of the 
dimensions the majority of parties were supportive.  
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results demonstrate important theoretical implications for the understanding of Green party 
behaviour towards the processes of European integration. It was clear at first that the process of 
liberalisation did indeed represent the potential for the promotion of market structuring which 
would allow uncontrollable growth and unchecked this could endanger political movements that 
aimed to ensure environmental negative externalities of industrial development and activity be 
taken into account. Between 1989 and 1994 there was a continuous pattern of criticism towards 
the process. This continued amongst Green parties in the 1973, 1995 and 2004 accession groups. 
However, amongst the original six member states, their Green parties, by 2004, had accepted the 
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process and all used minor positive discourse in their manifestos. As noted in the hypotheses 
chapter, there was the potential for integration to allow for capitalism to be regulated and the 
market to be governed at a much greater scale than a purely national level would allow. Greens 
also would have seen the potential to provide structures to promote ecological balance as key 
policy goal.  
While there was a discernible shift in behaviour with the dimension of liberalisation, Green 
parties did not significantly alter their behaviour towards economic harmonisation. In 1989, it 
was of little interest, but by 1994, with the exception of two parties, the remainder rejected the 
process. This remained the case during the 1999 and 2004 elections, though for some it was of 
little significance. Theoretically one can posit that EMU and more generally harmonisation 
policies have done little, if anything, to encourage the use of local produce, local goods and 
services, and what harmonisation makes easier is the transport of goods across Europe which is 
so at odds with the aims to decrease carbon emissions. This can bring the question that if this is 
the case, then why has there been an observable shift towards minor support towards 
liberalisation? EMU and its one-size fit all monetary policy will generally be altered on the basis 
of core economies, with a detrimental effect towards the peripheries. If the businesses of the 
peripheral regions cannot compete, then surely it will become a net importer – totally at odds 
with encouraging an ecological balance. 
The observations noted a general increase in the support for supranational integration, though a 
few parties did remain critical throughout the period. Initially however, the majority of the Green 
parties did not support the process of further transfers of sovereignty to Brussels. This behaviour 
initially does seem to fit with the argument in the hypotheses chapter that are fearful of both a 
„super-state‟ developing and a further distancing from the citizens of the Union (see Freeden, 
1996:540-542; Bomberg, 1998:2). Furthermore, with the observable shift it supports the second 
argument in the hypotheses chapter that Green parties may well see supranational integration as a 
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potential source of directives and legislation, which may allow the overcoming of the collective 
action problem.  
A clear line of behaviour was observable with legal integration and this did contradict the 
arguments posited by the hypotheses chapter. Initially it was theorized that legal integration 
would be seen as a threat as it is essentially imposed from the supranational body to national 
political structures, as well as regional bodies. However, legal integration also provides 
opportunities for Green action as EU law constructed in the first pillar regulates the single 
market and this provides opportunities for laws and directives that can force or encourage 
member states to take account of the environmental impact of the economy. 
Also noted in the comparative observations was the large-scale support towards social integration 
across all the elections. The hypotheses chapter noted that Green movements could indeed 
contain socialist elements (Freeden, 1996: 526). This in one respect can be interpreted as Green 
parties attempting to broaden their appeal by espousing elements of socialist ideology, and on the 
other supporting attempts to mitigate the externalities which will clearly exist between regions of 
the EU despite the move towards more regulated capitalism. As stated in the hypotheses, it was 
expected that due to social policies being mostly directed at the populations of Europe, rather 
than having a wider scope which would help alleviate poverty in the third-world, this would lead 
to critical discourses. This has not been the case. However, the EU is a large donor of aid to the 
third-world, though this was not reflected in the content analysis. 
Cultural integration was difficult to analyse, as the pattern is not completely homogenous 
amongst the party family, the accession groups within the party family, and also the 
core/peripheral relationship within the party family. Initially it was hypothesised that Greens may 
well view the EU as neither European nor a Community and should not be exclusive (Bomberg, 
1998:62). Yet there are a clear number of parties, which have supported cultural integration. Pro-
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cultural integration was constructed on the basis of the following variables: National way of life: 
Negative; Immigration: Positive (European level); and European Way of Life: Positive. 
Therefore, the extensive use of minor positive discourse is somewhat of a surprise and needs 
further research. One can put forward an explanation that any policy which promotes a view 
beyond the national, which fosters a spirit of co-operation, and distances citizens from nationalist 
rivalries, can further help the cause of Green and Ecological movements. 
Finally, foreign policy integration saw extensive use of positive discourse across all Green 
political parties and across the three elections38. This has significant implications for the 
theoretical understanding of the behaviour of Green parties. Previously this thesis argued that 
traditionally Green/ecological parties have been opposed to military expenditure and action 
(Poguntke, 1993:10). However, this result could be seen as surprising. However, returning to how 
the positive aspects of the dimension were constructed using the following variables: Foreign 
Special Relationships: Positive (European-level), Military: Positive (European-level), Peace 
(European-level), Anti-Imperialism (European-level), Internationalism: Positive (European-level), 
one can see that the Green parties may well support all of these variables, bar the creation of a 
military level at the EU-level. Certainly build up of the EU as a soft power and distancing of the 
EU from the Cold War institutions of NATO could be seen as positive in the eyes of Green 
parties. This is something, which needs further research. 
                                                 
38 Unfortunately, this was not coded as part of the 2004 set of data for the Euromanifestos Project and hence has 
had to be treated as missing. 
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SUMMARY 
The overall argument of the thesis has been that in order to understand party positions towards 
European integration, a much more dynamic, as well as nuanced definition and framework was 
needed in order to fully understand the way in which the process has developed and how parties 
compete towards the issue. Furthermore, on the issue of how parties compete towards European 
integration, it is strongly influenced by the ideological predispositions of political parties, seen 
through the party family lens. As stated earlier ideology is historically grounded, but significantly 
it is not a fixed entity. Essentially party ideology is not a tether, and not a straightjacket in forcing 
political parties to take certain policy decisions, but provides a framework for how to parties 
should respond to developments. 
The results in this chapter strongly highlighted the impact of ideology on party positions towards 
European integration, and especially with respect to the positions taken by Eurosceptic political 
parties. As such there were aspects of ideological impact in the positions of all party families.  
The framework underlined the argument that parties interpret Euroscepticism in terms of 
multiple processes and structure their responses based on a nuanced understanding of European 
integration. The definition identified a much larger set of Eurosceptic parties within each party 
family. However, when generalising about the entire party family, rather than a Eurosceptic 
subset, patterns of behaviour seem to be more easily discernible amongst the left wing parties 
than right wing. This is not say that the individual party families on the left were homogeneous, 
but the right appeared more fragmented, and the Agrarian party family suffered from a lack of 
available cases.  
Beyond this, the chapter has pulled out important behavioural aspects that were previously 
under-researched. With the Liberals, despite being generally seen as fairly pro-European as a 
party family, the evidence gathered does suggest that this is not necessarily always the case. With 
such a broad nature to its party ideology, integration developments were undoubtedly going to 
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impinge on traditional Liberal positions to issues – hence the identification of five Eurosceptic 
Liberal parties during the time-scale. The economic-liberal element remained strong throughout 
the period, with harmonisation also becoming strongly supported. Despite the existence of 
Liberal-Conservative parties, most parties became broadly supportive towards social integration, 
as well as supranational integration. Interestingly cultural integration never really became a salient 
issue for the Liberals. Foreign policy was popular for all Liberal parties (with only a small number 
of exceptions). Importantly the Liberal-Radical and Liberal-Conservative distinctions became less 
obvious over time and by 2004 the majority were supportive of all but cultural integration.   
The results for Conservative parties demonstrate the scepticism predicted towards the newer 
dimensions of integration – social, cultural and foreign policy was ill-founded. On the whole 
Conservative parties were supportive of the process. However, the party family clearly views the 
national arena as the most appropriate policy domain given the levels of negative discourse 
towards supranational integration, and one can therefore extrapolate that while they are broadly 
supportive of other measures, these should be achieved through intergovernmental co-operation 
rather than supranational policy transfers to the European Union. The one case that stands out, 
of course, is the British Conservatives who have become very sceptical towards integration 
beyond the economic sphere despite earlier support. However, this party is very much the case of 
British exceptionalism and is an example of the exception rather than the rule when considering 
broad party family trends. 
Given the size of the Socialist and Social Democratic party family, to have only six Eurosceptic 
parties identified during the fifteen year period indicates the decreasing salience of Eurosceptic 
discourses for the party family. The results found a high level of conformity between the 
observed positions and the hypotheses providing very strong indication that ideology does have 
predictive power in this case. However, the expected shift in the positions of Socialist and Social 
Democratic party support for European integration took place much earlier and hence there was 
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little evidence of this from 1989 onwards. It was for the most part a supportive party family, 
hence the provisos in the hypotheses turned out to be unnecessary and incorrect. Theoretically, 
the results confirm previous academic explanations indicating that the shift in support has seen 
Socialist and Social Democratic parties make use of Europe as an agent of change in their own 
countries. Given the lack of opportunity to achieve social democratic goals at the national level, 
given the impact of domestic pressure groups, business organisations and the potential for the 
exit of foreign direct investment, straying too far from the path of a liberalised market/lightly 
mixed economy, social democratic parties have shifted their work to the supranational level in an 
attempt to soften the impact of the market. This is clearly supported by the evidence of the 
positive discourses used towards social integration and for the most part liberalisation and 
supranational integration. 
One cannot discount the pro-European nature of the Christian Democrats, given that they have 
been a driving force behind the European integration project. Johansson (2002: 880-887) 
identified several ideological traits, which were present in the European People‟s Party (the EP 
group which mainly consists of Centre-Right parties – especially the Christian Democrats). They 
emphasised integration along federal lines, as well as the Christian vision of man. This formed the 
basis for concepts such as subsidiarity, personalism, and the social market. He also noted that 
before the Maastricht Treaty the EPP called for a federal constitution, commitments to a strong 
single currency, institutional adaptation – including the power of co-decision, the reinforcement 
of executive power and the political role for the Commission. In addition, social policy was seen 
as the most important for the heads of the EPP. None of the results contradict these ideological 
traits, but one can argue that developments in supranational and cultural integration have seen 
critical reactions from some of the most pro-European parties. 
Fundamentally, the results showed that (post)-Communists in general have rejected the major 
processes of European integration, with only a handful that have reacted more positively – 
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though the use of positive discourse amongst these has been extremely limited to the very few 
post-Communist parties which were identifiable  (the Italian PDS and Spanish IU). There 
appears to be a consistent left-wing critique to the classic dimensions of integration – 
liberalisation, harmonisation and supranational integration. However, the really significant 
findings to come out of the study is that the far left have not completely rejected the utilisation of 
European structures, and hence Eurosceptic discourse does not extend to the dimensions of 
social policy integration and foreign policy integration, though very different explanations can be 
posited for this – the mitigation of negative externalities of the internal market, which cannot 
necessarily be achieved at the national level; and the latter to promote defence structures away 
from American domination.  
The number of Western Europe Agrarian parties, which have had available European manifestos, 
was incredibly small, but on a whole the party family has few members. Both parties were 
Eurosceptic during the period and this appears to be as a result of ideological responses derived 
from the centre-periphery cleavage – for both harmonisation and supranational integration. 
There appeared to be considerable discomfort for the transfers of sovereignty away from nation 
states, this is despite the growth in the involvement of regions in policy-making – the growth in 
the Committee of the Regions and subsidiarity rules. However, the levels did reduce and indeed 
the SK re-orientated itself. The two surprising results were the lack of engagement with cultural 
discourses, as one would have expected rural parties to be critical of any impact on their cultural 
distinctiveness, and also the level of acceptance of economic liberalisation, which has exposed 
their constituencies to further competition and potential erosion of success in certain markets, 
though it also opens up access to new markets. This may have been because of the need to widen 
their appeal, as Batory and Sitter, 2004: 523-527) suggested, but there appeared to be no 
encroachment on the ideological territory of the extreme nationalist right. 
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Ethno-regionalist party ideology has been impacted on by two historical cleavage structures – the 
centre-periphery cleavage and urban-rural cleavage. Despite parties being derived from these two 
social conflicts, they have produced a wide variety of ideological responses and hence the party 
family is quite heterogeneous. As such the hypotheses proved to be ineffective in predicting party 
responses to the various processes of European integration. However, the study has illuminated 
the way in which regionalist parties respond to the supranational level, and it is clear that despite 
previous academic findings, it is a highly Eurosceptic party family, with a particular fear of 
transfers of sovereignty as well as legal provisions. What this tells the observer is that despite an 
increase in the potential for these parties to engage in policy making and subverting the 
traditional national barriers, it is still seen critically. However, regionalist parties as a group appear 
to be somewhat pragmatic and have demonstrated that social and foreign policy integration does 
appeal, suggesting that these peripheral regions see the opportunity that these integration areas 
provide. The fascinating result however was the clear debate surrounding the impact of 
liberalisation on these peripheral regions. Support fell over the period from post-Maastricht until 
this was reversed in the 2004 election, indicating the removal of non-tariff barriers was feared 
due to the potential to open up these more fragile regional economies to a more extensive free-
market regime, though it appears that many came to accept this process later on. 
One can see that the results were derived from a small sample of Western European nationalist 
parties. However, all nationalist parties during the period were Eurosceptic during the period, 
with all being critical of supranational integration. However, only the German REP and French 
FN extended this to further dimensions such as economic, cultural and foreign policy integration. 
The treatment of European integration by nationalist parties remains quite heterogeneous despite 
the more nuanced examination of the integration process. However, one can clearly see that 
nationalist parties remain wedded to the superiority of the nation state in terms of sovereignty as 
well as legally when this was threatened by the Constitutional debates during the early 2000s and 
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towards the run up to the 2004 European elections. The traditional toolkit of the nationalist party 
appeared to be used less. Two of Stöss‟s (1991 in Ramet, 1999: 6) four characteristics – that of 
exaggerated nationalism with hostile attitudes towards other states and/or peoples; and folk-
ethnocentric element appeared less obvious in the majority of nationalist parties. The potential 
for Europe to be treated in an almost mythical fashion appeared plausible from its treatment by 
the Belgian FN, Italian AN, and Italian LN39, but nonetheless the results have been very 
surprising. Furthermore, across the time period, the number of no overall positions suggested the 
focus of the election campaign concentrated on other issues to a greater extent than other parties 
(see chapter four for the mean average utilisation of various policy discourses). 
Finally, the results and theoretical discussion have shown that the Green party family underwent 
considerable discussion and reorientation towards European integration. However, the patterns 
of policy shift did differ from dimension to dimension. There was only limited evidence of 
behaviour in European elections conforming to previously established and hypothesised 
positions. Essentially, far from embracing European integration, the party family has taken a 
pragmatic approach to the integration process and have adapted their positions in order to 
maximise the opportunities available at the European level. This has been particularly evident 
with the economic integration process.  Liberalisation for the Green parties of the original six 
was seen more positively by the 2004 elections; however the pattern of behaviour across the 
accession groups for economic harmonisation did not significantly change across the time period. 
In addition the Greens shifted from viewing supranational developments critically to seeing the 
potential for Green directives and legislation beyond the nation state. The support for Legal 
integration was also understandable as it provided for the enforcement of Green standards and 
legislation. 
 
                                                 
39
 Although one can justifiably argue that the Lega Nord can be seen as a regionalist party. 
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CONCLUSION 
In addressing the research question of how do parties use Eurosceptic arguments in European 
election campaigns, the thesis contributed to the existing literature, by arguing that the 
Euroscepticism and indeed the entire European integration process needed to be understood as a 
more dynamic and nuanced. In addition, in order to understand the way in which parties 
compete on the issue of integration, a multi-dimensional framework was needed which would 
allow the subtle, and also the more obvious variations in party positions to be understood.  
It argued that ideology remained the strongest causal factor in structuring party responses. 
However, party ideology was not to be seen as a straightjacket, or historically fixed, but more of 
an evolving entity which allowed parties to adapt their positions towards the individual processes. 
The unit of analysis put forward here was that of the party family. This was due to their broader 
nature and their ability to take account of party evolution.  This was a more appropriate choice 
than that of cleavage structures, which were seen as much more of fixed historical entity, and the 
left-right dimension to which the thesis questioned the continued relevance, and the difficulties in 
applying cross-nationally.  
A clear area where the understanding of party competition towards the issue of European 
integration was lacking was in European elections. The research put forward the argument that 
despite the second-order nature of non-national elections, the issue of Europe in European 
elections was still important, and in the context of election manifestos was likely to have greater 
salience than previously thought. This linked in with the chosen methodological approach of the 
thesis which focused on a quantitative strategy of examining political party manifestos which 
allowed a large-scale large-n comparison of multiple parties from fifteen member state countries, 
and importantly enough data to analyse the nuanced policy positions taken by political parties 
during election campaigns.  The improvement in the way that Euroscepticism was conceptualised 
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was demonstrated by the results generated from its application. As chapter six showed, the multi-
dimensional conception of Euroscepticism identified a significantly greater number of 
Eurosceptic parties overall, as well as in each party family. With only a few exceptions, the 
definition correctly identified all Eurosceptic parties, which had been identified through the use 
of the single dimension of support and opposition towards the EU. 
The importance of the use of the multi-dimensional framework was underlined by the data 
analysed. The multicollinearity tests revealed that the individual dimensions did not share much 
of the variance in party positions, but the analyses confirmed that parties do take positions on 
those issues, and secondly that they compete on those issues as well. The analyses from chapter 
five did suggest that the more traditional patterns of competition related better to those 
dimensions which related to long-established processes, but as chapter six confirmed, 
Eurosceptic behaviour, as well as more supportive pro-European behaviour from various party 
families were captured on the newer processes – such as social, cultural and foreign policy 
integration. 
The research found that not only are European issues more important than previously thought, 
but they constitute the most salient issue within the European election party manifestos of parties 
from all nine party families included in the analyses: Liberal, Conservative, Socialist and Social 
Democratic, Christian Democratic, (post)-Communist, Agrarian, Ethno-regionalist, Nationalist 
and final Green/Ecologist parties. However, what was critical to being able to generalise out 
from how parties compete on the issue of European elections was to analyse whether the 
predicted behaviour of parties differed substantially from national to European elections. Initially 
it was identified that there were far more Eurosceptic parties identifiable through the use of the 
European manifesto data compared to the national manifesto data when utilising the same single 
dimension of support versus opposition to the EU. This suggested that parties might interpret 
the arena as a potential area where they could behave more Eurosceptically than in the national 
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elections. However, the multiple regression analyses confirmed that while not conclusive, the 
behaviour between elections was similar in terms of the strength and direction of relevant 
coefficients under test – party family and country dummies, general ideological variables, and the 
alternative theories which had been posited for Eurosceptic causation. This was an extremely 
important finding in illuminating the way in which parties compete in different elections on the 
issue of European integration. 
The results from the thesis again underlined the importance of ideology as a strong causal factor 
in determining the way in which parties respond to the processes of European integration. It 
produced a number of strong and statistically significant coefficients. When taken on its own, it‟s 
explanatory power declined when analysing the newer dimensions, but taken with the other 
causal factors under investigation in the later models it still produced some of the stronger 
coefficients. Overall, the explanatory power of the other causal factors were generally much 
weaker than party families. In the alternative theories set, the left-right dimension was only 
significant towards legal, social and foreign policy integration. The new politics dimension could 
only offer explanatory weight for the dimension of cultural integration, and finally the median 
voter position offered explanatory weight only for the dimension of legal integration. The 
country dummy variables faired better, though rarely added much to the R2 value much. 
Furthermore there were few patterns to the strength of the coefficients or their direction of 
support. One of the critical findings was the relationship between support for one aspect of 
integration and support for another dimension. It suggests that while there is clear evidence of 
parties taking more nuanced positions, parties supporting one particular aspect are more likely to 
be tied in to support another aspect, and therefore less likely to adopt Eurosceptic positions on 
related dimensions. It underlines the peripheral nature of the phenomenon.  
The final chapter reveals that as stated above, the multi-dimensional definition and framework 
identified a greater number of Eurosceptic parties. The examination of their behaviour, as well as 
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the more general observations of party family position revealed that there remains a strong 
ideological component to Eurosceptic arguments, and the positioning of parties towards 
individual dimensions. Furthermore it has revealed important behavioural aspects of the party 
families. 
The analyses revealed that that with the Liberals, despite their rather pro-European reputation, 
generated five Eurosceptic parties. The economic-liberal element of the ideology remained strong 
and economic integration was widely supported, and despite the existence of Liberal-
Conservative parties, most of the family became supportive of social and supranational 
integration. With the (post)-Communist party family there appeared to be a consistent left-wing 
critique of the more classic dimensions of integration, but the far left did not put forward the 
complete rejection of European structures – they remained supportive of social and foreign 
policy integration. The Social Democratic family was mostly supportive and the results indicated 
a real shift towards seeing Europe as an opportunity to enact change within their own countries. 
 
The Christian Democrats again were somewhat of a surprise. They have remained the driving 
force behind the process of integration, but have developed some critical reactions towards some 
of the developments in supranational and cultural integration. Yet in comparison, the 
Conservative party were on the whole supportive of the process, but deeply sceptical on the 
transfer of sovereignty, and one was left with the conclusion that they would prefer 
intergovernmental cooperation in most of the newer integration fields. 
 
The Agrarian parties lacked a significant number of cases, but they were clearly uncomfortable 
with the transfers of sovereignty to the supranational level, but surprisingly they did not engage in 
criticising cultural integration, and seemed to accept economic liberalisation. With the ethno-
regionalist party family, despite being derived from the centre-periphery and urban-rural cleavage, 
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the parties produced a wide variety of ideological responses. They were clearly Eurosceptic with 
particular fears of supranational and legal integration, but the party remained heterogeneous.  
 
All nationalist parties were Eurosceptic during the period especially towards supranational 
integration, but surprisingly the traditional toolkit of nationalist parties - that of cultural 
superiority – appeared to be utilised less when considering cultural integration in Europe. Lastly, 
for the Greens it was found that the party family had taken a pragmatic approach to the 
integration process and has adapted its position to maximise opportunities for Green policies to 
succeed at the supranational level. 
KEY IMPACTS OF THE RESEARCH 
The thesis has shown several key areas of impact for both scholars of the discipline, as well as a 
wider audience such as policy practitioners. For scholars of the discipline, the thesis has made 
important contributions to the understanding of the phenomenon surrounding the issue of 
conceptualisation and operationalisation, an understanding of how parties compete in European 
elections on the issue of Europe, and specifically how individual party families have behaved 
individually and as party families over the time period towards the individual aspects of 
integration. 
With the contribution to the literature from the improved conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, 
the narrowing of the field of focus to the general ideas of integration and allowing the nuanced 
positions political parties adopt to be fully captured by further developing the multi-dimensional 
approach previously used by Hooghe et al (2002) and to some extent, Lubbers and Scheepers 
(2005). In addition, the use of a Eurosceptic measure allows a distinction to be made between 
those parties that espouse isolated criticisms of particular aspects of integration and those that are 
more regularly Eurosceptic in their behaviour. 
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The findings of the examination of the issue saliency measurements in chapter four have made a 
significant step forward in understanding how parties campaign in both national and European 
elections. Significantly, the results highlighted the importance of Europe in European election 
manifestos, which has not been previously acknowledged. Furthermore, while the regression 
results did not suggest that parties behaved in exactly the same way on the issue of Europe 
between elections, it was very significant that the behaviour was reasonably similar and that no 
evidence was found which would suggest that parties made significantly higher usage of 
Eurosceptic discourse in European elections to that of national elections. Crucially, despite the 
lack of evidence of a clear party system developing at the EU level, parties have scrutinized 
aspects of integration to a much more substantial degree in elections and specifically European 
elections than previously thought. 
The key findings surrounding the behaviour of party families towards the individual dimensions 
of European integration have been mentioned above, however, particularly with the cases of 
some Liberal parties, Christian Democratic parties, (post)-Communist and Green parties their 
positions towards aspects of integration are much more nuanced than previously thought.  
For policy practitioners, the findings demonstrate that political parties indicate particularly varied 
positions towards individual dimensions of integration. The research also allows the reader to 
fully appreciate how parties have developed their positions over time and where they specifically 
stand on a particular development. 
THE APPLICABILITY OF THE MULTI-DIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORK TO OTHER CASES 
A brief examination of cases in Central and Eastern Europe revealed that despite a significant 
number of cases where parties had not developed positions, there were clear findings to be 
drawn from the application of the multi-dimensional framework, though economic 
harmonisation and legal integration saw fewer parties take on specific positions. Focusing on the 
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general trends within the member states, the data revealed that across most parties there was a 
pattern of support for the dimension of economic liberalisation, which indicated a high level of 
acceptance for pro-market reforms across the new member states. There were a few exceptions 
where the parties in Poland, Cyprus and Malta had not developed clear positions. 
Economic harmonisation across most of the new member states saw little saliency in the party 
manifestos. Three of the new member states (Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus) registered minor 
levels of support and critical discourses, but these formed a very minor role within the party 
manifestos. This was a fairly predictable result given that none of the new states were in a 
position to actively consider accession to the Euro-zone. A very interesting finding with the 
process of supranational was that strong criticisms were clearly evident, with the only two 
exceptions being that of parties in Hungary and Slovenia. There was a visible pattern of 
polarization amongst most of the party systems in the new member states.  
For the dimension of legal integration, it was possible to identify a centripetal tendency in party 
positions being clustered around minor support and minor criticisms. This was of little surprise 
given the prerequisite for joining the EU was the acceptance of the extensive body of European 
law. A more interesting pattern emerged with the consideration of social integration. The 
majority of the new member states had extensive welfare provision. Therefore it was of little 
surprise to see the indications of the use of positive discourses. The exceptions were Poland, 
Slovakia and Cyprus where the parties took very minor positions. Finally with cultural 
integration, while there was evidence of considerable variation in party positions, there were clear 
patterns of negative discourse, revealing a particular critique of the promotion of more European 
identities. 
Clearly within these states parties have begun to engage with a more multidimensional 
understanding of the European integration process, but there were still limits to this. The focus 
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on European issues was much less within the manifestos when compared to West European 
parties. However, with further elections, there may well be a shift by parties to consider the 
aspects of European integration in more detail within the Central and East European states, and 
hence will become an important set of cases to include in further analyses within the future. A 
particularly important research topic could focus on whether after four or eight years (by 2013) 
more specific nuanced critiques are emerging, especially as the argument was made that during 
the pre-accession most discourse focused on criticising issues surround the membership process 
(see Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2002: 27 where this was discussed). 
FUTURE RESEARCH AVENUES 
During the course of the thesis a number of future research avenues became apparent. In 
particular, when the construction of hypotheses was being considered it became clear of the lack 
of research towards the behaviour of Liberal, Christian Democratic, Conservative and Agrarian 
party families towards Europe, and indeed beyond the confines of European policy. Furthermore 
with a number of party families, the existing research appeared dated, especially with such a time 
sensitive issue such as party responses towards Europe and European policy in general. This was 
particularly the case with Green, (post)-Communist and Ethno-regionalist party families. 
Secondly, with the time-series analyses being confined to a fifteen-year period, the opportunity to 
extend is also a possibility. Data is available from 1979 onwards so extending back and reviewing 
the developments over twenty-five years would be feasible with the EU-12. A recent 
development has been the commitment by the Euromanifestos team to extend the data to 
include 2009 European elections. This highlights the possibility of future research into a number 
of new cases with the 2004 and 2007 entrants in the future, as hitherto the lack of cases previous 
to the 2004 elections has made this impossible.  
The final way in which further research could be conducted (related to the original research 
presented here) would be to focus more in-depth on campaign material beyond that of election 
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manifestos. Manifestos do indeed constitute only one aspect of an election campaign. Depending 
on the campaign budget of each party and the institutional rules governing election campaigns, 
there will be politician speeches, specific campaign literature and policy launches, newspaper 
reports, as well as TV and radio broadcasts, magazines and billboard adverts etc. These all are 
legitimate sources of party positioning data, as well as being potentially rich in revealing policy 
nuances. This would be potentially be a much more qualitative content analytical approach, 
would be much wider in scope, and would most likely require a team of researchers with specific 
foreign language expertise. 
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APPENDIX 
UNSTANDARDISED REGRESSION RESULTS 
The following tables will show the unstandardised coefficients along with their standard errors in 
parentheses from the regression analyses in chapter four and chapter five. 
SINGLE DIMENSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE EU 
Table 45: National Election Regression Results  
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 3.257 (.623) 3.879 (.930) -107.338 (113.186) -63.655 (118.856) 
Party Families     
Green/Ecologist -2.346 (.910)* -3.053(.911)*** -2.537(.904)** -3.321(1.044)** 
Communist -3.696 (.882)*** -4.700(.928)*** -3.618(.953)*** -3.424(1.032)*** 
Socialist & Social Democrats -.543 (.827) -1.027(.823) -.877(.801) -1.045(0.811) 
Christian Democrat -.066(.945) -.410(.944) -.572(.827) .505(.986) 
Conservative .102(.990) -.247(1.011) -.208(.861) .820(1.026) 
Nationalist -4.477 (1.234)*** -5.997(1.438)* -2.480(1.553) -1.225(1.726) 
Agrarian -2.091(2.219) -1.851(2.296) -2.901(2.008) -.540(2.175) 
Ethnic-Regional -.187 (1.018) -1.116(1.192) -1.999(1.181) -1.196(1.309) 
Special Issue -5.077(2.682) -3.877(2.705) -2.850(2.313) -.541(2.476) 
     
Country     
Sweden  -.862(1.183) -1.570(1.063) -2.173(1.612) 
Denmark  -1.411(1.098) -1.924(1.080) -1.674(1.280) 
Finland  -1.370(1.182) -1.147(1.096) -1.439(1.499) 
Belgium  .385(1.037) .082(.976) 1.045(1.150) 
France  2.268(1.218) 1.379(1.083) 1.793(1.465) 
Italy  .972(1.412) -.441(1.314) .237(1.359) 
Spain  1.230(1.334) 1.151(1.296) 1.780(1.510) 
Greece  -.592(1.305) -.033(1.453) .467(1.556) 
Portugal  .613(1.634) .488(1.424) .349(1.486) 
Germany  2.756(1.067)** 2.739(.986)** 3.363(1.186)** 
Austria  -1.436(1.110) -1.096(1.018) -.666(1.621) 
Great Britain  -1.497(1.216) -1.829(1.108) -1.372(1.808) 
Ireland  -1.822(1.175) -2.195(1.059)* -.870(1.159) 
     
Year of Election   .056(.057) .035(.059) 
     
General Ideological Variables     
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive   1.318(.282)*** 1.304(.283)*** 
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative   -.043(1.235) .040(1.243) 
Military: Positive   .250(.188) .307(.192) 
Military: Negative   -.292(.165) -.244(.167) 
Internationalism: Positive   .346(.106)** .344(.111)** 
Internationalism: Negative   -.402(.179) -.370(.185) 
Decentralisation: Positive   .062(0.89) .044(0.89) 
Centralisation: Positive   -.163(.684) .109(.685) 
Free Enterprise: Positive   .096(.093) .075(.103) 
Market Regulation: Positive   -.453(.112)*** -.429(.117)*** 
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Welfare: Positive   -.020(0.53) .005(.058) 
Welfare: Negative   -.562(.263)* -.465(.273) 
National Way Life: Positive   -.244(.109)* -.184(.114) 
National Way Life: Negative   .650(.517) .591(.514) 
Multiculturalism: Positive   -.153(.112) -.112(.119) 
Multiculturalism: Negative   -.308(.131)* -.265(.131)* 
Constitutionalism: Positive   -.242(.226) -.165(.234) 
Constitutionalism: Negative   .395(.349) .283(.347) 
     
Alternative Theories     
Left-Right Position    .004(.022) 
Gal-Tan Values 2006     .865(.357)* 
Gal-Tan Values 2002     -1.286(.425)** 
Gal-Tan Values 1999     .076(.345) 
Is EU Membership a good thing?  
Eurobarometer data     -.024(.036) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.208 0.481 0.497 
Durbin Watson 1.796 
Source: Comparative Manifestos Project 1989-2003/5     
Excluded Variables:  Diverse Alliance, Northern Ireland     
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Table 46: European Election Regression Results 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 10.76(1.93) 11.13(2.84) 24.45 -174.788 
Party Families     
Conservative 1.58(2.78) -0.65(2.89) 2.72(2.90) 8.54(3.17)** 
Socialist & Social Democrats 5.22(2.40)* 4.67(2.45) 3.34(2.61) 2.81(2.58) 
Christian Democrat 6.90(2.90)* 8.54(2.95)** 7.68(2.91)** 14.82(3.23)*** 
Communist -16.53(2.74)*** -18.59(2.83)*** -16.93(3.13)*** -18.67(3.15)*** 
Agrarian -1.98(4.74) -2.16(4.93) -3.01(4.90) 5.87(5.12) 
Ethnic-Regional -1.12(2.90) -2.48(3.16) -2.96(3.52) -0.78(3.42) 
Nationalist -15.55(3.73)*** -23.34(4.29)*** -19.66(4.40)*** -9.99(5.19) 
Green/Ecologist -8.14 (2.78)** -8.06(2.83)** -9.45(3.12)** -17.01(3.55)*** 
Special Issue -14.05(10.77) -12.54(10.71) -12.99(14.77) -5.55(14.36) 
     
Country     
Sweden  -6.19(3.10)* -6.86(3.30)* -5.99(3.96) 
Denmark  4.73(3.21) 3.59(3.44) 3.47(3.52) 
Finland  5.83(3.26) 3.71(3.46) 5.09(3.93) 
Belgium  0.16(3.03) -1.14(3.06) -3.90(3.83) 
France  2.20(3.43) 2.24(3.61) 3.69(3.75) 
Italy  10.95(4.26)* 7.53(4.36) 5.76(4.40) 
Spain  1.59(3.16) -0.58(3.53) -2.12(3.45) 
Greece  -4.23(4.08) -2.03(4.46) -3.53(4.41) 
Portugal  2.58(6.34) -0.86(6.30) -3.76(6.23) 
Germany  1.69(3.10) -2.01(3.42) -2.97(3.55) 
Austria  -6.38(3.42) -9.66(3.56)** -7.18(4.59) 
Great Britain  -0.88(3.19) 0.49(3.64) 0.08(4.25) 
Ireland  -1.87(3.40) -4.07(3.53) -6.95(3.83) 
     
Year of Election   -0.01(0.16) 0.10(0.16) 
     
General Ideological Variables     
Foreign Special Relationship: Positive   -0.06(0.19) -0.01(0.18) 
Foreign Special Relationship: Negative   0.16(0.46) 0.27(0.44) 
Military: Positive   -0.12(0.13) -0.19(0.13) 
Military: Negative   0.04(0.09) 0.04(0.09) 
Internationalism: Positive   0.01(0.05) 0.00(0.5) 
Internationalism: Negative   -0.46(0.13)*** -0.37(0.13)** 
Decentralisation: Positive   0.38(0.13) 0.29(0.13) 
Centralisation: Positive   -0.41(0.19) -0.44(0.19) 
Free Enterprise: Positive   0.02(0.05) 0.00(0.05) 
Market Regulation: Positive   0.02(0.14) 0.06(0.14) 
Welfare: Positive   -0.06(0.07) -0.02(0.08) 
Welfare: Negative   -0.01(0.06) 0.01(0.06) 
National Way Life: Positive   0.02(0.07) 0.00(0.07) 
Nat Way Life: Negative   0.11(0.43) -0.04(0.43) 
Multiculturalism: Positive   0.05(0.10) 0.07(0.09) 
Multiculturalism: Negative   0.05(0.14) 0.23(0.140 
Constitutionalism: Positive   -0.04(0.06)** -0.02(0.06)* 
Constitutionalism: Negative   -0.21(0.31)* -0.01(0.31)* 
     
Alternative Theories     
Left-Right Position    0.03(0.07) 
Gal-Tan Values 2006     0.32(1.08) 
Gal-Tan Values 2002     -0.88(1.33) 
Gal-Tan Values 1999     -2.53(0.99)* 
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Is EU Membership a good thing?  
Eurobarometer data     0.08(0.12) 
     
Adjusted R2 0.343 0.396 0.457 0.5 
Durbin Watson 2.048 
Source: Euromanifestos Project 1989-2004  
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Northern Ireland 
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MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
LIBERALISATION 
Table 47: Multiple Regression results – DV (Liberalisation) 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 10.407 (2.13) 14.671 (2.85) 256.969 (412.39) 291.022 (430.70) 320.212 (449.26) 388.473 (481.24) 
Party Families       
Conservative -5.040 (3.37) -4.994(3.20) -2.14(2.92) -2.41(3.08) -2.49(3.46) -2.41(3.51) 
Socialist & Social 
Democrats -9.705 (2.71)** -9.674 (2.58)*** -7.76(2.50)** -7.44(2.74)** -7.02(2.95)* -6.85(3.00)* 
Christian Democrat -5.78 (3.37) -7.77 (3.12)* -7.13(2.83)* -7.34(2.94)* -7.64(3.66)* -7.66(3.70)* 
Communist -17.572 (2.94)*** 
-17.258 
(2.837)*** -8.93(3.01)** -8.59(3.24)** -8.23(3.50)* -7.64(3.78)* 
Agrarian -8.33 (5.00) -12.346(4.85)* -5.26(4.55) -5.04(4.63) -5.40(5.10) -5.54(5.16) 
Ethnic-Regional -11.026 (6.74) -14.131(6.64)* -12.07(5.93)* -12.09(5.96)* -12.13(6.12) -12.15(6.21) 
Nationalist -8.944 (4.03)* -3.134(4.325) -.582(3.93) -0.90(4.10) -1.70(5.32) -1.64(5.38) 
Green/Ecologist -13.450(3.29)*** -15.106 (3.05)*** -9.92(3.15)** -9.62(3.33)** -8.92(4.03)* -8.43(4.21)* 
       
Country       
Sweden  0.673(3.08) 1.87(3.00) -2.12(3.14) 1.82(3.29) -0.31(7.18) 
Denmark  -6.99(3.05)* -5.55(2.81) -5.19(3.08) -5.43(3.28) -6.91(5.42) 
Finland  -1.16(3.47) -0.40(3.24) 0.08(3.65) -0.11(3.74) -2.15(6.92) 
France  -15.24(3.3)*** -13.56(3.09)*** -13.34(3.20)*** -13.78(3.62)*** -15.35(5.63)** 
Italy  -8.26(4.16)* -6.77(3.82) -6.48(3.97) -6.68(4.15) -7.39(4.61) 
Greece  -3.33(3.92) -4.32(3.58) -4.76(3.91) -5.58(4.42) -6.80(5.33) 
Portugal  -5.50(6.11) -2.49(5.61) -2.46(5.64) -2.66(5.88) -3.83(6.74) 
Germany  1.31(3.00) -0.25(3.07) -0.13(3.12) -0.71(3.49) -2.35(5.72) 
Austria  -9.23(3.35)** -7.28(3.18)* -7.11(3.25)* -7.68(3.57) -10.16(8.02) 
Ireland  -3.15(3.34) -2.45(3.16) -2.15(3.34) -2.73(3.76) -2.84(3.84) 
       
Year of Election   -0.12(0.21) -0.14(0.22) -0.16(0.23) -0.19(0.24) 
       
Forms of 
Integration       
Social integration   -0.15(0.06)* -0.14(0.07) -0.14(0.07) -0.14(0.07) 
Supranational 
Integration   0.13(0.07) 0.13(0.07) 0.13(0.07) 0.12(0.07) 
Legal Integration   0.28(0.18) 0.27(0.18) 0.28(0.19) 0.30(0.20) 
Cultural Integration   0.07(0.17) 0.07(0.18) 0.07(0.18) 0.06(0.19) 
Economic 
Harmonisation   0.19(0.08)* 0.19(0.08)* 0.19(0.09)* 0.19(0.09)* 
Foreign policy 
integration   0.07(0.06) 0.08(0.06) 0.08(0.06) 0.08(0.07) 
       
Alternative 
Theories       
Left-Right Position    0.02(0.07) 0.02(0.07) 0.03(0.08) 
Gal-Tan Values 
2006      -0.37(1.34) -0.39(1.36) 
Gal-Tan Values 
2002      0.63(1.51) 0.71(1.54) 
Gal-Tan Values 
1999      -0.09(1.17) -0.13(1.19) 
In Government 
when manifesto  
published      -0.59(1.70) 
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Is EU Membership a good thing?  
Eurobarometer data      -0.05(0.16) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.495 0.636 0.636 0.637 0.638 
Durbin Watson 1.897 
Source: 
Euromanifestos 
Project      
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory 
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HARMONISATION 
Table 48: Multiple Regression results – DV (Harmonisation) 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 6.90(2.28) 4.17(3.49) 584.24(519.71) 694.64(540.29) 888.84(529.15) 553.78(564.77) 
Party Families       
Conservative -3.58(3.60) -4.70(3.92) -2.10(3.70) -2.99(3.88) 1.69(4.13) 1.19(4.14) 
Socialist & Social Democrats -2.53(2.90) -2.43(3.16) 0.37(3.33) 1.40(3.59) 2.75(3.62) 2.05(3.63) 
Christian Democrat -2.13(3.60) -2.72(3.83) -1.36(3.70) -2.09(3.83) 3.01(4.46) 3.09(4.44) 
Communist -15.87(3.14)*** -16.83(3.47)*** -8.97(3.88) -7.82(4.17) -8.16(4.22) -10.02(4.42)* 
Agrarian -10.90(5.34)* -12.86(5.93) -5.54(5.77) -4.77(5.87) -1.01(6.12) -0.41(6.11) 
Ethnic-Regional -0.40(7.20) -2.64(8.12) 1.46(7.67) 1.32(7.69) -0.07(7.47) -0.13(7.46) 
Nationalist -6.47(4.30) -7.11(5.29) -4.85(4.95) -5.88(5.14) 0.75(6.35) 0.62(6.33) 
Green/Ecologist -10.91(3.51)** -12.05(3.73)** -6.31(4.15) -5.32(4.35) -6.88(4.89) -8.42(4.98) 
       
Country       
Sweden  4.42(3.77) 6.77(3.74) 7.59(3.90) 4.61(3.90) 14.96(8.28) 
Denmark  1.67(3.73) 5.84(3.58) 6.99(3.88) 3.71(3.96) 10.84(6.32) 
Finland  4.98(4.24) 7.13(4.03) 8.69(4.52) 7.44(4.39) 17.07(7.93)* 
France  2.72(4.04) 9.90(4.18)* 10.54(4.27)* 7.15(4.60) 14.56(6.72)* 
Italy  4.13(5.09) 5.88(4.89) 6.78(5.03) 3.84(5.01) 7.15(5.45) 
Greece  5.68(4.80) 8.12(4.49) 6.59(4.92) 1.62(5.32) 7.09(6.27) 
Portugal  -1.74(7.47) 4.69(7.10) 4.74(7.11) 0.38(7.02) 5.97(7.92) 
Germany  8.33(3.67)* 7.83(3.80)* 8.20(3.84)* 3.57(4.15) 11.33(6.62) 
Austria  0.73(4.10) 6.47(4.09) 6.97(4.15) 3.56(4.36) 15.61(9.36) 
Ireland  2.40(4.09) 6.69(3.95) 7.64(4.15) 2.04(4.49) 2.68(4.52) 
       
       
Year of Election   -0.29(0.26) -0.35(0.27) -0.44(0.27) -0.29(0.28) 
       
Forms of Integration       
Social integration   0.02(0.08) 0.04(0.09) 0.02(0.09) 0.04(0.09) 
Supranational Integration   0.11(0.08) 0.11(0.08) 0.06(0.08) 0.09(0.08) 
Legal Integration   -0.08(0.23) -0.12(0.23) -0.15(0.23) -0.22(0.23) 
Cultural Integration   0.32(0.22) 0.33(0.22) 0.23(0.22) 0.25(0.22) 
Economic Liberalisation   0.32(0.22)* 0.31(0.13)* 0.27(0.12)* 0.27(0.12)* 
Foreign policy integration   0.15(0.08)* 0.16(0.08) 0.17(0.08)* 0.17(0.08)* 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    0.07(0.09) 0.10(0.09) 0.09(0.09) 
Gal-Tan Values 2006     -3.06(1.57) -2.93(1.57) 
Gal-Tan Values 2002     3.32(1.77) 2.92(1.78) 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -2.03(1.38) -1.85(1.38) 
In Government when manifesto  
published     1.89(1.98) 
Is EU Membership a good thing?  
Eurobarometer data      0.26(0.18) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.213 0.196 0.331 0.328 0.38 0.386 
Durbin Watson 1.735 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession 
Year 
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SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION 
Table 49: Multiple Regression results – DV (Supranational Integration) 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 1.70(3.22) 9.24(4.83) 71.04(644.46) -56.65(671.89) -67.84(685.08) 305.40(721.37) 
Party Families       
Conservative -0.74(5.09) -0.55(5.42) 5.67(4.53) 6.64(4.75) 10.75(5.15)* 10.70(5.14)* 
Socialist & Social Democrats 7.38(4.10) 5.46(4.37) 11.53(3.92)** 10.32(4.30)* 8.97(4.53) 9.50(4.51)* 
Christian Democrat 3.39(5.09) 1.98(5.29) 7.49(4.49) 8.28(4.65) 14.39(5.49)* 13.63(5.47)* 
Communist -6.50(4.44) -8.17(4.80) 7.33(4.86) 6.07(5.20) 2.68(5.48) 5.88(5.75) 
Agrarian -19.30(7.55)** -18.59(8.20)* -11.74(7.03) -12.50(7.14) -6.07(7.77) -6.76(7.73) 
Ethnic-Regional 4.85(10.18) 4.23(11.23) 11.98(9.37) 12.06(9.39) 12.06(9.42) 11.23(9.41) 
Nationalist -4.38(6.08) -3.87(7.32) 4.59(6.11) 5.75(6.35) 13.40(7.96) 13.25(7.92) 
Green/Ecologist 1.48(4.97) 1.28(5.15) 13.90(4.97)** 12.77(5.24)* 6.82(6.25) 9.22(6.36) 
       
Country       
Sweden  -12.98(5.22)* -14.33(4.44)** -15.21(4.63)*** -14.54(4.76)** -24.82(10.38)* 
Denmark  -10.34(5.15)* -5.96(4.43) -7.25(4.81) -6.73(5.02) -14.08(8.03) 
Finland  -10.33(5.86) -9.79(4.94)* -11.54(5.55)* -10.33(5.58) -20.39(10.12)* 
France  -11.26(5.58)* -8.95(5.22) -9.69(5.34) -7.01(5.90) -15.08(8.63) 
Italy  -11.26(5.58) -4.59(6.05) -5.61(6.24) -4.96(6.38) -8.52(6.94) 
Greece  -6.48(6.63) -4.55(5.61) -2.88(6.12) -2.51(6.78) -8.99(7.98) 
Portugal  -14.20(10.34) -14.08(8.64) -14.09(8.66) -16.59(8.77) -22.07(9.81) 
Germany  -15.53(5.07)** -19.20(4.34)*** -19.57(4.39)*** -19.29(4.89)*** -27.14(8.04)*** 
Austria  -13.63(5.67)* -12.25(4.94)* -12.80(5.02)* -11.94(5.43)* -24.32(11.81)* 
Ireland  -7.89(5.66) -10.03(4.83) -11.09(5.08)* -12.04(5.58) -12.13(5.61)* 
       
       
Year of Election   -0.04(0.32) 0.03(0.34) 0.04(0.34) -0.14(0.36) 
       
Forms of Integration       
Social integration   -0.09(0.10) -0.12(0.11) -0.11(0.11) -0.12(0.11) 
Liberalisation   0.31(0.16) 0.31(0.16) 0.30(0.16) 0.28(0.16) 
Economic Harmonisation   0.17(0.13) 0.17(0.13) 0.10(0.14) 0.14(0.14) 
Legal Integration   1.00(0.26)*** 1.04(0.27)*** 0.89(0.28)** 0.94(0.28)*** 
Cultural Integration   -1.18(0.24)*** -1.19(0.24)*** -1.24(0.25)*** -1.24(0.24)*** 
Foreign policy integration   0.07(0.10) 0.06(0.10) 0.05(0.10) 0.04(0.10) 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -0.07(0.11) -0.08(0.11) -0.06(0.11) 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      0.65(2.04) 0.51(2.03) 
Gal-Tan Values 2002     -0.44(2.30) 0.05(2.30) 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -2.67(1.76) -2.78(1.75) 
In Government when manifesto 
published      -3.56(2.51) 
Is EU Membership a good thing?  
Eurobarometer data      -0.27(0.23) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.134 0.428 0.425 0.433 0.441 
Durbin Watson 1.017 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession 
Year 
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LEGAL INTEGRATION 
Table 50: Multiple Regression results – DV (Legal Integration) 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parenthesis) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 5.36(1.30) 5.73(1.85) 
-
279.26(239.10) -132.03(245.73) -137.32(249.12) -294.87(259.87) 
Party Families       
Conservative -4.34(2.06)* -3.43(2.08) -2.89(1.68) -3.83(1.71) -2.34(1.90) -2.60(1.89) 
Socialist & Social Democrats -1.02(1.66) -0.59(1.84) -1.91(1.52) -0.60(1.62) -1.40(1.68) -1.60(1.67) 
Christian Democrat -0.10(2.06) -0.86(2.03) -1.51(1.70) -2.32(1.71) -0.17(2.08) -0.09(2.05) 
Communist -6.45(1.79)*** -5.68(1.84)** -3.56(1.80) -2.11(1.91) -3.23(1.97) -3.80(2.06) 
Agrarian -1.36(3.05) 1.07(3.14) 3.34(2.65) 4.06(2.62) 5.56(2.78) 5.49(2.75)* 
Ethnic-Regional -3.69(4.12) -1.50(4.30) -2.22(3.52) -2.28(3.46) -2.42(3.46) -2.62(3.43) 
Nationalist -3.14(2.46) -2.69(2.80) -1.24(2.29) -2.44(2.32) 1.70(2.94) 1.70(2.91) 
Green/Ecologist 0.38(2.01) -0.36(1.97) -1.27(1.93) -0.10(1.98) -2.66(2.28) -3.17(2.31) 
       
Country       
Sweden  -3.04(2.00) -0.06(1.75) 0.96(1.79) 1.23(1.82) 7.88(3.79)* 
Denmark  -3.67(1.97) 0.16(1.67) 1.56(1.78) 1.51(1.84) 5.99(2.89)* 
Finland  -2.56(2.25) -0.52(1.89) 1.41(2.08) 1.83(2.06) 7.89(3.66)* 
France  -0.94(2.14) 2.54(1.97) 3.26(1.96) 3.74(2.13) 8.17(3.06)** 
Italy  -0.04(2.70) -0.42(2.27) 0.70(2.29) 0.63(2.33) 2.67(2.52) 
Greece  -2.06(2.54) 1.05(2.10) -0.75(2.24) 0.79(2.47) 3.75(2.89) 
Portugal  -5.15(3.96) 0.54(3.27) 0.61(3.22) 0.40(3.26) 3.78(3.64) 
Germany  4.21(1.94)* 5.44(1.70)** 5.69(1.67) 6.26(1.81) 10.75(2.88)*** 
Austria  2.21(2.17) 4.49(1.85)* 4.94(1.83)** 5.81(1.93)*** 13.16(4.15)** 
Ireland  -0.02(2.17) 3.58(1.81) 4.59(1.85)* 5.00(2.02)* 5.35(2.01)** 
       
Year of Election   0.14(0.12) 0.07(0.12) 0.07(0.12) 0.14(0.13) 
       
Forms of Integration       
Supranational Integration   0.14(0.04)*** 0.14(0.04)*** 0.12(0.04)* 0.12(0.04)*** 
Economic Harmonisation   -0.02(0.05) -0.02(0.05) -0.03(0.05) -0.05(0.05) 
Social Integration   0.16(0.03)*** 0.18(0.04)*** 0.18(0.04)*** 0.18(0.04)*** 
Cultural Integration   0.21(0.10)* 0.21(0.10)* 0.19(0.10) 0.19(0.10) 
Economic Liberalisation   0.09(0.06) 0.09(0.06) 0.09(0.06) 0.09(0.06) 
Foreign policy integration   0.07(0.04) 0.08(0.03)* 0.07(0.04)* 0.07(0.03) 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    0.08(0.04)* 0.08(0.04) 0.08(0.04)* 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      0.20(0.74) 0.17(0.74) 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      -1.09(0.83) -1.13(0.83) 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -0.02(0.65) -0.01(0.64) 
In Government when manifesto 
published      0.25(0.92) 
Is EU Membership a good thing?  
Eurobarometer data      0.17(0.08)* 
       
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.222 0.512 0.529 0.54 0.551 
Durbin Watson 1.55 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession 
Year 
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SOCIAL INTEGRATION 
Table 51: Multiple Regression results – DV (Social Integration) 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 1.50(2.96) 4.02(4.35) 403.85(651.78) -265.29(632.80) -139.94(658.12) 83.21(702.69) 
Party Families       
Conservative 2.75(4.67) 2.12(4.88) 4.75(4.60) 8.93(4.43)* 8.74(4.98) 9.12(5.03) 
Socialist & Social Democrats 10.50(3.76)** 11.09(3.94)** 9.11(4.04)* 2.30(4.17) 3.55(4.43) 3.87(4.48) 
Christian Democrat 2.42(4.67) 2.54(4.77) 1.31(4.62) 5.14(4.42) 4.22(5.46) 4.08(5.50) 
Communist 9.35(4.07)* 9.33(4.32)* 9.87(4.88)* 3.60(4.93) 3.59(5.26) 4.56(5.61) 
Agrarian 9.75(6.93) 11.94(7.39) 5.33(7.21) 0.62(6.84) -0.61(7.49) -0.85(7.56) 
Ethnic-Regional 8.50(9.35) 9.80(10.12) 7.09(9.55) 6.80(8.91) 6.17(9.12) 6.49(9.21) 
Nationalist 1.93(5.59) -5.32(6.59) -2.26(6.21) 3.73(6.00) 1.96(7.77) 1.85(7.83) 
Green/Ecologist 14.81(4.56)** 13.53(4.64)** 10.22(5.13)* 3.71(5.08) 5.58(6.02) 6.42(6.23) 
       
Country       
Sweden  -5.60(4.70) -3.31(4.74) -7.45(4.55) -8.41(4.73) -17.25(10.27) 
Denmark  -6.90(4.64) -6.18(4.48) -11.70(4.42)** -12.71(4.68)** -18.64(7.69)* 
Finland  -3.83(5.28) -2.16(5.11) -10.51(5.24)* -10.96(5.34) -19.04(9.87) 
France  0.94(5.03) -4.96(5.35) -8.02(5.06) -9.86(5.61) -15.90(8.37) 
Italy  9.52(6.35) 6.11(6.11) 0.26(5.91) -0.76(6.15) -3.53(6.80) 
Greece  -11.14(5.98) -10.32(5.60) -0.92(5.78) -3.45(6.51) -7.45(7.78) 
Portugal  -11.61(9.31) -9.34(8.83) -8.46(8.24) -8.94(8.54) -13.38(9.72) 
Germany  0.50(4.57) -5.59(4.82) -7.07(4.51) -8.77(5.02) -15.05(8.17) 
Austria  2.75(5.11) -3.82(5.16) -6.23(4.85) -7.88(5.29) -17.94(11.61) 
Ireland  -5.29(5.10) -7.37(4.95) -11.67(4.75)* -13.40(5.32) -14.01(5.40)* 
       
Year of Election   -0.20(0.33) 0.14(0.32) 0.07(0.33) -0.03(0.35) 
       
Forms of Integration       
Supranational Integration   -0.09(0.11) -0.11(0.10) -0.10(0.10) -0.11(0.10) 
Economic Harmonisation   0.03(0.13) 0.06(0.12) 0.04(0.13) 0.06(0.13) 
Legal Integration   1.16(0.26)*** 1.21(0.24)*** 1.23(0.25)*** 1.27(0.26)*** 
Cultural Integration   -0.20(0.28) -0.23(0.26) -0.21(0.27) -0.22(0.27) 
Economic Liberalisation   -0.36(0.16) -0.30(0.15) -0.30(0.15) -0.30(0.15) 
Foreign Policy Integration   0.04(0.10) -0.03(0.09) -0.01(0.09) -0.01(0.10) 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -0.36(0.09)*** -0.33(0.10)*** -0.34(0.10)** 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      -1.57(1.95) -1.53(1.97) 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      2.02(2.20) 2.12(2.23) 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -0.03(1.71) -0.05(1.73) 
In Government when 
manifesto published      -0.44(2.47) 
Is EU Membership a good 
thing? Eurobarometer data       -0.22(0.23) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.134 0.277 0.371 0.356 0.348 
Durbin Watson 2.269 
Source: Euromanifestos 
Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU 
Accession Year 
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CULTURAL INTEGRATION 
Table 52: Multiple Regression results – DV (Cultural Integration) 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 0.43(1.16) 0.68(1.68) -28.00(248.21) -67.95(258.92) -107.70(263.12) -44.41(281.42) 
Party Families       
Conservative -0.42(1.83) -0.18(1.88) 1.37(1.75) 1.68(1.84) 2.93(2.00) 2.93(2.03) 
Socialist & Social Democrats -0.21(1.47) 0.59(1.52) 2.74(1.55) 2.37(1.69) 2.00(1.77) 2.14(1.79) 
Christian Democrat 1.15(1.83) 1.50(1.84) 2.30(1.74) 2.56(1.80) 4.52(2.14)* 4.44(2.16)* 
Communist -0.04(1.60) -0.13(1.67) 2.43(1.88) 2.04(2.01) 0.94(2.11) 1.59(2.25) 
Agrarian -1.38(2.72) 0.16(2.85) -1.22(2.75) -1.48(2.79) 0.72(3.00) 0.53(3.03) 
Ethnic-Regional -0.49(3.66) 0.29(3.90) 2.35(3.63) 2.39(3.65) 3.01(3.64) 2.85(3.69) 
Nationalist 4.58(2.19)* 2.85(2.54) 3.73(2.33) 4.09(2.42) 5.40(3.06) 5.44(3.08) 
Green/Ecologist 2.75(1.79) 2.87(1.79) 5.54(1.91)** 5.18(2.01)* 3.49(2.39) 3.98(2.47) 
       
Country       
Sweden  -2.54(1.81) -4.66(1.74)** -4.95(1.82)** -4.59(1.86)* -6.09(4.13) 
Denmark  -0.79(1.79) -1.61(1.71) -2.02(1.87) -1.42(1.94) -2.51(3.17) 
Finland  -1.02(2.03) -2.80(1.92) -3.35(2.16) -3.03(2.16) -4.54(4.01) 
France  -2.64(1.94) -4.11(2.00) -4.35(2.05)* -2.77(2.27) -4.01(3.40) 
Italy  4.11(2.45) 1.90(2.33) 1.56(2.41) 2.10(2.45) 1.51(2.72) 
Greece  0.43(2.30) -0.71(2.17) -0.19(2.36) -0.34(2.61) -1.43(3.13) 
Portugal  -5.51(3.59) -6.57(3.30)* -6.57(3.32)* -7.55(3.34) -8.41(3.83)* 
Germany  2.38(1.76) -2.28(1.83) -2.42(1.85) -2.72(2.02) -3.99(3.31) 
Austria  0.20(1.97) -2.24(1.95) -2.42(1.99) -2.48(2.13) -4.32(4.69) 
Ireland  -2.54(1.96) -3.57(1.87) -3.90(1.96)* -4.35(2.15)* -4.35(2.20) 
       
Year of Election   0.01(0.12) 0.03(0.13) 0.06(0.13) 0.03(0.14) 
       
Forms of Integration       
Supranational Integration   -0.18(0.04)*** -0.18(0.04)*** -0.18(0.04)*** -0.19(0.04)*** 
Economic Harmonisation   0.07(0.05) 0.07(0.05) 0.06(0.05) 0.06(0.05) 
Social integration   -0.03(0.04) -0.04(0.04) -0.03(0.04) -0.04(0.04) 
Legal Integration   0.22(0.11)* 0.24(0.11)* 0.21(0.11) 0.22(0.11) 
Economic Liberalisation   0.02(0.06) 0.03(0.06) 0.02(0.06) 0.02(0.06) 
Foreign Policy Integration   0.05(0.04) 0.05(0.04) 0.04(0.04) 0.04(0.04) 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -0.02(0.04) -0.04(0.04) -0.03(0.04) 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      0.77(0.78) 0.74(0.79) 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      -0.09(0.88) 0.01(0.90) 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -1.40(0.67)* -1.43(0.68)* 
In Government when 
manifesto published      -0.79(0.98) 
Is EU Membership a good 
thing? Eurobarometer data       -0.04(0.09) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.106 0.274 0.268 0.283 0.272 
Durbin Watson 1.572 
Source: Euromanifestos 
Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU 
Accession Year 
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FOREIGN POLICY INTEGRATION 
Table 53: Multiple Regression results – DV (Foreign Policy Integration) 
 Unstandardised Coefficients (Standard Error in parentheses) 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 11.92(3.20) 14.11(4.73) 194.22(701.89) -153.04(721.55) -396.45(743.26) -360.49(795.14) 
Party Families       
Conservative -5.65(5.05) -6.80(5.30) -2.37(4.97) 0.40(5.16) -0.38(5.73) -0.65(5.81) 
Socialist & Social Democrats -5.80(4.07) -5.92(4.28) -4.08(4.45) -7.02(4.70) -8.71(4.95) -8.41(5.02) 
Christian Democrat 3.06(5.05) 3.31(5.18) 5.38(4.94) 7.42(5.02) 7.44(6.14) 7.31(6.20)* 
Agrarian -7.11(7.49) -10.10(8.03) -3.60(7.77) -5.69(7.77) -4.33(8.46) -4.71(8.55) 
Communist -12.90(4.40) -14.94(4.70) -3.09(5.35) -6.26(5.59) -7.17(5.91) -5.77(6.35) 
Ethnic-Regional 0.41(10.10) -3.14(11.00) 0.59(10.30) 0.95(10.18) 2.48(10.33) 1.74(10.46) 
Nationalist -5.66(6.04)* -9.90(7.16) -6.29(6.65) -2.92(6.85) -2.82(8.79) -2.46(8.87) 
Green/Ecologist -11.12(4.93) -13.64(5.04) 8.76(5.56)** -11.29(5.69)* -12.73(6.71) -11.64(6.99) 
       
Country       
Sweden  0.24(5.11) 3.22(5.10)** 0.55(5.27)** 2.37(5.44)* 4.13(11.82) 
Denmark  -5.68(5.05) -1.07(4.87) -4.58(5.21) -2.11(5.51) -1.07(9.01) 
Finland  1.36(5.74) 3.40(5.49) -1.53(6.11) -0.78(6.18) 0.47(11.42) 
France  -1.56(5.46) 3.59(5.77) 1.38(5.84)* 4.87(6.44) 5.39(9.66) 
Italy  5.79(6.90) 5.28(6.59) 2.32(6.72) 4.48(6.94) 4.72(7.70) 
Greece  -3.51(6.49) -2.25(6.13) 2.25(6.58) 5.96(7.35) 5.46(8.84) 
Portugal  -6.95(10.12) -1.93(9.54)* 1.63(9.44)* 2.70(9.72) 3.14(11.13)* 
Germany  7.30(4.96) 2.44(5.21) 1.10(5.21) 3.79(5.76) 4.41(9.42) 
Austria  -4.21(5.55) -2.58(5.55) -4.13(5.56) -1.63(6.06) 0.02(13.34) 
Ireland  -10.83(5.54) -8.84(5.31) -11.51(5.46)* -8.16(6.17)* -7.65(6.30) 
       
       
Year of Election   -0.09(0.35) 0.08(0.36) 0.20(0.37) 0.18(0.40) 
       
Forms of Integration       
Supranational Integration   0.08(0.11)*** 0.06(0.11)*** 0.06(0.12)*** 0.05(0.12)*** 
Economic Harmonisation   0.27(0.14) 0.29(0.14) 0.33(0.14) 0.34(0.15) 
Social integration   0.05(0.11) -0.03(0.12) -0.02(0.12) -0.02(0.12) 
Legal Integration   0.57(0.30)* 0.67(0.30)* 0.63(0.31) 0.62(0.32) 
Economic Liberalisation   0.21(0.18) 0.22(0.17) 0.22(0.18) 0.21(0.18) 
Foreign Policy Integration   0.44(0.29) 0.39(0.29) 0.36(0.30) 0.33(0.30) 
       
Alternative Theories       
Left-Right Position    -0.20(0.11) -0.24(0.12) -0.21(0.12) 
Gal-Tan Values 2006      3.16(2.19) 3.02(2.22) 
Gal-Tan Values 2002      -3.13(2.47) -2.89(2.52) 
Gal-Tan Values 1999      -0.16(1.94)* -0.28(1.96)* 
In Government when manifesto 
published      -2.18(2.79) 
Is EU Membership a good thing? 
Eurobarometer data       0.04(0.26) 
       
Adjusted R2 0.016 0.106 0.274 0.268 0.283 0.272 
Durbin Watson 1.572 
Source: Euromanifestos Project       
Excluded Variables:  Belgium, Luxembourg, UK, Northern Ireland, Belgium-Wallonia, Belgium-Flanders, Netherlands, Cleavage Theory, EU Accession 
Year 
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PARTY POSITIONING DIAGRAMS 
Figure 21: French Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections  
 
Figure 22: French Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections  
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Figure 23: French Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections  
 
Figure 24: French Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections  
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Notes: Greens (Green Parties), La terre sinion rien (Green Parties), PCF Communists (Post-Communist), LO Workers Fight (Post-Communist), 
LCR Revolutionary Communist League (Post-Communist), Parti des travailleurs (Post-Communist), PS Socialist (Social Democratic), ER-Radical 
Energy (Regionalist), PRG- Radical Left Party (Social Democratic), MDC – The Citizen‟s Movement (Social Democratic), UDF (Conservative), 
RPR (Conservative), MPF – Mouvement for France (Conservative), RPR/UDF (Conservative), RPR/DL now UMP (Conservative), FN National 
Front (Nationalist), UFCN (Nationalist), RPF –Rally for France and an Independent Europe (Regionalist/Special Interest), CPNT Hunting 
Fishing Nature Traditions (Regionalist/Special interest), L‟ouest au Coeur (Special Interest), Nouvelle solidarite (Special Interest), HZ (Special 
interest), EDE Europe – Democratie – Esperanto (Special Interest), Parti des socioprofessionels (special interest). 
Figure 25: German Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections  
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Figure 26: German Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections  
 
Figure 27: German Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections  
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Figure 28: German Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections  
 
Notes: Greens (Green Parties), PDS – Party for Democratic Socialism (Post-Communist), SPD – Social Democratic Party (Social Democratic), 
FDP – Free Democrats (Liberal), CDU –Christian Democratic Union (Christian Democratic), CSU – Christian Social Union (Christian 
Democratic), REP – Republikaner (Nationalist) 
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Figure 29: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
  
Figure 30: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
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Figure 31: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
 
Figure 32: Luxembourg Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
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Notes: Greens (Green Parties), POSL LSAP Social Democrats (Social Democratic), PD DP Democrats (Liberal) PCS CSV – Christian Social 
Party (Christian Democratic), ADR Pension Justice (Special Interest) 
Figure 33: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
 
Figure 34: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
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Figure 35: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
 
Figure 36: Dutch Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
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Notes: GL Green Left (Green Parties), Regenboog (Green parties), SP Socialist Party (Post-Communist), CU/SGP: former RPF/SGP/GPV until 
2004 (Christian Democrat), PPR Radical Political Party (Social Democratic), CPN (Social Democratic), PvdA Labour (Social Democratic), VVD 
Liberals (Liberal), CDA Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), RPF Reformatorian Political Federation (Christian Democratic), SGP 
Political Reformed Party (Christian Democratic), GPV Reformed Political League (Christian Democratic), Lijst Pim Fortuyn (Nationalist), 
EuroTrans (Special Interest). 
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Figure 37: Italian Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
 
Figure 38: Italian Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
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Figure 39: Italian Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
 
Figure 40: Italian Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
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Notes: Fed. V: Federazione dei Verdi (Green Parties), LV Green List (Green Party), RC New Communists (Post-Communist), PdCI Communisti 
Italiano (Post-Communist), PCI-PDS Communists (Post-Communist), PDS Italian Communists (Post-Communist), PR Radicals/Lista Emma 
Bonino (Social Democratic), PSI Socialists (Social Democratic), Lista pri Liberal (Liberals), S.C.D.P. (IDV) Lista di Pietro (Liberals), Dem: The 
Democrats (Liberals), UD.EUR Democrats Union for Europe (Liberals), FLI/PRI (Liberals), Ulivo (Liberals), DS/SDI/La Margherita (Liberals), 
Patto Segni (Christian Democratic) PPI-DC Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), CCD Christian Democratic Centre (Christian 
Democratic), UDC (Christian Democratic), FI Forza Italia (Conservative), AN National Alliance (Nationalist), LN Northern League (Nationalist), 
SVP –South Tyrol Peoples Party (Regionalist) 
Figure 41: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
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Figure 42: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
 
Figure 43: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
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Figure 44: Belgian Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: Ecolo Francophone Ecologists (Green Parties), PS Francophone Socialists (Social Democratic), PRL-FDF-MCC (Liberal), FDF-PRL 
(Liberal), MR Mouvement Reformateur (Liberal), PSC Francophone Christian Social Party (Christian Democratic), FN National Front 
(Nationalist), CDH (Regional), FDF – French Speaking Front (Regional), FDF-RW (Regional), Groen!: former Agalev Flemish Greens – Until 
2004 (Green parties), SP Flemish Socialists (Social Democratic), Spirit (Regional), VLD: former PVV Flemish Liberals (Liberal), CD&V: former 
CVP Flemish Christian Peoples Party (Christian Democratic), NVA: former VU Flemish Peoples Union – until 2004 (Regional), VB Flemish Bloc 
(Regional), Spirit: former VU-ID21 –until 2004 (Regional).  
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Figure 45: British Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
 
Figure 46: British Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
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Figure 47: British Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
 
Figure 48: British Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: Greens (Green Parties, Labour (Social Democrat), LP/SDP – Liberal Party/Social Democratic Party (Liberal), LDP – Liberal Democrats 
(Liberal), Conservatives (Conservative, PC – Plaid Cymru (Regional), SNP – Scottish National Party (Regional), UK Independence Party 
(Regional/Special Interest), Respect (Special Interest), SDLP – Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party, DUP – Northern Ireland 
Democratic Unionist Party, UUP – Northern Ireland Ulster Unionist Party, SF – Northern Ireland Sinn Fein. 
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Figure 49: Danish Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
 
Figure 50: Danish Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
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Figure 51: Danish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
 
Figure 52: Danish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: SF – Socialist Peoples Party (Post-Communist), SD – Social Democrats (Social Democratic), CD Centre Democrats (Social Democratic), 
RV Radicals (Liberal), V Liberals (Liberal), KF Conservatives (Conservative), DF Danish Peoples Party (Nationalist), Siumut Greenland 
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(Regionalist) FP Progress Party (Regionalist), FB Peoples Movement against EC (Special Interest), JB June Movement against EC (Special 
Interest). 
Figure 53: Irish Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
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Figure 54: Irish Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
 
Figure 55: Irish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
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Figure 56: Irish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: Greens (Green Parties), WP Workers Party (Post-Communist), LP Labour Party (Social Democratic), PD Progressive Democratic Party 
(Liberal), Fine Gael (Christian Democratic), Fianna Fail (Conservative), Sinn Fein (Special Interest). 
Figure 57: Greek Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
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Figure 58: Greek Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
 
Figure 59: Greek Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
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Figure 60: Greek Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: KKE Communist (Post-Communist), SYN Coalition Left and Progress (Post-Communist), PASOK Socialists (Social Democratic), 
DIKKI Democratic Social Movement (Social Democratic), ND New Democracy (Christian Democratic), POLA Political Spring (Christian 
Democratic), LAOS: Laos Orthodoxos Synagermos (Nationalist), DPE Demokratiki Perifereiaki Enosi (Agrarian). 
Figure 61: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
 
For Against 
Against 
Against 
Against 
Against 
For 
For 
For 
Economic Integration (Harmonisation)
  
Legal Integration 
Supranational Integration  
Social Integration 
Cultural Integration 
Against For 
Economic Integration (Liberalisation)
  
For 
IU  CDS PSOE  CIU AP, PP 
Foreign Policy Integration 
PNV 
EAJ 
ER
C 
Coalicion 
For Against 
For Against 
Against 
Against 
Against 
Against 
For 
For 
For 
Economic Integration (Harmonisation)
  
Legal Integration 
Supranational Integration  
Social Integration 
Cultural Integration 
Against For 
Economic Integration (Liberalisation)
  
For 
KK
E  
PASO
K 
SY
N  
LAO
S 
ND DPE 
 393 
Figure 62: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
 
Figure 63: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
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Figure 64: Spanish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: Los Verde (Green), IU – former PCE-IU Communists until 2004 (Post-Communist), PSOE Socialists (Social Democratic), CDS – Centre 
Democrats (Christian Democratic) AP/PP – Popular Party (Conservative), CiU Convergence and Unity (Conservative), PNV EAJ – Basque 
National Party (Regional) , EA Basque Solidarity (Regional), ERC - Catalan Republican Left (Regional), EH Euskal Herritarrok former HB – 
Herri Batasuna (Regional), BNG - Galician Nacionalist Bloc (Regionalist), Agrupacion Ruiz Mateo (Regionalist), CC – Canarian Coalition 
(Regionalist), Coalicion “Europa de los Pueblos” – EA, ERC and PNG (Regionalist/Special Interest), Por la Europe de los Pueblos (Regionalist), 
GALEUSCA (Regionalist), Coalicion Europea (Regionalist). 
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Figure 65: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 1989 European Elections 
 
Figure 66: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 1994 European Elections 
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Figure 67: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
 
Figure 68: Portuguese Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: PEV Greens (Green), PCP Communists (Communist), B.E. Bloco de Esquerda (Communist), CDU – Coligacao Democratica Unitaria 
(Communist), PSP Socialists (Social Democrat), PSD Social Democrats (Social Democrat), PP – Popular Party, former: CDS (Social Democrat), 
PSD- PP – Coligacao Forca Portugal (Social Democrat).  
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Figure 69: Swedish Political Party Positions in the 1995 European Elections 
 
Figure 70: Swedish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
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Figure 71: Swedish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: Greens (Green Parties), VP - Communists (Post-Communist), SdaP – Social Democrats (Social Democrat), FP – Liberals (Liberal), KdS – 
Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), MSP Conservatives (Conservative), Centre Party (Agrarian), Junilistan (Special Interest). 
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Figure 72: Finnish Political Party Positions in the 1996 European Elections 
 
Figure 73: Finnish Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
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Figure 74: Finnish Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes: VL Greens (Green parties), VL Left Wing Alliance (Post-Communist), SSDP - Social Democrats (Social Democrat), KD (former: SKL) – 
Christian Union (Christian Democrat), KK National Coalition (Conservative), SK - Finnish Centre (Agrarian), RKP SFP – Swedish Peoples Party 
(Regional). 
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Figure 75: Austrian Political Party Positions in the 1996 European Elections 
 
Figure 76: Austrian Political Party Positions in the 1999 European Elections 
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Figure 77: Austrian Political Party Positions in the 2004 European Elections 
 
Notes:  GA Greens (Green), LINKE (Post-Communist), SPO Socialists (Social Democrat), FPO – Freedom Movement (Liberal), LF –Liberal 
Forum (Liberal), OVP – Christian Democrats (Christian Democratic), HPM – Liste Hans-Peter Martin (Special Interest) 
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